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Saudi Arabia is moving towards a “free market” economy. This policy shift is 
consistent with the prevailing developmental views of the major international 
financial and economic institutions and of the major industrialised nations (which 
will form a given assumption for this thesis). A companion policy assumption 
fostered today by the international financial institutions and major industrialised 
nations is that essential to a sound market economy is a viable rule-based legal 
infrastructure that incorporates a substantive and procedural “rule of law” 
orientation.
The recent economic legal reforms being undertaken by Saudi Arabia involve 
both enhancements and modifications to the basic Islamic law framework required 
under the Saudi Constitution to help facilitate the growing domestic demands of the 
Saudi economy and society and the de facto introduction of “modem” Western-based 
practices, approaches and techniques respecting commercial and financial 
transactions. That would be more attractive to foreign investors and financiers. 
While such reforms should make a positive contribution to the development of the 
desired market-based system, the overall effectiveness of these new reforms, as 
argued in this volume, may be adversely impacted or impeded by the existing de 
facto duality created by these reforms. This existing de facto duality is exemplified 
by having Islamic law (/'. e., Shari’a) as the paramount and primary legal system and, 
within this overall system, the separate, enactment of other positive laws related to 
the commercial, banking and financial sectors (i.e., “a system within a system”).
This thesis argues that this current Saudi notion of legal duality needs to be re­
evaluated and an internal reconciliation needs to be effected to avoid any negative 
implications on the functionality of the financial system and on the effectiveness of 
financial transactions such as, merely by way of selective example used in this 
volume, securitisations and secured transactions, which are important elements in a 
“modem” market-based economy. To this effect, Saudi Arabia may consider the 
- advisability of further dualising the Saudi financial system whereby the “Western- 
based” component of the Saudi financial system is not functioning within an Islamic 
Shari'a system but alongside an Islamic financial system (i.e., a system alongside a 
system) as is the case in a successful emerging economy such as Malaysia. In doing
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so, Saudi Arabia is also advised to consider the “segregation” phenomenon, which is 
used in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), to segregate its 
conventional financial component from any inconsistencies with other Saudi laws.
It is suggested that the Saudi government in implementing a combination of the 
Malaysian and DIFC models can better develop a complementary and reinforcing 
dual “parallel” financial system structure of a modem Western-oriented system and a 
modernised Islamic financial system, with both operating legitimately under the 
“umbrella” of an Islamic grounded Constitution. In effect, a dual financial system 
should provide an opportunity for the Saudi government to have the better of both 
worlds: a special and robust financial system that is well-rooted in the domestic 
culture and interconnected with the growing Islamic regional financial markets in the 
Gulf Region and that also makes foreign investment and financing in Saudi Arabia 
and the Region more attractive and “secure” while making it feasible to link it into 
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Adopting a market-based economy or the move towards such policy is thought to 
make a positive contribution to the cause of economic development and 
modernisation.1 2Hence, many countries and governments, especially after the demise 
of the Soviet-Union and its alternative centrally-planned are adopting market 
economic policies. The main reason for this policy shift is the urgent domestic need 
for economic development by developing countries in improving the living standards 
and the economic infrastructure.
Also, globalisation has played an important role or is being seen as a reason for 
adopting market-oriented policies.3 Globalisation is the result of the profound 
transformation which the world order is undergoing as exemplified by the 
improvement of technology that facilitate the movement of people and lead to the 
fast transmission of capital, goods and economic and political ideas globally. 
Connected to this global integration is the dominance of the ‘neo-liberal policy 
convergence’, which is a “policy shift among states towards an open, market- 
oriented policy stance”.4
At the heart of these market-economy policies and changes, which aim for 
sustainable economic growth and equitable wealth creation, financial systems play a 
pivotal role. Capital • formation is perceived as an important element for
1 See The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: World Development 
Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Oxford University Press, 1996). See also, The State in a 
Changing World: World Development Report (Oxford University Press, 1997). See also the 
World Bank’s website “Legal Institutions o f  the Market Economy”; 
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/index.cfm
2 See, e.g., the East European countries which adopted market economic policies. For more details, 
see Paul Marer Et Al., The Transition To A Market Economy: Volumes (1)&(2), (OCDE, 
1991).
3 Gunther Schulze et al., Globalisation of the Economy and the Nation State, 22(3) THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 295, at 303, (1999).
4 Katherine Lynch, The Forces Of Economic Globalisation: Challenges To The Regime Of 
International Commercial Arbitration , at 46 (Kluwer Law International, 2003),
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development.5 Extension of credit is an “engine of economic growth”.6 Any 
development projects to improve the economy, job creation, improvement of the 
economic infrastructure and so on in any country require capital. Unavailability of 
the needed capital to undertake these development changes necessitates creation of, 
or deepening of, the existing financial system to facilitate the accumulation of capital 
and the productive channelling of funds domestically. This, in turn, would need an 
improved and developed legal infrastructure to facilitate the orderly and transparent 
functioning of the financial system. Such will be needed to attract external funds and 
capital.
The law plays an important role as an instrument to achieve a country’s economic 
goals.7 All economic policies would prove fruitless if they operate in a legal vacuum 
or within a legal system that does not accommodate these economic changes or is 
inconsistent with their application. To meet a country’s development needs and to 
accommodate any new economic policy, legal reforms are important to facilitate 
effectively the implementation of this economic policy. In the light of this, market-
5 See Neal Zank et al., Reforming Financial Systems: Policy Change and Privatisation, at 
1 (Greenwood Press, 1991): “One of the primary constraints to accelerated economic performance in 
developing countries is the absence of strong, dynamic financial systems. Healthy capital and credit 
markets can serve the vital functions of attracting savings, intermediating funds, and allocating credit 
to productive uses. Development practitioners are unanimous in their identification of capital 
formation as one of the most important components in the development process”.
6 Neil Cohen, Internationalising the Law o f Secured Credit: Perspectives from the U.S Experience, 
20(3), U. PA. J. INT’LECON, L., 423, (1999), 428.
7 It is submitted that the law is used as an instrument for economic reform. See JOSEPH NORTON, 
Financial Sector Law Reform in Emerging Economics, at 129 (The British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law and The London Institute of International Banking, Finance and 
Development Law Limited, 2000): “In terms of the legal content of the economic reform dimension of 
the transition to a market economy, the role of law should be seen, on the one hand, as a means or 
instrument for implementing effective and efficient policies”. See also BAHHA El-Dean, 
Privatisation and the Creation of a Market-Based Legal System: The Case of Egypt, at 4 
(Koninklijke Brill NV, 2002): “The inter-relationship between law and economic policy is apparent. 
Law in any given state, of whatever economic policy, do not function in isolation; they are inter­
related with and at the same time reflect the state’s economic and political ideology. As law is the 
principal instrument used by governments to translate policies into binding rules, governments resort 
to legislation whenever they wish to influence behaviour, conditions, or events”.
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economy necessitates a market-oriented legal framework within which market forces 
would be able to function in an effective, transparent and fair manners.
In the light of this, there have been economic and financial reforms in many parts 
of the world. These reforms have encompassed legal reforms to facilitate 
implementing the new economic policies and to increase the investors’ confidence in 
the legal system to encourage investments. Islamic countries are no exception. Many 
Islamic countries have been involved recently in major reforms to their economic, 
financial and legal systems to keep up to speed with global economy and to 
accelerate economic development domestically.
However, certain Islamic countries have been experiencing difficulties in 
adapting to market-economy. This is particularly true in the case of financial services 
that Islamic countries have always viewed them as being against the Islamic Shari ’a 
for reasons that will be explained in Chapter One. Due to the difficulties associated 
with the financial services, certain Islamic countries have developed Islamic- 
complaint financial services, the co-called “Islamic finance”. “Islamic finance” has 
been expanding successfully in recent years and many Islamic countries have 
recognised “Islamic finance” and adopted it alongside its non-Islamic financial 
system.
Amidst all these developments that the world has been witnessing, the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is attempting to develop and to improve its financial and legal 
systems. To this effect, Saudi Arabia has been undertaking recently major reforms to 
its financial and legal systems. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia has introduced a law 
to supervise the activities of its capital market and it has transformed its insurance 
sector to an Islamic-compliant insurance system. This volume aims to study the case 
of Saudi Arabia and track the current tensions arising from adapting the Saudi legal
9
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system, being Islamic Shari’a, with global economy. It provides insights towards 
further developing the Saudi would-be market-led financial system in the light of 





The Developing Countries in Global Economy and the Legal 
Implications: The Case of the Islamic Countries
CHAPTER OUTLINE
1. Introduction
2. Trends o f  Global Econom y
2.1 The P olicy Shift Towards Market Econom y
2.2  The Characteristics o f  a Market Econom y
2.3 The Importance o f  a R ule-Based Financial System
2.4  The Importance o f  the Rule o f  Law in a Market Econom y
3. The Concept o f  Legal Pluralism
3.1 O verview
3.2 The D efinitional Parameters o f  Legal Pluralism
3.3 Legal Transplantation and State Legal Pluralism
3.4  A  Critical Linkage? Legal Pluralism and the Rule o f  Law
4. Islam ic Countries in the Global E conom y and the R esulting Pluralism
4.1 The Law  o f  Islam ic Shari 'a
4 .2  Islam ic Shari 'a and M odem  Finance
4.2.1 The Prohibition o f  Riba
4.2 .2  The Prohibition o f  Gharar
4.2 .3  The Shari’a and Investors’ Expectations in Conventional Finance
4.3 The D evelopm ent o f  Islam ic Finance
4.3.1 Profit and Loss Sharing Financing M odes (PLS)
4 .3 .2  N on-Profit and L oss Sharing Financing M odes (N on - PLS)
4.3.3 Islam ic Capital Market Products
4.3.3 Islam ic In su ran ce-T ak afu l
4 .4  Islam ic Finance in the G lobal Econom y





In moving towards a market-oriented economy, virtually; every developing 
country is undergoing some form of financial sector law reform.1 In doing so, a 
major or a would-be concern to a developing country, at certain stage of its economic 
development, is the linkages to the global markets. Such linkage would secure an 
access to the international financial markets and in return would enhance the 
developing country’s domestic financial market. It would also attract foreign 
investments and facilitate capital flow to the developing country.
To this effect, developing countries, with varying extents, attempt to join global 
economy through implementing the policies and views of the major international 
economic and financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),2 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED).4 Equally, these 
policies and views are reflected in the creation of certain regional trade agreements 
and multilateral institutions such as the European Union (E.U),5 67North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur, the Co-operation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf (G.C.C)8, the World Trade Organisation (WTO)9 and the major 
industrialised nations through the G-7/G-8.10
The developmental policies and views being propagated by these bodies and 
governments, which would serve as suitable starting points and are chosen as
1 Joseph Norton, Financial Sector Law Reform in Emerging Economies, at 2 (BIICL, 2000).
2 See generally http://www.imf.org
' 3 See generally http://www.worldbank.org
4 See generally http://www.oecd.org
5 See generally http://europa.eu/
6 See generally http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org
7 See generally http://www.mercosur.int
8 See generally http:// www.gcc-sg.org/
9 See generally http://www.wto.org
10 See generally http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
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Chapter One
fundamental assumptions for the purposes of this thesis,11 123include the following: 1) a 
sustainable economic development requires a shift from centralised to a market 
economy, 2) a sound market economy requires an appropriate rule-based economic 
and financial legal infrastructures; 3) such a viable legal infrastructure requires a 
genuine procedural and substantive rule o f law orientation. Additionally, at the micro 
level, these requirements translate into market-oriented laws that facilitate the 
activities of a market economy including financial transactions.
In incorporating the above policies, developing, countries are facing the challenge 
of adapting these market-oriented policies and laws to their domestic legal systems. 
Failure to do so, may result of a certain form of legal pluralism that contains 
inconsistent laws and in turn adversely affect the economy. Douglas writes:
“In countries where the legal reform process has permitted customary laws to
exist side by side with new laws..., the potential for legal conflict between the
customary laws and the new formal system adds yet another dimension of
11uncertainty to the functioning of the economy”.
Moving from general to particular, the Arab and Islamic countries, especially the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, are among those countries that have been undergoing 
market-oriented reforms to join more closely the global economy. In doing so, these 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, are or have been in the process of modernising 
their economies, financial infrastructures and legal systems.
11 This Chapter is not intended to argue the merits o f  such assumptions as conclusive and exclusive 
policy objectives. However, this Chapter does attempt to set forth the historical, institutional, and 
policy bases for such prevailing assumptions and in the modern genre o f economic developmental law 
theories and polices.
12 As will be argued in this thesis, not all forms o f legal pluralism have adverse impact on its market- 
oriented economic policies. See discussion infra.
13 Douglas Webb, Legal System Reform and Private Sector Development in Developing Countries, in 
Economic Development, Foreign Investment and the Law: Issues o f  Private Sector INVOLVEMENT, 
Foreign Investment and the Rule of Law in a New Era, 47 (Robert Pritchard, ed., Kluwer Law 
International and International Bar Association, 1996).
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To this effect, certain Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, were enticed to 
examine other financial and legal models that have been adopted internationally or 
by developed countries to accelerate the transformation process and to achieve the 
desired aims. In fact, borrowing other countries’ models is not a recent phenomenon 
in the Arab and Islamic countries. For example, Islamic countries had to live with 
Western-based interest-bearing financial systems and practices (referred to as 
conventional financial system henceforth) for decades.14
Nevertheless, the presence of conventional financial systems and its associated 
legal practices in the Islamic countries has generated many legal issues and debates 
in respect to their inconsistency with the principles of Islamic Shari’a. Islamic 
Shari ’a being the paramount legal system of certain Islamic countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, or one of the principal law sources in most Islamic countries’ constitutions 
considers conventional financial systems and practices as illegitimate as will be 
explained later in this Chapter.
As a result, Islamic countries have been experiencing certain difficulties in 
accommodating conventional financial systems and practices. This unease and the 
persistent “legal unrest” resulting from the conflict between Islamic Shari’a and 
modem finance have induced the Islamic countries to devise certain models and legal 
innovations to “stabilise” this “legal unrest”. These innovations have been recognised 
by certain Islamic countries in order to provide a functional equivalent for an 
efficient market-led financial system.
Thus, Islamic countries were able to develop an Islamic-compliant financial 
model, such as in Malaysia that can to some extent meet modem financing needs and
14 For the purposes of this thesis, the term “conventional” would mean any financial transactions that 
involve interest payment. See also the discussion infra.
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at the same time fulfil the requirements of Islamic Shari'a. In addition, certain 
countries in realising the fact that their domestic legal systems might jeopardise the 
activities of the would-be “international” financial centres, have adopted the 
“segregation” phenomenon whereby the legal framework of the financial centre is 
completely segregated from the country’s own legal system. A good example is the 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC)15 through which the “segregation” 
phenomenon has been first initiated.
This Chapter aims to lay down the foundations upon which the legal and 
financial systems of Saudi Arabia are discussed throughout this volume. In doing so, 
the trends of global economy are the main departure points.16 Then, a discussion of 
the “legal pluralism” concept is necessary to provide a helpful background for further 
discussions of certain legal and financial models that are existing (i . e Saudi Arabia), 
have developed (i.e., Malaysia and DIFC) or can be developed17 18in the Islamic 
countries. Finally, the Chapter focuses on the Islamic countries vis-à-vis the trends of 
global economy highlighting their implications and the resulting “legal pluralism” 
models as well as the emerging concept of “Islamic finance”.
2. Trends of Global Economy
2.1 The Policy Shift Towards Market Economy
One of the main features in the developing countries is the predominant role of the
1 ftpublic sector in the production structure. One of the reasons for the public sector’s
' 15 See generally http://www.difc.ae
16 As already mentioned, these trends namely; market economy, rule-based financial systems and the 
“rule o f  law” are considered as given assumptions for the purposes o f  this thesis.
17 A combination o f  the Malaysian model and the DIFC is suggested for the case o f Saudi Arabia. See 
Chapter Five.
18 Said El-Naggar, Privatisation and Structural Adjustment: The Basic Issues, in PRIVATISATION AND 




dominance in these countries is often the result of a political ideology for countries 
that have passed through a stage of socialist development.19 Another reason for the 
public dominance is for pragmatic considerations:20 for example, governments may 
have had to intervene in the means of production or in providing the services21 23for a 
variety of bona fide reasons. However, regardless of the reasons of adopting these 
policies, the developing countries believed that such polices are a step towards 
economic development and modernisation. Evidently, the dominance of the public 
sector and the adoption of these policies to modernise and to develop the country
'J'Xhave proved to be unsatisfactory. These unsatisfactory achievements that resulted 
from adopting these policies have encouraged the developing countries to seek 
alternative models.
At this juncture, the model of a market-based economy appears to provide an 
alternative solution. Hence, many developing countries have begun to go in the 
opposite direction. Private sector involvement in the economy is encouraged and 
begins to displace (but, not wholly) public sector dominance. A market economy, 
which can be defined as a “system of allocating resources based only on the 
interaction of market forces, such as supply and demand [and it is] free of 
governmental influence, collusion and other external interference”,24 starts to replace 
the “command economy” model and to become the driving force in allocating natural 
resources. Hence, the essence of market economy is to minimise to some extent the
19M
20 Id. at 2.
21 Id.
22 E.g., the desire to take control of strategic natural resources or unavailability of private sector to 
undertake important investments. Id.
23 Id. El-Naggar, summarises the results of studies undertaken on the consequences of the dominance 
of the public sector in developing countries on the economy: “It was found that, with few exceptions, 
the public sector incurs substantial loss, contributes significantly to budget deficits, earns exceedingly 




influence of non-economic factors that could influence the allocation of resources 
efficiently.25 This is in contrast with the “command economy” model in which most 
allocations occur as a result of a command issued by a central government agency.
While a market economy is usually connected to “capitalism” and Western 
economies, some argued that this is not necessarily the case (e.g., the current stage of 
a “socialist market economy” in the People’s Republic of China).26 A market 
economy could exist with some levels of governmental interference depending on 
how this influence is used.27 Regardless of whether a market economy is necessarily 
connected to a political ideology, market economy is viewed today as a necessary 
means for economic development. Recently, many countries have adopted the 
process of transformation to a market economy, especially after the demise of the 
Soviet Union.28
This policy shift towards a market-based economy is becoming a general trend. It 
is supported by the major international financial institutions and the international 
economic bodies, which seek to build a global economic order and to play a leading 
role in this transformation process. Also, other regional blocs such as the EU and the 
G.C.C support these policies. The desire of the developing countries to join this 
global economic order and their commitment for international integration depends on 
their willingness to undertake market-oriented reforms which meet the policies of 
these institutions, organisations and regional blocs. For example, the Central and
25 Blommestein et al., The Role o f Financial Institutions in the Transition to a Market Economy , in 
Building Sound Finance in Emerging Market Economics, 139, at 143 (Gerard Caprio et al. eds.,
- International Monetary Fund, 1994).
26 Id. There could be a ‘socialist market economy’, see LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA: MARKET 
Economy And Law (Wang Guiguo et. al. ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1996).
27 Supra note 18.
28 Jeswald Salacuse, The Legal Architecture o f Emerging Markets, in THE REFORM OF THE 
International Financial Architecture, 47, at 58. (Rosa Lastra ed., Kluwer Law International, 
2001)(refers to the market economy model as ‘Development Model II’ and to the opposite economy 
model as ‘Development Model I’).
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Eastern European Countries had to commit to undertake major economical reforms 
which meet the criteria of the EU in order to be able to join or associate with the EU. 
Also, applying for the membership in the WTO requires the applicant to undertake 
major changes to meet the WTO’s criteria.
A good illustration is to consider the IMF and its leading role in assisting 
countries to move towards market-economy.29 The IMF offers financial assistance 
for emerging markets that are IMF members in transition through its ‘conditionality’ 
policy.30 Under this policy the IMF offers financial support to a specific country on 
the condition that this country undertakes market-oriented reforms alongside the 
financial assistance.31
The role of the IMF can be seen in the recent Asian financial crisis. During the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998, the IMF provided financial assistance to 
Thailand, Korea and Indonesia. Under its ‘conditionality’ policy, the IMF required 
certain banking, financial and market-oriented reforms to be undertaken by the 
borrowing countries.32 Likewise, the World Bank offers technical and financial 
assistance on the condition that certain financial, legal and market-oriented reforms 
are undertaken by the borrowing countries. The OCED share some overlap in the
29 Rosa Lastra, The International Monetary Fund in Historical Perspective, 3(3) J. Int. Economic Law 
507,521,(2000).
30 For a general study on the IMF conditionality policy see Ariel Buira, ‘An Analysis o f IMF 
Conditionality ’, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No.22,2003.
31 The IMF will offer such technical assistance only when requested. Generally, when the financial 
assistance is requested by the borrower country, a letter of intent will be submitted to the IMF which 
outlines the reforms which the borrower country is willing to undertake. In theory, the programme of 
the reforms will be chosen by the borrower country but in practice the IMF does play a very 
influential role in designing these programmes. See Rosa Lastra, 'IMF Conditionality ’, in 
International Monetary and Financial Law upon Entering the New Millennium: Sir 
Joseph Gold Memorial Series Vol. 1, at 554 [hereinafter International Monetary] (Joseph 
Norton and Mads Andenas eds., BIICL, 2002).
32 On the Asian financial crisis see part two The East Asian Financial Crisis: 1997- 1998, in 




mission of these institutions in promoting market-oriented policies. In fact, the 
fundamental criterion to join the OCED is being a market-based economy.33
Other regional development banks are playing a vital role in promoting market- 
oriented policies. For example, the purpose of establishing the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is to stimulate the transition towards 
market economy. Article 1 of the EBRD Establishing Agreement provides: “In 
contributing to economic progress and reconstruction, the purpose of the Bank shall 
be to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote 
private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries 
committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and 
market economies”.34 To this end, the EBRD has been involved in market-oriented 
legal reforms in its countries of operation.35 36
The above institutions and organisations are working together and in co-operation 
with the industrialised states through the G-7/G-8 in promoting the move towards 
market economies. Also, other developing countries through their regional blocs
33 The OCED uses two criteria in considering the eligibility o f  the candidate country namely; “like- 
mindedness” and “significant player”. Under the “like-mindedness” criteria there are several 
yardsticks; most fundamentally the existence, o f  market-based economy and democratic principles. A 
third criterion could be considered namely; “mutual benefit”. See A STRATEGY FOR ENLARGEMENT 
and Outreach: Report by the Chair of the Heads of Delegation Working Group on the 
Enlargement Strategy and Outreach, Ambassador Seiichiro Noboru (OECD), at 16-18.
34 Article 1, Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
available at http://www.ebrd.com
35 The aim o f the legal reforms undertaken by the EBRD was to “assist the Bank’s countries o f  
operations to develop a legal environment which supports the conduct o f  private sector commercial 
and financial transactions and assists in fostering the transition towards democratic, open market- 
oriented economies”. See JOSEPH NORTON, International Financial Institutions and the Movement 
toward Greater Accountability and the Case o f Legal reform Programmes and the Problem of 
Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY, supra note 31, at 388.
36 See G8, FOSTERING Growth AND PROMOTING A RESPONSIBLE MARKET ECONOMY: A G8
DECLARATION, Evian, June 2 (2003), available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit
/2003evian/growth_en.html. The G-7 comprises o f  USA, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy and 
Canada. Also referred to as the G-8 with the inclusion o f Russia. There are other groups or ‘Gs’ such 
as the G-10, G-20 and the G-22 which have been created at the initiatives o f  governments. These ‘Gs’ 
provide “a forum for developing a consensus on national policies needed for a robust international 
financial system and international understandings concerning the limits o f  these policies”; see Mario 
Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects o f International
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have approved the move towards market economy as a basis for their regional 
integration efforts. The G.C.C in adopting the Long-Term Comprehensive 
Development Strategy for the G.C.C States (2000-2025) has approved the need to 
move towards a market-based economy.37 Having argued that market-economy has 
become a global trend, it is helpful to identify the main characterises of such 
economy.
2 .2  T h e  C h a r a c t e r is t ic s  O f M a r k e t  E c o n o m y  
Notwithstanding arguments concerning the ideological foundations of a 
particular country’s economy, there are four common features of market 
economics.38 39Firstly, the state has a limited role in planning the economy or in 
allocating the society’s resources. Unlike in a command economy, decisions on 
investments and credit allocations should be left primarily for the market to decide. 
Market economy is a decentralised decision-making system.40 Thus, there is no 
central governmental agency which informs the individual producer what to produce 
and how the production to be distributed.41 However, we have to bear in mind that 
the role of the government is not wholly abolished in market economies.42 For 
example, the government has to ensure effective competition which is a pre-requisite 
in market economies.43
Financial Standards Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW 
Millennium, at 18 (Mario Giovanoli ed., Oxford University Press, 2000).
37 See generally CHAPTER TWO.
38 Salacuse, supra note 28, at 59.
39 Id.
40 Arne. Isachsen et al., Understanding the Market economy, at 14 (Oxford University Press, 
1992).
41 In a market economy the prices are the carriers of the information, see Id.
42 M a t 128.
43 Id. See also id. Chapter 7 (Prerequisites for a Market Economy), at 77.
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Secondly, private enterprises and private ownership are fundamentals.44 As 
explained above, a command economy model is rooted in a public ownership of the 
country’s resources, evincing “little confidence in the capacity of private initiative 
and the free market to do the job”.45 Hence, public enterprises carry out all sort of 
economic activities. In a market economy, however, private enterprises are a primary 
means for production. Thirdly, in a market economy system any excessive regulation 
should be removed; a process called ‘deregulation’.46 The private sector should not 
be constrained by regulations that impede it from active participation in the 
economy. The general rule should be that “all economic activity is permitted unless 
specifically prohibited”.47 Finally, in a market economy system there should be 
“economic liberalisation” by reducing the barriers to international and internal 
trade.48 No excessive regulations should impede the inflow of foreign investment, 
technology and capital.
Governments that are willing to adopt the market economy model should 
ensure the existence of the abovementioned characteristics in their overall economic 
policies. This should be accompanied, however, with policies on macroeconomic
44 Salacuse, supra note 28, at 59. However, privatisation is considered to be a means to the 
introduction of market economy. See Paul Marer Et Al., The Transition To A Market 
Economy: Volume (2), at 14 -  15 (OCDE, 1991) (“privatisation forms a central pillar of the 
programme to create market economics.,.. Creating a market economy is thus seen as inextricably 
tied to the establishment of the institution of private property, and the privatisation of state assets.”)
45 Edward Mason, Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and 
BUSINESS, at 43 (Fordham University Press, New York, 1958).
46 Salacuse, supra note 28, at 60. It is submitted that under a market-economy and privatisation 
policies, the state's role in the economy changes from producer to regulator. This should not be 
confused with the ‘deregulation’ process. While the state should remove any excessive regulations, it 
should introduce some form of regulation to supervise the market. See also Ibrahim Shihata, Good
' Governance and the Role o f Law in Economic Development, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: 
Legislative Reform for Institutional Transformation and Good Governance, at xvii (Ann 
Seidman et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 1999).
47 See Salacuse, at 61. This general rule has been referred to as the ‘presumption of permissiveness’. 
See Shihata explains the assumption: “The assumption, however, should always be that economic 
activities are generally permitted, subject only to the legal and regulatory requirements which should 




stability, a sound currency, fair competition,49 and an efficient financial 
intermediation system.50 Due to the particular importance of financial systems, for 
the purposes of this volume, the following section will discuss this in further detail.
2.3 T h e  Im po r ta n c e  o f  A R u l e -B a sed  F in a n c ia l  Sy stem  
The availability of a strong and efficient financial system is at the heart of the 
transformation from command economy to a market economy.51 As noted above, in a 
command economy model, allocation of resources is controlled mainly by a central 
plan. Theoretically, once there is a transformation from a command economy 
model to a market economy one, and the central planning is abolished a “vacuum” 
emerges.53 Hence, it becomes essential to establish the necessary conditions “under 
which lending is rationed by price and constrained by borrowers’ solvency- that is, 
that there should be sound, market-based finance”.54 Thus, financial systems play a 
very important intermediation role in market economies, facilitating the move of 
funds and the provision of credit to finance projects and to stimulate the 
“privatisation” process.55
49 Michel Herbiet, The Constitutional Basis o f the Economic Order During a Period o f Transition 
from a Planned Economy to a Market Economy, in RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITION TO A MARKET 
Economy: Proceedings of the UniDem Seminar organised in Sofia on 14-16 October 1993, at 
15 (European Commission for Democracy through Law, Council of Europe Press, 1994): “Another 
basis of the market economy.certainly appears to be the principle of free competition which allows the 
various economic operators to pursue their economic activities in ‘ a system of competition which 
must not be hindered by either regulations or by benefits coming from the public authorities’”.
50 Paul Marer Et Al., The Transition To A Market Economy: Volumes (1), at 111 (OCDE, 
1991).
51 G. Caprio Et Al., Building Sound Finance in Emerging Market Economics: Proceeding of 





55 See Susan Creane et al., Financial Development in the Middle East and North Africa, at 
2 (International Monetary Fund, 2003): “A modern financial system promotes investment by 
identifying and funding good business opportunities; mobilises savings; monitors the performance of 
managers; enables trading’ hedging and diversification of risk; and facilitates the exchange of goods 
and services. These functions result in a more efficient allocation of resources, a more rapid
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More specifically, as fostered by the international financial and economic 
institutions and other regional development banks, a robust rule-based financial 
system is essential to a market economy; that is, one that meets the “test of 
markets”.56 Thus, it remains stable despite the market conditions and 
circumstances.57 The robustness of the financial system is considered to be a 
fundamental factor for financial stability.58 The robustness is exemplified by the 
flexibility of the financial system and its internal stability.59 Hence, despite the 
economic changing circumstances, a robust financial system should continue to 
function efficiently in allocating resources and it will not generate financial shocks of 
a magnitude that can lead to a financial crisis.60
Due to the importance of a robust financial system to exist, the G-10 has 
identified three actions to be taken by each country in relation to its financial system 
depending on its development stage: these are 1) creation of an institutional setting 
and financial infrastructure necessary for a sound credit culture and effective market 
functioning; 2) promotion of the functioning of markets so that owners, directors, 
investors and other actual and potential stakeholders exercise adequate discipline 
over financial institutions; and 3) creation of regulatory and supervisory 
arrangements that complement and support the operation of market discipline.61
accumulation of physical and human capital, and faster technological progress, which in turn feed 
economic growth”.
56 Report Of The G10 Working Party On Financial Stability In Emerging Market 
Economies, Financial Stability In Emerging Economies: A Strategy For The Formulation, 
Adoption And Implementation Of Sound Principles And Practices To Strengthen 





61 Id. at 3-4.
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In contributing to the existence of a robust and well-functioning financial 
system, the international financial institutions as well as other regional development 
banks are playing a leading role in providing technical assistance to countries willing 
to build a robust financial system. In doing so, sound principles and practices have 
been developed by different bodies in co-operation with the international financial 
institutions and national authorities such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee), the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB),62 34 the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),65 and 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).66 These institutions 
have been involved in setting “international standards” in different areas.
The Basel Committee published its Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (Basel Core Principles)67 which identified twenty-five main principles 
that are important to any bank supervisory system. As for the regulation of the capital 
market, the IOSCO published the Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation.68 This document sets out thirty principles of securities regulations with 
an aim to protect investors, to ensure that markets are fair, efficient and transparent 
and to reduce systemic risk.69 70Also, the IOSCO is working in co-operation with the 
IASB to develop international accounting standards. Likewise the IAIS has
62 Joseph Norton, International Co-operative Efforts and Implications for Law Reform, in, BANK 
Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition, at 296 (Rosa Lastra et al. eds., 
Kluwer Law International, 1999).
63 See generally http://www.bis.org
64 See generally http://www.iasb.org.uk.The IASB preceded the International Accounting Standards 
Commission (IASC) established in 1973.
65 See generally http://www.iosco.org
66 See generally http://www.iaisweb.org
67 IOSCO, Objectives and Principles o f  Securities Regulation, September (1997), available at 
http://www.iosco.org
6*ld
69 Id. at 5.
70 Norton, supra note 1, at 19.
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published principles, standards and guidance papers related to the regulation and 
supervision of insurance markets.71
All these standards aim to contribute to the stability of the financial markets, to 
guarantee efficient functioning of the financial institutions and to encourage 
investments and savings through providing a sound supervisory principles and 
practices. The implementation of these principles constitutes one main feature of an 
overall international strategy for the development of financial stability in emerging 
markets.72 In addition, to oversee the development, implementation and coordination
TXof these various standards, a Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has been established. 
The mandate of the FSF is to strengthen the surveillance and supervision of the 
international financial system as well as assessing the vulnerabilities affecting it. 
Also, the FSF is to identify and to oversee actions needed to address the problems 
identified.74 75The efforts of the above various international financial institutions and 
standard- setting bodies in creating this web of international standards and principles
*7f
of financial law is said to constitute an international financial architecture.
However, in implementing these international practices to develop a robust
<_ • . • _
financial system in the emerging market economies, three major points should be 
taken into consideration. Firstly, the mere application of these international practices
71 September 1997, supra note 63.
72 Norton, supra note 62, at 296.
,73 See generally http://www.fsforum.org . See also, George Walker, International Financial Crisis 
'  and the Financial Stability Forum, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM: STANDARD 
Setting And Infrastructure Development, 173 [hereinafter International Financial Sector 
Reform] ( Say Goo et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 2002)
74 The FSF issued a Compendium of Standards listing standards relevant to international financial 
stability.
75 See generally, Giovanoli, supra note 28. See also, Joseph Norton, The New International Financial 




is not sufficient. The application of these international principles should involve a 
“long-term societal commitment whereby the notion of a process based upon a rule o f 
law becomes ingrained within and throughout the fabric of civil, political and 
economic societies in emerging economies, in a substantive manner and not merely 
as a facade”.76 7
Secondly, each reforming country should take into consideration any sui 
generis factors related to its political, economic, financial and legal systems. So, 
financial law reform should be in the form “made-to-order” and not “ready made” 
one.78 Thirdly, a viable legal infrastructure should exist to facilitate the functioning 
of the well-supervised financial system. There is no international consensus on what 
constitute a viable legal infrastructure for financial systems.79 However, certain core 
areas of law have been identified and considered to be of great importance;80 81these 
are: clear and defined property rights, binding and enforceable contracts, adequate 
company laws, adequate lending infrastructure including secured transactions law, 
rules governing foreign investments, rules governing bankruptcy and predictable and 
fair tax laws.
In fact, the existence of such viable legal infrastructure is not only important for 
the existence of a well-functioning financial system but it is important for the well­
functioning of the whole market-based economy system. Law is the instrument
n t
through which economic policies are implemented effectively. This is why; the 
‘rule of law’ is considered one of the main features in a market economy system.82
76 NORTON, supra note 1, at 47.
11 Id. at 13.
78 Id. at 26.
79 Id  at 32.
*°Id. at 31-32.
81 NORTON, supra note 1, at 129.
82 Marer ET Al., supra note 50, at 111.
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Due to the importance of the law in market economies; further discussion of the ‘rule 
of law’ and the ‘role of law’ will be dealt with in the next section.
2.4 T h e  Im p o r t a n c e  Of T h e  R u l e  Of L a w  In  A M a r k e t  E c o n o m y
The idea of subjecting the governmental power to the control of the law can be 
traced back to the old days of the Greek philosophers. Aristotle, for example, 
argued that ‘government by laws’ was superior to ‘government by men’.84 This 
notion is normally referred to as the ‘rule of law’. The rule of law “means, in the first 
place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of 
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government”.85 
Consequently, in order to avoid the arbitrariness and the undue discretion of the 
government, laws should be clear and known in advance. In other words, certainty, 
predictability and transparency of the laws are associated with the concept of the rule 
of law.86 87
Hence, all the actions of the government should be “bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty 
how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan 
one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”. The concept of the rule of 
law and the principles associated with it such as predictability and transparency have
“ Anthony Bradley Et. al., Constitutional and Administrative Law, at 101 (Addison Wesley 
Longman, 1997).
M Id.
85 Albert Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, at 198 
'  (Macmillen, 1941).
86 Bradley Et. al., supra note 83, at 110.
87 Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, at 54 (Routledge, 2001). However, the principles of 
predictability and certainty have been approved in the English case law see, for example, Black- 
Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke AG [1975] AC 591, 638 where Lord Diplock said: “The 
acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before committing 




been further developed and extended to encompass social and economic aspects.88 
For example, command economy is viewed as an economy that lacks the “rule of 
law”.89
Unlike in a command-based economy, a market-based economy should be a “rule 
of law” economy.90 The “rule of law” or ‘supremacy of law’ is seen as a pre­
condition for establishing a market economy.91 92In other words, a market economy is 
a legal-system economy, where law provides the ‘rules of the game’ both 
substantively and procedurally.93 These rules need to be established and maintained 
to create a “level playing field” where market forces can engage in economic 
activities with free competition and without the interference of the state. Hence, “rule 
of law” requires a sound and predictable legal framework.94 This legal framework 
has at least four functions: “(i) to define the universe of property rights in the system; 
(ii) to set a framework for exchanging those rights; (iii) to set the rules for the entry 
and exit of actors into and out of productive activities; and (iv) to oversee market 
structure and behaviour to promote competition”.95
88 Bradley Et. al., supra note 83, at 110.
89 See Hayek, supra note 87, at 54-55: “Economic Planning ...cannot tie itself down in advance to 
general and formal rules which prevent arbitrariness”. Cf. Leughlin, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL 
Theory, at 84-101.
90 Albert Chen, The Developing Theory o f Law and Market Economy in Contemporary China, in 
Legal Developments In China: Market Economy And Law, supra note 2 6 ,3 ,4 .
91 Shihata, supra note 46, at xviii.
92 Chen, supra note 90, at 4.
93 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: World Development 
Report 1996: From Plan to Market, at 87 (Oxford University Press, 1996) (“under central 
planning, law was first and foremost an instrument o f  state control. Law in market economics is
(fundamentally different; it defines the rules o f  the game and gives individuals the rights and tools to 
enforce them”).
94 Max Weber has emphasised that predictability is an essential element for a functioning market 
economy. See Weber, Max Weber On Law In Economy And Society, at 40 (Wirtschaft et al. 
trans., Simon & Schuster, New York): “the universal predominance o f  the market consociation 
requires, on the one hand, a legal system the functioning o f which is calculable in accordance with 
rational rules”.
95 Gray, “Evolving Legal Frameworks for Private Sector Development in Central and Eastern 
Europe ”, (1993), World Bank Discussion Paper, No (209), at 1.
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So a state, which is adopting market-based policies, should enact or reform the 
existing laws in order to facilitate these functions. For example, a state’s constitution 
should define property rights and ownership.96 Further, the exchange of rights is 
accomplished by ensuring that the contract law is developed to meet market-based 
economic needs. Moreover, rules of the entry will need to be governed by sound 
company and foreign investment laws.97 98More generally, the state has to ensure that 
its existing rules encourage foreign investors to invest in the country. Rules that 
govern the exit of economic enterprises will be required: that is well-developed laws 
of bankruptcy and liquidation. Finally, the government should introduce suitable 
competition and anti-monopoly laws to prevent unfair competition. Throughout all 
this, fair and transparent administrative and procedural rules are essential.
In order to provide the appropriate legal infrastructure, the “rule of law” 
framework also should meet certain formal, institutional and procedural criteria.99 
Generally speaking, a “rule of law” framework necessary for a market-based 
economy should be based on three main elements.100 The first element is the 
presence of ‘legally binding rules’.101 These substantive rules should be promulgated 




99 David Clark, The Many Meanings o f the Rule o f Law, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN Asia: 
The Rule of Law and Legal Institutions, at 32 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., Routledge, 1999). 
However, Ibrahim Shihata gives a very good definition o f  a rule o f  law legal system which 
encompasses these criteria; see his book The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected 
Essays, Vol. I, at 85 ( Franziska Tschofen et al. eds. , Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991 ): a rule o f  
law legal system is “a system assumes that: a) there is a set o f  rules which are known in advance, b) 
such rules are actually in force, c) mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application o f the rules and 
to allow for departure from them as needed according to established procedures, d) conflicts in the 
application o f the rules can be resolved through binding decisions o f  an independent judicial or 
arbitral body and e) there are known procedures for amending the rules when they no longer serve 
their purpose”.
100 Shihata, supra note 46, at xviii. See also Ibrahim Shihata, The Role o f Law in Business 
Development, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1577, (1997).
101 Shihata, supra note 38, at xix.
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Modification of these rules should be guided by law according to previously 
disclosed and fair procedures. These rules should include several laws governing 
commercial and financial activities.102 03
The second element is the existence o f ‘appropriate processes’.104 These processes 
include: fair and transparent rule-making, rule-enforcing and rule-changing.105 There 
should be clear procedures which are known in advance of how rules and laws are 
being enacted, enforced and changed. The third element is the existence of ‘well­
functioning public institutions’.106 Public administrative institutions should apply the 
laws in a fair manner without arbitrariness or corruption. Equally or even more 
importantly, an independent and effective judiciary which applies the laws and the 
rules is important for a market-based economy,107
In sum, the “rule of law” in a market-based economy and as to the attendant 
financial system necessitates a strong legal infrastructure. This legal framework, as 
discussed, is the means through which the developing country achieves and applies 
its economic polices successfully and in an effective manner. States which are 
adopting market-based policies should not underestimate the importance of the law.
3. The Concept Of Legal Pluralism
Developing countries that are in the process of modernising their legal systems to 
accommodate market-oriented reforms face the challenge in adapting their domestic 
legal systems and principles with these market-oriented policies. A potential result of 
the interaction between the domestic laws and the new market-oriented policies/laws
102 Clark, supra note 99, at 32 (referring to these as the formal criteria).
103 Shihata, supra note 46, at xix.
m Id
m Id
106 Id. at xx.
107 Id. at xxi.
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is “legal pluralism”. This might adversely affect the “rule of law” and in turn the 
proper establishment of a market-oriented legal infrastructure. The following 
discusses this theme in detail.
3.1 Overview
The concept of “legal pluralism” under general jurisprudential theories is 
originated as an alternative to the idea of “legal centralism”. The view of legal 
centralism is that “law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a set of single of state institutions”.108 
Opponents of legal centralism argue that the idea is a ‘myth’.109 This debate 
encompasses legal, political and social dimensions. A core contention respecting 
legal pluralism can be analysed by addressing two main issues. Firstly, what is the 
definition of the concept itself: what is legal pluralism? Secondly, does legal 
pluralism exist at all? These jurisprudential issues involve other related fields 
including sociology and anthropology. The concept of legal pluralism is still a 
developing notion without definitive parameters.
This Section aims to provide an overview of the various definitional components 
of the concept of legal pluralism and review the possible practical approaches to deal 
with in this concept. In doing so, this section will try to answer the question whether 
the existence of legal pluralism, such as in Saudi Arabia, as will be seen in Chapter 
Two, affects the concepts of “rule of law” of a market-based economy system and 
rule-based/rule of law oriented legal infrastructure. This Section, however, does not 
attempt to join the fray with legal pluralist theorists who are debating the general 
definition of legal pluralism and does not seek to provide ‘a descriptive conception of 
legal pluralism’.
108 John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 Journal o f Legal Pluralism 1, 3, (1986).
109 Id, at 4: “Legal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion”.
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3.2 The Definitional Parameters Of Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralists have not agreed on one single definition for the concept of legal 
pluralism. Generally speaking, legal pluralism can be defined as “the condition in 
which a population observes more than one body of law”.110 A more specific and 
helpful approach to the study of legal pluralism finds a significant pedigree in the 
separate works of Vanderlinden and Hooker.111 12Their work provides a significant 
contribution in understanding the concept. Vanderlinden defines legal pluralism as: 
“the existence within a particular society of different legal mechanisms applying to 
identical situations”. According to Vanderlinden’s definition of legal pluralism the 
‘different legal mechanisms’ should apply to identical situations. Accordingly, for 
Vanderlinden, when different legal mechanisms apply to different situations, it is a 
plurality of law rather than legal pluralism.113 In his work, he provides various 
examples that he considers to reflect legal pluralism.114 Vanderlinden gives, inter 
alia, the following examples:115
The merchant who sells goods is subject to a different contractual mechanism
from the ordinary citizen who conducts the same operation.116
The diplomat, under protection of his ‘immunity’, benefits from legal
mechanisms other than those which apply to the inhabitants of the country in 
which he performs his duties when the latter are in identical situation.117
110 Gordon Woodman, The Idea o f Legal Pluralism, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN The Arab WORLD, 3 
[hereinafter Legal Pluralism] (Baudouin Dupret et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 1999).
111 See also John Gilissen who edited essays published under the title Le pluralisme juridique in 1971. 
See also Gordon Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate about Legal 
Pluralism, 42 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21, at 23-24, (1998) (referring to John
, Gilissen). According to Woodman, Gilissen implied a definition of legal pluralism in his introduction. 
Woodman, also, refers to Jacus Vanderlinden, who contributed to the volume edited by Gilissen. See 
also Barry Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial 
Laws (Clarendon Press, 1975).
112 Woodman , supra note 110, at 4.








Different mechanisms which apply to adults and minors.118
The laws of an insurgent group which is in a conflict with the state and its
laws.119
However, Hooker in his comparative study defines legal pluralism as “the 
situation in which two or more laws interact".120 In his study Hooker was concerned 
to describe “the systems of legal pluralism in the contemporary world which have 
resulted from the transfer of whole legal systems across cultural boundaries”.121 
Hooker argues that there are number of reasons where a state’s legal system might be 
ineffective.122 This arises where there are “multiple systems of legal obligation 
existing within the confines of the state”.123 Hooker enumerates four situations where 
the ‘multiplicity of obligation’ occurs. The first instance where ‘multiplicity of 
obligation’ arises is through colonial laws.124 The imperial power determines the 
legal structure in the colonial territories. Even after the independence of these 
colonies, the colonial laws still constitute the legal system along with the ‘indigenous 
law’. Secondly, ‘multiplicity of obligation’ arises in states where indigenous 
people are administered as a disadvantaged class.126 Thirdly, ‘multiplicity of 
obligation’ arises where some states voluntarily adopt Western laws in order to 




20 Hooker, supra i
21 Id. at l .









statute is passed to abolish traditional systems and introduce ‘revolutionary 
ideology’.128 129
However, Vanderlinden’s and Hooker’s views have been attacked and critically 
debated. The main debate revolves around the definition of legal pluralism. These 
debates have extended the definition of “legal pluralism” and divided such concept 
into two main categories. The first category is the so-called ‘state legal pluralism’ 
which refers to the existence of “two bodies of norms within the law of the state”.130 
The second category is what is referred to as ‘deep legal pluralism’.131 *It means the 
existence of the law of state along with other ‘normative orders’ that are not directly 
associated with the state. It has been referred to as deep because the distinction 
between its laws goes deeper in separating state law from non-state law as compared 
to state legal pluralism that is just a distinction within the body of state laws.133 The 
second category is the result of sociological contributions rather than legal ones.134 135
Despite the above-mentioned debates and the fact that legal pluralism has been 
divided mainly into two types: that is deep legal pluralism or state legal pluralism, it
l i e
is evident that forms of state legal pluralism are recognised to be existing. 
However, whether state legal pluralism should be the means to define ‘a descriptive 
conception of legal pluralism’ or should be excluded is not the purpose of this study. 
As will be seen in Chapter Two, state legal pluralism exists in Saudi Arabia and its 
existence affects the functionality of the financial and banking systems. Should such
128 Id. However, the focus in this volume is on the third situation due its relevance for the purposes o f  
this thesis.




133 Gordon Woodman, 'Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice’, 40(2) J. OF AFRICAN L. 152, 159, 
(1996).
134 Woodman, supra note 110, at 5.
135 See Hooker, supra note 111.
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legal pluralism be maintained, abolished, or modified is an issue that the author will 
be explaining in this volume.
3.3 Legal Transplantation And State Legal Pluralism
Legal transplantation is “the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country 
to another”. This movement happens during the process of law-making or legal 
reform.136 37 1389As law is used as an instrument to apply efficiently the policies necessary 
for economic development, developing countries would be induced to borrow and 
to adopt voluntarily other successful legal models or “ready-made laws” and to 
transplant them into their own legal systems with the aim to develop their own 
existing legal infrastructures to which in turn will accommodate their new economic 
policies.
The idea of transplanting legal models is motivated by two reasons. Firstly, 
certain legal models have proven to be successful in the economic and legal 
environments of their donor state. Secondly, the aim to accelerate the legal reform 
process in developing countries or the transplantee states because these states are not 
in the position to wait for the development of their own legal models.140 The theory 
of legal transplantation finds its roots in the work of Watson, arguing against the 
“mirror theories of law”.141 The mirror theory of law describes law as the mirror of 
the society and that the law is not an autonomous set of rules and concepts.142 On the
136 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, at 21 (1974)
137 Lukas Mistelis, Regulatory Aspects: Globalisation, Harmonisation, Legal Transplants, and Law 
Reform -  Some Fundamental Observations, 1055 INT’L Law ..., 1067, (2000) referring to Eric Stein, 
Uses, Misuses and Non-uses o f Comparative Law, 72 NW.U.L.Rev 198,202, (1977).
138 Norton, supra note 1, 129.
139 Id. at 130.
140 Id.
141 William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic o f Legal Transplants ’, 43 AM. J. COMP. 
L, 489,492, (1995).
142 Id. See also, LAWRENCE. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN Law, at 12 (Simon & Schuster, 
1985) (mentions that the law is “not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and concepts, not as
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contrary, Watson believes that there is no necessary inherent relationship between 
the society and the law that is operating within it.143 He argues that law develops by 
transplanting often with no connection with the society’s structure.144 According to 
him, “most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing”145 146by different
146means.
Kahn-Freund147 148disagrees with Watson’s argument that there is no inherent 
relationship between society and the law, which is operating within it. He argues that 
any attempt “to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its origin continues to
«¿g
entail the risk of rejection”. Also, he argues that there are “degrees of 
transferability”.149 According to him, in order to study the viability of exporting a 
rule to transplant it in the transplantée state, the social and political environments in 
both the transplantor and transplantée states and their relationship to the rule must be 
studied and compared.150 Regardless of any argument for or against legal transplants 
and their relation to the society, legal transplants are facts of modem economic 
development though and their effectiveness in the transplantée country should be 
evaluated and monitored on a case-by-case basis. It is evident; however, that no
the province o f  lawyers alone, but as mirror o f  society. It takes nothing as historical accident, nothing 
as autonomous, and everything as relative and moulded by economy and society”).
143 Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 313, 313-314, (1978): 
“There is no exact, fixed, close, complete, or necessary correlation between social, economic or 
political circumstances and a system o f rules o f private law”.
144 Watson, supra note 136, at 315.
145 Id. at 94.
146 Id. at 30 stating that: “Actually, receptions and transplants come in all shaped and sizes. One might 
think also o f  an imposed reception, solicited imposition, penetration, infiltration, crypto-reception, 
inoculation and so on, and it would be perfectly possible to distinguish these and classify them 
systemically.... No point in elaborating a detailed classification o f borrowing until individual 
instances has been examined to see what they reveal”.
147 Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses o f Comparative Law’, 37(1) MOD. L. REV. 1, (1974).
148 Id. at 27.
149 Id, at 6. He states: “In most cases we must ask what chances there are that the new law will be 
adjusted to the home environment and what are the risks that it will be rejected. The chance and 
inversely, the risk, may be smaller or larger, and the magnitude o f  this chance and o f this risk 
determine the point on the scale at which we have to place the foreign law”.
150 Id, 11-13. See also Mistelis, supra note 137, at 1066.
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country can develop by simply transplanting legal models from developed 
countries.151 It is a long-term process which involves education, adaptation, 
assimilation of the transplanted law and “reconciliation” between external and 
internal influences.152 A plausible argument is that, failure to educate, to adapt, to 
assimilate and to reconcile the transplanted law within the legal system of the 
transplantée state leads to a legal plurality in the legal system (i.e., a state legal 
pluralism). In fact, failure to reconcile the transplanted laws is one of the reasons, as 
argued by Hooker, that leads to a state legal pluralism.153 Hooker describes this 
process by stating that:
“multiple obligation arises in those states which have voluntarily adopted 
western laws with the motive of modernising themselves.... A legal 
plurality arises here quite simply because the original is by no means 
displaced in whole or in part by the introduced law. There are number of 
reasons for this and they commonly include the non-communication or 
maladministration of the new law... The result is a conflict of principle 
which is settled in a number of different ways or, more often than not, 
left unsolved”.154
151 Norton, supra note7, at 130. See also PATTI OFOSU-AMAAH, REFORMING BUSINESS-RELATED 
Laws to Promote Private Sector Development: The World Bank Experience in Africa, at 
18-19 (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000). See also Ann Seidman 
et al., State and Law in the Development Process: Problem-Solving and Institutional 
Change in the Third World, at 44 (St. Martins Press, 1994) states: “Turkey copied French law; 
Ethiopia copied Swiss law, the French-speaking African colonies, French law, Indonesia, Dutch law. 
Universally, these laws failed to induce behaviour in their new habitats anything like [that] in their 
birth places. Inevitably, people chose how to behave, not only in response to law, but also to social, 
economic, political, physical, and subjective factors arising in their own countries from custom, 
geography, history, technology, and other, non-legal circumstances”.
152 See Norton, Id, arguing that developing countries should not undermine the usefulness o f  the 
comparative law methodology. Fie further argues that the relevance o f this methodology is both 
external and internal. By external he means that developing countries should not undermine external 
available models. This has to be reconciled with the “internal influences” that is internal legal, 
economic and political environment.
153 See supra Section 3.2.
154 Hooker, supra note 111, at 3.
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Hooker raises an important point which results from the maladministration or non­
communication of the new rule; that is, the conflict between the existing law and the 
borrowed law. In other words, he impliedly argues that state legal pluralism might 
include conflicting legal rules, if it is left unsolved. Conflicting laws within the same 
legal system of the state, as a corollary, leads to inefficiency. Having reached such a 
logical conclusion, there are two suggestions to avoid this ‘inefficiency’. First, the 
transplantée state should exercise its best efforts to succeed in the ‘communication’ 
and ‘administration’ of the new law, thus avoiding the existence of conflicting legal 
rules and in turn legal plurality or state legal pluralism.
Alternatively and secondly, the transplantée state can borrow the legal ‘organ’ 
(i.e., model of a certain law) and create for it a complete new body of law to 
eliminate any risk of conflict between this new ‘organ’ and the existing law. Thus, 
such model has been introduced in the DIFC where certain laws were enacted to 
facilitate international financial activities; but these laws were segregated from the 
state’s own legal system. In other words, the DIFC has been established as a “free 
zone” with its own laws and systems.155 Another example could be Malaysia, where 
an Islamic financial system, with its own governing laws and regulations, has been 
established alongside the conventional financial system (i.e., a system alongside a 
system).
To elaborate further, Hooker argues that legal plurality arises because the new 
introduced law ‘by no means displaced in whole or in part’ the original law. The 
author’s suggestion is that this is one of the possibilities. Another possibility is that 
legal plurality could arise if the new introduced law is constructed to work alongside
155 See generally Michael Blair et. al., Legal Issues Arising in the New Dubai International Financial 
Centre, 20 J.I.B.L.R 207, at 207, 2005.
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the existing system or as a separate “free zone” coexisting with exiting system. In 
this sense, there is no “displace in whole or in part”, to the original existing law.
There are various reasons for such models. For example, the population of a 
developing country might consist of different communities with cultural or religious 
different orientations. Another example could be that the new introduced law will act 
as a ‘supporting machine’ to the existing original law until the original law is further 
evolved and “re-activated” in an effective manner: thus, the new introduced law 
could be used temporarily. Finally, as it is the case in the DIFC, the main reason for 
such model is to attract international investment and capital.
Hence, it is possible to argue that there are two types of state legal pluralism. 
Firstly, the ‘conflicting’ state legal pluralism that consists of conflicting rules and 
laws resulting from introducing new laws. This conflict between the rules within the 
same legal system would leave the developing country with its status quo but with no 
further development or improvement: destruction rather than construction. 
Secondly, is the ‘non-conflicting’ state legal pluralism. In this situation, we have 
legal plurality or different legal rules within the same legal system working alongside 
each other and with no conflict between them.
It can be concluded that if the ‘conflicting’ state legal pluralism exists; the state 
has to take one of the following measures: 1) to unify the conflicting rules into one 
legal system (that is adapting the transplanted rules to the existing ones or the 
existing ones to the transplanted rules); or 2) in case the state it is unsuccessful to 
achieve the previous measures, to further ‘pluralise’ the ‘conflicting’ state legal 
pluralism to reach the level of ‘non-conflicting’ state legal pluralism. The result is 




While there is a level of obscurity surrounding a general discussion of these 
matters, it is hoped further clarifications will come about with subsequent country 
and model specific discussions (e.g., in Chapter Two as to Saudi Arabia and Chapter 
Five as to Malaysia and DIFC). In any event, it will be pertinent to argue that the 
concept of ‘conflicting’ state legal pluralism is inconsistent with the basic elements 
of the ‘rule of law’. As the ‘rule of law’ is an important component in a market-based 
economy, it will be important for this thesis to demonstrate that ‘non-conflicting’ 
legal pluralism can be structured in a way consistent with the rule of law.
3.4 A Critical Linkage? Legal Pluralism and Rule of Law 
This Chapter attempts to create a “chain”. First of all we have market economy 
which is considered an important model for development. Secondly, market 
economy is a “rule of law” economy. Hence, the establishment of a rule of law and 
in turn a viable legal framework is important. Then we have a certain form of legal 
pluralism, which might cause conflict of rules within the legal system of the state. At 
this juncture, the question is whether the existence of “legal pluralism” adversely 
affects the necessary components of the “rule of law”. In case this question is 
answered in the affirmative, the existence of “legal pluralism” could be considered to 
impair the establishment of a successful market-economy. In other words the chain 
has been broken.
The argument that “legal pluralism” is not compatible with the “rule of law” finds 
a strong basis when deep legal pluralism is concerned.156 157The main reason, arguably, 
is that in some cases a person is subject to conflicting duties. This is because the
156 Woodman, supra note 133, at 160.
157 Id. This is one o f  the two reasons which Woodman presented in his article where deep legal 
pluralism is considered to be against the rule o f  law. The second reason is where persons and officials 
follow the norms and values customary law (for example to be engaged in nepotism) and disregard the
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existence of both state law and indigenous or customary law. According to 
Woodman “the competing sources of legitimacy give rise to competing duties, and 
consequently the rule o f law cannot totally prevail”.158 However, the argument that 
deep legal pluralism would be against the “rule of law” can be extended to 
encompass state legal pluralism.159 Whether state legal pluralism could be against the 
rule of law depends on what one means by state legal pluralism.160 As discussed 
previously, state legal pluralism could result from legal transplantation and it can be 
divided into two categories: namely ‘conflicting’ state legal pluralism and ‘non- 
conflicting’ state legal pluralism.
As the “rule of law” requires predictability and certainty in the legal 
framework,161 it can be argued that the ‘conflicting’ state legal pluralism is against 
the “rule of law”. Inconsistent rules within the same legal system will affect the 
certainty, predictability and enforcement of the legal transactions and procedures. 
‘Non-conflicting’ state legal pluralism, on the other hand, should not adversely affect 
these requirements of the “rule of law”. This is because under such form of “legal 
pluralism”, there are no rules that conflict with each other. Instead, the legal rules are 
functioning alongside each other. That is, each component has its own predictable 
and certain rules and procedures.
Therefore, the conclusion being taken for the purposes of this thesis is that while 
it is plausible to argue that legal pluralism is against the “rule of law”, this would be
values and norms o f  the state law. He disagrees that such situation infringes the rule o f  law to a great 
extent because it contributes the rule o f  customary law. See id
158 Id.
159 Woodman, supra note 110, at 12, (stating in the footnotes that: “The ideals o f  the rule o f law and 
equality before the law as propounded in the context o f  legal positivism do indeed seem to be opposed 
to state legal pluralism”. It is further argued the state legal pluralism is against the principle o f equality 
before the law. It is pertinent to note that such argument against state legal pluralism is when state 
legal pluralism means ‘different norms to be applied to different persons in the same situations”), see 
also Woodman, supra note 133, at 160.
160 See discussions o f  the definition supra.
161 See supra note 87; see also the discussion o f the rule o f  law supra.
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true in the case of ‘conflicting’ state legal pluralism. ‘Non-conflicting’ state legal 
pluralism, on the other hand, is not necessarily against the “rule of law”. Hence, if 
the “rule of law” is undermined by the existence o f ‘conflicting’ state legal pluralism, 
the state should further ‘pluralise’ the legal system to maintain the “rule of law”. But 
in further ‘pluralising’ {i.e., adopting the ‘non-conflicting’ approach), a state will still 
need to ensure that this form of pluralism {i.e., ‘non-conflicting’ state legal 
pluralism) incorporates all of the required components of the “rule of law”. That is, 
predictability, certainty and a rule-based legal infrastructure.
4 . I s l a m ic  C o u n t r ie s  in  G l o b a l  E c o n o m y  a n d  t h e  R e s u l t in g  P l u r a l is m
By the end of the colonial era, the newly independent Islamic states have 
witnessed the advent of their national economic and legal policies. Such has received 
a particular attention from the newly formed governments because it further 
reaffirmed their independence as sovereign states. Nevertheless, during this period, 
“legal transplants” provided a significant source for the Islamic countries in building 
up their independent legal systems. For example, Egypt was inspired by the French 
Napoleonic code which has later influenced other neighbouring Islamic countries.162
However, for the reasons explained below; Islamic Shari ’a has a juridical 
importance and remains influential in the Islamic countries.163 For example, in most 
Islamic countries the issue whether Islamic Shari’a should be the paramount legal 
system of these countries has always been on the agenda.164 Also, with varying 
degrees, Islamic Shari ’a has always provoked legal debates in the Islamic countries.
162 See generally Nabil Saleh, How Will the Shari'a Influence Middle East Contract Law over the Next 
20 Years?, 24 MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP. 9, at 11, (2001).
163 Lu’ayy Al-Rimawi, Relevance o f Shari’a in Arab Securities Regulation with Particular Emphasis 
on Jordan as an Arab Regulatory Model, 27 COMP. Law. 221, at 227 (2006).
164 Most recently in the case o f Iraq.
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Most importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, are the legal debates generated 
through the interaction between modern finance and the Islamic Shari ’a.
Foreign banks have played an important role in financing trade and 
development in the Islamic countries.165 Because modem finance practices are 
inconsistent with the Islamic Shari’a, for reasons which will be explained below, 
initiatives as early as 1960 have aimed at developing an alternative finance model 
which culminated with the development of “Islamic finance”. The concept of 
“Islamic finance” has received a warm welcome from few Islamic countries that 
embarked at Islamising their financial systems. Others have allowed “Islamic 
finance” to function alongside conventional modem finance.166 Along the spectrum, 
these countries have varied in their view of “Islamic finance”. Some countries have 
supported “Islamic finance”, and others have adopted the gradual policy of “wait and 
see”. This section aims to introduce Islamic Shari’a, to differentiate between 
conventional modem finance and “Islamic finance” and to highlight the pressures 
that Islamic countries are facing in the global economy and its associated legal 
policies.
4.1 The Law of Islamic S h a r i ’a
Shari’a, sometimes referred to as Shariah, is an Arabic word which means the 
path to be followed and literally means the way to a watering place.167 168The 
jurisprudential meaning of Shari ’a, however, is the regulations and rules made by 
God for his mankind to follow. There are primary and secondary sources of the
165 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, at 49 (Edinburgh University Press, 
2000) .
166 See definition of “conventional finance” infra.
161 See Abdur Rahman Doi, Shariah: The Islamic Law, (Ta Ha Publishers, 1987).
168 See Abdul Al-Salam Et Al., An Introduction To Legislation Principles In Saudi Arabia, 
at 9 (Dar El-Ketab El Jameae, 1983) [in Arabic],
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Islamic Shari’a. The primary sources are the Holy Quran and the Sunna}69 The Holy 
Quran contains broad and general legal propositions.169 70 The second primary source 
of the Islamic Shari ’a, the Sunna, is an important complementary source for the 
Quran. The Sunna is all the teachings, statements or deeds by the Prophet 
Muhammad. It is also what the Prophet has approved to be legitimate under Islamic 
Shari’a either expressly or implicitly. Hence, the Sunna is a supplement to the Quran 
and plays an important role for both religious and legal purposes.171
However, there are secondary sources for the Islamic Shari ’a which must be taken 
into consideration due to their modernity importance. These secondary sources are 
important because, for example, the above-mentioned primary sources do not 
encompass complex laws related to banking, finance and insurance. Therefore, 
Islamic scholars will use the secondary sources in order to devise laws and rules that 
satisfy both the modem need for such laws and its Islamic compliance. The main 
secondary source is ijtihad, which means the independent reasoning172 173or “an 
exercise to arrive at one’s own judgement”. Ijtihad is a process that involves 
reviewing the texts of the Quran and the Sunna and it has five main sources:174
1. Ijma or (consensus of opinions):175 Ijma is defined as “the consensus of 
opinion of the companions of the Prophet and the agreement reached on the 
decisions taken... by the Jurists on various Islamic matters”.176
169 Abdur Rahman Doi, S h a r i a h : The Islamic Law, at 21 & 45 (Ta Ha Publishers, 1987).
170 Some areas o f  the Shari ’a have been mentioned in more details such as the law o f inheritance. 
Others have been mentioned in more general terms; such as sale contracts where four versions been 
mentioned only in the Quran leaving mankind to deal with the details. See Abdul Al-Salam Et Al., 
supra note 168, at 74.
171 Doi, supra note 167, at 49.
172 M. Qal Aji Et Al., Dictionary Of Islamic Legal Terminology (Arabic- English- French), at 
21 (Dar An-Nafase, 1996).
173 DOI, supra note, at 78.
174 ABDUL Al-Salam Et Al., supra note 168, at 80 (however, these sources are outside the scope of 
this thesis).
175 DOI, supra note 167, at 64.
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2. Qiyas or (analogical reasoning): Qiyas is a method by which “the principles 
established by Quran, Sunna and Ijma are to be extended and applied to the 
solution of new problems not expressly regulated before”.177 The 
justification of the extension is on the ground that the new situation might 
share a common characteristic with the old situation.178
3. Masalih Al-Mursalah or (Public Interest):179 Public interest is regarded in 
the Islamic Shari ’a as a basis for the law.180
4. Istishab or (Presumption of Continuity):181 Istishab means “a rule of 
evidence or a legal presumption of continuance of conditions”.182 An 
example of that is the presumption of permissiveness, which means that 
specific situations or legal transactions should be allowed as long as there is 
no express evidence for otherwise.
5. Sadd al Dharai or (Prohibition of Evasive Legal Devices):183 Broadly, this 
secondary source means that any thing or situation which leads to 
something or situation against which is illegitimate under Islamic Shari ’a is 
to be considered illegitimate as well. In that it is blocking the way to the 
illegal.
Opinions and interpretations regarding different issues and novel situations have 
been introduced by Islamic scholars using the above-mentioned sources. Hence, 
Islamic Shari ’a is described as “a compilation of opinions and interpretations of 
religious legal scholars who studied the sacred texts of Islam during the first
176 Id.
177 Id. at 78.
178 Frank. Vogel et al., Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return, at 51 (Kluwer 
Law International, 1998).
179 DOI, supra note 175, at 81.
180 Id.
181 Qa lAji Et Al., supra note 172, at41.
182 DOI, supra note 175, at 83.
183 Qal Aji ET AL., supra note 172, at 191.
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• * 1 8 4centuries of its existence”. It is more accurate, however, to use this description in 
referring to the Islamic fiqh because Islamic Shari’a is much broader. In simple 
terms, Islamic fiqh is the classical Islamic law represented by the four main 
Schools.184 85 1867These axe the Hanafi School, the Malaki School, the Shafi School and the 
Hanbali School. Different views and interpretations resulted from the different 
reading of the main sources of the Shari ’a.
The Ottomans at a later stage have contributed towards the codification of the 
Islamic Shari’a. They introduced Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah,ni sometimes 
referred to as the Mejelle and hereinafter referred to as Majalla. The Majalla is a 
summary of certain Islamic jurisprudence principles based on the Hanafi School. The 
Majalla constitutes an essential source of legislation to many Arab countries. Later in 
Saudi Arabia, a similar code has been introduced namely; Majalat Al-Ahkam Al- 
Shri ’yah, which is similar to the Majalla but is based on the Hanbali School.
The importance role of the Islamic Shari’a is still present despite the fact that 
many of the Arab and Islamic countries have introduced “positive” laws that, 
arguably, are not driven from the Islamic Shari’a. According to Al-Rimawi, the 
importance of the Islamic Shari’a is attributed to three reasons.189 Firstly, the 
constitutional role of the Islamic Shari'a. Thus, the majority of the Arab 
constitutions refer to the Islamic Shari ’a as a principal source of the law.
184 Enid Hill, Comparative and Historical Study o f Modern Middle Eastern Law, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 
279, at 292 (1977-1978).
185 There are other Islamic Schools. However, references to the Islamic Shari’a throughout this 
volume is including Islamic fiqh,
186These are the main Sunni Islamic Shari’a Schools. Each school name itself after its founding 
scholar. See VOGEL, supra note 178, at 9.
187 For a translation of Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah see THE CIVIL LAW OF PALESTINE AND TRANS­
JORDAN (Volume 1) [hereinafter The CrviL Law of Palestine] (C. A. Hooper trans., Azriel Printing 
Works, 1933). See also THE MEJELLE BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MAJALLAHEL-AHKAM-I- 
Adliya and a Complete Code on Islamic Civil Law, [hereinafter The Mejelle] (Tyser et al. 
trans., Law Publishing Company, 1901; reprint 1967).
188 See Ahmad Al-Qari, M a j a l a t  A l - A h k a m  A l - S h r i ’y a h , (Tihama Publications, 1981).
189 Al-Rimawi, supra note 163, at 227.
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Secondly, Islamic Shari ’a in the different Arab countries and at varying degrees 
plays a “gap-filling” role. To elaborate, other than those Arab countries that apply 
Islamic Shari ’a as the paramount legal system such as Saudi Arabia, other countries 
have introduced civil and commercial codes that are modelled on Western laws. 
These civil codes have referred to the Islamic Shari’a as a “gap-filling” source of 
law.
Finally, the importance of the Shari’a is not only attributed to the fact that it is 
mentioned in the various legal legislations of the Arab countries. As Al-Rimawi 
suggests correctly, Islamic Shari’a has an “ever-enduring societal relevance”.190 In 
this sense, the influence of the Islamic Shari ’a on the Muslim communities should 
not be undermined. As will be seen below, the Shari’a ’s prohibition of certain 
elements of modem finance has precluded many Muslims from investing using 
modem finance methods although such is legally allowed.191 192In other words, Islamic 
Shari'a does affect the “credit culture” of the Muslim communities and this “credit 
culture” can not be legislated.
4.2 Islamic Sh a r i’a  and Modern Finance
Certain principles of the Western-style financial systems are in direct 
contradiction with the principles of Islamic Shari ’a. Firstly, unlike modem finance;
1 07Islamic Shari’a does not recognise the trade of money as a subject-matter of trade. 
Usmani explains: “[under Islam] money has no intrinsic utility; it is only a medium 
of exchange; each unit of money is 100 per cent equal to another unit of the same 
denomination; therefore, there is no room for making profit through the exchange of 
these units inter se. Profit is generated when something having intrinsic utility is sold
190 Id.
191 Id. at 229.





for money or when different currencies are exchanged, one for another”. In other 
words, Islam approves financing when it is an asset-backed financing.193 94
The second issue is the Islamic prohibition of interest as a form of riba. The third 
issue is the Islamic prohibition of gharar (risk, uncertainty and speculation).195 
These principles of Islamic Shari’a may frustrate many conventional finance 
transactions. As a result, in theory at least, investors should not have high 
expectations when transacting businesses that are subject to Islamic Shari’a, because 
Islamic Shari’a has different understanding of investments as will be explained 
further below. The following, however, aims to give a general overview of the main 
two Islamic Shari ’a elements that might frustrate conventional financial transactions. 
4.2.1 T h e  P r o h i b i t i o n  o f  I n t e r e s t
The issue of interest in financial transactions is one of the most controversial 
issues in the Muslim world and has been subject to a long-standing debate.196 
Charging interest in financial transactions has been considered to be riba under 
Islamic Shari’a; and in turn, illegal.197 Riba is an Arabic word meaning, literally, 
“increase”198 and generally, signifies “any unjustified increase of capital for which 
no compensation is given”.199 The word riba should not be equated with the charging
193 Id. at xiv - xv.
194 Id. at xiv.
195 See the discussion infra.
196 See generally Ghilbli Mallat, The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth Century Jurisprudence, 
in Islamic Law and Finance, 69 (Ghilbli Mallat ed., Graham & Trotman, 1988). See also Nabil 
Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law (Graham & Trotman, 1992).
197 There some other opinions which consider charging interest are not riba.
198 Ibrahim Shihata, Some Observations on the Question o f Riba and the Challenges Facing 'Islamic 
Banking, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC LAW (2000-2001), at 25 
(Joseph Norton et al. eds., BIICL, 2003). See also WILLIAM. BALLANTYNE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE 
Arab Middle East: The Gulf States, at 122 (Graham&Trotman, 1992).
199 William Ballantyne, Essays And Addresses On Arab Laws, at 122 (Curzon Press, 2000).
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of interest on loans in financing transactions as such phenomenon did not exist at the 
time of the primary sources of the Islamic Shari ’a (i.e., Quran and Sunna).200 2013
Riba has been mentioned and condemned in the primary sources of the Islamic 
Shari'a. While the Quran refers expressly to one form of riba; it does not further 
define riba or its forms. The type of riba which has been referred to in the Quran 
expressly is a pre-Islamic practice; the so called “pay or increase”. In this form of 
riba, creditors used to double the principal upon default by the debtors in return for 
an extension of the repayment period. This form of riba includes charging the 
debtor any amount as a penalty for failure to pay on time.204 20567
The Sunna reaffirms the prohibition of riba and extends the concept of riba 
further to encompass other forms, namely; riba in sales and riba in loans. More 
relevant to this study is the riba in loans because it concerns the loan contract. The 
Sunna prohibition of riba in loans derives, inter alia, from the Prophet’s saying 
“every loan that attracts a benefit is riba’'’?06 Therefore, interest charged on loans is 
considered to be a benefit and is banned under Islamic Shari ’a. Such conclusion has 
universal acceptance among Islamic scholars.
4.2.2 T h e  P r o h i b i t i o n  o f  G h a r a r
The second issue that affects financial transactions is the Islamic prohibition of 
gharar. Gharar has no precise meaning and Islamic jurists have differed on its
200 Shihata, supra note 198, at 26.
201 M a t  25.
202 VOGEL ET al., supra note 178, at 73 (Kluwer Law International, 1998).
203 Id. Also, this is referred to as “riba al-jahiliyya".
204 Id.
205 On riba in sales see VOGEL ET AL., supra note 178, at 74-77.
206M
207 VOGEL ET AL., supra note 178, at 77. For more detailed study on riba and the different opinions o f  
the different Islamic Schools see SALEH, supra note 196.
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definition. Literally, gharar means fraud but in transactions the word gharar is 
normally used to mean risk, uncertainty, hazard and speculation. Hence, 
because of gharar, Islamic Shari’a prohibits any transaction which involve 
unjustified enrichment through pure chance208 9112 213and any transaction which involves 
elements of speculation. Also, because of gharar, Islamic Shari’a considers a 
contract of sale invalid where there is uncertainty regarding the object of the sale or 
its price. Thus, gharar “includes both ignorance of the material attributes of the 
subject-matter of a sale, and also uncertainty regarding its availability and 
existence”.214 A classical example is the sale of a fish in the sea.215
However, the different definitions of gharar that are given by the different Islamic 
Schools have resulted in different implementations of the concept to the various 
transactions. Vogel divides the implementations of the concept of gharar into two 
main approaches.216 *218These are the restrictive approach and the broader approach. 
According to Vogel the majority are adopting the restrictive approach. An 
example of the restrictive approach is the prohibition by some Islamic Schools of the 
sale of non-existing objects at all. Another Islamic School has allowed the sale of 
non-existing objects on the condition that the buyer has the right to reject the goods
910even if it fits the description.
208 Mohammad Kamali, Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futures and Options, at 86 
(Islamic Texts Society, 2000).
209 Id
2l0Id.
211 Mervyn Lewis, 'Wealth Creation through Takaful (Islamic Insurance), at 8 paper presented at the 
Islamic Wealth Creation Conference, University o f  Durham, July 2003 (on file with author).
212 Id. at 7. E.g., Islam prohibits gambling.
213 Id. at 8.
214 Kamali, supra note 208, at 85.
215 Vogel ET AL, supra note 178, at 89.
216 Id  at 91.
2]1Id.
218 Shaifi School adopts this approach.
2,9 Hanafi School supports such view.
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However, the supporters of the broader approach hold the view that the sale of 
non-existing objects is valid on the condition that upon the production of the object: 
it must conform to the description.220 21 Another liberal approach towards the 
interpretation of gharar has been introduced by Ibn Taymiyya who argued that 
gharar is a matter of degree. Hence, if the contract involves a trivial gharar, the 
contract should be valid. As will be seen, the concept of gharar will have 
implications on financial systems. Even the liberal approaches to the interpretation of 
gharar “would not countenance the conscious assumption of risk inherent in many 
modem financial transactions, such as dérivâtes or insurance, or, most of all, use of 
these transactions for sheer speculation”.223
4.2.3 T h e  S h a r i  ’a a n d  I n v e s t o r s  ’ E x p e c t  a t i o n s  i n  C o n v e n t i o n a l  F i n a n c e  
The above discussions of riba and gharar shed some light on why conventional 
financial transactions are in conflict with the principles of Islamic Shari’a. This does 
not mean, however, that Islamic Shari’a is against profit making. Thus, Islamic 
Shari’a differs from conventional finance in terms of the means in making the 
profits. Profit making is legitimate under the Shari’a as long as, inter alia, riba is not 
existent and gharar is eliminated. Thus, profit making is achieved through using 
different structures that will be outlined in the next Section.
It can be argued then that the prohibition of gharar and riba present a challenge to 
the investors who are used to modem finance techniques and indeed to their 
expectations in terms of profit-making and risk management. Thus, investors who are 
used to conduct their businesses using conventional finance methods have high






expectations in terms of the protection available to minimise any risks. This is might 
be attributed to the fact that conventional financial systems and their practices are 
emanating from the West and predominated by the Anglo-American legal systems. 
The Anglo-American legal systems are pro-creditor in their nature and do grant a 
legal flexibility to the creditors or the financial institutions in structuring and 
managing the risks.224
In addition, the views and policies that are propagated by the major international 
financial institutions and discussed earlier in this. Chapter add another dimension 
towards what “would-be” expected from a developing country or an emerging 
market. While this might have contributed to the high expectations of the investors, 
this might not be the case when one considers the Islamic Shari’a and its views 
which oblige the investors to undertake certain level of risk to justify any profits. 
Such will be further highlighted in the next Section which considers the development 
of “Islamic finance”.
4.3 The Development of Islamic Finance225 
Warde opines that Islamic countries regardless of their ideological learnings 
have learned to live with interest and modem finance.226 This is true, as Islamic 
countries had no alternatives. In addition, the Arab and the Islamic countries with 
varying degrees had to borrow laws that are modelled on Western laws. In the 1970s, 
however, economic and political events have challenged these facts and “helped to 
create a more acute sense of an original Islamic identity, and a collective feeling that
224 That is not to deny that fact that other developed countries maintain viable legal systems such as 
France and Germany.
225 Most o f  the following discussions under this Section are based on the author’s co-authored 
publication. See Amr Marar et al., Islamic Securities Exchanges: Principles and International 
Developments, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND EXCHANGES LAW, (eds., Michael Blair et al., Oxford 
University Press, 2006).
226 Warde, supra note 165, at 49.
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the Shari’a should guide and govern the lives of Muslims in all their daily 
interactions, and not be confined merely to personal and family matters. As a result, 
there is a growing impetus for a fresh evaluation and interpretation of the original 
principles of the Shari’a, with the aim of reasserting the Shari’a as a valid and 
reasonable corpus of commercial and civil law”.227 28
In the light of this, there was a pressing need to develop an Islamic-compliant 
functional equivalent for the existing conventional interest-bearing financial systems. 
To this effect, major initiatives have been introduced and extensive researches took 
place to introduce an Islamic banking model which has developed later to encompass 
other financial sectors such as capital markets and the insurance sector. These 
initiatives were based on major reviews of the Islamic Shari ’a including Islamic fiqh 
and culminated with the development of “Islamic finance”. Islamic finance, 
therefore, is a new development and a novel financial innovation aimed at satisfying 
both the modem needs and their Islamic compliance.
Thus, “Islamic finance” services are based, in their objectives and operations, 
on the principles of the Quran and the Sunna. In this sense, “Islamic finance” is 
different from conventional finance which has no such preoccupations. Also, 
“Islamic finance” involves more than banking and it includes investment funds, 
insurance, capital markets and other non-banks.229 In providing Islamic-compliant 
services, Islamic financial institutions should incorporate certain Islamic principles in 
their operations. Hence, Islamic financial institutions should avoid riba and gharar, 
discussed above.
227 Saleh, supra note 162, at 11.
228 Based on Warde’s definition o f  “Islamic financial institutions”. See Warde, supra note 165, at 5.
229 Id. at 6.
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Another principle that should be singled out is that, under Islamic Shari’a
"5 A
principles, any financial gain without effort or liability is prohibited. Islamic 
Shari ’a is not against financial gains or profits as long as an effort is performed or a 
partial liability is accepted. This “risk-bearing” concept of Islamic finance applies 
to both labour and capital. Thus, Islamic Shari ’a does not allow payment to labour 
unless there is an effort is performed and it does not allow any reward for capital 
unless it is exposed to business risks.230 133 In this sense, Islamic financing transactions 
should be based on a “risk-sharing” basis between the financier and the borrower. 
Islamic finance is, therefore, different from conventional finance because its 
structures would normally need an approval from an Islamic Shari ’a committee for 
its Islamic Shari ’a compliance.234
The Islamic finance industry has grown tremendously during the last decade. 
Islamic-compliant finance products are estimated to worth USD 500 billion and are 
projected to grow at 12 to 15 % per annum for the next ten years.235 Many Islamic 
countries have recognised Islamic finance formally. Thus, Malaysia, as will be seen 
in Chapter Five, has formally recognised Islamic finance and developed a successful 
Islamic financial system alongside its conventional financial system. It has also 
introduced a viable legal framework to govern these Islamic finance activities. Other 
G.C.C Member States, as will also be seen later in this volume, have followed the 
same route.
230 Diederik van Schaik, Islamic Banking, 3 The Arab Bank. Rev . 45, at 46 ,2001.
231 Id.
232 Ausaf Ahmed, The Evolution of Islamic Banking, 15, at 17 in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAMIC 
Banking and Finance, (Institute o f Islamic Banking and Finance, 1995).
233 /¿.
234 Normally Islamic banks will have a Shari "a committee comprising o f  Shari’a scholars who will 
review the transaction documentations to ensure the transaction’s compliance with Islamic Shari’a.




The growth of “Islamic finance” is not confined to Islamic countries. Certain 
non-Islamic countries have already adjusted certain laws to facilitate Islamic finance 
transactions.236 Other countries have licensed for Islamic bank and have expressed 
their interest in “Islamic finance”. For example, the City of London, one of the 
leading international financial centres, has been witnessing recently a growing 
competition among major law firms, banks and insurance institutions in providing 
“Islamic finance” services to their clients.237
Given the rapid growth of “Islamic finance”, there has been a need to bring the 
industry within the global mainstream of regulation. To this effect, various 
multilateral Islamic Financial Institutions and standard-setting bodies have 
emerged.238 Their main objective is to contribute in building Islamic international 
standards and best practices as well as shaping up the “Islamic financial 
architecture”.239 These institutions include, inter alia, the Islamic Financial Services 
Board, the Islamic Development Bank and the Accounting & Auditing Organisation
236 E.g., the UK has amended certain tax-related rules to accommodate Islamic finance transactions. 
See the Finance Act (2005) and Finance Act (2006). In addition, the UK Financial Services Authority 
is studying introducing specific regulations to regulate Islamic finance products and has published a 
consultation paper to this effect. See generally FSA, REGULATION OF HOME REVERSION AND HOME 
PURCHASE PLANS, Consultation Paper 06/8, April (2006) available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk
237 E.g., the Securities and Investment Institute; a widely respected professional body for those who 
work in the securities and investment industry in the UK has introduced the “Islamic Finance 
Qualification”. See generally http://www.sii.org.uk. See also Rodney Wilson, Islamic Banking in the 
United Kingdom, 148 New HORIZON 5, (2005). See Islamic Bank o f Britain http://www.islamic- 
bank.com and the European Islamic Investment Bank (EIIB) http://www.eiib.co.uk/. See also, 
Editorial, Is EIIB Thinking What UK Muslims are Thinking, 110/111 ISLAMIC BANKER 22, (2005). 
Also other banks have launched Islamic products through their London subsidiaries: The Arab 
Banking Corporation has launched Alburaq Islamic products to retail customers in UK and Europe; 
see http://www.alburaq.co.uk. See also Mushtak Parker, Alburaq Ascends Mortgage Ladder, 100 
Islamic Banker 18, (2004). HSBC has also launched Islamic finance products see 
http://www.hsbcamanah.com/. Also, Lloyds TSB Bank has launched its Islamic banking current 
account in the UK; see Mushtak Parker, Lloyds TSB Launches Islamic Current Account, 108/109 
Islamic Banker 16, (2005).
238 See Chapter Five for further discussion.
239 Islamic Financial Institutions are those multilateral Islamic institutions that have been established 
to oversee the Islamic finance industry and to work towards its standardisation such as the Islamic 
Financial Services Board, Islamic Development Bank and the Accounting and Auditing Organisation 
for Islamic Financial Institutions. See Chapter Five for full discussion
55
Chapter One
for Islamic Financial Institutions. However, while these institutions have introduced 
various standards, their practical implementation is yet to be seen.
At this stage, it is helpful for the purposes of this thesis, to briefly introduce the 
main Islamic financing modes as well as other products such as Islamic sukuk {i.e., 
bonds)240 and Islamic takaful {i.e., insurance) since these Islamic finance modes are 
not only used for banking transactions but are also used in structuring various 
Islamic-compliant capital market structures. The Islamic financing modes can be 
divided into two broad categories, namely, the Profit and Loss Sharing and the Non- 
Profit and Loss Sharing financing modes.
4 , 3 . 1  P r o f i t  a n d  Loss S h a r i n g  F i n a n c i n g  M o d e s  ( P L S )
The PLS financing modes are equity financing mechanisms. It is argued that 
these modes are the original mechanisms for financing under Shari’a and upon 
which Islamic financing transactions should be based.241 24 There are two main 
contracts under the PLS financing modes. The first contract is the musharka or 
‘partnership finance’, which is an equity participation contractual relationship 
between the parties. Under the musharka structure, the financier and the borrower 
each contribute capital and share both the profits and the losses on the basis of their 
share in the capital and their effort. In Islamic banking practice, musharka structures 
are used for both short- and long-term financings.
The second PLS financing mechanism is the mudaraba or ‘trust financing’, 
which is a partnership structure whereby the investment comes from one partner {i.e.,
240 Sukuk is the plural o f  suk which is an Arabic word meaning bond or better referred to as an Islamic 
investment certificate. See Nathif Adam et. al., Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, 
Structuring and Investing in Sukuk, at 3 (Euromoney, 2004).
241 Usmani, supra note 192, at xv. See also SAMI TAMER, THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A 
Critical Analysis and Suggestions for Improving its Efficiency, (Peter Lang, 2005).
242 Tamir, supra note 241, 83-84.
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the beneficial owner of the capital)243 and the management is the exclusive 
responsibility of the other (i.e., the mudarib or “management trustee”)-244 Under this 
structure, the Islamic bank provides the entire capital needed for the financing and 
shares in the profits with the borrower {i.e., the management trustee) at a 
predetermined ratio. However, losses are entirely borne by the bank. A model of 
mudaraba, the “two-tier mudarabd’, enables the Islamic bank to act as an 
intermediary between investors (depositors) and entrepreneurs (borrowers).245
The “two-tier mudarabd” structure consists of two mudaraba contracts: the 
unrestricted mudaraba and the restricted mudaraba. The Islamic bank enters into an 
unrestricted mudaraba with its depositor whereby the depositor provides the capital 
and the bank acts as a “management trustee” enjoying a complete and unrestricted 
freedom in using the funds. Then, the bank enters into a restricted mudaraba contract 
with the entrepreneur (i.e., borrower). Here, the bank is acting as a “capital provider” 
and the entrepreneur is the “management trustee”. The contract is restricted because 
the bank agrees to finance a specific project carried out by a specific entrepreneur.246
4 . 3 . 2  N o n  -  P r o f i t  a n d  L o s s  S h a r i n g  F i n a n c i n g  M o d e s  ( N o n - P L S )
In essence, unlike PLS financing modes, the Non-PLS financing modes are not 
financing mechanisms. They have, however, been adjusted and reshaped in order to 
be used in Islamic financing transactions. There are three main Non-PLS financing 
modes, namely murabaha, istisna and ijara. Unlike the PLS financing modes,
243 Rodney Wilson, The Issue o f Interest and the Islamic Financing Alternatives, 13(1) J.I.B.L 23, at 
25, (1998).
244 Id.
245 Islamic Capital Market Fact Finding Report: Report of the Islamic Capital Market 
Task Force of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, at 11, July, 
(2004).
246 V. SUNDARARAJAN ET AL., ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCTS IN THE GLOBAL 
Financial System: Key Issues in Risk Management and Challenges Ahead, at 21, IMF 
Working Paper, November (2002).
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murabaha and istisna are forms of Islamic debt financing and ijara is.a form of 
quasi-debt financing.
Murabaha, or ‘cost plus financing’, in essence, is a sale contract. Under 
the murabaha structure, the bank buys the assets, which means that ownership is 
transferred to the bank which therefore takes certain risks associated with ownership. 
The bank then sells the assets to the client at a price which includes the bank’s profit. 
The client pays for the assets in instalments over an agreed period of time. This 
transaction is a debt-financing mechanism because, when the bank sells the assets to 
the client on an instalment basis, a creditor-debtor relationship is created. The 
murabaha structure is usually used in international trade financing.
In construction or manufacturing projects, Islamic financiers have developed 
the concept of istisna, or ‘commissioned manufacturing’.247 849 2501Istisna is a “kind of sale 
where a commodity is transacted before it comes into existence. It means to order a 
manufacturer to produce a specific commodity for the purchaser”. Islamic banks 
enter into a “back-to-back istisna” structure which involves two contracts. The
first contract is between the Islamic bank and the manufacturer whereby the bank 
acts as the buyer of the manufactured assets. The second contract is between the 
client and the Islamic bank whereby the bank acts as the seller or the manufactured 
assets.
247 Wilson, supra note 243, at 27.
248 USMANI, supra note 192, at 37.
249 Gohar Bilal, Islamic Finance: Alternatives to the Western Model, 23 Fletcher. F. World Aff. 145, 
154,(1999).
250 USMANI, supra note 192, at 88.
251 Ariel Berschadsky, Innovative Financial Securities in the Middle East: Surmounting the Ban on 
Interest in Islamic Law, 9 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 107,116, (2001).
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Another structure which is commonly used by Islamic banks is the ijara; 
normally referred to as ‘lease financing’.252 253Under an ijara agreement, the Islamic 
bank purchases an asset and leases it to the client. Unlike conventional leasing 
provided by conventional banks, under the ijara structure, the ownership risks that 
are associated with the asset are borne by the Islamic bank. Some structures involve a 
lease purchase arrangement or ijara wa iqitina. Under this structure a lessee will 
be able to purchase the leased asset at the end of the lease period.
4 . 3 . 3  I s l a m i c  C a p i t a l  M a r k e t  P r o d u c t s  •
While conventional bonds are deemed non-Shari ’a compliant due to the 
“interest” involved, equity securities such as shares have not attracted major 
criticisms from Islamic scholars because in essence they represent ownership and 
some element of “risk-sharing” which are in compliance with Islamic Shari ’a.254 
However, with the development of “Islamic finance” certain Islamic finance products 
have been introduced to the market. The following discussion gives a brief summary 
of “Islamic finance” based equity securities and sukuk.
Ideologically, Islamic law has always encouraged equity financing. Islamic 
jurists, therefore, hold the view that the ownership and trading of common stock is 
permissible.255 256However, screening criteria have been developed as a yardstick for 
permissible Islamic-compliant stock investments. These criteria, although 
arbitrary, have received recognition by many Islamic jurists and are being 
implemented by Islamic stock indexes. Screening is a developed practice that serves
252 Bilal, supra note 249, at 154.
253 Ausaf Ahmad, Contemporary Practices of Islamic Financing Techniques, at 46 (IRTI, 
1993).
254 See Luayy Al-Rimawi, Middle East: Islamic Models o f Equity Markets, 21 Company Lawyer 161, 
at 161, (2000). (arguing that because equity represents risk capital in conventional finance, Islamic 
jurists were prepared to accept existing equity market models instead o f developing Islamic ones).
255 TAMIR, supra note 241, at 108-109.
256 Id. a t l l l .
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as a benchmark in including or excluding publicly traded securities from investment 
portfolios based on the principles of Islamic Shari’a?51
In equity investments, the screening process can be divided into qualitative and 
quantitative criteria. The qualitative criterion involves mentoring the activities of 
the investment to ensure its compatibility with the Islamic Shari'a. Thus, the 
activities of the company which has issued the stock must be permissible and 
Islamic-compliant.257 859 This means that companies involved in non-Islamic business 
activities such as the distribution of alcoholic beverages would fail to meet the 
qualitative criterion.
The second screening criterion is the quantitative criterion which is a set of 
financial ratio filters. These financial ratios involve a precise measurement of the 
underlying investment accounts to ensure that they are Shari'a compliant.260 Because 
Islamic Shari'a prohibits riba, the quantitative criterion involves examining the 
underlying investment accounts to ensure that the proportion of the investee 
company’s income that derived from interest is minimal. In addition, due to the
Islamic prohibition of interest-bearing debts, the criterion also examines the debt-to-
' <. ■ .
equity finance of the underlying investment to ensure that the debt proportion is at
257 F. Scott Valpey, Structuring Islamic Equity Funds, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTH HARVARD 
University Forum on Islamic Finance (September 30 - October 1 2000) 263, at 264 (Centre for 
Middle Eastern Studies-Harvard University, 2002).
258 Trevor Norman, Islamic Investments Funds, in Islamic ASSET MANAGEMENT: FORMING THE 
FUTURE FOR S h a r i ’a -  Compliant Investment Strategies, at 6 (Sohail Jaffer ed., Euromoney 
Books) [hereinafter ISLAMIC ASSET MANAGEMENT]
259 TAMIR, supra note 241, at 109.
260 Rodeny Wilson, Screening Criteria for Islamic Equity Funds, in ISLAMIC ASSET MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 258, 35, at 39.
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acceptable levels. The following are the common financial ratios that must be less 
than 33 per cent:261 62 263
1. total debt divided by trailing 12-month average market capitalization;
2. the sum of company's cash and interest-bearing securities divided by the 
trailing 12-month average market capitalization; and
3. accounts receivable divided by the trailing 12-month average market
It seems from the above that “Islamic finance” based equity securities are some 
form of “fine-tuning” rather than complete innovation. Islamic sukuk, on the other 
hand, have been introduced to provide a functional equivalent to conventional bonds 
because they are completely deemed to be non-Shari ’a compliant. Thus, while a 
conventional bond is a loan of money creating a creditor-debtor relationship that 
involves “interest”, an Islamic bond represents an ownership stake in an existing 
asset. Hence, trading in Islamic bonds equates to the transfer of ownership 
interests while trading in conventional bonds is a sale of debt. The structures of 
Islamic bonds may take various forms that are based on one or combination of more 
than one of the Islamic financing modes discussed above. Further analysis of these 
structures is dealt with in Chapter Three.
4.3.4 Isla m ic  In s u r a n c e - T ak af u l
One of the main objections to the business of insurance under Islamic Shari ’a 
is that insurance violates the gharar (uncertainty) principle.264 This is because the 
benefits of the insurance contracts depend on future events which are unknown at the
261 The debt-to-equity ratios have been subject to debate. However, the advent o f Dow Jones Islamic 
Market (DJIM) Indexes has codified the practice. See generally, http://www.djindexes.com/.
262 These are the ratios applied by the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index. For a company to be included 
in the index, it has to meet these ratios.
263 Adam ET. AL., supra note 240, at 52.




time of signing the agreement. Thus, the insured is uncertain as to whether the 
payment will be paid as promised, how much is going to be, or when it is going to be 
paid.265 66 267Another objection to the insurance business is that insurance companies 
invest their premiums in interest-based investments. Hence, insurance companies’ 
investments are riba-based and contravene Islamic Shari ’a.268 269In the light of this, an 
Islamic form of insurance, known as takaful is developed.
760Takaful, which means “guaranteeing each other”, is a concept based on 
social solidarity, mutual assistance and co-operation.270 Takaful is co-operative in the 
sense that all participants are both the insured and the insurers themselves.271 27*Thus, 
under takaful, policyholders pay a periodic contribution in a collective pool and 
agree that in event of a covered loss, each policyholder will make a proportionate gift 
from his account to cover the loss. Also, policyholders’ contributions are invested 
in a manner compatible with the Islamic Shari ’a. The takaful contract is based on the 
concept of tabarru ’ (i.e., to donate or contribute). Under this arrangement, policy­
holders agree to pay a contribution to a common pool out of which compensation is 
paid.274
4.4 Islamic Finance in the Global Economy 
It is a truism that “Islamic finance” has developed as an alternative means of 
finance to satisfy Islamic Shari ’a requirements, but it is fair to argue, however, that
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 VOGEL ET AL, supra note 178, at 150.
268 Lewis, supra note 211, at 12. Also it is argued that insurance is like gambling which is prohibited 
by the Islamic Shari 'a.









the Islamic finance industry, through its Islamic Financial Institutions and standard­
setting bodies, is moving towards more integration within the global economy. This 
is true especially that the globe, especially after the recent financial crises, is moving 
towards harmonisation of financial practices and strengthening of the international 
financial architecture. Therefore, Islamic banks are under pressure to comply with 
these standards and norms. Warde agrees stating: “at the international level, the 
major Islamic banking groups rather than trying to establish a global Islamic network 
that would rival the global banking system, are keen on remaining within that 
system...”* 276 *278
In addition, the co-operation between Islamic banks and the international 
conventional banking system in terms of experience, resources, correspondent 
banking and management agreements has been essential towards developing the 
Islamic banking system which lacked resources at early stage of its development.
In fact one has referred to the “Islamic finance” as being “not truly independent” of 
the modem financial complex. To this end, Islamic Financial Institutions have 
been co-operating with the World Bank and the IMF in shaping up their international 
Islamic standards.279 This does not mean, however, undermining the main objective 
of the Islamic Financial Institutions which is “to achieve a full integration within 
global economy but at the same time to construct their institutional difference at the
f 75 Kristin Smith, Islamic Banking and the Politics o f International Financial Harmonisation, 167 in 
Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues, at 168 (Nazim Ali ed., Harvard Law 
School, 2005).
276 WARDE, supra note 165, at 107.
111 Id. at 108.
278 Umar Moghul et. al., Contractual Forms in Islamic Finance Law and Islamic Inv. Co. o f the Gulf 
(Bahamas) Ltd. V. Symphony Gems N. V. & ORS: A First Impression o f Islamic Finance, 27 FORDHAM 
INT’l L.J. 150, AT 151, (2003).
279 Smith, supra note 275, at 175-176.
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global level and to create a separate financial architecture”.280 Such special 
characteristics of the growing Islamic financial architecture are discussed in Chapter 
Five.
4.4 Islamic Countries: The Problem Defined 
In the light of the modernisation process being undertaken by most Islamic 
countries in developing their financial systems and securities markets, the main 
challenge is the reconciliation between the Islamic Shari’a and modem finance in 
order to create a viable legal system that accommodate a market-led financial system. 
As already mentioned, Islamic countries have learned to live with modem finance 
and interest prior to the development of “Islamic finance”. However, with the 
development of “Islamic finance”, Islamic countries are recognising “Islamic 
finance” practices. Generally speaking, it is fair to state that almost every Islamic 
country does have both conventional and Islamic financial activities. The interaction 
of these activities with the legal systems of the relevant Islamic countries have 
generated many issues that need to be addressed by policy makers in order to create 
more efficient market-led financial systems.
Thus, conventional financial activities in the Islamic countries, at varying 
degrees, have always been subject to legal risks caused by the inconsistencies 
between elements of the Islamic Shari ’a and modem finance. Al-Rimawi explains 
perfectly these implications stating:
“...Shari’a produces unquantifiable juridical risks that at best render 
“offending” modem Arab commercial legislation precarious, and at worst may 
result in annulling it... However, in so far as Arab countries maintain this
280 Id. at 169.
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incongruous dichotomy between general principles of law enshrined in Shari ’a 
and particular secular laws, judicial risks will always jeopardise the certitude of 
modem commercial legislation.”281
Faced with this dilemma, Al-Rimawi correctly opines that “remedying this 
legal contradiction...requires the political will to reconstruct Arab constitutions. 
Nevertheless, such a reconstruction (which may be perceived as de-Islamising its 
legal systems) will undoubtedly encounter many misgivings..,”282
But even at the “Islamic finance” front, these legal risks, although at a lesser 
extent, are not absent. The developed “Islamic finance” practice is based on new 
interpretations of the Shari’a ’s primary sources. Hence, “Islamic finance” practices 
might face rejection and challenges when disputes arise. Nevertheless, as will be 
seen later in this volume, the Islamic finance community is shaping up an Islamic 
financial architecture and a standardisation of the Islamic finance practices to 
mitigate such implications.
When examining the financial systems of the Islamic and Arab countries 
closely, one may observe different approaches or models that have developed. 
Firstly, the traditional approach of most Arab countries is that a conventional 
financial system is functioning within their “positive” laws with some elements of 
the Islamic Shari ’a. Under this approach fits most of the Arab countries that have 
both civil and commercial codes. Also, these countries are witnessing the 
development of “Islamic finance”. Under this traditional approach fits other certain 
countries that unlike other Arab countries maintain Islamic Shari 'a as the paramount 
legal system of the country. Saudi Arabia, for example, maintains a conventional




financial system within an Islamic Shari ’a. In this sense, the interaction between the 
Islamic Shari’a and the conventional financial system in a country such as Saudi 
Arabia is more likely.
Other Islamic countries, however, have accommodated conventional financial 
systems in a more efficient way. Malaysia is a good example in accommodating a 
conventional financial system which may be attributed to the fact that Malaysia is a 
common law based country. In addition, Malaysia has also developed a different 
approach that Arab countries are trying to follow. Malaysia, as an Islamic country, 
has developed an Islamic financial system alongside its conventional financial 
system. Thus, developing a dual financial system that comprises both conventional as 
well as “Islamic finance” components.
Finally, in realising the importance of the financial services few Arab countries 
are desirous to develop this sector and in doing so these countries have adopted a 
new approach. The United Arab Emirates, for example, in building up the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC) has introduced the phenomenon of 
“segregation”. To this effect, the DIFC is completely segregated from the U.A.E’s 
legal system. This, is believed, grants the required confidence in the DIFC’s legal 
framework and attracts foreign investors.
5. Conclusion
The discussions throughout this Chapter reveal that Islamic countries have 
experienced or are experiencing certain “legal unrests” resulting from the interaction 
between global economy trends, which require market-led financial systems, and the 
principles of Islamic Shari ’a. These “legal unrests” have left certain Islamic 
countries with undesirable situations whereby a conventional financial system is
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functioning within an Islamic Shari’a body, such as in Saudi Arabia, and therefore 
jeopardising certain modem finance transactions.
The Chapter also explained, by way of given assumptions, that the requirements 
of a sustainable economic development are the move towards market economy, 
building an appropriate rule-based economic and financial legal infrastructures; and 
such infrastructures require a genuine procedural and substantive rule of law 
orientation. However, if the “legal unrests” continue to exist, these requirements 
might be undermined. To avoid such consequences, Islamic countries have 
developed “Islamic finance” practices in order to provide a functional equivalent of 
finance but at the same time to comply with Islamic Shari’a requirements. In 
addition, certain Islamic countries have developed certain models, such as in 
Malaysia and DIFC, which provide viable examples for other Islamic emerging 
markets such as Saudi Arabia.
In the light of the discussions presented throughout this Chapter and having laid 
the foundations, the study in this volume aims to place the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
under the “legal microscope” to analyse its legal and financial systems vis-à-vis the 
trends of global economy. In pursuing this objective, the volume firstly examines the 
Saudi legal and financial systems at the macro level highlighting its existing de facto 
duality that has resulted from the interaction between the Saudi Islamic Shari’a legal 
system and the global economy trends and which, as argued in this volume, 
undermines the proper functionality of the existing Saudi conventional financial 
system (Chapter Two). Secondly, the volume takes the investigation further by 
examining the impacts of this interaction at the micro level by focusing on 
securitisations (Chapter Three) and secured transactions (Chapter Four).
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Finally, the thesis concludes that Saudi Arabia is one of those Islamic countries 
that are experiencing “legal unrests”. Further, the thesis proposes that these “legal 
unrests” can be eliminated and a better market-led financial system can be developed 
if Saudi Arabia adopts a two level reform process (Chapter Five). The first level 
would include establishing an Islamic financial system alongside its existing 
conventional financial system, following the Malaysian model but also taking into 
consideration the international efforts by the Islamic Financial Institutions and 
standard-setting bodies as well as other regional efforts by the G.C.C countries. In 
other words, a “three-dimension” approach incorporating the national model of 
Malaysia, the regional efforts of the G.C.C Member States and the international 
efforts by the Islamic Financial Institutions.
The second level of the reform process would involve incorporating the 
“segregation” phenomenon as adopted by the Dubai International Financial Centre 
(DIFC). This would mean segregating the Saudi domestic conventional finance 
component from the overall legal system and therefore eliminating any legal risks 
that may arise from the interaction between the Islamic Shari’a and conventional 
finance. Such combination, is hoped, should provide an opportunity for the Saudi 
government to have the better of both worlds: a special and robust financial system 
that is well-rooted in the domestic culture and interconnected with the growing 
Islamic regional financial markets in the G.C.C Region and that also makes foreign 
investment and financing in Saudi Arabia and the Region more attractive and 





Saudi Arabia: The ‘Duality’ Of The Legal System And The 
Challenge Of Adopting Market Economy- Oriented, 
Commercial And Financial Laws*
CHAPTER OUTLINE
1. Introduction
2. The Economic Policies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
2.1 The Saudi Membership in the World Trade Organisation
2.2 Saudi Arabia as a Member in the G.C.C - The Economic Objectives
2.3 The Saudi Five-Year Economic Plans
2.4 Concluding Remarks
3. The Financial System in Saudi Arabia
3.1 The Banking Sector
3.2 The Capital Market
3.3 The Insurance Sector
4. Saudi Arabia: The ‘Duality’ of the Legal System
4.1 The Concept of ‘Duality’: Searching for a Definition
4.2 Historical Background
4.3 The Legal System in Saudi Arabia
4.3.1 The Paramount Legal System in Saudi Arabia
4.3.2 The Implications of Islamic Shari ’a on the Saudi Financial System
4.3.3 The Modernisation of the Saudi Legal System
4.3.3.1 The Saudi Commercial Law and Commercial Disputes
4.3.3.2 The Saudi Banking Law and Banking Disputes
4.3.3.3 The Saudi Capital Market Law and Securities Disputes
4.3.3.4 The Saudi Insurance Law and Insurance Disputes
4.3.4 Final Observations
5. The Saudi Duality at Crossroads
6. Conclusion
* In connection with the author’s doctoral research, this Chapter has been published in two articles 
with the doctoral supervisor’s permission. See Amr Marar, The Co-operation Council for the Arab 
States o f the Gulf 10(3) LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 475 (2004) and Saudi Arabia: The Duality o f the 




In line with the global economy trends discussed in the previous Chapter, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia like other developing countries and emerging markets is 
adopting new market-oriented economic policies1 and is undergoing some form of 
financial sector law reform. Such policy shift is necessary in order to link the Saudi 
financial system regionally with the Gulf Co-operation Council (G.C.C) and 
internationally with the international capital markets. It also facilitates meeting the 
Saudi significant capital formation and sustainable economic development needs.2 
The government’s strong commitment to development and financial reform are 
exemplified by the Saudi proactive roles at the international, regional and national 
levels.
Thus, the Saudi persistence to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) despite 
the obstacles that encountered its membership application shows its commitment to 
join global economy. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia has played a leading role in 
the formation of the G.C.C. Additionally, at the domestic level; Saudi Arabia 
publishes a rolling five-year plan to achieve certain economic targets. To date, these 
economic plans have generated the enactment of several new economic-related laws. 
Yet, despite these economic plans and economic laws adopted to improve the legal 
infrastructure by the government, some commentators have cast doubt as to the 
effectiveness of the existing legal framework in Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis economic 
development.3
1 See Section 2 infra.
2 E.g., Saudi Arabia will need up to $15 billion new money a year, o f  which 30% will come in equity. 
However, local banking will be able to finance only $3 billion. The difference will have to come from 
international capital market. See Nigel Dudley, The Banker, 2002, supplement, 23, at 24.
3 See, e.g., Monica Malik, The Role o f the Private Sector, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI 
Arabia, at 126 (Rodney Wilson ed., RoutledgeCurzon, 2004)
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Being an Islamic country that maintains Islamic Shari’a as the paramount legal 
system, Saudi Arabia is undergoing certain “legal unrests” resulting from the 
interaction between Islamic Shari’a and the global economy trends. Thus, while 
Islamic Shari ’a remains the paramount and primary legal system in Saudi Arabia, the 
government has come to allow a separate, Western-based commercial law system to 
function within the Islamic Shari ’a umbrella. For instance, conventional banks are 
allowed to function even though that may introduce inconsistency to the overall legal 
system. This in turn might affect the functionality of certain financial transactions as 
will be seen later in this volume.
However, like other Islamic countries striving to develop their financial systems 
in line with the global economy trends as well as satisfying Islamic Shari’a 
requirements at the same time, “Islamic finance” activities have emerged in Saudi 
Arabia. Thus, the phenomenal growth of the first Islamic bank in Saudi Arabia has 
encouraged other conventional banks to provide Islamic banking services and in fact 
to convert their practices in complete compliance with the provisions of Islamic 
Shari ’a.4 It is also noted that 95 percent of consumer sales activities are carried out in 
a Shari ’a compliant manner.5 However, “Islamic finance” activities in Saudi Arabia, 
unlike other Islamic countries, function in the absence of formal regulatory and legal 
frameworks dedicated to “Islamic finance”.
This Chapter explores the current Saudi financial and legal systems and 
highlights the implications that have resulted from the interaction between Islamic 
Shari’a and global economy at the macro level. It argues that the economic 
transformation process that the Saudi government is currently undertaking is creating
4 Nathif Adam, Converting a Conventional Retail Bank to Islamic Banking, at 41 in ISLAMIC RETAIL 





a dualistic legal system that has intended positive implications on the financial 
system and financial transactions, but in terms of the practical implementation may 
give rise to certain impediments to the establishment of a market-led financial 
system.
To develop an efficient financial system that is necessary for a market-economy, 
Saudi Arabia is advised to eliminate any uncertainties and any “legal unrests” that 
might result from this existing de facto duality. In effect, the government should 
consider the advisability of formally re-organising and modifying this existing de 
facto duality through legally enhancing and co-ordinating both of the legal 
components relating to Islamic and conventional finance. This can be achieved 
through implementing the “segregation” phenomenon adopted by the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC) which would contribute towards segregating 
the conventional financial practice from the overall legal system of Islamic Shari’a. 
Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia is advised to further develop the emerging Islamic 
finance component of its financial system to work alongside its conventional 
counterpart such as in Malaysia. In doing so, Saudi Arabia would link its financial 
system to the international capital markets as well as the Islamic world.
In pursuing this theme, this Chapter considers the Saudi legal and financial systems 
at the macro level and highlights the existing de facto duality. Essential to such 
discussion is to analyse the Saudi economic policies through reviewing its 
membership in the WTO, the economic agreements of the G.C.C in which Saudi 
Arabia is a member and to review the Saudi Economic Development Plans. The third 
Section introduces the Saudi financial system as well as the major Saudi financial 
institutions. The fourth Section analyses the Saudi legal system, highlighting the
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existing de facto duality. The fifth Section poses and attempts to answer the question 
of whether such duality should be maintained.
2. The Economic Policies In The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia
The aim of this Section is to review the related economic policies approved and 
supported by the Saudi government. Thus, in understanding the Saudi economic 
orientation, one can advise what are the possible laws and legal reforms that need to 
be undertaken in order to facilitate the implementation of these economic policies. 
As will be seen, Saudi Arabia is desirous to improve and to develop its economic and 
financial systems. In pursing such objectives, Saudi Arabia has taken measures at 
different levels in order to make a positive contribution to the cause of economic 
development and modernisation.
At the international level, Saudi Arabia applied to join the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Also, Saudi Arabia is a participant in the G-20. The G-20 seeks 
“to promote an open and constructive dialogue between industrial nations and 
emerging markets countries on key issues relating to the international monetary and 
financial system and, in process, to help strengthen the international financial 
architecture”.6 At the regional level, Saudi Arabia is the driving force behind the 
establishment of the G.C.C. The economic objectives and policies of this regional 
integration effort should have a positive impact on the Saudi legal system. Finally, at 
the national level; Saudi Arabia has been undertaking major reforms in order to 
facilitate the implementation of its objectives.
6 See http://www.g20.org /aboutg20.htm.
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2.1 The Saudi Membership in the World Trade Organisation
On 13 June 1993, Saudi Arabia applied to the WTO’s predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), under Article XXXIII.7 The GATT 
1947 Council established a Working Party to examine the application of Saudi 
Arabia but no progress has been achieved. However, pursuant to the decision of the 
General Council of the WTO, the GATT 1947 Accession Working Party was 
transformed into a WTO Accession Working Party.8 The Saudi attempt to join the 
WTO shows its desire to join global economy. However, during the WTO accession 
process, Saudi Arabia has faced certain difficulties that have delayed its membership.
Saudi Arabia as an Islamic conservative country has always had concerns in 
opening its markets. Prior to the full accession of Saudi Arabia to the WTO, one has 
argued that the Saudi application for membership is a mere containment to the 
globalisation forces and that Saudi Arabia had no real desire to actually join the 
WTO.9 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has been finally acceded to the WTO on 11 
December 2005. So, at the policy level it is finally settled that Saudi Arabia is willing 
to comply with the WTO policies and to join global economy but the practical 
implications of such membership are yet to be seen.
Being a member of the WTO, Saudi Arabia is under the obligation to meet the 
WTO standards and to this effect it has undertaken a series of commitments to 
further liberalise its trade regime and accelerate its integration in the world economy. 
This means that Saudi Arabia would apply the WTO agreements uniformly
7 World Trade Organisation, Report of The Working Party on the Accession Of The 
Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia To The World Trade Organization, (11 November 2005), at 1 
[hereinafter Report on the Accession of Saudi Arabia] available at http://www.wto.org
8 Id. at 2.




throughout Saudi Arabia’s customs territory.10 Saudi Arabia will also eliminate any 
non-tariff measures that cannot be justified under the WTO but it still maintains the 
right to restrict the importation and exportation of a certain number of goods and 
services in order to protect public morals, the life and health of the population, 
national security interests, etc.11
In addition, Saudi Arabia will implement the relevant WTO Agreements (i.e., 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).12 Financial services will be allowed to Saudi 
Arabia subject to certain restrictions. Thus, banks will be permitted in the form of a 
locally incorporated joint-stock company or as a branch of an international bank. 
Upon Saudi Arabia’s accession, the foreign equity cap for joint ventures in banking 
will be increased to 60 per cent.13 While financial services can only be provided by 
commercial banks, asset management and advisory services may also be provided by 
non-commercial banking financial institutions.
Generally, however, Saudi Arabia is facing a huge task to adapt and further 
develop its legal and financial systems to meet WTO requirements. Thus, Islamic 
Shari’a has always been an issue during the WTO negotiations. The Saudi 
representatives have had concerns that joining the WTO would jeopardise certain 
Islamic principles. Consider the Saudi reluctance to allow foreign insurance services 
into the country on the ground that insurance practices are against the principles of 
Islamic Shari’a. Prior to the Saudi membership in the WTO, the insurance industry
10 World Trade Organisation, WTO General Council successfully adopts Saudi Arabia's terms of  
Accession, (11 November 2005), available at http://www.wto.org
11 Id.
u Id.
13 The previous equity cap was 49%.
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in Saudi Arabia has always suffered from the lack of legal recognition for a long 
time, as will be seen later in this Chapter.
WTO pressures, however, necessitated the availability of well-developed 
insurance regulations that allow market access to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi reaction 
was to develop “Islamic finance” based insurance namely, “Islamic Co-operative 
Insurance”. As a result, commercial presence of insurance companies in Saudi 
Arabia has become permissible provided that these companies establish a locally 
incorporated Islamic compliant “cooperative insurance” joint-stock company. This 
further highlights that developing “Islamic finance” is a trend resulting from the 
interaction between Islamic Shari ’a and global economy.
2.2 S a u d i  A r a b ia  a s  a  M e m b e r  In  T h e  G.C.C - T h e  E c o n o m ic  O b j e c t iv e s 14
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the G.C.C which was established 
in May 1981.15 The G.C.C consists of six Member States: these are 1) the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia 2) The United Arab Emirates, 3) the Kingdom of Bahrain, 4) the 
Sultanate of Oman, 5) the State of Kuwait and 6) the State of Qatar. The main 
founding documents and regulations that established the G.C.C, its main 
organisations and its executive procedures are the G.C.C Charter, the Supreme 
Council Rules of Procedure, the Ministerial Council Rules of Procedure and finally 
the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Rules of Procedure.
Generally, the aim of the establishment of the G.C.C can be deduced from the 
Charter’s Preamble: “to effect co-ordination, integration, and interconnections
14 For a general study on the economic objectives o f  the G.C.C, see Amr Marar, The Co-operation 
Council for the Arab States o f the Gulf, 10(3) Law and Business Review o f the Americas 475, (2004). 
Also, see generally http://www.gcc-sg.org/
15 The G.C.C has four main organisations: 1) the Supreme Council, 2) the Ministerial Council, 3) the 
Secretariat-General and 4) the Commission for Settlement o f  Disputes.
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between them [Member States] in all fields”.16 Following the approval of the above 
mentioned documents, the Member States concluded the Economic Agreement,17with 
the desire to “to achieve advanced stages of economic integration that would lead to 
a Common Market and an Economic and Monetary Union among Member States 
according to a specific timetable, while enhancing market mechanisms and fostering 
the role of the private sector.. .”.18
Also, the G.C.C Member States have signed and agreed on related strategies in 
respect to different fields. The economic and developmental aims to be achieved as a 
result of these agreements and strategies are the driving force behind this regional 
integration effort. As Member States, including Saudi Arabia, have agreed to apply 
certain economic policies and to unify certain laws that meet the general aims of the 
G.C.C, it is more likely that these regional agreements might affect the policies and 
the laws of each Member State.
A general reading of the G.C.C agreements and policies shows that the economic 
objectives of the G.C.C is in line with the general global trends discussed in the first 
Chapter (i.e., market-economy and liberalisation).19 The economic objectives of the 
G.C.C can be found in five main documents: 1) the G.C.C Charter,20 2) the
16 See the G.C.C CHARTER Preamble, available at http://www.gcc-sg.org/ [hereinafter CHARTER],
17 The Economic Agreement-December, 31, 2001, available at http://library.gcc-sg.org/ [hereinafter 
Economic Agreement], The Economic Agreement amended and revised The Unified Economic 
Agreement, which was signed and approved on November 11, 1981. See Unified Economic 
Agreement, Nov. 11, 1981, available at http://library.gcc-sg.org/ However, art. 32(2) o f  the Economic 
Agreement states that: “[the Economic Agreement] shall supersede the GCC Economic Agreement 
signed in 1981..., and shall supersede equivalent provisions set forth in bilateral agreements [between 
Member States]”.
18 See the Preamble o f the Economic Agreement.
19 See Chapter One , Section 2.1
20 CHARTER art. 4: “1) To effect co-ordination, integration and inter-connection between Member 
States in all fields in order to achieve unity between them. 2) To deepen and strengthen relations, links 
and areas o f  co-operation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields. 3) To formulate 
similar regulations in various fields including the following:
a. Economic and financial affairs. b. Commerce, customs and communications,
c. Education and culture. d. Social and health affairs,
e. Information and tourism. f. Legislative and administrative affairs.
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Economic Agreement (EA), 3) the recently revised Unified Industrial Development 
Strategy (UIDS)21, 4) the amended Joint Agricultural Policy (JAP)22 and 5) the Long­
term Comprehensive Development Strategy (2000-2025) (LCDS).23 Unlike the UIDS 
and the JAP, the general economic objectives can be found in the EA and the 
LCDS.24
The EA consists of nine chapters and thirty three articles. The nine chapters cover 
different issues related to the economic development.25 Under the EA, the Member 
States are obliged to establish a customs union,26 (i.e., to bring into being the Gulf 
Common Market), to unify the currency among the Member States and to achieve an 
economic and monetary union.27 28This includes “the achievement of a high level of 
harmonisation between Member States in all economic policies, especially fiscal and 
monetary policies, banking legislation, setting criteria to approximate rates of 
economic performance related to fiscal and monetary stability, such as rates of
AO
budgetary deficit, indebtedness, and price levels”. Also, the EA obliges the
4) To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields o f  industry, mining, agriculture, 
water, and animal resources; to establish scientific research; to establish joint ventures and encourage 
co-operation by the private sector for the good o f their peoples”.
21 Unified Industrial Development Strategy (revised version), 2000, available at http:// library.gcc- 
sg.org/ [hereinafter UIDS]. The original UIDS was adopted by the Supreme Council in 1985. 
However, the UIDS was revised and a new version was adopted by the Supreme Council in 1998.
22 Joint Agricultural Policy, 1996, available at http:// library.gcc-sg.org/ [hereinafter JAP]. The JAP 
was adopted by the Supreme Council in 1985. However, the JAP was amended and the new amended 
version was adopted in 1996.
23Long Term Comprehensive Development Strategy (2000-2025), 2003, available at http:// 
library.gcc-sg.org/[hereinafter Development Strategy] is a review o f the document Development 
Goals, Policies and Plans for the GCC States which was adopted in 1985. However, this Chapter will 
be covering the Development Strategy. The economic objectives are also covered in the Development 
Goals, Policies and Plans for the GCC States.
24 The UIDS and the JAP are more specific related areas o f  economic development.
25 This Section does not provide a full review o f the Economic Agreement.
26 Economic Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1. See also Common Customs Law for the Arab States of 
the Gulf (January 2003), available at http:// library.gcc-sg.org/ which was adopted in 2001 by the 
Supreme Council; see also Rules o f Implementation o f the Customs Law (January 2003), available at 
http:// library.gcc-sg.org/.




Member States to unify all the investment related laws and regulations,29 to integrate 
financial markets among the Member States and to unify all related legislation and 
policies.30
The EA calls for the implementation of the LCDS.31 The main goal of the LCDS 
is “accomplishing sustainable and integrated development plans, imparting the 
necessary flexibility to serve the goals of development in each state separately and 
jointly at the level of the Council thereby accomplishing constant rise in the quality 
of life of the people in the G.C.C states and instilling the capacity to adjust with the 
developments of the 21st century”.32 In the LCDS, the Member States are to assess 
objectively the challenges facing the G.C.C in various spheres. Taking these 
challenges into consideration, the Member States then are to lay down certain 
objectives and goals to be achieved and to be implemented in order to meet these 
challenges.
In approving the LCDS, the Member States realises the challenges that they face 
in different economic and development spheres. The Member States also recognise 
the growing trend towards globalisation of the economy.33 This includes freeing the 
international trade and investment within the framework of the WTO, quitting 
centralised planning, adopting decentralised planning and establishing a free market 
economy.34 The LCDS ensures that Member States remove all hurdles that prevent 
the movement of economic resources between the Member States and re-emphasise 
the integrated economic partnership.35 It also directs Member States to remove the
29 Id. art. 5(1).
30 Id. art. 5(3).
31 Id. art. 7.
32 See Development Strategy, supra note 23, “The Main Goal and the Strategic Objectives”.
33 See Development Strategy, supra note 23, “Second Set o f  Challenges”. '
34 M
35 See Development Strategy, supra note 23, “Economic Issues”.
79
Chapter Two
sources of vulnerability from the economic environment in the G.C.C states,36 37to
q <7
ensure adequate water resources for development needs, to derive maximum 
benefit from infrastructure facilities,38 to build joint large-scale Gulf projects39 and to 
undertake small-scale projects which will fulfil the objectives of integration between 
the large-scale projects.40
Being a signatory to the above-mentioned agreements and policies shows that the 
government of Saudi Arabia is willing to improve the economic infrastructure by 
taking measures concerning the following:41 1) freeing the international trade and 
investment, 2) adopting a market-oriented economy, 3) enacting laws which 
encourage foreign investors; and 4) unifying its banking and financial legalisations 
with other Member States of the G.C.C
2.3 The Saudi Five-Year Economic Plans
The government of Saudi Arabia has realised the need for economic development 
long before the establishment of the G.C.C.42 In fact, being the driving force behind 
the establishment of the G.C.C as a regional bloc, Saudi Arabia has been laying the 
foundations for a long-term economic development plan.43 In pursing its objective of 
development, the government of Saudi Arabia has established the Ministry of 






41 See Development Strategy, supra note 23, “Mechanisms for Implementing the Strategy”; see also 
mechanism (6) for implementing the Development Strategy, the Member states should “amend 
legislations, laws and resolutions, which are incompatible with efforts aimed at achieving the strategic 
objectives...”
42 See generally, e.g, KING FAISAL AND THE MODERNISATION OF SAUDI ARABIA, (Willard Beling ed., 
Croom Helm Ltd, 1980).
43 There are other non-economic reasons behind the establishment o f the G.C.C
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development plans.44 As explained in the previous Chapter, economic planning is 
normally associated with socialist and communist countries. Ideologically, however, 
planning in Saudi Arabia is not based on any of such ideologies.45 Planning in Saudi 
Arabia has been a ‘macroeconomic exercise’ rather than a detailed ‘microeconomic 
management’.46 The government ensures that its planning policies do not have a 
great interference with the private sector.47
Economic planning in Saudi Arabia was first devised in 1960s. So far, there are 
eight economic plans each of them is covering a period of five years. This section, 
however, does not aim to analyse all the economic plans. Rather, the aim is to 
highlight the common aims shared among the economic plans and to deduce the 
economic orientation of the Saudi government. The basic aims that have been 
addressed in these economic plans include economic diversification and reduction of 
the Saudi dependence on oil revenues, encouraging the role of the private sector, 
improving the standard of living and developing Saudi human resources.
However, the recent plans reflect international and regional dimensions. This is 
because of the Saudi application to join the WTO and its membership in the G.C.C. 
In order to meet the WTO accession requirements, the Saudi government had to 
commit to undertake major reforms and to meet international standards. Also, being 
a member in the G.C.C. Saudi Arabia ensures to conform its economic policies to 
regional requirements of the G.C.C. The recent Saudi economic plans have taken this 
into consideration.
44 See generally http://www.planning.gov.sa/
45 See Wilson, supra note 3, at 22.
46 Id. Wilson argues that planning can be implemented into four basic ways which two o f  them are 
present in Saudi Arabia namely: 1) Designing a public expenditure based on expected resources and 





The First Development Plan covered the period 1970-1975. The main aim of the 
First Plan was for “Saudi Arabia to maintain its religious and moral values, and to 
raise the living standards and welfare of its people, while providing for material 
security and maintaining economic and social stability”.48 The Second Development 
Plan covered the period 1975-1980, a period during which Saudi Arabia witnessed 
significant increase in the oil revenues. The Second Plan focused on the issue of 
industrialisation and the establishment of two new industrial cities. This Plan also 
encouraged the private sector to participate in national development. In facilitating 
the private sector role, the government created Specialised Credit Institutions to 
extend credits to the private sector at favourable prices.49
The Third Development Plan covered the period 1980-1985. The Third Plan re­
emphasised the need to diversify the Saudi economy and to reduce the dependence 
on the oil revenues. To support this policy, the Fourth Development Plan, which 
covers the period 1985-1990, laid down basic themes to restructure the national 
economy in order to enable the private sector to play a greater role in the country; 
namely, 1) greater operational efficiency, 2) increased attention to non-oil revenue­
generating activities such as agriculture, industry and financial services, 3) enhanced 
private sector participation in economic development and 4) greater integration with 
neighbouring G.C.C states.50
The Fifth Development Plan, covering the period 1990-1995, aimed at continuing 
the diversification of the economy and the encouragement of the private sector 
involvement. The implementation of the Fifth Plan was adversely affected by the 
Gulf War in 1999-1991. The Sixth Development Plan, covering the period 1995-
48 See Rodney Wilson, supra note 3, at 23.
49 For example, Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank, see infra Section 3.1.
50 Philip Dew, Saudi Arabia: Restructuring For Growth, at 26 (Euromoney Books, 2003).
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2000, introduced various new initiatives including privatisation. According to Dew, 
by the end of the Sixth Plan the government was successful in establishing the basic 
infrastructure needed to support modem economy.51 In 1999, the government 
established the Supreme Economic Council (SECON) to improve the decision­
making process in relation to the economic policies pursued by the government. The 
SECON has reaffirmed its commitment to apply the principles of free market 
economy.52 53
In line with its predecessor plans, the Seventh Development Plan, covering 2000- 
2005, “emphasised the development of the private sector within the context of a free 
market economy with the aim of preparing this sector to become a major pillar of 
economic activity”. So, it is a governmental policy to adopt a free market economy 
in Saudi Arabia where the private sector will play an important role.54 To this end, 
one of the main strategies of the Seventh Plan is to accelerate the review of all 
regulations related to the private sector.55
The government in adopting the Seventh Plan realises the importance of the 
financial sector. It states “the mobilisation of [the] financial resources will require 
major steps to be taken to make the financial and non-fmancial investment climate in 
the Kingdom more attractive, particularly by improving the financial system’s 
institutional and regulatory framework”.56 This Plan encourages commercial banks to 
develop their activities in order to extend credit on a long-term basis.57 The Seventh
5'ld.
52 Wilson, supra note 3, at 19.
53 See, The Seventh Development Plan, Chapter 7 available at http://www.planning.eov.sa/ 
[hereinafter Seventh Development Plan\.
54 DEW, supra note 50, at 28.
55Seventh Development Plan, supra note 53, Section 7.4.5 “Improving the Regulatory and Investment 
Environment”.
56 Seventh Development Plan, supra note 53, Section 7.5.1 “Role o f the Financial Sector”.
57The dominant share o f  lending (75%) in Saudi Arabia is on a short-term basis. See Seventh 
Development Plan, supra note 53, Section 7.5.2.2 “Commercial Banking System”.
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Plan, also, reflects the governmental policy towards the Specialised Credit
CD
Institutions. The government believes that the role of these institutions should 
decline and that “lending and borrowing activities should be based on market 
requirements and mechanisms”.58 9 Hence, the Seventh Plan calls for developing the 
equity and capital markets.60 Finally, the Seventh Plan lays down the following 
measures in order to develop the financial sector’s institutional framework:61
enacting a securities market law to complement the existing banking control 
law and the companies’ law, along with the development of the capital 
market infrastructure in the Kingdom;
prepare and implement an adequate framework to regulate the securities 
issuance operations by non-bank financial institutions, including off-shore 
institutions;
develop a mechanism in order to regulate and oversee the activities of stock 
markets as is the case in other countries. The stock market regulatory 
agency should establish procedures for issuing new shares with the 
objective of encouraging companies to convert to joint stock companies;
revise the regulations relating to the conversion of firms into joint stock 
companies; and facilitate the process of transformation, especially for 
innovative companies; and establish the institutional and regulatory 
framework to enable the private sector raise capital through the issuance of 
corporate bonds;
58 The Specialised Credit Institutions are governmental institutions which provide loans for specific 
industries, see infra.
59Seventh Development Plan, supra note 53, Section 7.5.2.4 “Specialised Credit Institutions”.
60Seventh Development Plan, supra note 53, Section 7.5.2.3 “Equity Capital Markets”. According to 
the Seventh Development Plan, bond issuing is not available as a source o f  corporate finance.




provide facilities to ensure small and medium-sized firms’ access to capital, 
provided that these facilities will be an integral part of the Kingdom’s 
policies related to diversification and employment creation; and
issue regulations aimed at encouraging commercial banks to provide real 
estate mortgage lending, through appropriate coordination with relevant 
government agencies and departments.
In addition, the Eighth Development Plan, which covers the period 2005-2009, 
reaffirms the Saudi willingness to develop and to improve the financial system. The 
main objectives of the Eighth Development Plan in respect of the Saudi financial 
system are to encourage and mobilise national savings to finance various economic 
activities, to develop local capital markets and insurance services as well as raising 
the level of their efficiency and to contribute to the improvement of the 
performance of the national economy including the diversification of income.62 34 The 
Eighth Plan aims to adopt, inter alia, the following various policies to achieve the 
above objectives:65
encouraging the merger of banks and expanding the establishment of 
specialised investment banks;
supporting a legal framework for residential and commercial mortgages;
supporting the financing of small and medium-scale companies;
establishing a market for corporate bonds, including government enterprises 
bonds;







co-operating with the G.C.C countries for the establishment of regional 
capital markets; and
opening the securities market for foreign investors.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
Having reviewed the Saudi economic initiatives, it is noticeable that Saudi 
Arabia aims to achieve two main broad objectives. Firstly, as a member of the WTO, 
Saudi Arabia is desirous to join global economy and to link its financial system with 
the international capital markets. The Saudi government’s announcement of its desire 
to establish the “King Abdullah Economic City”66 in Jeddah reveals the Saudi 
commitment to develop the financial sector in the country. In line with these 
objectives, Saudi Arabia has also opened its financial services market to foreign 
banks to fulfil its commitments under the WTO agreements.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia aims to further enhance its integration with the 
neighbouring countries of the G.C.C. Thus, The Eighth Development Plan expressly 
provides for further integration with the G.C.C through establishing a regional capital 
market. Saudi Arabia is also committed to further enhance such integration in 
fulfilment of its commitments under the G.C.C agreements. To pursue this objective, 
Saudi Arabia is required to undertake certain measures in relation to its financial 
system in order to achieve some level of harmonisation with other member states of 
the G.C.C.
Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, the G.C.C Member States, as will be seen in 
Chapter Five, have developed “Islamic finance” related regulations. Nevertheless,
66 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, 'King Abdullah Economic City’ launched by 




Saudi Arabia has expressed its intention to develop “Islamic finance” activities 
within its financial system. Thus, the Eighth Development Plan expresses the Saudi 
desire in developing an Islamic mortgage system. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is 
also under the obligation to consider the enactment of “Islamic finance” regulations 
under the G.C.C agreements. Thus, the G.C.C agreements call for some level of 
harmonisation among the G.C.C banking and finance legislations. Presumably, this 
would include “Islamic finance” legislations.
Meeting the entire economic objectives mean that Saudi Arabia would be able to 
attract foreign capital and investments. Such are needed to achieve a broader goal, 
namely; diversifying the economy (i.e., non-oil economy).67 8 To this effect, Saudi 
Arabia is in the process of developing other sectors and industries. The Saudi 
government has already taken certain steps to facilitate this process. For example, 
building a viable investment infrastructure has been a major focus for the Saudi 
government.69 To oversee this process, the government has established the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA).70
SAGIA seeks to improve the investment climate in Saudi Arabia and report any 
suggested reforms to the Supreme Economic Council71 which is the top economic 
policy making body in Saudi Arabia. In 2005, SAGIA has issued licenses for 642 
foreign and joint-venture projects with an investment capital of Saudi Riyal 202
67 Eight Development Plan, supra note 62, at 320.
68 Diversification o f  the Saudi economy is one o f  the main priorities on the Saudi agenda. See SAUDI 
Arabian Monetary Agency, Forty-Second Annual Report (2006), at 36 [hereinafter Annual 
REPORT (2006)] available at http://www.sama.gov.sa/
69 See Annual report (2006), supra note 68, at 36. (refers to the improvement o f  the investment 
environment as one o f  the priorities).
70 See generally http://www.sagia.gov.sa/.
71 See generally http://www.sec.gov.sa/
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billion, involving 174 licenses for industrial projects and 466 licenses for service
projects.72
Presumably, these policies and objectives lay the foundations for an efficient 
market-economy in Saudi Arabia. However, as discussed in the previous Chapter, 
this policy shift necessitates a rule o f law orientation and a rule-based financial 
system. But, a major challenge for Saudi Arabia is to adapt its existing legal system 
to market economies. It is the aim of the rest of this Chapter to review the financial 
and legal systems of Saudi Arabia and to identify the potential challenges.
3. The F inancial System In Saudi Arabia
It is helpful to undertake an overview of the overall financial system in Saudi 
Arabia before going into a deeper examination related to its legal foundations. The 
Saudi government is taking major steps in order to upgrade its existing financial 
system and to meet the challenge of adopting a market economy. Although Saudi 
Arabia has a large financial system, “its development remains constrained by 
restrictions in Islamic law and a tradition of secrecy in corporate affairs”.73 As 
discussed in the previous Chapter, Islamic Shari ’a prohibits the charging of interest. 
Arguably, these religious sensibilities have also contributed to the underdevelopment 
of the debt securities market in Saudi Arabia.74 These issues will be further 
illustrated in the rest of this Chapter: the following, however, is a general overview 
of the Saudi financial system.
72 See Annual Report (2006), supra note 68, at 36




3.1 The Banking Sector
• J C
The banking system in Saudi Arabia comprises four main elements: 1) the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA); 2) the government-owned Specialised 
Credit Institutions; 3) the commercial banks; and 4) the money exchangers. SAMA 
is the central bank75 67 of Saudi Arabia. The main objectives for establishing SAMA as 
laid down in the establishing Charter are:78 1) to issue and strengthen the Saudi 
currency and to stabilise its internal and external value; 2) to deal with the banking 
affairs of the Government and 3) to regulate commercial banks and exchange dealers. 
Clearly, SAMA is the supervisory authority of the commercial banks and the 
exchange dealers.79 80All commercial banks and money exchangers are required to
on
render to SAMA statements of their financial status on a monthly basis.
As mentioned, the Saudi government upon the adoption of the Second 
Development Plan decided to create Specialised Credit Institutions that will 
contribute in providing the needed credit for specific developmental sectors. To this 
effect, the government established the following five Specialised Credit Institutions:
1) The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank:81 the bank was established in 196182 
to provide low-cost finance for agricultural projects.
75 Dew, supra note 50, at 46. Dew refers to these four elements to as constituting the financial system 
in Saudi Arabia. We preferred the term banking to exclude capital markets and the insurance sector.
76 The money exchangers are outside the scope o f  this study.
77 Interestingly, when SAMA was first established the Saudi King refused that SAMA is referred to as 
‘bank’ or ‘financial agency’. See Wilson, supra note 3, at 59.
78 Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Royal Decree No. 23, December 15,1957, 
art. 1 [hereinafter CHARTER OF SAMA]
79 Id. art. 1(c) and art. 3(d). Recently, however, as will be seen infra SAMA is the responsible body 
for supervising the insurance sector.
80 CHARTER OF SAMA, art.3(d).
81 See generally http://www.saab.gov.sa
82 Saudi Arabia Agricultural Bank Law, Royal Decree No. 58,1961.
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2) The Real Estate Development Fund: the Fund was established in 197483 to 
encourage urban development and the construction of private residential 
houses.
3) The Saudi Industrial Development Fund:84 the Fund was founded in 197485 
to provide medium-term and long-term funding for private sector 
industrial projects.
4) The Public Investment Fund: the Fund was established in 197186 87to 
provide medium-term and long-term financing for “commercially oriented
R7public corporations”.
5) The Saudi Credit Bank: the Bank, which was created in 1973,88 89is the 
smallest Specialised Credit Institution. It provides personal loans to Saudi 
individuals.
However, lending by these institutions has declined since the mid-1990s. This 
reflects the governmental policy which is stated in the Seventh Development Plan. 
The government’s desire to move towards a market-based economy explains the 
decline in the lending activities by these government financial institutions.
In addition, there are private commercial banks that operate in Saudi Arabia. 
Unlike the Specialised Credit Institutions which are capitalised by the government, 
the commercial banks are privately-owned.90 Commercial banks include Islamic and
83 Real Estate Development Fund Law, Royal Decree No. M/23, 1974.
84 See generally http://www.sidf.gov.sa
85 Saudi Industrial Development Fund Law, Royal Decree No. M /3 ,1974.
86 Public Investment Fund Law, Royal Decree No. M/48, 1971.
87 Supra note 73, at 14
88 Saudi Credit Bank Law, Royal Decree No. M/44, 1973.
89 Supra note 73, at 12.
90 One o f these private banks ; the National Commercial Bank is 50% owned by the Saudi government 
through the Public Investment Fund (40%) and the General Organisation for Social Insurance (10%). 
See id, at 7.
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non-Islamic conventional banks.91 Currently, there are twelve incorporated 
commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. In addition, SAMA has granted licences to ten 
foreign banks (including G.C.C banks) to operate in Saudi Arabia. Half of these 
banks are already operating and the rest are expected to begin soon.92 *SAMA 
believes that there should be mergers and consolidations between local banks in 
order to build a bigger and stronger banking sector capable of competing at 
international levels.
Both commercial Islamic and conventional banks are under the supervision of 
SAMA. Islamic banks offer Islamic-compliant financial services that are based on 
certain Islamic concepts as discussed in Chapter One.94 Saudi Arabia is considered to 
be the biggest market for Islamic finance in size.95
3.2 The Capital Market
The capital market refers to the market of both equity and debt securities. 
Recently, the Saudi government is endeavouring to expand the role of the non­
banking financial intermediation in order to facilitate and to encourage the
91 Even conventional non-Islamic banks have “Islamic windows” and offer Islamic-compliant 
financing.
92 SAMA granted licences to the following G.C.C banks: 1) Gulf International Bank (operating), 
Emirates Bank (operating), 3) National Bank o f Bahrain (licensed but not operating), 4) National 
Bank o f Kuwait (operating) and 5) Muscat Bank (licensed but not operating). Also, SAMA granted 
licences to the following foreign banks: 1) Deutsche Bank (operating), 2) BNP Paribas (operating), 3) 
J.P. Morgan Chase (licensed but not operating), 4) National Bank o f Pakistan (licensed but not 
operating) and 5) State Bank o f India (licensed but not operating).
9 3 Id.
94 For a general study on Islamic modes o f  financing see MUHAMMAD USMANI, An INTRODUCTION To  
ISLAMIC Finance (Kluwer Law International, 2002). See also, Nik Thani Et Al., Law And 
Practice Of ISLAMIC Banking And finance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). Islamic finance concepts 
are being structured to provide different types o f  financing including project finance and 
securitisation. On Islamic project finance see Reinhard Klarmann, ISLAMIC PROJECT FINANCE: A 
Legal Study With Particular Reference To The Laws Of Switzerland And The United 
Arab Emirates (Schulthess, 2003). On Securitisation see Chapter Four.
95 Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia is the biggest in size. See PHILIP MOLYNEUX ET AL., BANKING AND 
Financial Systems in the Arab World, at 116 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Islamic banking 
activity is concentrated in the G.C.C countries which account for 83 % o f the total assets o f  Islamic 
banks. Saudi Arabia is the largest market for Islamic finance in terms o f seize; the largest Islamic bank 
in the world is located in Saudi Arabia namely; Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation.
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mobilisation of capital.96 Such will play a pivotal role in the privatisation process and 
in the shift to market economies. Saudi Arabia has the largest stock market by 
capitalisation in the Arab world97 and the second largest in the Islamic world after 
Malaysia.98 The Saudi market capitalisation as of end-November 2006 was USD 
341.65 billion.
However, two elements have affected the growth of the Saudi stock market. 
Firstly, the availability of government finance through its Specialised Credit 
Institutions which offer loans with zero interest.99 Secondly, the dominant ‘family 
business’ mentality within the Saudi businesses.100 Such mentality prevents Saudi 
companies from listing in the market. As for bonds and debt securities, the market is 
still not very developed due to religious sensibilities.101 According to the Seventh 
Development Plan, bond issues were not available as a source of corporate 
financing.102
Prior to 2003, SAMA was the regulatory agency of the stock market. However, 
with the promulgation of the new Capital Market Law in 2003, a new regulatory 
authority is established: namely, the Capital Market Authority, taking over the role of 
SAMA in supervising and regulating the issuance and trading of securities. The law 
also establishes for the first time a trading floor, namely, the Saudi Stock Exchange 
which is the sole entity authorised to carry out trading in securities in Saudi Arabia. 
Whether such regulatory and legal frameworks contribute in enhancing and 
strengthening the Saudi capital markets will be discussed in this Chapter.
96 Bank for International Settlements, The Banking System in Emerging Economies: How 
Much Progress Has Been Made?, BIS Papers No. (28), August (2006), at 331.
97 Dew, s u p r a  note 50, at 65.
98 Wilson, s u p r a  note 3, at 67.
99 Wilson, s u p r a  note 3, at 67.
m ld.
101 S u p r a  note 73, at 7.
102 S e e  s u p r a  note 60.
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3.3 The Insurance Sector
The dominant players in the Saudi financial system are the banks. Other financial 
players have marginal role. Insurance companies in Saudi Arabia offer traditional 
insurance services.103 04 The insurance sector in Saudi Arabia can be divided into two: 
1) the General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI).105 The GOSI is a state- 
owned entity and it is responsible for providing pensions to the Saudi workforce. 2) 
The rest of the insurance market comprises companies that are privately owned. As 
will be seen further in this Chapter, insurance transactions have been viewed to be 
against Islamic law. Hence, insurance companies have been circumventing these 
legal prohibitions by registering the company in a neighbouring G.C.C state and 
running a branch in Saudi Arabia.106
However, one insurance company has not faced such dilemma: the so-called 
National Company for Co-operative Insurance (NCCI).107 108The NCCI is owned by the 
government and enjoyed monopoly over government related business. The reason for
1 HRits legality is the fact that it operates according to Islamic Shari’a principles. 
However, the new insurance law provides official recognition for the Saudi insurance 
sector in the Kingdom and requires all the conventional insurance companies to 
transfer its operations in a manner similar to the NCCI.109
103 Supra note 73, at 14.
104 Id.
105 See generally http://www.gosi.co.sa/
106 Supra note 73, at 14.
107 See generally http://www.ncci.com.sa. The NCCI is a joint stock company established in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia by Royal Decree Number M/5, 1985.
108 See The Articles o f  Association: The National Company for Co-operative Insurance available at 
http://www.ncci.com.sa/EN/About%20Us/Establishment/AoA%20E.pdf. Art. 3 states the purpose is: 
“To transact cooperative insurance operations and related activities, such as reinsurance or agency 
activities, provided that such activities are in conformity with Islamic Shari’a ...”. However, whether 
co-operative insurance is an Islamic insurance similar to the takaful concept applied in Malaysia has 
been questioned. See Dawood Taylor, Is Co-operative Insurance Akin to Takaful?, 97 ISLAMIC 
BANKER 8, (2004). See also Mushtak Parker, Is Co-operative Insurance Islamic?, 84 ISLAMIC 
BANKER 6, (2003). See Chapter Five on Islamic Takaful in Malaysia.
109 See the discussion infra.
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4. Saudi Arabia: The Duality Of The Legal System
4.1 T h e  C o n c e p t  O f D u a l it y  : S e a r c h in g  F o r  A D e f in it io n  
Prior to discussing the Saudi legal system in depth in order to highlight the 
existing de facto duality, this Subsection endeavours to define what is meant by the 
term ‘duality’. A general definition of ‘duality’ or dualism is “the division of 
something conceptually into two opposed or contrasted aspects”.110 So, duality of the 
legal system could mean the existence of opposing and contrasting aspects, norms, 
principles and substantive laws within the same legal system. This may lead to the 
existence of a dual judiciary or two court systems.111 123 Each court system has 
jurisdiction over certain type of law. As discussed in the previous Chapter, Hooker 
explains why ‘legal pluralism’ or duality might exist within a legal system. He 
argues that duality exists when a state voluntary adopts a certain law which is 
borrowed from another. Hence, the duality is created simply because “the original 
[law] is by no means displaced in whole or in part by the introduced law”.114
Such a conclusion is of relevance to the developing countries and emerging 
markets. Countries that are moving towards market-economy and willing to deepen 
and strengthen their financial and legal systems such as Saudi Arabia, will be 
inclined to borrow certain laws from the developed countries. In doing so, and 
without adapting the existing law, Saudi Arabia is creating a dual legal system. The 
dualistic nature of the legal system is reflected by the existence of Islamic and other 
“positive” laws.
u° j HE concise Oxford Dictionary, at 440 (Judy Pearsall ed., Oxford University Press, 1999).
111 See, e.g., Nizar Hamzeh, Qatar: The Duality of the Legal System, 30(1) MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 
79, (1994).
112 The term ‘duality’ is preferred to be used in this volume to denote the existence o f  only two 
opposed norms within the same legal system which are going to be further identified in this Chapter.
113 See Chapter One.
114 Barry Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial Laws, 
at 3 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975).
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Nabil explains this situation in the Arab world stating that: “The Egyptian and 
Arab cases have had many...legal dualities and shortcomings historically, and still 
have. We dare not say pluralism lest it may imply a legal coexistence and peace 
among legal systems which are philosophically, referentially and functionally 
contradictory in so far as effectiveness and applicability to legal relations are 
concerned, not to mention their applicability to the contradictory legal centres in 
society. There is a duality within the official legal system itself between secular, 
western references and purely religious references”.115
Clearly, the above statement refers to the duality as existing within the “official 
legal system”. Hence, such duality is a synonym to state legal pluralism.116 Moving 
from general to particular, Vogel gives an excellent description of the duality in the 
Saudi legal system stating that:
“In most Islamic states other than Saudi Arabia, the legal system is 
bifurcated: one part is based on man-made, positive (wadi) law; the other 
part on Islamic law. The first part usually exists in the form of 
comprehensive codes similar to those of the European civil law systems, 
and the second in the form of Islamic law, usually codified as well. The 
positive legal system provides the basic or residual law, while the Islamic 
law is exceptional, supplementary and relatively narrow in scope. There 
is a similar bifurcation in the institutions that apply the law, for example, 
between positive law tribunals and religious law courts.
Saudi Arabia also has a dual legal system, but the relative roles of the 
two sides are reversed. The Islamic component of the legal system is
nS Nabil Abd Al-Fattah, The Anarchy o f Egyptian Legal System: Wearing Away the Legal and 
Political Modernity, in Legal Pluralism In The Arab World, at 159 (Baudouin Dupret et al. eds., 
Kluwer Law International, 1999).
116 In the above statement, Nabil, uses the term duality rather than pluralism explaining that pluralism 
might imply coexistence and peace among legal systems. However, the author’s discussions o f  “legal 
pluralism” in Chapter One did not show neither expressly nor implicitly that the term ‘pluralism’ 
implies coexistence and peace. However, the author has suggested that there could be “legal 
pluralism” that maintains the “rule o f law”. In this respect, the term “duality” and “pluralism” are used 
interchangeably for the purposes o f this thesis.
95
Chapter Two
fundamental and dominant. The positive law, on the other hand, is 
subordinate, constitutionally and in scope”.
The above statement explains correctly the status of the Saudi legal system and 
highlights the existing de facto duality in Saudi Arabia, which is analysed further in 
this Chapter. It is in the light of Vogel’s statement that one should examine the 
financial and legal systems in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the existence of a conventional 
financial system within the Islamic Shari’a has generated many “legal unrests” as to 
executing financial transactions. These “legal unrests” continue to exist because 
there is always an interaction between Islamic Shari’a and conventional financial 
transactions. On the other hand, “Islamic finance” is growing in Saudi Arabia. This, 
as explained in Chapter One, reflects the general growing trend in the Islamic 
countries, being the development of “Islamic finance” as a means to contain the 
“legal unrests” generated by the interaction between Islamic Shari’a and modem 
finance.
An example for such trend in Saudi Arabia is the conversion of the Saudi
insurance sector into an Islamic-compliant sector to circumvent the “legal unrests”
<. . 
that have always been caused as a result of the interaction between the conventional
insurance practice and Islamic Shari ’a as explained later in this Chapter. The current
status of the Saudi financial system can be summarised as follows:
1. There is an existing conventional finance component that interacts with 
the overall Islamic Shari’a (i.e. a system within a system). This is the 
existing de facto duality. *
1,7 Frank Vogel, Islamic Governance in the Gulf: A Framework for Analysis, Comparison, and 
Prediction, in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, 
AND RELIGION, 249, at 275-276 (Gary Sick et al. eds., Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997).
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2. There is a growing “Islamic finance” component within the Saudi 
financial system, including the conversion of the Saudi insurance market 
into an Islamic-compliant sector. This “Islamic finance” component is not 
rule-based or regulated by special “Islamic finance” laws or regulations in 
line with the growing trend followed by certain Islamic countries and 
promoted by the major International Islamic Financial Institutions as will 
be discussed later in this volume.
The aim of the rest of this Chapter is to analyse further the existing de facto 
duality referred to above. It will also explain its implications on the Saudi legal 
system. Arguably, there are historical reasons for this existing de facto duality. 
Hence, a brief historical background is helpful.
4 .2  H is t o r ic a l  B a c k g r o u n d
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a recent state established in 1932 when Ibn 
Saud118 declared himself as the King of Saudi Arabia.119 The King unified the main 
five regions under one Kingdom120 namely:121 123Najd,n2 Al-Hasa, the Hijaz (Western 
Region), Asir, and the Northern Region. Unlike other Arab countries in the Middle 
East, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has not been colonised by Britain or any other 
Western country.124 However, there was a paramount British influence during the 
first three decades of the twentieth century.125 Prior to the annexation of the Western
118 King Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rhman A1 Saud, referred to him as Ibn Saud.
119 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History Of Saudi Arabia, at 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
120 Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis, at xv 
(Routledge, 1993).
121 Id.
122 The Central Region o f the Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia.
123 The Western Region is considered to be the most important as the two Holy Cities for the Muslims 
are located in this region ( i.e. Mecca and Medina)




Region in 1932, the Western Region used to be under the control of the Ottoman 
Empire.126 As such, the Western Region has been affected by the Ottoman’s law.
The Ottoman Empire used to apply Islamic law until 183 9.127 *12930In 1839 onwards, 
reforms took place by introducing the Tanzimat.m  Tanzimat, which mean ‘ordering’
1 'IQor to put things in order, did not replace Islamic law, but was introduced in 
addition to it. The Ottomans introduced laws which are copied from Europe and in
• i t
particular France. Several laws had been introduced, for example, criminal law of 
1840, commercial law of 1850 and civil procedure law of 18 80.132 13At the same time, 
the Ottomans worked on the codification of some of the Islamic laws, namely the 
laws related to civil transactions the so-called the Majalla, referred to in Chapter 
One, or according to Hooker, the Civil Code.134
These reforms, which had been taking place in the Ottoman Empire, along with 
the application of the Islamic law at the same time, has caused state legal pluralism 
and is one of the case studies that have been examined by Hooker.135 The resulting 
situation is described as follows: “Modem Turkish legislation falls roughly into two 
classes: the codes genuinely intended for home consumption, and those of which the 
primary aim is to satisfy the foreigner, and to support the claim of Turkey to equal
126 However, the population in the Hijaz was reluctant to accept the Ottoman control at that time. See 
Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Peoples And The End Of Empire, at 83 (2001, Arnold 
Publishers).
127 Muhammad Abdul Jawad, Essays in Islamic S h a r i a  and Law, at 29 (Munshat Almaref, 1977) 
[In Arabic].
28 JUSTIN, supra note 126, at 16.
129 Id
130 HOOKER, supra note 114, at 362.
131 ABDUL Jawad, supra note 127, at 29.
132 M a t  29-30.
133 M a t  30.
134 Hooker, supra note 114, at 363.
135 Id. at 360. One o f the reasons mentioned by Hooker for state legal pluralism is the voluntary 
adoption o f Western laws as a means o f  social and economic reform.
98
Chapter Two
136international treatment”. In addition to these changes, new courts were established 
to apply the new adopted laws leading to a duality in the judicial organisation.136 37 The 
result is that Ottomans had two court systems namely; the “Tanzimat Courts” to 
apply the new Tanzimat and the “Islamic Shari’a Courts” to apply Islamic law.138
The adoption of Western laws, along with the application of the Islamic law in 
the Ottoman Empire, had arguably, laid the foundations for a dual legislative as well 
as judicial systems in all the territories that fell under its control.139 Hence, this 
duality has been passed to the Western Region or Hijaz, because it was under the 
direct control of the Ottoman Empire and which is currently a part of Saudi 
Arabia.140 However, when the Western Region had been taken over by King Ibn 
Saud in 1925 and became part of the Saudi Kingdom, the King stated that the 
Ottoman laws would still apply in the Western region.141 Thus, the duality, which 
did not exist in the Saudi legal system prior to the inclusion of the Western Region, 
had been passed to the Saudi legal system and the rest of the Kingdom.142
4.3 T h e  L e g a l  S y s t e m  In S a u d i  A r a b ia
It is a plausible argument that there are historical roots for the existing de facto 
duality in the Saudi legal system. However, since the discovery of oil in the 
Kingdom, there was a need to enact new laws to accommodate the resulting new 
economic changes. Accordingly, many laws were passed, and especially laws related 
to the commercial sector because it was the main concern for the Kingdom. So, the
136 Id. at 362, (referring to Ronald Wilson, ‘Modern Ottoman Law’, 8 J. COMP. Leg. & INT’L. L. 41, 
41,(1907).
137 Abdul Jawad, supra note 127, at 31 .
138 Id.
m Id.
140 Muhammad Abdul Jawad, The Legislative Development in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, at 66 (Munshat Almaref, 1977) [In Arabic],
141 Id. at 44.
142 Id. at 69.
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duality in the Saudi legal system should not be only seen as a continuation of the past 
caused by historical reasons upon the annexation of the Western region; but also, 
other reasons play a very important role.
Thus, the recent policy shift towards adopting market-oriented policies and the 
government’s desire to activate the private sector’s participation in the national 
economy have necessitated the enactment of further specific laws that would 
facilitate fulfilling such aims. As this Chapter explains, the enactment of these laws 
has caused the existing de facto duality in the legal system in Saudi Arabia.
4 . 3 . 1  T h e  P a r a m o u n t  L e g a l  S y s t e m  i n  S a u d i  A r a b i a  
The paramount legal system in Saudi Arabia is the Islamic Shari’a.143 The 
Kingdom has been described as the “most traditionalist Islamic legal system” 
nowadays.144 This is clear from the constitution of the Kingdom.145Article 1 of the 
constitution states: “The religion of Saudi Arabia is Islam; its Constitution is the 
Book o f God Most High and the Sunna of His Prophet...”.146Also, Article 7 of the 
Constitution provides that the “government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the 
Holy Quran and the Prophet’s tradition”.147 Islamic Shari’a provides the ‘cultural
143 Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia, at 2 (Namara 
Publications, 2000). Shari’a, sometimes referred to as Shariah, is an Arabic word which means the 
path to be followed and literally means the way to a watering place. See Abdur Rahman Doi, 
SHARIAH: The ISLAMIC LAW, (Ta Ha Publishers, 1987). The jurisprudential meaning o f Shari’a is the 
regulations and rules made by God for his mankind to follow. See Abdul Al-Salam Et Al., An 
Introduction To Legislation Principles In Saudi Arabia, at 9 (Dar El-Ketab El Jameae, 1983) 
[in Arabic], It can be referred to as the common law o f Islam, see WILLIAM BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS 
And Addresses On Arab Laws, at 33 ( Curzon Press, 2000).
144 Vogel, supra note 143, at xiv.
145 The term constitution is not used in Saudi Arabia as it is believed that the Holy Quran is the 
constitution o f Kingdom. Hence, the Saudi government has deliberately avoided the term constitution. 
Instead the constitution has been referred to as Nisam Assasy, which means the Basic System or the 
Basic Regulation, and was promulgated in 1992. For more on the constitutional reforms in Saudi 
Arabia see Rashed Aba-Namay, The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia, 42 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 295, (1993).
146 Constitution Of Saudi Arabia, March 1992, art. 1 available at http://www.the-saudi.net/saudi- 
arabia/saudi-constitution.htm [hereinafter SAUDI CONSTITUTION]
147 Id. art. 7.
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milieu’ for the development of the legal system in Saudi Arabia148 and it is
considered by most of the Saudis as their ‘indigenous law’.149 As mentioned in
Chapter One, there are four main Islamic schools. The predominant school in the
Saudi legal system is the Hanbali School, but this does not mean casting aside the
rest of the Islamic schools as they can also be considered.150 152
Because Saudi Arabia applies Islamic Shari’a as the paramount legal system,
Islamic Shari ’a courts have the general and higher jurisdiction. However, as
discussed in detail below, there are certain exceptions. Article 26 of the Judiciary
Law states: “Courts shall have jurisdiction to decide with respect to all disputes and
crimes, except those exempted by law. Rules for the jurisdiction of courts shall be
set forth in the Shari’a Procedure Law Courts and Law of Criminal Procedure.
Specialised Courts may be formed by Royal Order on the recommendation of the
Supreme Judicial Council”.15 ̂ Judges of the Islamic Shari'a courts apply Islamic
Shari’a; article 1 of the Judiciary law states: “Judges are independent and, in the
administration of justice, they shall be subject to no authority other than the
1provisions of Shari ’a and laws in force. No one may interfere with the Judiciary”.
However, Islamic Shari'a courts are not to be considered the only entities to 
adjudicate disputes. The second entity is the Board of Grievances which has 
jurisdiction over disputes where one of the government agencies is involved. In other
148 Nicholas Angell, Impact of the GCC on the Developing Legal Systems of the Gulf Countries, in 
The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation And Stability In An Independent World, at
149 (John Sandwick ed., Westview Press, 1987). Sometimes the Islamic Shari'a is referred to as the 
,‘common law’. See also Enid Hill, 'Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle Eastern 
Law ', 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 279, at 280 n. 4 (1977-1978).
149VOGEL, supra note 143, at xiv.
150 Abdul Jawad, supra note 140, 75-88. See also Nayla Comair-Obeid, The Law of Business 
Contracts in the Arab Middle East: A Theoretical and Practical Comparative Analysis 
with Particular Reference to Modern Legislation, at 156 (Kluwer Law International, 1996).
151 The Law o f Judiciary, Royal Decree No. M/64, 23 July 1975, art. 26 available 
http://www.moj.gov.sa [hereinafter Judiciary Law],
152 Judiciary Law, supra note 151, art. 26
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words, the Board of Grievances is specialised injudicial review. As will be seen, the 
jurisdiction of the Board has expanded to encompass other areas of laws (for 
example, commercial law disputes).153 Thirdly, there are specialised committees that 
deal with different areas of law and are discussed later in this Chapter.
4.3.2 T h e  I m p l i c a  t i o n s  o f  I s l a m i c  S h a r i  ’a  o n  t h e  S a  u d i  F i n a n c i a l  S y s t e m
Being the paramount legal system of Saudi Arabia, Islamic Shari ’a has influenced 
certain Saudi laws that are related to the commercial and financial systems. Thus, 
consider article 2 of SAMA’s Charter, which states that: “The Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency shall not pay nor receive interest but shall only charge certain fees 
on services rendered to the public and to the Government, in order to cover the 
Agency’s expenditures”.154 Also, article 6(a) of the Charter states that SAMA shall 
not act: “in any manner which conflicts with the teachings of the Islamic law. The 
Agency shall not charge any interest on its receipts and payments”.155
SAMA is not the only entity that does not deal with interest. Thus, the Specialised 
Credit Institutions established by the government are not allowed to charge interest 
in their loan transactions. Nevertheless, it can not be concluded that Saudi Arabia 
maintains an ‘interest-free’ banking system. The commercial banking in Saudi 
Arabia is partly a de facto interest-based system.156 However, when executing loan 
agreements the term ‘commission’ is used instead of interest.157 Nevertheless, 
commercial banks have had difficulty in enforcing the payment of interests,
153 See the discussion infra.
154 Charter Of Sama, supra note 78, art. 2.
155 Id  art. 6(a).
156 DEW, supra note 50, at 46.




especially in the 1980’s.158 The reason is that Islamic Shari'a courts have never 
accepted the idea of enforcing interests due to its prohibition under Islamic Shari ’a. 
Hence, many defaulting borrowers took advantage of that to avoid paying interests 
charged by banks.159 This, in turn, has affected the availability of financing to small 
firms due to the reluctance of commercial banks to provide such financing in the 
absence of a legal system that enforces their rights.160
Despite the government’s response to solve this problem,161 1623the issue of charging
interest in Saudi Arabia is still unclear, Al-Dukheil writes: “the issue of payment of
interest by the commercial banks continues to remain a grey area in the country’s
legal framework. Religious-minded people’s aversion to the word ‘commercial’ in
banking nomenclature continues to be a major drag on the ability of the commercial
1banks to act as mobilisers of savings in the Saudi household”.
Islamic Shari’a has also its implications on the Saudi insurance sector. Thus, as 
explained in Chapter One, Islamic scholars maintain the view that insurance is 
against Islamic Shari’a due to the Islamic Shari’a prohibition of gharar. As a 
result and prior to the new insurance law, insurance companies were unable to 
register in Saudi Arabia due to the illegality of their operations. These examples, 
inter alia, show the implications of the Islamic Shari ’a on, but not limited to, the 
Saudi financial system.164




161 The Saudi government established the Committee for Settlement o f  Banking Disputes. See the 
discussion infra.
162 Id. 50-51.
163 See Chapter One.
164 Islamic law is the dominant law in Saudi Arabia. Hence, the implications are not only upon the 
existing financial system but also in all other sectors and areas o f  law. Consider, for example, Article 
6 o f the Saudi Negotiable Instruments Regulations, which states: “any stipulation o f interest in the bill
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These implications may not be viewed positively from a conventional finance 
perspective. However, the need of finance in modem economy and given the 
implications of Islamic Shari 'a; “Islamic finance” has emerged, as indicated earlier, 
to create a balance in providing the necessary financial services while complying 
with the Shari 'a requirements. Such Shari ’«-compliant products were instigated due 
to the implications of the Islamic Shari’a on the Saudi conventional finance 
component. The following discussion shows how the Saudi government is dealing 
with the interaction between the conventional finance component and Islamic 
Shari 'a.
4 . 3 . 3  T h e  M o d e r n i s a  t i o n  O f  T h e  S a  u d i  L e g a l  S y s t e m  
The inconsistencies between many of the conventional commercial, banking and 
financial practices with the principles of the Saudi Islamic law have led the Saudi 
government to take certain measures in order to enhance the efficiency of and to 
ensure the certainty of the overall Saudi legal system. Another aim has been to keep 
pace with the ongoing economic development in Saudi Arabia: here, the Kingdom is 
in need to accelerate the financial and legal infrastructures in order to meet its 
economic demands. To this effect, certain commercial and financial laws were 
introduced, the so called; Regulations or “Nizams”.165
Vogel describes: “In .Saudi Arabia, the world’s most traditional Islamic country 
the laws applied in explicitly commercial matters, such as companies, banking and 
commercial paper law strongly resembles French and Egyptian laws”.166 Hence, a
o f exchange shall be null and void”. See Negotiable Instruments Regulation, Royal Decree No. M/37, 
February 1964, art. 6 available at http://www.commerce.gov.sa (in Arabic).
165 For the purposes o f this thesis, the term “law” or “regulation” will be used interchangeably.




duality in the legal system has been created because the general legal system of 
Islamic Shari ’a by no means has been displaced in whole or in part by these laws.167
4.3.3.1 The Saudi Commercial Law and Commercial Disputes
One of the laws that have contributed to the existence of the duality in the Saudi 
legal system was the enactment of the Commercial Court Regulations (CCR) in 
1932.168 The CCR contained six hundreds and thirty three articles dealing with 
various areas including companies, bills of lading, and money exchangers. The CCR 
established the commercial court with jurisdiction to hear commercial disputes.169 
Thus, despite the existence of the Islamic Shari ’a courts and an Islamic law body, 
there were other regulations governing commercial transactions. However, in 1954 
the commercial court was abolished.170 No express reasons were given for such 
decision, but one has argued that there was a pressure that commercial transactions 
should be heard by the original and normal courts (i.e., Islamic Shari’a courts).171 *
Thereafter, Islamic Shari ’a courts regained their jurisdiction over commercial 
transactions disputes.
However, at that time, Shari 'a courts were inexperienced to deal with disputes 
related to trademarks. Hence, Shari’a courts were not prepared to hear such cases. 
Faced with such dilemma, the Ministry of Commerce established the Commercial 
Disputes Settlement Board (the “Commercial Board”).173 According to the 
Resolution, the Commercial Board is competent to hear all commercial disputes just
167 These laws have not displaced Islamic Shari’a because it is still functioning within the Islamic 
Shari’a.
168 Commercial Court Regulations, Royal Decree N o (32), June 1931 available at 
http://www.commerce.gov.sa [hereinafter Commercial Regulations] (in Arabic).
169 See generally Commercial Regulations, supra note 168, arts 432 -  587.
noMuhammad Al-Sheikh, Pluralism of the Commercial Judicial Committees: Reasons, Consequences 
and Solutions, 21(3) JOURNAL OF Law  233, at 241 (1997) (in Arabic).





like its predecessor (i . e the commercial court).174 175Despite these measures that aimed 
to improve the judiciary and ensure its efficiency, in order to keep pace with the 
rapid improvements and development that Saudi Arabia was undergoing, there was 
insufficiency of substantive laws that dealt with specific areas of laws such as 
company law regulations. In light of this, the government passed the Company 
Regulations in 1965. This law provided for the establishment of a new committee 
to deal with any disputes governed by the Company Regulations. However, in order 
to avoid the conflicts between the jurisdiction of the Commercial Board and the new 
committee established by the Company Regulations, it was agreed that one 
committee should be established with the competence to hear all commercial related 
disputes including those related to Company Regulations.176 17
Strangely, the new committee, namely; the Commercial Disputes Settlement 
Committee (CDSC) had branches in three main cities in Saudi Arabia only. This 
meant that the settlement of commercial disputes in accordance with the CDSC laws 
and regulations is only possible in these three cities. Similar commercial disputes 
in other cities were governed by the Islamic Shari ’a and adjudicated by the Islamic 
Shari’a courts.178 Such position was unsatisfactory and the Ministerial Council had 
to transfer the competence over commercial disputes to the Board of Grievances, 
which would be competent to hear commercial disputes in all areas of the Kingdom 
on temporary basis until the establishment of a new commercial court.179 Such court,
174 Id.
175 Company Regulations, Royal Decree No M/6, July 1965 available at http://www.commerce.gov.sa 
(in Arabic).
176 Al-Sheikh, supra note 170, at 243.
177 Id  at 245-246.
m Id.
179 Id. at 246.
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however, has not been established yet, and the status quo remains that the Board of 
Grievances is the entity which has the jurisdiction over commercial disputes.
4.33.2 The Saudi Banking Law and Banking Disputes 
Saudi Arabia has taken two major legal steps in relation to its banking sector 
during the 1960’s and 1980’s. Such steps have added the legality to the banking 
sector, or in other words have provided the basis for a legal framework which within 
the banking sector can function. However, it should be noted that such regulations 
have not provided any substantive banking law. Thus, there are no detailed laws 
dealing with day-to-day banking transactions.180 The first law was the Banking 
Control Law (BCL), which was promulgated in 1966.181 This law was a 
governmental response to the banking problems faced by the government in 1960. At 
that time, the government had intervened in order to prevent one of the Saudi banks 
from becoming insolvent. The government, through SAMA, intervened by injecting 
fresh capital and acquiring 38% of the shares of the bank.182 183
As mentioned above, the influence of the Islamic law has clear implications on 
the Saudi financial system in regards to the interest issue. Nevertheless, the BCL 
provides a legal basis for a conventional banking system within the general Islamic 
law of Saudi Arabia. The BCL consists of twenty six Articles that deal mainly with 
the regulation of banks in Saudi Arabia. It defines a bank as “any natural or juristic 
person practising any of the banking business in the Kingdom”. According to the 
BCL, banking business means: “the business of receiving money on current or fixed
I80Abdul-Majeed Abdu, The Banking System in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, at 15 (Mahad 
Al-Edara, 1406H): arguing that there is a ‘legislative vacuum’ in relation to the banking law in Saudi 
Arabia.
181 The Banking Control Law, Royal Decree No. M/5, June 1966 available at http://www.sama.gov.sa 
[hereinafter BCL].
182 Wilson, supra note 3, at 59.
183 BCL, supra note 181, art. 1(a)
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deposit account, opening of current accounts, opening of letters of credit, issuance of 
letters of guarantees, payment and collection of cheques, orders, or payments orders 
and similar other papers of value, discounting of bills, promissory notes and other 
commercial papers, foreign exchange business and other banking business”.184
The existence of such law is of great importance in any country which is desirous 
to maintain a strong robust banking system. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
the law only acknowledges, to an incomplete extent, the existence of a conventional 
banking system. The law does not address the interest issue; but, as noted above, 
Saudi commercial banks do charge de facto interest in most of their banking 
transactions. In fact, it is argued that certain provisions of the BCL are in 
contradiction with the “Islamic finance” concept of musharka.185 186This is because the 
BCL prevents the Saudi banks from owning “stocks of any other joint-stock 
company incorporated in the Kingdom, in excess of ten percent of the paid-up capital 
of such company”. Such provision was not of main concern to the banks at that 
time as they did not offer Islamic products.187 However, Islamic banks in Saudi 
Arabia do offer Islamic financing products based on the musharka concept despite its 
inconsistency with the above-mentioned BCL provision.188
The consequences of the BCL’s existence as a law defining the business of the 
commercial banks in Saudi Arabia within the general Islamic law became clear in 
1980s. Wilson describes: “There was ... reluctance to repay loans on time on the part 
of unscrupulous businessmen, some of whom cited the Islamic prohibition of riba to 
justify their delays and evasions despite the fact that they had been fully aware of the
184 Id. art. 1(b).
185 Wilson, supra note 3, at 59.
186 BCL, supra note 181, art. 10(4).
187 Wilson, supra note 3, at 60.
188 See generally http://www.alrajhibank.co.sa
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terms of the funding at the time the loans were taken out”.189 Clearly, the main 
reason is that such loan agreements have been transacted within an Islamic law body. 
Borrowers took an advantage of the ambiguities in the legal system in order to avoid 
performing their obligation under the agreements.190
Faced with such dilemma,191 the government had to take an action in order to 
maintain the efficacy of the Saudi legal system and not to discourage the commercial 
banks from providing loans and financing to the private sector. In the light of this, 
the government established the Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes 
(CSBD) in 1987.192 The main aim for the establishment of the CSBD is to take 
banking disputes away from the Islamic Shari’a courts, which took strict position 
regarding the interest issue. As will be seen, the establishment of the CBSD is one of 
the measures that are creating a duality within the Saudi legal and judicial systems.
The law establishing the CBSD is a Resolution issued by the Prime Minister, 
which instructs all the Saudi courts (i .e S h a r i’a courts) and other committees193 not 
to deal with any banking related dispute unless there is an authorisation from the 
Ministerial Council.194 This has been emphasised by a Circular issued by the 
Minister of Justice to this effect.195 The implementation of both the Resolution and 
the Circular has constrained the competence of the Islamic Shari’a courts over
189 Wilson, supra note 3, at 59.
190 Al-Dukheil, supra note 158, at 50.
191 Also the courts procedures for the banks lasted long and became expensive. Extension o f time 
favoured to the debtor. See Rolf Meyer-Reumann, The Banking System in Saudi Arabia, 10(3) ALQ 
207, at 230, (1996).
192 Prior to the establishment o f  the CSBD the Saudi Ministry o f  Commerce issued a Ministerial 
Resolution No. (822), 1985 requiring all banking disputes to be referred to the Legal Committee o f  the 
Ministry. However, this Resolution has not been implemented. See Meyer-Reumann, supra note 191, 
at 232.
193 Committees which deal with the commercial disputes.
194 Resolution No. 729/8, 10 March 1987, art. 1 [hereinafter CSBD Resolution]. The CSBD 
Resolution has been translated by the author. The original Arabic copy does not refer to the term 
“Article”; instead numbers has been used as points. However, the term “Article” will be used here for 
convenience.
195 “Judicial Circular to All Courts: Very Urgent” (in Arabic): a Circular o f  the Minister o f  Justice, 
No. 12/138 o f  28 March 1987.
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banking disputes.196 Thus, the CBSD has exclusive competence to hear banking 
disputes.
Of the composition of the CBSD, the Resolution states that the CBSD should 
have three members who are specialised in banking matters. Their task is to settle the 
disputes between banks and their customers and to find suitable solutions for both 
parties according to the agreements signed between them.197 The CBSD has been 
granted a wide degree of discretion.198 This is clear from the Resolution, which gives 
the CBSD the power to decide what measures can be taken in order to guarantee the 
settlement of such disputes:199 the CBSD can take measures such as preventing the 
debtor from leaving the Kingdom or freezing the debtor’s money accounts.200 While 
the Resolution did not address expressly disputes where the bank is the debtor, it is 
presumed that the CBSD will have jurisdiction over such disputes because of its 
exclusive competence.201
However, there is a confusion regarding the competence of the CBSD resulting 
from the formulation used in the Resolution. The Resolution states that, in case the 
CBSD fails to reach a satisfactory settlement between the disputed parties, the 
dispute should be referred to the “competent court holding original jurisdiction 
power”202 (/. e., Islamic Shari’a courts). However, an important point has been 
emphasised by the Secretary-General of the CBSD,203 in accordance with the
196 Meyer-Reumann, supra note 191, at 232.
197 CSBD Resolution, supra note 194, art. 2.
198 Meyer-Reumann, supra note 191, at 233.
, 199 CSBD Resolution, supra note 194, art.3.
200 Id. See also the Rules o f  the Internal Procedures o f the CBSD 1407, No. 3/86620 [hereinafter Rules 
o f CBSD] (in Arabic). Art. 6 o f  the Rules o f  CBSD give the right to the debtor to complain before the 
CBSD regarding the freezing injunction during 15 days. Art. 7 o f  the Rules o f  CBSD states that the 
CBSD has competence to hear from other creditors regarding the frozen accounts.
201 Meyer-Reumann, supra note 191, at 233. See also Richard et al., ‘The SAMA Committee Breaks 
New Ground on Jurisdiction September MEER 22, (1988).
202 Meyer-Reumann, supra note 191, at 234. See also CBSD Resolution, supra note 194, art. 7.
203 Meeting with Dr. Ahmed Al-Saleh, Secretary-General o f  the CBSD on 28 April 2004.
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wording of the Resolution, is that the CBSD is the entity which decides whether the 
dispute should be referred to the “competent court holding original jurisdiction” or 
not and it is not left to the discretion of the disputed parties.204 In practice, the CBSD 
does not refer the disputes to the “competent court holding original jurisdiction”.205 
However, there is no higher court or committee to hear appeals against the decisions 
of the CBSD.206 207
Having explained that, it can be argued that allowing the conventional banking 
system to function within an Islamic law body has resulted in a duality in the Saudi 
judicial body. The Islamic Shari ’a courts were not prepared to approve non-Islamic 
practices such as charging of interest by the banks. The government had to establish 
such a committee in order to enhance the credibility of the Saudi legal system. Yet, a 
simple reading of the Resolution shows inconsistencies, which again reflect the 
duality caused as a result of the need to adapt the law to market-economies and to 
have a judicial body which meets the requirements of a modem financial system.
Impliedly, there is a duality in the wording of the Resolution itself. Thus, while 
the Resolution has established the CBSD with an exclusive competence to hear 
banking disputes, it instructed the CBSD to refer cases to the “competent court 
holding original jurisdiction” (i.e., Islamic Shari’a courts) in case the CBSD fails to 
reach a satisfactory settlement between the parties. Such clause has led one to argue 
that the CBSD is neither a court nor a judicial body. In fact, certain entities have
204 See also Mahmmod Al-Kateeb, Rules Of Banking Disputes Settlement In The Kingdom Of 
Saudi Arabia, at 12 (Dar Al-Kateeb, Saudi Arabia)(In Arabic).
205 Supra note 203.
206 Zuheer Al-Harbash, ‘The Judicial Competence of the Banking Disputes in Saudi Arabia’, Teegarat 
Al-Riyadh (Commerce in Riyadh Magazine), No. 397, October 1995,66, at 68. (In Arabic).
207 Meyer-Reumann, supra note 191, at 233. Interestingly, the wording o f the establishing Resolution 
is pro-settlement. Thus, it instructs the CBSD to refer the dispute to the “competent court holding 
original jurisdiction” in case it failed to reach a “satisfactory settlement between the parties”. We find 
such formulation inconsistent with the great discretion and powers given to the CBSD which force the 
debtor to be obliged to settle.
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hesitated to implement the decisions taken by the CBSD.208 In turn, the Saudi Deputy 
Minister of Interior had to issue a Circular instructing the enforcement entities to 
accelerate the enforcement of the CBSD decisions with no delays.209 210
It can be argued that the legal duality resulting from the measures taken by the 
Saudi government to reform the Saudi banking sector is exemplified by different 
facts: 1) the existence of a conventional banking system that charges interest within 
an Islamic law body; 2) the establishment of the CBSD to settle banking disputes 
within an Islamic judicial system; and 3) the settlement of disputes between banks 
and their debtors in accordance with the agreements executed between the parties 
within an Islamic law body. Thus, if the borrower has agreed with the bank that the 
borrower should pay certain amount of interest for the loan provided by the bank, the 
CBSD will attempt to enforce the outstanding amount according to the agreement
A1A
signed despite the Islamic prohibition. However, the CBSD might reach a 
satisfactory settlement between both parties regarding the outstanding amount. The 
establishment of the CBSD may have achieved its purpose in circumventing Islamic 
Shari 'a courts in regards to banking disputes but detaching such disputes from the
“i l loverall Islamic Shari’a is still questionable.
4.3.1.3 The Saudi Capital Market Law and Securities Disputes
208 In Saudi Arabia, the police has civil rights department to enforce civil rights. Some o f these 
departments have hesitated to enforce the decisions taken by the CBSD.
209 Circular by the Deputy Minister o f Interior No. 10207 (1988) (In Arabic).
210 It is argued that the CBSD will enforce the agreements even it is in conflict with the Islamic 
Shari'a law. See Michael McMillen, ‘Islamic Shari’a-Compliant Project Finance: Collateral Security 
and Financing Structure Case Studies’, 24 FORDHAM INT’LL. J. 1184, at 1215, (2001).
211 The jurisdiction o f  the CBSD is quite limited. For example, for the dispute to be heard by the 
CBSD, at least one o f  the litigants needs to be a commercial bank. See Al-Harbash, supra note 206, at 
68. However, the CBSD does not hear cases where the Specialised Credit Institutions mentioned 
supra are involved. This is self-explanatory since the Institutions do not charge interest. See Circular 
o f the Ministry o f  Economy and Finance No. 17/4129 (3/9/1408 H).
112
Chapter Two
As mentioned earlier, the debt securities market in Saudi Arabia is not very well- 
developed due to religious sensibilities.212 Unlike the debt securities market, equity 
securities are acceptable. The reason is because acquiring equity is not illegal under 
Islamic Shari’a.213 As equity capital represents risk capital:214 it shares the same 
concept of risk-sharing under Islamic finance law.215 However, as expressed in the 
Saudi Development Plans, the current trend is to develop both the debt and equity 
securities markets in the light of the new market-oriented economic reforms and 
policies adopted by the Saudi government.216
In 2003, the government enacted the long-awaited Capital Market Law (CML),217 218
^ in
described as the ‘big bang’ of Saudi finance. One of the main features of the CML 
is to create a capital market authority to regulate the securities sector. The CML 
established the Capital Market Authority (CMA),219 which is responsible for issuing 
rules and for implementing the provisions of the CML.220 21The CMA’s main task is to 
act as the regulatory authority over activities concerning the issuance and trading in 
securities. The CMA is also responsible to develop procedures to reduce the risks 
related to securities transactions,222 to protect the investors and citizens from unfair 
and unsound practices,223 to achieve fairness, efficiency and transparency in
212 See supra p. 52.
213 Lu’ayy Al-Rimawi, ‘Middle East: Islamic Models of Islamic Markets’, 21(5) Company Lawyer 
161, at 163, (2000).
214 Equity holders are the last to be paid in case o f  insolvency. See ROSS CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF 
BANKING Law , at 326 (Oxford University Press, 2002).
215 Wilson, supra note 3 , at 23: “the participatory nature o f  Islamic finance implies risk sharing, which 
is seen as highly desirable”
216 See supra Section 2.
217 Capital Market Law, Royal Decree Number M/3, July 2003 available at http://www.cma.org.sa 
[hereinafter CML].
218 Supra note 73, at 13.
219 CML, supra note 217, art. 4(a).
220 Id. art. 5(a).
221 Id. art. 5(a)(2).
222 Id. art. 5(a)(1).
223 Id art. 5(a)(4).
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securities transactions and to regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information 
regarding securities.224 25
Another feature of the CML is to establish an official market for the trading in 
securities. In this connection, the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE), a joint-stock 
company, was established as the sole entity authorised to carry out trading in 
securities in Saudi Arabia. The objectives of the SSE is to ensure fair, efficient and 
transparent listing requirements,226 to provide reliable and rapid settlement 
procedures through its Securities Depository Centre,227 to establish and enforce 
professional standards for brokers and their agents228 29and to ensure the financial 
strength and soundness of the brokers. The CML also deals with matters related to 
the regulation of broker activities,230 disclosure,231 and insider dealings.232
The term “securities” is defined, inter alia, by the CML as:233 1) convertible and 
negotiable shares of companies and 2) bonds and other negotiable instruments of 
debt issued by companies, the government, public institutions or public 
organisations. The definition of securities does not only include equity securities, 
which presumably do not have any conflict with the Islamic Shari ’a, but does cover 
debt securities such as bonds. The CML is again creating a duality within the Saudi 
legal system by allowing debt securities to function within an Islamic law body.
224 Id. art. 5(a)(6).
225 Id. art. 20(a).
226 Id. art. 20(c)(1).
227 Id. art.20(c)(2). The Securities Deposit Centre is a department established as the sole authority 
which is authorised to practice the operations o f  deposit, transfer, settlement, clearing and registering 
ownership o f  securities traded in the SEE. See id. art. 26(a).
228 CML, supra note 217, art. 20(c)(3).
229 Id  art. 20(c)(4).
230 Id. Chapter Five.
231 Id. Chapter Seven.
232 Id. Chapter Eight.
233 Id. art. 2. See also id. art. 3 o f  the CML excluded cheques, bills o f  exchange, order notes, 




In addition, the Saudi government has realised that any dispute resulting from 
transactions that involve debt securities cannot be referred to the Islamic Shari’a 
courts. Therefore, the issue has been dealt with in a manner tantamount to the 
banking disputes settlements process. However, unlike the Resolution which 
established the CBSD, the CML uses clearer provisions to establish the Committee 
for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) with jurisdiction over any dispute 
resulting from the implementation of the CML.234
The CML gives the CRSD the power to settle all disputes,235 236to issue subpoenas, 
to issue orders, to impose sanctions and to order the production of evidence and 
documents. The CRSD is to consist of legal advisors who are specialised in 
matters related to securities, finance and commercial affairs.237 In addition, the CML 
provides for an Appeal Panel which can hear appeals filed against the CRSD 
decisions.238 The Appeal Panel has discretion to review the decisions of the CRSD, 
to affirm such decision and to undertake a de novo of the legal action or complaint.239 
The decisions of the Appeal Panel are final.240
Following the enactment of the CML, the CM A has introduced sets of rules in 
line with its objectives to further enhance the regulation of the Saudi capital market. 
These laws are: the Listing Rules,241 the Securities Business Regulations,242 the 




CML, supra note 217, art. 25(a). 
Id.
Id.
237 Id. art. 25(b).
238 /¿  art. 25(f).
239 Id. art. 25(g).
240 Id.
241 The Listing Rules, Royal Decree M/30, October (2004) available at http://www.cma.org.sa
242 The Securities Business Regulation, Royal Decree M/30, June 2005 available at
http://www.cma.org.sa




Regulations of Offers of Securities.24 45 Currently, two consultation drafts have been 
circulated by the CMA, namely; the Investment Funds Regulations Consultation 
Draft246 and the Corporate Governance Consultation Draft.247
Unlike certain G.C.C member states,248 the CMA has not issued any Islamic 
finance specific regulations that deal with the issuance of Islamic securities (i.e. 
sukuk). However, having allowed for the issuance of Islamic securities in Saudi 
Arabia; it can be argued that the CMA has already recognised the concept of Islamic 
securities.249 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the . Saudi Eighth Development Plan 
expressed the Saudi objective in creating an Islamic mortgage system. Such system 
can be enhanced through developing the “Islamic securities” system which would 
facilitate the availability of financing for the Saudi real estate demands.250
Having summarised the recent legal developments of the Saudi capital market, it 
can be concluded that the enactment of the CML is a positive step towards 
maintaining an efficient and well-supervised capital market. Practically speaking, the 
implications of the CML in general and the CRSD in specific on the Saudi capital 
market is not yet clear as the law and the entities that support it have only become 
fully functional at the end of 2004. However, it is the author’s opinion that such law 
has contributed in creating the existing de facto duality. The establishment of CRSD 
is one reason but the lack of a supporting legal framework is another. Since the CML 
is supervisory in nature, the Islamic Shari’a as the paramount legal system still 
interact with securities-related transactions; as further elaborated in Chapter Three.
244 The Market Conduct Regulations, October (2004) available at http://www.cma.org.sa.
245 The Regulations o f  Offers o f  Securities (2004) available at http://www.cma.org.sa.
246 Investment Funds Regulation (Consultation Draft) available at http://www.cma.org.sa.
247 Corporate Governance (Consultation Draft) available at http://www.cma.org.sa.
248 See Chapter Four.
249 E.g., CMA has authorised the issuance o f  Islamic sukuk recently. See e.g., OFFERING CIRCULAR, 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, 3 July 2006.
250 See Chapter Three for further discussion on “Islamic securities”.
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4.3.1.4 The Saudi Insurance Law and Insurance Disputes 
The insurance sector in Saudi Arabia is a good example that highlights the 
“legal chaos” in Saudi Arabia. As mentioned earlier, the insurance sector in Saudi 
Arabia was unregulated until the enactment of the Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies (LSCIC) in 2003,251 Prior to the promulgation of 
the LSCIC, the existence of a conventional insurance sector within the Islamic 
Shari’a had contributed towards the existing de facto duality. Conventional insurance 
companies were functioning within an Islamic law body which does not approve 
their practices. This is why insurance companies, as mentioned earlier, could not 
obtain commercial registration to carry out insurance business.
Also, this has caused obstacles in relation to the insurance disputes. Because 
insurance has been considered to be against the practices of Islamic Shari 'a, the 
Islamic Shari ’a courts were not prepared to deal with any disputes that were related 
to the conventional insurance business. Thus, insurance contracts could not be 
enforced through the Saudi courts.252 Even in case of litigation, there was no 
coherent body of law which could be used as reference by the litigant parties.253 Until 
late 1985, cases involving insurance transactions were resolved by an internal 
procedure of the Ministry of Commerce.254 From late 1985, the Ministry of
251 Law on Supervision o f Cooperative Insurance Companies, Royal Decree No. M/32, September 
2003 available at http://www.sama.gov.sa [hereinafter LSCIC]
252 Andreas Haberbeck, Insurance under Saudi Arabian Law, 2 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND 
COMMERCIAL Law  246, at 247-48, (1986).
253 Id. at 248.
254 Id. A hearing will take place and then the matter will be referred to the legal department o f  the 
Ministry for a decision. However, cases involve subrogation o f  claims used to be referred to the 
Committee for the Settlement o f  Commercial Disputes. See Id.
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Commerce has decided that the insurance disputes should be referred to arbitration255 
in accordance with the Saudi Arbitration Law.256 257
These “legal unrests” that have been caused by the existing de facto duality have 
led the Saudi government to stabilise the insurance legal framework through legally 
recognising the Saudi insurance practices. To this effect, Saudi Arabia introduced the 
LSCIC. The LSCIC calls for the islamisation of the insurance sector and requires 
that all insurance practices should comply with the Islamic Shari ’a?51 The LSCIC 
states that: “Insurance in the Kingdom shall be undertaken through registered 
insurance companies operating in a cooperative manner as it is provided within the 
article establishment of the National Company for Cooperative Insurance 
promulgated by Royal Decree M/5... and in accordance with the principles of 
Islamic Shari 'a”.258
The implications of the LSCIC on the current practice of the Saudi insurance 
sector are clear. All the existing conventional (i.e., non-Islamic) insurance companies 
are required by the new law to convert their operating techniques in accordance with 
the Islamic Shari’a principles.259 The main objectives of the LSCIC260 are to protect 
the rights of insured parties and investors, to encourage fair and effective 
competition, the provision of better insurance services with competitive prices and
255 Haberbeck, supra note 252, at 248.
256 Arbitration Regulations, Royal Decree No. M/46, April 1983 available at 
http://www.commerce.gov.sa
257 However, this was the aim o f  the government which was stated in the Fifth Development Plan and 
aimed to introduce two changes to the Saudi insurance sector namely; the merger o f  the small private 
insurance companies into large co-operative insurance company working according to the Islamic 
Shari ’a and the creation o f a re-insurance industry.
258 LSCIC, supra note 251, art. 1.
259 Insurance companies are required to operate in a manner similar to the NCCI (i.e., co-operative 
insurance). However, the similarity o f  co-operative insurance to the Islamic insurance takaful has been 
questioned. See supra note 108.
260 The Implementing Rules for the Law on Supervision o f Cooperative Insurance Companies, art. 2 
available at http://www.sama.gov.sa [hereinafter implementing Rules]
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coverage, to strengthen the stability of the insurance market and to develop the 
insurance sector in Saudi Arabia.
Also, the LSCIC has provided that a committee should be established in order to 
hear disputes between insurance companies and their clients.261 263To this effect, the 
Insurance Committee was established. Also, the Insurance Committee deals with 
cases that might result from violations of the regulatory and supervisory instructions 
issued to both insurance and reinsurance companies. The decisions of the 
Insurance Committee could be appealed against before the Board of Grievances. 
SAMA has set a deadline for conventional insurance companies to comply with the 
LSCIC and to transfer all its operations in compliance with Islamic co-operative 
insurance.264
From the above discussion, it appears that duality existed through the provision 
of conventional insurance services within an Islamic law body; and arbitration was 
the only way to resolve insurance disputes. The question, however, is whether the 
LSCIC has abolished the existing duality in relation to the insurance sector in Saudi 
Arabia. By stating that insurance practices should conform to the principles of 
Islamic Shari ’a, the LSCIC seems to be in line with the overall Islamic Shari ’a of 
Saudi Arabia.
The shift towards the concept of Islamic insurance which is based on “Islamic 
finance” related principles shows the Saudi appetite for recognising gradually
261 LSCIC, supra note 251, art. 20. The committee also hears disputes related to the subrogation o f  
rights.
262 LSCIC, supra note 251, art. 20.
263 Id. However, other type o f  cases related to the insurance can be heard by the Board o f Grievances; 
for example disputes between insurance and reinsurance companies. See Id. art. 22.
264 The deadline was 29/12/2004. See “Important Notice and Directives from the Saudi Monetary 
Agency to the Public and Existing Companies Transacting Insurance and Reinsurance Business in 
Saudi Arabia” available at http://www.sama.gov.sa.
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Islamic finance related concepts. In fact, the recognition of the insurance activities as 
well as providing an efficient supervisory system for such activities has always been 
a necessity in Saudi Arabia and especially after joining the WTO. The shift towards 
Islamic insurance, is believed, has provided a means to circumvent the “legal 
unrests” that have been caused by the existing de facto duality.
However, having introduced certain regulations to govern the insurance sector, 
the LSCIC created a level of uncertainty as to the Saudi financial system. Thus, it is 
not very clear why the insurance sector has been made as Shari ’«-compliant while 
other components of the Saudi financial system are not. To elaborate, insurance
‘y s c
companies along with other institutional investors are responsible for most of the
A / ' / '
trading in financial markets. Insurance companies are the most important type of
'y e n
institutional investors. In establishing a developed financial system, insurance 
companies should be able to invest in the financial market. By having an Islamic 
insurance sector working in accordance with Islamic Shari ’a principles alongside a 
conventional finance component, the Islamic insurance sector might have difficulty 
in investing in the capital market. However, despite the fact that insurance companies 
will be conducting their business in accordance with the Islamic Shari ’a; the LSCIC 
does not refer the insurance disputes to the Islamic Shari’a courts. Instead, the 
LSCIC established the new Insurance Committee which will have the power to hear 
insurance disputes.
4 . 3 . 4  Final O bser  va tions
The committees that have been established in Saudi Arabia to deal with 
commercial and financial related disputes are the result of the existing de facto 265*
265 Such as pension funds and investment funds.
266 Marc Levinson, Guide To Financial Markets, at 8 (Profile Books Ltd, 1999).
261 Id. at 9.
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duality. It is argued, however, that there is confusion among the litigants regarding 
the efficiency of these committees and that the decisions issued by these committees 
have no obligatory nature. According to Muhammad, this is why the litigants have 
preferred to take their cases to the Islamic Shari’a courts.268 69 Hence, some 
commentators have reached the conclusion that these committees are ‘quasi- 
judicial’ and not true judicial bodies.270
However, Muhammad agrees that that there is a logical reason behind the 
existence of these committees, if only because the Islamic Shari ’a courts are not 
prepared to apply the “positive laws”271 27 such as the Capital Market Law etc. 
Nevertheless, he believes that the status quo regarding the judicial system, which is 
resulting from the existing de facto duality, is unsatisfactory and should be resolved. 
He offers a straightforward solution to the current status quo of the judicial system. 
He argues that there should be one court system, namely, the Islamic Shari’a 
courts. However, within this court system there should be specialised judges who 
will be specialised in different areas of law such as banking, insurance etc.273 In his 
view, the appointment of specialised judges will solve the dilemma of having many 
specialised committees. The reason for reaching such solution is that it is more in 
line with the Saudi society’s mentality.274
It is hard to see how this solution can provide an efficient judicial system. 
Practically speaking, how a judge at the Islamic Shari ’a court can, even if he is 
specialised in banking for instance, accept the idea of enforcing interest-bearing
268 Al-Sheikh, supra note 170, at 251.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 235,





transactions, bonds etc. The core of the dilemma is not the speciality nature of the 
courts but it is really the existence of two conflicting body of laws. On the one hand, 
we have the Islamic Shari’a and on the other we have other “positive laws”. To unify 
the judicial system and to have one Islamic Shari ’a court system means to unify the 
legislation which is the main reason for the duality in the Saudi judicial system.
Vogel agrees with Muhammad in regards to the status quo of the Saudi legal 
system. He argues that there seems to be an agreement on three main points in this 
regards. He states275 “first, the status quo is unsatisfactory and unstable; second, the 
legal system should move toward greater internal harmony, so that increasingly the 
siyasa and fiqh laws and courts interact more smoothly and effectively (for example, 
by elimination of the siyasa tribunals and unification of the judiciary); and third, the 
ultimate system should not be the sort of ideologically dual (secular/religious) legal 
system...”.276
While this author agrees with Vogel that the current status quo is unsatisfactory 
and unstable; it is hard to see how the internal harmony can be achieved? Can the 
unification between the CRSD and CBSD, for example, on the one hand, and Islamic 
Shari’a courts on the other be achieved? Can such harmony be achieved in line with 
the general global trends discussed in Chapter One (i.e., market-oriented policies)? 
The issues arising from these questions are considered further in the next Section 
where the author aims to place the cornerstone for his proposition that will be further 
elaborated and discussed throughout this volume.
275 VOGEL, supra note 143, at 309.
276 Id. In the above statement, the siyasa laws and tribunals which are referred to by Vogel are those 
Committees discussed above, see supra Section 4 .3 .2 ..
122
Chapter Two
5 . T h e  S a u d i  D u a l it y  a t  C r o s s r o a d s
In solving any terminal dilemma, the cause must be identified, surrounded and 
attacked. The dilemma is the de facto “legal unrests” surrounding the Saudi financial 
system. Thus, Saudi Arabia is incurring extra development costs to compensate 
outsiders for the uncertainties of its legal system.277 The cause of the dilemma is the 
existing de facto duality which has resulted from the interaction between Islamic 
Shari’a and modem finance. The symptoms are the appearance of the above- 
mentioned committees. However, the establishment of these committees is not 
solving the dilemma because it deals with form rather than substance. These 
committees provide a form of superficial reform at the surface without actually going 
to the roots of the dilemma.
Having identified the cause being the existing de facto duality, it is desirable to 
examine what could be the cure. To achieve this, the question is whether this existing 
de facto duality should be maintained, abolished or modified. To answer such 
question, for the purposes of this thesis, the existing de facto duality should be 
measured against its implications on the Saudi financial system and related financial 
transactions. Thus, does the status quo achieve the Saudi objective in establishing a 
market-led financial system? How can conventional financial transactions be 
transacted effectively in Saudi Arabia?
Indications from surrounding Islamic countries and considering other 
international developments, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, reveal that certain 
Islamic countries are taking different approaches to enhance their financial systems 
and to improve their capabilities in accommodating various financial transactions in
277 Frank Vogel, Prospects for a Restatement: The Codification o f Commercial and Contract Law in 
Saudi Arabia, in COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, at 31 [hereinafter Vogel, Prospects for a 
Restatement] (H. Lewis et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 1995).
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order to meet their developmental needs. The first approach is developing “Islamic 
finance” alongside conventional finance. Many structures are being structured in an 
Islamic compliant manner. The development of “Islamic finance”, as argued in 
Chapter One, is simply a reaction to the “legal unrests” that have resulted from 
transacting conventional financial transactions. Introducing “Islamic finance” in 
certain Islamic jurisdictions is, therefore, a means to avoid the cumbersome burden 
in attempting to accommodate the conventional financial practice within the Islamic 
Shari ’a. Certain Islamic countries are following this, approach.
The second approach which is completely a new innovation in the G.C.C Region 
and which has been applied at a smaller scale to develop a rule-based and a robust 
international financial centre in order to gain the confidence of international investors 
is through introducing the “segregation” phenomenon. A whole “free zone” area is 
established with its own laws, regulations and judicial system. This “free zone” is 
completely segregated from the overall legal system of the country. So there is no 
interaction between the laws of this “free zone” area and other laws that exist under 
the relevant jurisdiction. An example of this model is the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC). Such model has been introduced in the United Arab 
Emirates to ensure foreign investors’ confidence in the legal framework of the DIFC.
Reverting to Saudi Arabia, its current model appears to be the existing de facto 
duality which generates “legal unrests” because of the interaction between Islamic 
Shari’a and modem finance. This form of duality fits under the ‘conflicting’ state 
legal pluralism umbrella which we discussed in Chapter One. This is because there is 
a conventional financial system and practices within an Islamic Shari’a system (i.e., 
a system within a system). Conflicts arise between both systems’ rules and practices 
affecting the predictability and certainty of the overall financial legal system. This in
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turn affect the ‘rule of law’ required for a well-functioning market-led financial 
system.
This interaction will be further elaborated and highlighted through studying 
securitisations and secured transactions in the light of the existing de facto duality in 
Chapters Three and Four. However, rather than going through the thorny route in 
attempting to combine the inconsistent concepts of Islamic Shari’a and modem 
finance, Saudi Arabia could be enticed to apply a combination of the two approaches 
mentioned above to achieve its aim in establishing a rule-based market-led financial 
system.
In considering this “combination” approach, Saudi Arabia would modify its 
existing de facto duality into a much more efficient type of duality that takes into 
consideration regional and international developments and would enable Saudi 
Arabia to tap its financial market regionally and internationally. In doing so, Saudi 
Arabia would develop the “Islamic finance” component of the Saudi financial system 
and at the same time implements some form of “segregation” to eliminate any 
potential conflicts between the modem finance practice and Islamic Shari’a. This 
“combination” model will be further explained in Chapter Five.
At this stage, it is enticing to envisage how Saudi Arabia would perceive this 
“combination” model. Of developing the “Islamic finance” component, there has 
been a growing academic consensus that Saudi Arabia is not really in favour of 
“Islamic finance”. In fact, Saudi Arabia has been referred to as a country which is 
“actively discourage a separate Islamic banking presence”.278 The Saudi position has 
been heavily criticised by the editorial of the Islamic Banker stating:
278 VOGEL ET AL., supra note 143 , at 11 . See also Ramin Maysami et. al., One Country, Two Systems: 
Banking in Malaysia, 13(7) JIBL 233, at 236-237, (1998) (“ ...Saudi Arabia has always been looked 
at somewhat sceptically as rather pro-Western, and any official recognition given to an Islamic bank
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“...Saudi Arabia urgently needs clarity in terms of its position regarding 
Islamic banking. [It has] to take the political decision either to steer the 
Kingdom either towards a dual banking system, or towards a fully- 
fledged Islamic system. The piecemeal approach of the status quo is an 
absurdity which is no longer sustainable, especially as we go into the 
21st Century. If Saudi Arabia wants to be taken seriously as an ethical 
faith-based financial centre, then its rulers must act decisively, and adopt 
a dual banking system in which an Islamic banking system complete 
with its own enabling law exists side-by-side with a conventional one, 
co-operating but not interacting.
Such dual banking models, pioneered by Malaysia, are the mainstay 
of an increasing number of Muslim countries, including the Gulf States 
of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE”.279
While this has been the case at some point; the attitude towards “Islamic finance” 
has been changing in recent years. The position is completely different. Islamic 
Financial Institutions have emerged, neighbouring countries of the G.C.C have 
introduced “Islamic finance” related laws and other successful models have emerged 
such as in Malaysia. In addition, The U.A.E established the DIFC and Qatar is 
following a similar route by establishing the Qatar Financial Centre.280 These Centres 
do have “Islamic finance” related laws.
would label conventional banks “un-Islamic” by comparison. It is thus believed that the Government 
was wary o f according special status to Islamic banks by granting these institutions the necessary 
licences to operate: once the first distinction between “Islamic” and “un-Islamic” is made, it will be 
difficult to resist pressure from fundamentalists groups to “Islamise” the entire Islamic system. This 
they do not wish to d o ...”). See also, Wilson, supra note 3, 60 -61 (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
279 Editorial, A Very Saudi Corporate Identity Crisis, 101 ISLAMIC Banker 2, at 2, (2004).
280 See generally http://www.qfc.com.qa/
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All these developments that will be explored further in Chapter Four add up and 
exercise some form of pressure on Saudi Arabia. For example, under the G.C.C 
agreements; Saudi Arabia is required to unify its existing financial and banking 
legislations with the neighbouring countries of the G.C.C. In this sense, Saudi Arabia 
would consider “Islamic finance” more seriously. However, external pressures are not 
the only reasons for considering “Islamic finance”. As mentioned earlier, Saudi 
Arabia has expressed its willingness in the Eighth Development Plan to develop an 
Islamic mortgage system. Also, Saudi Arabia has introduced the “Islamic 
insurance” being the only means to provide insurance services in the Kingdom. This 
is an indication that Saudi Arabia is accepting “Islamic finance” at the policy level. 
So, it is the author’s believe that Saudi Arabia would welcome developing the 
“Islamic finance” component of its financial system as a part of the “combination 
model”.
Turning to the second part of the “combination model”, that is; introducing the 
“segregation” phenomenon. How would Saudi Arabia perceive segregating its 
modem finance practice from the overall legal system? Perhaps such process could be 
much harder than developing the “Islamic finance” component of the Saudi financial 
system due to the political issues that could arise. However, it can be argued that 
Saudi Arabia has been experiencing some form of segregation already.
Thus, consider the establishment of the committees that the author has discussed 
earlier. While these committees are the result of the existing de facto duality, their 
. establishment reflect an attempt to segregate their functions from the overall legal 
system of the Islamic Shari’a. By proposing the full “segregation” phenomenon 
adopted in the DIFC as part of the “combination model”, the author is not proposing
281 Eight Development Plan, supra note 62, at 320.
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an entirely new approach. Instead it is a call to finalise the “unfinished agenda”. This, 
however, goes hand in hand with developing the “Islamic finance” component. It is, 
therefore, fair to conclude that such approach could be welcomed.
In the light of the above discussion, this volume suggests that the existing de facto 
duality should neither be maintained nor abolished but instead it should be modified. 
To this effect, Saudi Arabia is advised to replace the existing de facto duality by 
adopting the new modified duality. This can be done by further dualising the Saudi 
financial system whereby a conventional financial system is not functioning within an 
Islamic Shari’a system but alongside an Islamic financial system (i.e., a system 
alongside a system). This conventional finance component is segregated from the 
overall legal system of Islamic Shari 'a.
The main aim for such reform should be the development of a parallel dual rule- 
based financial system which meets the requirements of a market-based economy and 
maintains at the same time the ‘rule of law’. This new modified duality fits under the 
‘non-conflicting’ state legal pluralism umbrella discussed in Chapter One. Unlike the 
existing de facto duality, the new modified duality involves segregating the 
conventional finance component from the overall Islamic Shari ’a realm; and at the 
same time, building an Islamic financial system alongside its conventional 
counterpart. This, it is hoped, would serve creating a robust and efficient dual 
financial system which meets the requirements of a market-based economy.
282 See Zaki Badawi, Which Banking System -Dual or Single?, 34 ISLAMIC BANKER 16, at 17, (1998) 
; (Badawi states: “Is it permissible and feasible for a Muslim state to have two systems: Islamic and 
conventional? the feasibility is demonstrated by Malaysia, Egypt, Jordan and some other countries 
where Islamic banking is allowed to function..”. He argues that Islamic banking should serve Muslims 
and the conventional banking should serve non-Muslims. However, he adds: “ ...in  all circumstances, 
there is no objection to maintaining the two systems [Islamic and conventional banking] in parallel 
during a transition stage- as long as the ultimate intention is to lead financial and commercial sector to 
the Islamic business and financial system.”) . This Chapter, however, does not discuss from a religious 
viewpoint whether adopting a dual financial system is Islamic or not. The proposition made for Saudi 




This Chapter reveals that Saudi Arabia is desirous to adopt market-based policies 
and to establish a market-led financial system. To this effect, Saudi Arabia has 
passed several major laws that aimed at facilitating the functions of the Saudi 
financial system. These laws, however, have caused the existing de facto duality and 
a duality within the Saudi judicial system. In addition, the interaction between the 
Islamic Shari’a and modem finance has generated “legal unrests” that could 
undermine the effectiveness of the Saudi financial system and in turn adversely 
affecting the proper implementation of Saudi market-based policies.
The Chapter also argued that two approaches have developed by other Islamic 
countries in order to eliminate any potential conflicts between modem economy and 
Islamic Shari ’a. These are the development of “Islamic finance” and the emerging 
phenomenon of “segregation” that has been implemented in the DIFC. The Chapter 
proposes that a combination of both approaches would serve a good model for the 
Saudi financial sector law reform process. To this effect, Saudi Arabia is advised to 
modify its exiting de facto duality into a new modified duality whereby a 
conventional financial system is functioning alongside an Islamic financial system 
and at the same time the conventional finance component should be segregated from 
the overall legal system of Saudi Arabia. This model will be further examined in 
Chapter Five. In the following two Chapters, however, the author takes a closer look
recognised. Also, adopting a dual financial system may offer a strategy prior to Islamising the whole 
financial sector. Arguably, it is not viable to transfer the conventional financial system into an Islamic 
one rapidly. See Muhammad Chapra, Towards A Just Monetary System, at 227 (The Islamic 
Foundation, 1985): “ It would...be a mistake to try to achieve the transition from the conventional 
capitalist money and banking system now prevalent in the Muslim world to the just Islamic model in 
one stroke or over a very short period o f time. Such an attempt could suffocate the whole system and 
do great damage to the economy . . .”. However, it is evident that Islamic finance flourishes in free 
market economies rather than in states where government control the banking sector; hence, economic 
liberalisation aids Islamic finance rather than hindering its development. See generally Rodney 
Wilson, The Politics o f Islamic, finance, 147 NEW HORIZON 5, (2005).
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as to the impact of the existing de facto duality on financial related transactions to 
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* In connection with the author’s doctoral research, this Chapter has been published in two journals 
with the doctoral supervisor’s permission. See Amr Marar, Saudi Arabia: The Duality of the Saudi 
Legal System and Its Implications on Securitisations, 27 COMPANY LAWYER 344, (2006). Reprinted in 




In the previous two chapters, the author attempted to explain the broader view 
surrounding the theme of this volume. Chapter One introduced market economy 
policies, their interaction with the Islamic Shari ‘a and the development of “Islamic 
finance” highlighting the current trend in the Islamic countries. Then, Chapter Two 
moves closely to the case of Saudi Arabia examining this broader view of the 
interaction and its implications as to the Saudi financial system. This Chapter goes 
further and moves closer to study a specific financial transaction (i.e., securitisation) 
in the light of the Saudi legal system to establish the author’s theme. This being that 
the Saudi financial system is constrained by the existing de facto duality and despite 
the various laws that Saudi Arabia has introduced; an interaction between the Islamic 
Shari’a and modem finance still exists. This would have potential adverse 
implications on these transactions.
For elaboration purposes, therefore, this Chapter considers how a modem 
financial innovation -  asset securitisation - might interface within the Islamic law- 
based Saudi system. Generally, asset securitisation is a financial technique that links 
the capital markets with the banking markets1 by allowing banks to convert their 
“receivables and other assets that are not readily marketable into securities that can
1 Joseph Norton, Financial Sector Law Reform in Emerging Economies, at 236 (BIICL, 2000).
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be placed and traded in the capital markets”.2 It is a relatively recent financial 
innovation which has been developed in the United States.3
However, this financial technique has been exported outside the US to other 
countries and has been applied successfully in the United Kingdom as well as in 
other parts of Europe.4 Many benefits, which are explained below, have been brought 
by using asset securitisation. For example, in using asset securitisation, banks would 
be able to adjust their balance sheet and improve liquidity,5 borrowers would be able 
seek lower cost of fund by accessing the capital market,6 78and investors would be able
*7to invest in highly rated securities with great yields.
Given its benefits, it is believed by many government policymakers and by the 
International Financial Institutions that securitisation techniques contribute to the 
overall economic growth in the country, including developing, transitioning and
o
emerging economies. For example, the positive indications and advantages of using 
securitisation in the developed and industrialised countries9 have encouraged the
2 Kenneth Elmgren, An Overview of Securitisation, in INTERNATIONAL ASSET SECURITISATION, at 1 
(Joseph Norton et al. eds., Lloyd’s o f  London Press Ltd, 1995). Receivables inter alia refer to assets 
like “mortgage and charge debts, car loans, insurance premiums, credit card debts, secured consumer 
loans, equipment loans, freights (including sub-freights), rentals from real and personal property, 
debts for goods sold or services rendered”. See FlDELIS ODITAH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECEIVABLES 
Financing, at 2 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1991).
3 See generally Elmgren, supra note 2.
4 See generally Asset-Baked Securitisation IN EUROPE (Theodor Baums et al. eds., Kluwer Law 
International, 1996).
5 Bharat Jain, Promoting Securitisation in Emerging Economies, in ACCESSING CAPITAL MARKETS 
Through Securitisation, 205, at 210 [hereinafter Accessing Capital] (Frank Fabozzi eds., Frank 
J Fabozzi Associates, 2001).
6 Joseph Shenker et al., Asset Securitisation: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. 
Rev 1369, at 1371, (1991).
7 /¿/. at 1371-1372.
8 See generally Leonora Walters et al., A Helping Hand, 73 INT’L SECURITISATION Rep. 15, (2002- 
2003). See also Lee Meddin, Structured Finance in the Emerging Markets, in GLOBAL 
SECURITISATION Review (2004-2005), 1 (IFC & Euromoney). See also Lakshman Alles, Asset 
Securitisation and Structured Financing: Future Prospects and Challenges for Emerging Market 
Countries, (IMF Working Paper, 2001).
9 For example, in 2001 asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities accounted for 28.3% of the US$ 
17.7tr US bond market. See Murra, Id. at 15.
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International Finance Corporation (IFC)10 affiliate of the World Bank Group to take 
an active role in promoting securitisation to developing countries and emerging 
markets.11
Nevertheless, the growth of the securitisation markets outside the developed 
countries arena has been slow.12 The slow adoption of securitisation outside the 
developed countries can be attributed to different reasons including: the lack of 
experience in secured transactions,13 the absence of desirable pools of receivables,14 
the extent of the involvement of the central bank as well as the commercial banks in 
promoting securitisation,15 1678unavailability of a strong institutional infrastructure and 
investor base and the restrictive regulator environment.
Hence, securitisation cannot be applied successfully in emerging markets unless 
structural problems with the banking sector as well as equity and debt markets are 
addressed. In addition, developing a suitable legal framework to accommodate the 
Tegally-intense’ technique of securitisation is at the heart of the financial legal 
reforms that need to be addressed by the developing countries that are aiming to
improve capital investment securities and mortgage markets. Therefore, it is
<.
suggested that a legal framework that supports the functioning of the financial 
system should include a basic asset securitisation law.19 Numerous developing 
countries (e . g People’s Republic of China, Argentina, Mexico, Thailand and South 
Africa) have adopted asset securitisation legislations.
10 See generally http://www.ifc.org
" The IFC role involves advising and assisting emerging markets on their first products. Also, the IFC 
participates in structuring and providing credit enhancement to securitisation deals.
2 Norton, supra note 1, at 237.
13 M
14/c/.
15 Jain, supra note 5, at 208.
16 Id. at 207
17 Norton, supra note 1, at 237.
18 Jain, supra note 5, at 212.
19 Norton, supra note 1, at 50.
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In the light of this, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can benefit from a financial 
technique such as securitisation. In fact, various attempts in using securitisation 
techniques in the Kingdom began as early as 1993.20 21However, as argued in this 
Chapter, the Saudi legal infrastructure is not wholly supportive of securitisation 
transactions. The existing de facto duality has its impact, inter alia, on one of the 
major steps in securitisations, namely, the sale of assets. This Chapter analyses these 
issues being an example of the current dilemma of the Saudi financial system that 
has resulted from the interaction between Islamic Shari ’a and modem finance 
techniques which is the theme of this volume.
This Chapter also shows an example of an “Islamic finance” product that has 
emerged as a result of the interaction between Islamic Shari ’a and global economy. 
This “Islamic finance” product is referred to as “Islamic securitisation” and is 
developed to offer benefits that are similar to those offered by conventional 
securitisations while complying at the same time with the Islamic Shari ’a. The 
development of “Islamic securitisation” goes beyond the fact that it is a reaction to 
the “legal unrests” caused by the interaction between Islamic Shari’a and modem 
finance. Thus, “Islamic finance”, including “Islamic securitisations”, is relevant to 
the securitisation industry. It is suggested that: 1) Islamic investors are an attractive 
pool of investors that can be tapped for placement of capital market instruments 
issued by securitisation vehicles; and 2) there are many originators (particularly in
20 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, Country Finance: Saudi Arabia (2004) at 16 (the 
J report states that securitisation o f receivables has begun in the automobile cars to improve the
liquidity o f  the cars dealers. No further details have been provided in this report regarding the 
techniques used).
21 See the discussion infra (in relation to the principles o f  Islamic Shari'a that contravene with 
conventional securitisations).
22 Abradat Kamalpour et al., Islamic Securitisation, in GLOBAL SECURITISATION AND STRUCTURED 
FINANCE, 220, at 220, (Globe White Page Ltd., 2006) [hereinafter GLOBAL SECURITISATION] . See 
also Michael McMillen et al., An Innovation in Financing — Islamic CMBS, in COMMERCIAL 
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation, 382, at 402 (Andrew Petersen ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2006)
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the Middle East and Far East) that wish to securitise their pool of financings in an 
Islamic compliant fashion.
Recently, this “Islamic securitisation” technique has been used to securitise the 
receivables of a leading car rental company in Saudi Arabia.23 4 Such initiatives show 
that there is marked interest by the Saudi private sector financial community in 
seeking alternative methods to raise funds. Whether the Saudi legal system is 
developed enough, even after the new introduced legal reforms, to accommodate 
these initiatives and to meet the private sectors’ interests in securitisation is 
questionable.
It can be argued that the use of “Islamic securitisation” in Saudi Arabia rather 
than conventional securitisation is attributed to the fact that the general paramount 
legal system is Islamic Shari ’a. Thus, there is a legal dimension in using an “Islamic 
securitisation” structure, that is, the belief that such structure works more efficiently 
within the Saudi legal system. Nevertheless, there are no laws or regulations that 
specifically govern “Islamic securitisation”. For instance, none of the provisions of 
the Saudi Capital Market Law25 address the issue of sukuk26 {i.e., Islamic bonds).27 28
As indicated in Chapter Two, there are indications that Saudi Arabia is interested 
to develop the Islamic finance industry. This should be accompanied, however,
(arguing that Commercial-Mortgage-backed Securitisation sukuk could easily emanate from the US 
and Europe as opposed to Islamic countries because there is an increased involvement in Islamic 
finance by international banks, those banks have substantial Shari’a compliant assets, they have 
significant securitisation experience and international banks can obtain the necessary ratings as the 
transaction will be structured within a jurisdiction with a supportive legal framework).
23 Id.
' 24 Lousie Bowman, Saudi’s True-Sale Vehicle, 87 INT’L SECURITISATION REP. 24,2004.
25 Capital Market Law, Royal Decree Number M/3, July 2003 available at http://www.cma.org.sa.
26 However, Saudi Capital Market Authority has authorised the issuance o f  sukuk in Saudi Arabia. See 
Offering Circular, SABIC Basic Industries Corporation, 3 July 2006 [hereinafter Offering 
CIRCULAR] available at http://www.cma.org.sa
27 See generally NATHIF ADAM ET AL., ISLAMIC BONDS: YOUR GUIDE TO ISSUING, STRUCTURING AND 
Investing IN SUKUK, (Euromoney, 2004) (discussing Islamic bonds in detail).
28 See, e.g., The Eighth Development Plan, at 320 available at http://www.planning.gov.sa/. (referring 
to the desire to establish an Islamic mortgage system).
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with a supportive legal framework that could include “Islamic securitisation”. As 
will be seen later, not all the assets can be securitised using “Islamic securitisation”. 
Since Saudi Arabia does maintain a conventional financial practice, Saudi Arabia 
might consider the advisability of developing both securitisation markets (i.e., 
Islamic and conventional); in line with the current trend discussed previously. That 
is, adopting both Islamic and conventional financial practice.
2. Securitisation: General Overview
2.1 Elements of Securitisation
Securitisation is not only a process which involves the issuance of securities: 
other financial techniques might involve such a role (e.g., traditional debt securities 
offering in the capital market).29 However, in this Chapter, securitisation is referred 
to as “a form of financing where monetary assets with predictable cash flows are 
pooled and sold to a specially created third party that has borrowed money to finance 
the purchase. These borrowed funds are raised through the sale of asset-backed 
securities, which can take the form of either commercial paper or bonds”.30 
Securitisation is a form of structured finance.31 32Structured finance involves using a 
specific structure in order to reallocate the risks resulting from such transaction. 
Thus, in securitisation, the monetary assets to be securitised are structurally isolated
"X")from the former owner of the assets. Hence, the risks that associated with
' 29 Shenker, supra note 6, at 1373-1374 (arguing that there is not satisfactory uniform definition for 
securitisation and that the term is normally used to mean different things. Also, he argues that 
definitions that define securitisation to involve the issuance o f  securities only fail to mention the 
characteristics o f  asset securitisation which distinguish it from other financial techniques).
30 W. Alexander Rover et al., A Primer on Securitisation, 9(2) J. STRUCTURED & PROJECT FIN. 5, at 5, 
(2003).
31 Id.
32 The Committee On Bankruptcy And Corporate Reorganisation, Association Of The Bar 
Of The city Of new  York, Structured Finance Techniques, Bus. Law. 527, at 528. 1995.
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securitisation are mainly tied to the repayment of the monetary assets rather than to 
the performance of a specific project or entity.33
Generally, any securitisation transaction involves five main elements.34 35The first 
element is the existence of a pool of receivable monetary assets. Such assets should 
be identified by the originator (i.e., the entity that owns the assets and aims to
1C
securitise them). Thus, the originator begins by forming a pool of homogenous 
assets.36 37These assets could be mortgage loans, credit card receivables, auto loans, 
etc. Nowadays, the list of the assets that could be securitised is growing to include a 
variety of other assets such as leases, pharmaceutical patent revenues, trademark 
leases, insurance related transactions, etc. The eligibility of a specific group of 
assets for securitisation and their capability for commoditisation depends on the 
sufficient stability and predictability of these assets.38 39The ability to predict the 
performance of the underlying pool of assets is a key to the success of the
. . .  » 3 9securitisation transaction.
The second element, which has been described as the linchpin of the 
securitisation process,40 is the establishment of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The 
SPV is the legal entity used to segregate the assets being securitised from certain 
risks associated with the originator. Thus, after the assets have been identified by the 
originator; the originator transfers the assets to the newly established SPV. Such
33 Rover et al., supra note 30, at 5.
34 Daniel Singer, Securitisation Basics, in ACCESSING CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 13,15.
35 NORTON, supra note 1, at 238.
36 See Basel Committee Report on Asset Transfers and Securitisation (Sept. 1992), at 2 
(emphasising on the necessity of homogeneity for two reasons: to enable cost efficient analysis and to
' achieve common payment pattern), [hereinafter Basel Report] available at http://www.bis.org/
37 Ellen Welsher et al., Securitisations of “New Asset” Classes: A Rating Approach, 10(2) J. 
STRUCTURED FIN. 2 0 ,20 , (2004). See, e g., on insurance-related securitisation H. Wang, Securitisation 
of Insurance Risk: Devising an Appropriate Regulatory Framework, in YEARBOOK OF 
International Financial and Economic Law (2000-2001) (Joseph Norton et al. eds., BIICL, 
2003).
38 Welsher et al., supra note 37, at 20.
39 Singer, supra note 34, at 13.
w Id. at 15.
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transfer of assets should be structured in a way to constitute a “true sale”.41 This 
means that the receivables have been completely removed from the originator’s 
ownership in case of bankruptcy.42 In this sense, the SPV has to be structured as 
“bankruptcy remote”, so it is not affected by the bankruptcy of the originator.43
There are five characteristics that should be adopted in order to establish a 
bankruptcy remote SPV:44 1) restriction on objects and powers;45 2) debt 
limitations;46 3) independent director(s);47 4) no merger or reorganisation48 and 5) 
separateness.49 The establishment of the SPV in a securitisation transaction is what 
distinguishes securitisation from other capital raising techniques such as issuing debt 
or equity securities. Unlike issuing commercial investment securities, through 
securitisation the originator achieves non-recourse financing50 because investors will 
be mainly looking to the cash flow generated by the assets for repayment rather than 
to the originator’s assets or creditworthiness.51 The establishment of the SPV is 
intended to achieve this non-recourse feature of securitisation.
The third element in any securitisation transaction is to seek credit enhancement 
in order to minimise the associated risks, for example, the risk of delayed payments
41 Steven Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitisation, 1(1) STAN. J. L. BUS & FlN 133, 135 (1994).
42 Id. However, some limited recourse may be permitted as in the case o f  fraud or intentionally false 
representations and warranties.
43 Schwarcz, supra note 41, at 135.
44 James Penrose, Special-Purpose Entities in Project Finance Transactions, 2(3) J. STRUCTURED & 
PROJECT FIN. 58, 60, (1996) (explaining the SPV’s characteristics in the context o f  project finance, 
which equally apply in the context o f securitisation).
45 In the articles o f  the incorporation the objects clause restricts the powers o f  the corporation to the 
activities o f  the transactions only. However, in the securitisation transactions the SPV might take the 
form o f trust.
' 46 Any additional debts to finance the purchase o f  the assets from the originator should be restricted.
47 The SPV which is controlled by the originator is usually requires to have an independent director.
48 See Penrose, supra note 44, at 62.
49 Separateness means that the SPV should be clear to the whole world that it is an independent entity 
and especially from any involvement o f  a parent company. See Penrose, supra note 44, at 62.
50 Edward Park, Allowing Japanese Banks to Engage in Securitisation: Potential Benefits, Regulatory 
Obstacles, and Theories for Reform, 17 U. Pa . J. Int’L ECON. L. 723, at 732.
51 Yoshiki Shimada et al., Japanese Asset Securitisation: A Guide for Practitioners, 38 Harv. Int’L 
L.J. 171, at 171 (1997).
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or payment default under the receivables.52 These defaults will result in payment 
losses or payment delays to the investors.53 The amount of “credit enhancement” 
required is determined on a transaction-specific basis.54 Additionally, providing 
credit enhancement for the securitisation transaction will result of better credit 
agency rated securities.55 Such credit enhancement can be either external or 
internal.56 The purpose of using a credit enhancement mechanism is to increase the 
certainty for investors that cash flow will be paid as expected. There is variety of 
internal credit enhancement mechanisms,57 including overcollateralisation,58 cash 
collateral accounts,59 and senior-subordinate structure.60 However, credit 
enhancement can be provided externally through third-party guarantees or a third- 
party letter of credit or insurance.61
The fourth element is servicing the securitisation.62 In any securitisation structure 
there needs to be a servicer to monitor the performance of the securitised assets and
52Id. at 173.
53 Rover et al., supra note 30, at 10.
sUd.
55 In order for the securities to be marketed to investors, the originator will seek independent credit 
rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group, Moody’s Investor Service, Fitch Investors 
Services and Duff & Phelps. The aim o f these agencies is “to gauge credit quality and make 
investment decisions. A credit rating is not a recommendation to purchase, sell, or hold a particular 
security. The rating performs the isolated function o f credit risk evaluation, which is only one element 
o f the entire investment decision-making process”. See supra note 32, at 535. See also Paul Taylor, 
Credit Ratings on International Asset-Backed Securities, in INTERNATIONAL ASSET SECURITISATION, 
supra note 2, at 161
56 Rover et al., supra note 32, at 10.
57 Singer, supra note 37, at 18.
58 Overcollaterlisation is an internal credit enhancement mechanism provided by “issuing bonds with a 
par value that is less than the par value o f the loans or receivables in the collateral pool”. See Rover et 
al., supra note 32, at 10.
59 A cash collateral account is “a deposit equal to the necessary credit enhancement which is held for 
the benefit o f  the holders o f the securities”. See Basel Report, supra note 36, at 4.
60 In such structure at least two classes are issued where one class o f  securities is subordinate to the 
other senior class o f  securities. The holders o f  the subordinated securities are subordinated in 
payments, which mean that they absorb the losses for the benefit o f  the senior securities. See Rover et 
al, supra note 32, at 11. See also NORTON, supra note 2, at 247. However, subordinated securities 
will have higher yield.
61 Rover et al., supra note 32, at 10.
62 Singer, supra note 34, at 19.
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the cash flow. Servicing is normally undertaken by the originator,63 which will be 
responsible for preparing a monthly detailed report that can be distributed to the 
investors, rating agencies and credit enhancers.64 The last element of the 
securitisation process is the underwriting.65 This is basically the purchase of the 
securities by an investment bank and reselling them to the public as debt instruments 
in the capital/investment securities markets.66
2.2 Incentives For Securitisation
2 . 2 . 1  G e n e r a l  B e n e f i t s  F r o m  S e c u r i t i s a  t i o n  
The advantages of securitisation are numerous. Borrowers, originators, investors 
and the financial economy as a whole can benefit from the securitisation technique.67 68
For the overall economy, securitisation provides a lower cost capital and a more 
efficient financial system. It also helps in improving the liquidity of the economy’s 
credit market.69 70 Further, securitisation offers new investment instruments for 
institutional and other investors. It gives the investors the opportunity to diversify 
their portfolios and increases their choice.71 72Asset-backed securities offer greater
79protection to investors compared to traditional debt securities.
As for the originator, the advantages are manifold.73 One of the compelling 
reasons for the originator to use securitisation is that it provides an alternative and
63 The originator charges fee for such activity.
64 Singer, supra note 34, at 19.
65 Id. Singer refers to underwriting as “the process o f  selling securities by an investment bank...” Id. 
However, selling the securities in a securitisation might take different mechanisms each have it 
characteristics such as placement arrangements or purchase arrangements. On the different mechanics 
o f the distribution o f securities see ROSS CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW, at 335 (Oxford 
University Press, 2002).
66 Singer, supra note 34, at 19.
67 Park, supra note 50, at 728. See also supra note 8.
68 Park, supra note 50, at 728.
69 NORTON, supra note 1, at 241.
70 James Rosenthal et al., Securitisation of Credit, at 13 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1988).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 G ille s  T h ie ffry  et a l., Securitisation: The New Opportunities Offered by Economic and Monetary 
Union, 12 J .I .B .L  4 6 3 , at 4 6 4  (1 9 9 7 ) .
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efficient source of funding.74 The originator can raise capital immediately without 
the need to wait for the repayment of the receivables.75 By using securitisation, the 
originator can achieve lower cost of funds.76 *78This is because the originator issues 
securities through the SPV which is de-linked from the originator’s own credit 
ratings. Hence, securitisation normally achieves a higher credit rating than that of
«TO
the originator. Securitisation provides an efficient source of liquidity allowing the 
originator to vary its sources of credit and widen the range of its creditors away from 
traditional bank financing.79 .
However, using securitisation allows the originator to transfer a range of credit 
risks to the investors,80 thus, transforming these risks into one single risk.81 Also, 
securitisation allows for better management of the balance sheet.82 By transferring 
the assets to an SPV in order to be securitised, both assets and liabilities will be 
removed from the balance sheet.83 845This leads to an improvement in the financial 
ratios. The originator can raise money without the loan appearing on its balance
Of
sheet. This capital structure improvement is important especially for banks that 
comply with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision guidelines86 on capital 
adequacy. Thus, through securitisation, a bank can avoid reserving the required
74 NORTON, supra note 1, at 240.
75 Philip Wood, Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations and Set-off and Netting, at 45 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).
76 Rover et al., supra note 30, at 7.
11 Id.
78 NORTON, supra note 1, at 240.
79 Thieffry et al., supra note 73, at 464.
80 Norton, supra note 1, at 241.
81 Id.
82 Thieffry et al., supra note 73, at 464.
83 Norton, supra note 1,241.
84 Thieffry et al., supra note 73, at 464.
85 WOOD, supra note 75, at 45
86 Norton, supra note 1, at 242.
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capital to support the receivables being securitised by selling them and removing 
such liabilities from its balance sheet.87
2 . 2 . 2  P o s s i b l e  B e n e f i t s  F o r  A n  E m e r g i n g  E c o n o m y  S u c h  A s  S a u d i  A r a b i a
There is no doubt that an emerging economy such as Saudi Arabia could benefit 
from a financial technique such as securitisation. Other emerging economies such as 
Mexico and Argentina have already realised the importance of securitisation and 
have taken measures in order to create a “securitisation-friendly” market. One of the 
main aims for creating a “securitisation-friendly” market is to increase the 
availability of affordable low-cost housing.88 Hence, certain measures took place 
(e.g., in Mexico) to facilitate mortgage-backed securitisations.
While each country has its own specific needs, Saudi Arabia would join Mexico 
in its need for a low-cost housing. There is a huge demand for housing in Saudi 
Arabia because of the rapidly growing population.89 Few banks in Saudi Arabia have 
introduced mortgage products.90 Hence, it is believed that there are significant 
opportunities in setting up specialised funds (e.g., mortgage funds) through 
securitisation.91 Securitisation would offer a useful, an efficient and a low cost 
method of financing for the Saudi real estate industry. In addition, the use of 
securitisation is not confined to the Saudi housing industry but can be used in 
financing the Saudi construction industry which is the largest non-oil economic 
sector in Saudi Arabia.
87 WOOD, supra note 75, at 46
88 See generally David Banowsky et al., Secured Financing Issues for International Lenders: Bridging 
the Gap Between Civil and Common Law through Asset-backed Securitisation -  Lessons From and 
Respecting Argentina and Mexico, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS, 
307 (Joseph Norton et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 1998).





However, other market players in Saudi Arabia and a number of different sectors 
could benefit from this financial technique. For example, Saudi banks could benefit 
from securitisation to avoid capital adequacy requirements imposed by the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which imposes higher capital adequacy ratio 
above the 8% recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
According to the Saudi Banking Control Law, the capital adequacy ratio may vary 
but SAMA normally keeps the ratio around 18%. Such ratio may constrain the 
commercial banks from using its liquid funds to enter into new business 
opportunities. Hence, securitisation offers a method whereby Saudi banks can 
remove the exiting receivables from their balance sheet. Also, as Saudi Arabia is 
going through a process of privatisation, the private sector is therefore in need of 
capital to fund this process. Securitisation offers an alternative means of financing 
that would facilitate the privatisation process through making the fund available at a 
lower cost and long term basis.
2.3 Risks of Securitisation
There are certain risks that are associated with securitisation transactions. In 
order to achieve a successful transaction, these risks need to be managed and 
minimised. For example, in order for asset-backed securities to be widely 
marketable, investors’ exposures need to be minimised to an acceptable level. One 
of the most serious risks in a securitisation transaction is the failure to duly transfer 
the assets from the originator to the SPV (i.e., the issuer). As mentioned earlier, 
such transfer should amount to a ‘true sale’.* 934 In case such ‘true sale’ is not achieved, 
the assets may not be deemed removed completely from the originator’s ownership
. 92 CRANSTON, supra note 65, at 372.
93 NORTON, supra note 1, at 242-243. See also BASEL REPORT, supra note 36, at 6.
94 See the discussion infra.
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and its financial balance sheet. Therefore, the originator might remain subject to 
claims regarding the securitised assets in case of their non-performance95 and 
therefore subject to risk.
However, even after the transfer of the assets on a ‘true sale’ basis, there are 
other risks associated with the securitisation transaction. Firstly, after the transfer of 
the assets to the issuer (i.e., SPV), the credit risks attached to the underlying assets 
will be transferred accordingly.96 “Credit risk” means the risk that the receivables are 
not collectible.97 The credit risk is related to the quality of the securitised assets.98 
The quality of the securitised assets are, in turn, based on whether the obligors meet 
their obligations and whether, in case of default and enforcement, the proceeds of thé 
sale of the securitised assets are sufficient for the full payment of principal and 
interest.99 However, credit risks can be minimised by the availability of credit 
enhancement mechanisms mentioned earlier.100
Secondly, another risk that could undermine the securitisation transaction is the 
“liquidity risk”. Liquidity risks refer to the risk of shortfall of cash flow to meet the 
issuer’s payments obligations towards the investors.101 The reason is the timing 
mismatch between collecting the receivables and the repayment to investors.102 This 
timing mismatch may be caused by the debtors’ delay in payment or because of the
95 Norton, supra note 1, at 243.
96 CRANSTON, supra note 65, at 372.
97 WOOD, supra note 75, at 57.
98 Colin Paul et al., Banking and Capital Markets Companion, at 281 (Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 2003).
"Id.
100 E.g., credit risks can be minimised by using the overcollateralisation, see WOOD, supra note 75, 57. 
See also supra note 58.
101 PAUL ET AL., supra note 98, at 281.
102 WOOD, supra note 75, 57.
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receivables term.103 Also, it could be caused by the performance risk of the
104servicer.
A third risk which is associated with the securitisation transaction is the “interest 
basis risk”, which is the risk of a mismatch between the interest rates on the 
receivables and the interest rates to be paid to the investors.105 Finally, there can be a 
“reinvestment risk”, which is the risk that might result from the recovery of high 
interest-bearing receivables by the SPV before the due date of the securities and the 
inability of investing this sum with the same profitability.106
3. Legal A spects Of Securitisation
Generally, as mentioned earlier, a securitisation structure involves a transfer of
1 f)7the originator’s assets. Such transfer has to achieve what is referred to as ‘true 
sale’. The use of the term ‘sale’ is a banking jargon. Hence, referring to the 
originator as the seller of the assets is not an accurate legal description.107 809 Normally, 
the assets which are sold in securitisation transactions are loans (i.e., principal and 
interest). Such assets can not be sold like other tangible assets or goods. For example, 
under English law; the Sale of Goods Act 1979 excludes money from its definition of 
goods.110 However, different legal mechanisms might provide the legal means
m Id
104 Rover et al., supra note 30, at 13(arguing that investors in the securitisation transaction are exposed 
to the performance risk o f  the servicer. Thus, if  the servicer does not perform adequately, payment 
delays may occur. Hence, it is advised that there should be a back-up servicer). However, there is 
normally a liquidity facility agreement whereby the liquidity provider commits to provide liquidity 
when needed.
105 WOOD, supra note 75, 57.
106 Id.
107 Such is a matter o f  domestic law and applicable accounting rules.
108 Cranston, supra note 65, at 360.
109 Id.
1,0 See, e.g., Section 61 o f  the Sale o f Goods Act 1979 which defines goods to include “all personal 
chattels other than things in action and money, and in Scotland all corporeal moveables except money; 
and in particular “good” includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or 
forming part o f  the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract o f sale and 
includes an undivided share in goods”.
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through which the originator’s assets can be sold under English law; these would be 
assignment, novation and sub-participation. Prior to discussing these legal 
mechanisms; a brief description of the legal nature of the assets being sold in a 
securitisation transaction is necessary.111 12
3.1 The Legal N ature of the Securitised Assets
The tradability of debt assets is considered as one of the most discoveries that 
have deeply affected the fortunes of human race. In commercial and banking 
practices, companies and banks do sell their assets- that is, loans, credit card 
receivables and so on. Many modem transactions are based on the idea of selling 
debts, including securitisation and factoring.113 For lawyers, however, there must be 
a clear legal understanding and analysis of what exactly is being sold. Such 
understanding is crucial to execute these transactions effectively and successfully. 
Hence, a brief overview of what is being sold in a securitisation transaction is 
necessary.114
As receivables are financial assets that cannot be “sold” in the legal sense, they 
are transferred (in the English context) through assignment or novation. Such transfer 
or sale of the securitised assets involves the transfer of the rights to the receivables. 
Legally speaking, what are being transferred are not the actual receivables but the 
rights attached to them. One traditional English law classification of rights is, 1) real
111 Despite that the term ‘sale’ is not an accurate legal description; the use o f  the term ‘sale’ in this 
Chapter would mean the process o f  disposing o f  the assets by the originator regardless o f  the legal 
mechanism being used to accomplish such sale.
112 See Oditah, supra note 2, at 2 referring to Macleod, Principles of Economical Philosophy, 
(1872), at 481: “. . . i f  we were asked-who made the discovery which has most deeply affected the 
fortunes o f  the human race? We then, after full consideration we might safely answer -  the man who 
first discovered that a debt is a saleable commodity”.
113 See, e.g., FREDDY SALINGER, FACTORING Law AND PRACTICE, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).
114 The following discussion owes much to Nick Foster and his thorough research in the area o f  law of 
transfers. See generally, Nick Foster, Transfers of Rights and Obligations in the UAE: A Comparative 
Analysis in the Light of English Law, French Law and the Shari’a, 7 YEARBOOK ISLAMIC & MIDDLE 
Eastern L. 3, (2000 -2001), 3-13.
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rights and 2) personal rights.115 Real rights are those rights that relate directly to a 
thing,116 such as a house. Unlike real rights, personal rights are those rights which 
“derive their ‘existence’ from the possibility of an action against a person”117 
whether a natural person or a legal person.118 Personal rights can derive from 
different sources such as contract and tort.
Foster gives us an example to illustrate, if a seller sells; a house to a buyer; 
nothing happens to the house itself. What happens instead is that a transfer of a real 
right from the seller to the buyer takes place.119 As a result, the buyer will have all 
the rights to enjoy using the house. However, a sale of the securitised receivables is a 
sale of debt and hence it involves the transfer of personal rights.120 According to 
Foster, the securitised receivables are personal rights because these rights: “1) relate 
to future property of the creditor, property which the holder of the right does not 
have in his or her possession or control; 2) relate to indeterminate property such as 
money; and 3) are specifically tied to the counterparty’s ability to pay”.121 Thus, “a 
receivable is not a sum of money belonging to the creditor but in the possession of 
the debtor. Yet the liability of the debtor to fulfil his obligation is a thing, a valuable 
one at that, capable of being dealt with like any other intangible property”.122
However, these receivables or debts as personal rights are referred to as ‘choses 
in action’.123 Choses in action or a ‘thing in action’124 is a term that lawyers have had
115 Id. at 7.
116 Foster, supra note 114, at 7.
uyId. at 7.
118 Joanna Benjamin Et al., The Law of Global Custody, at 9 (Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002).
119 Foster, supra note 114, at 7.
120 Debt is a personal right see Benjamin Et al., supra note 118, at 9.
121 Foster, supra note 114, 8-9 listing three elements which distinguish a personal right from a real 
right.
12 Oditah, supra note 2, at 32.




nsdifficulty in defining. It refers to a property that does not have any physical 
existence but it can be enforced by action in courts.125 26 1278In a conclusion, the sale of the 
securitised assets in a securitisation transaction is the transfer of these choses in 
action or the transfer of the property rights. Such rights constitute a chose in action
197under English law.
3.2 The Law of Transfers: Definition and Sources of Hostility
A “securitisation-friendly” legal framework is one that provides, inter alia, for 
transparent and effective laws to facilitate transferring the securitised assets. As will 
be explained, there are various legal techniques in order to accomplish transferring 
the receivables under English law. However, different legal jurisdictions have 
different legal attitudes towards the law of transfer. Various reasons, which have 
been outlined in Foster’s study, play a role in having these different legal attitudes 
towards transfers.
Generally speaking, a transfer is a three party transaction and it involves the 
following scenario. Assume one is involved in two loan transactions. First, 
creditor (A) lends a borrower (B) £100. Second, (B) the borrower in the first 
transaction lends (C) £100. So, (A) has the right to receive and claim his £100 from 
(B). Likewise, (B) has the right to receive and claim his £100 from (C). (B) might be 
interested to transfer his right to receive the money from (c) in favour of (A). In this 
sense, (B) is a transferor and (A) is a transferee.129.
125 Id. at 70.
126/ ¿ a t  71.
127 Ravi Tennekoon, The Law and Regulation of International Finance, at 105 (Butterworths, 
199 preferring to Torkington v. Magee [1902] 2 KB 427).
128 This scenario is based on the legal mechanism o f  assignment.
129 Linguistically, the term “transferee” or “assignee”referes to the new holder o f  the “right” being the 
new “creditor”. The Majalla uses different meaning. See infra note
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The loan in the second transaction is a debt owed to the creditor (B) and hence it 
constitutes a personal right which can be transferred. (B) has no other obligations 
towards (C) (e.g., more loan advances); and hence a transfer transaction would 
involve a transfer of a right rather than an obligation. Under English law, another 
legal mechanism effects the transfer of obligations. As explained in the previous 
section, securitisations involve the transfer of personal rights rather than obligations. 
As will be seen in the next section, this can be achieved through assignment under 
English law.
However, different legal traditions have different legal attitudes towards the issue 
of transfer. According to Foster, such attitudes are the result of different influencing 
factors that have been identified to be:130 31 1) false wealth, 2) changing creditors, 3) 
excessive litigation, 4) total transfers, 5) sale at a discount, 6) delay in receipt of 
assets, 7) involvement of the debtor, 8) certainty problems and 9) the conceptual 
basis of the relationship. The “false wealth” factor is generally associated with the 
grant of non-possessory security.132 13Thus, if a creditor lends a debtor an amount of 
money in return for security collateral without taking possession of this security, the 
debtor may appear wealthy by having possession of the security. The debtor might
i Viuse this appearance of wealth in order to deceive other creditors. This applies to 
the transfer of receivables.134
130 Whether such right can be transferred is subject to local law.
131 Foster; supra note 114, at 15-16. See also Nick Foster, An Unstoppable Force Meets a Movable 
Objects? Assignment of Rights in UAE, 19 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY 169 hereinafter An Unstoppable 
Force Meets a Movable Objects?]', Nick Foster, Owing and Owning in Islamic and Western Law, 
paper presented at the Sixth Harvard Forum on Islamic Finance [hereinafter Owing and Owning] 
(Foster refers to Philip Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1995) for the first four factors).
132 WOOD, supra note 131, at 33.
133 Foster; supra note 114, at 16.
134 Owing and Owning, supra note 131, at 14.
150
Chapter Three
A second factor is the “creditor-debtor relationship”. Thus, if the law allows the 
transfer without the consent of the debtor it deprives the debtor from choosing his 
creditor.135 Hence, the debtor may be faced with a hostile creditor.136 A third factor is 
the excessive litigation which might result from the transfer of rights because it is 
tantamount to trading in claims.137 *Excessive litigation might lead to a large amount 
of claims before the courts, influencing negatively on the effectiveness of the 
administration of justice. This is because the transferees might be more likely to 
pursue claims than the original creditors.139
A fourth source of hostility towards transfers is the objection to the idea of a 
“total transfer”,140 which is the transfer of all the receivables present and future.141 
The reason behind such objection is to protect the weak from being under the 
excessive ongoing control of the financial power of another person.142 *Other sources 
of hostility have been identified by Foster in his studies on the transfer of rights. For 
example, the objections to the sale at a discount and delay in the receipt of assets are 
sources of hostility towards transfer of rights. This example applies to the Islamic 
Shari ’a, because it may give rise to issues related to riba.m
Another source of hostility is associated with the certainty required by a specific 
legal jurisdiction. Because the receivables being transferred have no physical 











Foster; supra note 114, at 16.
WOOD, supra note 131, at 33.




Owing and Owning, supra note 131, at 15.
Foster, supra note 114, at 17-18.
See Chapter One on riba.
Owing and Owning, supra note 131, at 15.
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a problem in some legal jurisdictions.145 Finally, another factor of hostility towards 
transfers could be the difficulty to construct a suitable conceptual framework which 
deals with the relationship between the debtor, the creditor and the property.146
These factors may have contributed in inhibiting the development of the transfer 
laws. However, these general sources of hostility should not be seen as having a 
universal application.147 The aim of the foregoing discussion was to give a brief 
overview of possible reasons for the different attitudes towards transfers. In 
circumventing the hostilities towards assignment that exist in some legal 
jurisdictions, specific laws will need to be enacted to facilitate the transfer of 
receivables.
3.3 Legal Techniques for the Sale of Receivables
As mentioned, there are three main techniques (under English law) that are used 
to sell loan assets: namely, assignment, novation and sub-participation.148 In case of 
an assignment, the assignor transfers to a third-party or the assignee its rights against 
the debtor.149 Thus, in a securitisation transaction, the originator or the ‘selling 
institution’ by means of assignment transfers its rights against the borrower or the 
obligor150 to the established SPV. Hence, the SPV will have the right to recover the 
principal and interest from the obligors as well as the right in suing them for
145 An Unstoppable Force Meets a Movable Objects?, supra note 131, at 8 (referring to the French 
Civil Code Art. 1129).
146 Owing and Owning, supra note 131, at 15.
147 Id.
148 In this section, novation and assignment are discussed. Sub-participation does not in law constitute 
a transfer o f rights or obligations; it is used however, as a mechanism for the sale o f receivables. See 
Tennekoon, supra note 127, at 108. The description o f such mechanisms is discussed in the light o f  
the common-based law countries such as English law.
149 CRANSTON, supra note 65, at 356.
150 Obligors are the debtors o f the originator.
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collection.151 In this sense, an assignment is an exception to the legal concept of the 
“privity of contract”.152
Under English law, such assignment can be effected into two ways: namely, legal 
assignment and equitable assignment.153 Legal assignment can be effected under the 
provisions of section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Legal assignment is 
valid when it meets the requirements stated in section 136(1), Hence, it must be in 
writing,154 it must be ‘absolute’ and not by way of charge,155 and a written notice 
must be given to the debtor/obligor.156 Practically speaking, some requirements may 
render the use of legal assignment unattractive as a mechanism to sell assets.157 For 
example, the originator or the ‘selling institution’ may not want the obligor to know 
that the right to the receivables has been assigned to the assignee.158 This is because 
the originator or the ‘selling institution’ wishes to maintain the relationship with the 
obligors.159 Another reason for the impracticality is that the originator wishes to 
assign only part of the debt.160 Such is not possible under legal assignment.
Another possibility under English law is to use the mechanism of equitable 
assignment. An equitable assignment is an assignment that does not have to meet the 
above-mentioned requirements of legal assignment. Hence, an equitable assignment 
provides a suitable and practical mechanism for the sale of receivables in a
151 The buyer will acquire the full legal and beneficial interest in the debt and may not need the seller 
in enforcement'. See Neil Cuthbert, Assignment and Participation of Loans, in PRACTICAL LENDING 
and Security Precedents, Volume (2), at 1005 -1006 .
152 Cranston, supra note 65, at 356.
153 The availability o f  two forms o f assignment (i.e., legal and equitable) is due to the historical fact of  
the existence o f  courts o f  law and courts o f  equity with different views on assignment and before the 
enactment o f  the Supreme Court o f  Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875.
154 Law o f Property Act 1925 (LPA), Sec. 136(1).
155 Id. Also, assignment must be o f  the whole debt; as section 136(1) does not cover the assignment of 
part o f  the debt. See Foster v Baker [1910] 2 KB 636 and Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd 
[1933] 1 KB 81, CA. See also, Hughes, supra note 123, at 75.
156 LPA, Sec. 136(1).
157 Tennekoon, supra note 127, at 107.
158 M
159 WOOD, supra note 75, at 51. See also CRANSTON, supra note 65, at 361.
160 Tennekoon, supra note 127, at 107.
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securitisation transaction. For example, equitable assignment is effective with no 
written notice to the obligors.161 So, receivables are assigned to the SPV using the 
equitable assignment.162 However, it is important to note that under the assignment 
mechanisms (i.e., legal or equitable), it is possible to assign the rights and not the 
obligations. Thus, the originator can assign the right to the principal and interest but 
not the obligation to extend further advances.163
Novation is another transfer mechanism whereby an existing contract is 
substituted by a new one with the consent of all the parties.164 In effect, a new 
contract is entered between the three parties; that is, the “selling institution”, the 
“buying institution” and the borrower. Strictly speaking, this is not an assignment of 
the existing contract; rather it is an extinction and replacement with a new 
contract.165 Unlike assignment, under the novation structure both rights and 
obligations are transferred.166 Thus, when receivables are transferred by means of 
novation; the ‘buying bank’ acquires direct rights against the borrower and all the 
benefits of the loan agreement. Also, all continuing obligations of the ‘selling bank’ 
are transferred to the ‘buying bank’. However, the borrower has to agree to such a 
transfer.167
3.4 T h e  L e g a l  In f r a s t r u c t u r e  f o r  S e c u r it is a t io n
Given the benefits of securitisation to the overall financial system, it is suggested 
that financial-related legal reforms in an emerging economy such as Saudi Arabia 
should include a basic asset securitisation law.168 Such law would play an important
161 Id.
162 Cranston, supra note 65, at 361.
163 Id. This is relevant in revolving credit facilities.
164 Cranston, supra note 65, at 355.
165 Id. at 388.
m Id. . .
167 This is in contrast with equitable assignment where no consent o f  the borrower is required. .
168 Norton, supra note 1, at 50.
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role in facilitating securitisation transactions to be completed effectively. Hence, a 
number of countries have addressed the issue of securitisation in a formal way. 
Turkey, for example, has addressed securitisation in its capital market law. Other 
countries such as Tunisia have included the concept of securitisation in its plan to 
develop its banking sector,169 and Lebanon has finally introduced a securitisation 
law.170
The existence of a specific securitisation law is not an absolute pre-requisite to 
structure securitisation transactions. It is important, however, that the legal 
infrastructure as a whole allow certain legal elements to facilitate the securitisation 
process and to encourage its market. Thus, the absence of a proper legal framework 
is proven to be an impediment to many emerging market countries willing to develop 
their securitisation markets.171 *
Firstly, a “securitisation-friendly” legal framework should not prevent the 
practice of securitisation by disallowing banks or corporations from participating in 
the capital market. Secondly, the legal framework should allow the creation of 
SPVs in order to facilitate the transfer of receivables to these entities.173 Also, SPVs 
should be allowed to issue securities under the local law.174 It should be noted, 
however, that certain structures have been used successfully by using offshore 
SPVs.175 Thirdly; a well-developed bankruptcy and insolvency laws are important.176
169 Nasri Antoine et al., MENA -  GCC Securitisation Market Review, at 2 ; available at 
http://www.bemosecuritisation.com
170 See lad Boustany et al., Asset Securitisation in Lebanon: a New Legal Framework, in GLOBAL 
Securitisation, supra note 22,280.
171 Norton, supra note 1, at 258.
m Id. at 259.
173 M
174 E.g., Under the Saudi law, SPVs are not allowed to issue securities; see infra Section 5.2.
175 NORTON, supra note 1, at 259. See also Manuela Belmontes, Using the Cayman Islands and other 
Offshore Jurisdictions for Securitisation Transactions, 10(2) J- STRUCTURED FIN 36, (2004) (discuses 
several elements which should exist in the jurisdiction where the SPV is going to be formed. He 
argues that the efficiency o f  securitisation is maximised when the SPV is formed in a jurisdiction
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A creditor-friendly insolvency law is well-suited framework for securitisation 
transactions.176 77 The law should be clear regarding the bankruptcy remoteness of the 
SPV. A bankruptcy remote SPV is essential in a securitisation transaction so it is not 
affected in case of the originators’ insolvency.
Finally, but not any less significantly, a securitisation-friendly legal framework 
should have a modem seemed transactions law and a modem commercial law that 
recognises the sale of receivables. Transferring the originator’s assets is crucial to the 
securitisation process. Hence, the law should allow the transfer of assets and 
receivables. The law should be modified to allow the transfer of such assets easily 
with no complications on ‘true-sale’ basis.
Given the importance of assignment as the primary legal mechanism for 
receivables financing178 and for the transfer of receivables in securitisation 
transactions, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) introduced the Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade (the Convention).179 The aim of the Convention is to make 
uniform the law regarding assignments in order to enhance the legal certainty and to 
increase receivables-based finance180 including securitisation.181 Reports by the 
UNCITRAL182 show that the differences in assignment laws and the lack of
which does not impose any additional tax costs to the transaction (i.e., tax neutrality), a jurisdiction 
which its legal framework ensures the bankruptcy-remoteness o f  the SPV, a jurisdiction which is 
recognised by the rating agencies and a jurisdiction with a familiar and creditor-friendly legal regime).
176 NORTON, supra note 1, at 259.
177 Belmontes, supra note 178, at 39.
178 Spiro Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL’s 
Contribution, 8 Duke J. Comp & Int’l L 315, at 315, (1998).
179 See generally http://www.uncitral.org
180 Bazinas, supra note 178, at 320.
181 Spiros Bazinas, Multi-Jurisdictional Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL's Impact on 
Securitisation and Cross-Border Perfection, 12(2) Duke J. Comp & Int’l L 365, at 365, (2002).




1developed rules constitute obstacles to receivables financing. While the 
Convention is intended to address international rather than domestic transactions;183 84 
it reflects the importance of having clear assignment laws in order to transact 
receivables financing and securitisation successfully.
While no international consensus has evolved in respect of the underlying legal 
framework that governs assignment law to transact securitisation effectively, the 
following practical requirements should be taken into consideration:
-  The existing transfer legal mechanism; or assignment should effect the 
transfer of rights rather than obligations;
-  The transfer by way of assignment should be on a ‘true sale’ basis and should 
not be re-characterised as a secured loan; and
-  There should be no requirement to give a notice to the obligor.
While this is not meant to be an exhaustive list, it does include basic practical 
requirements which serve as an effective assignment laws suitable for securitisation 
transactions. These practical requirements are considered when discussing transfer 
laws within the Saudi legal system.
4. Securitisation In Saudi Arabia and the Impact of D uality
Securitisation is not only a new phenomenon in Saudi Arabia but also in the Arab 
and other G.C.C countries. There are indications of regional interest in securitisation 
transactions. For example, a conference on securitisation was organised in the United 
Arab Emirates, and is to be held as an annual event.185 While GCC-govemments are
183 Id.
184 Harry Sigman et al., Toward Facilitating Cross-Border Secured Financing and Securitisation: An 
Analysis o f the United Nations Convention on the Assignment o f Receivables in International Trade, 
57Bus. Law. 727, at 729 (2002).
185 The conference is held on 12-14 April 2005.
157
Chapter Three
. 1 0£reported to be aware of the advantages of securitisation such events will help to 
create a “financial lobby” that might influence the government to take the necessary 
steps for financial legal reforms to facilitate transacting securitisations in the region.
There is no doubt that emerging markets are facing specific challenges in 
developing their securitisation markets. Saudi Arabia and the G.C.C countries are 
no exception. Certain challenges have been identified in the G.C.C countries, 
including Saudi Arabia that might constitute obstacles to the structured finance 
market in the region. These include: (i) poor sovereign rating, (ii) existence of 
legal systems that cannot support a structured finance transaction even when the 
sovereign rating is investment grade and (iii) underlying political factors (such 
political risks have been noted to be obstacles for securitisation in Saudi Arabia).186 7*90
Despite these obstacles, there are securitisation deals that have been concluded in 
the region such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.191 *However, these deals may take a long 
time to be completed and may otherwise entail unnecessary burdens. Thus, some 
deals have taken more than one year and others failed after two years of work.193 
Local players’ unfamiliarity with this new financial technique may be one reason for 
such delay.194 Hence, local players need to be educated along with developing the 
securitisation markets in the region.
186 Leonora Walters, Unlikely Markets Show Appetite, 72 INT’L SECURITISATION Rep . 31,2002, at 31.
187 See generally Jain, supra note 5.
188 lad Boustany et al., Islamic and Conventional Securitisation: Challenges and Opportunities for  
SMEs, at 2 in GLOBAL SECURITISATION Review (2004-2005) (Euromoney Yearbooks).
m  Id.
190 Walters, supra note 186, at 31.
191 Boustany et al., supra note 188, at 2.
m Id.
193 M
194 Walters, supra note 186, at 31.
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A common feature that all emerging markets share is being “bank centric” with 
underdeveloped equity and bond markets.195 Likewise, the legal infrastructure in 
these countries is underdeveloped. This is true in the case of Saudi Arabia, though 
the new Saudi legal reforms aim to address this issue. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
the government of Saudi Arabia intends to develop its equity and bonds markets. 
This is why the new Capital Market Law (CML) has been introduced. Such law is 
believed to encourage bond issuing and to stimulate the securitisation process. While 
such legal reforms are positive steps to facilitate such modem financial techniques; 
the CML does not work in isolation. The overall legal system of Saudi Arabia is the 
Islamic Shari 'a and the CML is a part of this overall legal system.
The effectiveness of these laws needs to be examined in the light of the existing 
de facto duality. The author has endeavoured throughout the previous Chapters to 
highlight how the interaction between Islamic Shari’a and modem economy has 
implications on the effectiveness of the conventional financial systems. In addition, 
the argument has been that these implications have created a trend towards 
developing “Islamic finance”. In this Chapter, the aim is to examine this theme by 
focusing on securitisations due to, other than the personal interest of the author, the 
growing interest in the region.
In Saudi Arabia, the existing de facto duality has two impacts on securitisation 
transactions. First, many principles of the Saudi Islamic law are in contradiction with 
the conventional securitisation technique. For example, conventional securitisations 
involve the sale of interest-bearing assets that are unacceptable under Islamic 
Shari ’a. Hence, such contradictions may affect the functionality of the securitisation 
and may create an uncertain legal environment, rendering the aims intended for
195 Jain, supra note 5, at 206.
159
Chapter Three
encouraging securitisation fruitless. Such uncertainty is leading to a second impact 
that is a positive one. The financial and legal communities in Saudi Arabia are 
circumventing the present obstacles by developing the market of Islamic 
securitisation.196 Such initiatives are solely private and not regulated or governed by 
the government.
However, developing the Islamic securitisation market is not the sole solution for 
introducing securitisations to the Saudi financial system. Thus, as explained in 
Chapter Two, conventional banking is recognised in Saudi Arabia. In other words, 
Saudi Arabia does not maintain a pure Islamic financial system. There could be the 
case that conventional banks would be interested to securitise certain assets or to 
offer this service to other institutions. Hence, developing an Islamic alternative for 
the securitisation technique is insufficient for a mature financial system that 
encompasses conventional banking. There is no indication that Saudi Arabia is 
aiming to “Islamise” the whole financial system; and therefore, the government 
might consider the advisability of encouraging both Islamic and conventional 
securitisations in Saudi Arabia and to provide a securitisation-friendly legal 
framework to accommodate such transaction whether Islamic or conventional.
The rest of this Chapter aims to discuss the obstacles that currently face 
conventional securitisations in Saudi Arabia. Arguably, such obstacles are the result 
of the existing de facto duality in Saudi Arabia which allows a conventional financial 
system to function within an Islamic law body. This Chapter also shows how the 
Saudi financial and legal communities reacted by developing Islamic securitisation 
techniques.
196 See the discussion o f  “Islamic securitisation” infra.
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4.1 Principles of Islamic Sh a r i’a  law and Securitisation 
As discussed previously, the paramount legal system in Saudi Arabia is the 
Islamic Shari’a. Within this Islamic law body, Saudi Arabia has allowed a 
conventional financial system to function. It introduced both the Banking Control 
Law and the Capital Market Law to regulate the banking sector and the capital 
market but there are no other banking and financial related laws. Hence, any legal 
vacuum may be filled by the Islamic Shah’a, the legal practice and the contributions 
of the committees such as the Banking Disputes Settlement Committee or the 
Securities Disputes Committee197 198that have been created to deal with financial related 
disputes. However, such committees render their decisions only in case of dispute. 
Such decisions are normally unpublished, so it is hard to constitute a readily 
available, transparent body of law in relation to the banking and finance
•  • 1 9 8communities.
The question that might be posed is whether the Saudi legal system, even after 
the recent legal reforms, constitutes a viable legal framework that accommodates 
modem financial transactions such as securitisation. In order to answer such 
question, one has to analyse the Saudi legal system to see what are the implications 
that might result when embarking on a securitisation transaction in Saudi Arabia. 
Generally speaking, in conventional securitisation transactions there are several 
elements that might be in contradiction with the paramount legal system of Islamic 
law in Saudi Arabia. One issue is the nature of the assets being securitised or the 
underlying assets, which should be in compliance with Islamic Shari’a}99 Assets
197 See Chapter Two.
198 However, in Islamic law precedents are not binding.
199 lad Boustany, Market Review for the MENA/GCC Region, in GLOBAL SECURITISATION REVIEW 
(2003-2004) at 75 (Euromoney).
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prohibited by the Islamic Shari’a, include interest-bearing assets200 such as credit 
card receivables and mortgages. Hence, Islamic Shari ’a does not allow the sale of 
such assets.
In practice, however, the dual nature of the Saudi legal system may cause 
confusion in this regards. While the issue of interest is completely prohibited by 
Islamic Shari ’a and interest cannot be enforced through the Islamic Shari ’a courts, 
the Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes does enforce the agreements as 
signed between the banks and their borrowers, which imply enforcement of interest. 
So, the sale of interest-bearing debts in conventional securitisations could be 
allowed. In other words, having allowed a conventional banking system to function 
and to extend interest-bearing credit, there is no practical reason why there should be 
an objection to the sale of interest-bearing assets in securitisations.
Islamic Shari ’a is objections to conventional securitisation are not confined to the 
nature of the underlying assets being securitised. The securitisation transaction itself, 
in substance, should comply with the Islamic Shari’a.201 20 In other words, the 
agreements linking the parties in the securitisation transaction must be in compliance 
with the Islamic Shari ’a. Arguably, in order for securitisation to comply with Islamic 
Shari ’a, the structure should match with one of the Islamic financing techniques such 
as murabaha and ijara. Thus, Islamic Shari’a holds a different view regarding 
investments and profit-making. Under Islamic Shari’a, financing is linked to 
assets203 and investors must ‘participate’ in the assets on a “profit and loss” basis.204
200 Id.
201 See Antoine, supra note 169, at 4; Boustany et al., supra note 188, at 5.
202 Boustany, supra note 199, at 75.
203 Muhammad Usmani, An Introduction To Islamic Finance, at xiv (Kluwer Law International,
2002) (explains that as far as Islamic Shari’a is concerned money is not to be considered as an asset. 
Hence, when we refer to Islamic finance as linked to assets it means something which has intrinsic 




In other words, investors must share some risk in return for any profits. So, 
Islamic Shari’a requires adopting one of the Islamic financing techniques in 
securitisation transactions that entitle the investor to an ownership or an equity 
interest in the assets and that justifies any returns to the investors.
Important points arise in relation to the above discussion as to the case of Saudi 
Arabia. Further, to adopt one of the Islamic financing techniques is completely a 
different means of financing. Islamic securitisation is a different technique developed 
as an alternative to conventional securitisation, due to the difficulty of structuring the 
former in Islamic-based countries such as Saudi Arabia. In other words, conventional 
securitisation can not be adapted to one of the Islamic financing techniques because 
it is a completely different structure. The two structures should not be confused. 
Another issue related to the Islamic-compatibility o f the structure arise when trying 
to apply conventional securitisation in Saudi Arabia. This would be the question of 
whether Islamic Shari ’a in Saudi Arabia can provide or allow for an efficient legal 
technique that can be used to accomplish the sale of the securitised assets on a ‘true 
sale’ basis. Such is essential in most securitisation transactions as previously 
discussed.
4.2 Transfer of Assets in Saudi Arabia: The Impact of the S h a r i ’a  Law
The financial laws in Saudi Arabia do not address the transfer of assets, 
assignment or securitisation. The Saudi Capital Market Law is promulgated mainly 
to regulate the securities market. There are no clear or certain rules governing the 
issue of assignment or the transfer of rights. As Islamic Shari’a is the paramount 
Saudi legal system, it does constitute the legal background that affect any 
securitisation transaction. We should also bear in mind that any dispute resulting *
204
205




from the transfer of assets in a conventional securitisation transaction that is taking 
place in Saudi Arabia may not be referred neither to the Committee for Settlement of 
Banking Disputes nor to the Securities Resolution Committee.
Thus, if a Saudi non-bank originator wishes to transfer the assets to an SPV 
which is a company, such transaction may not be referred to the above-mentioned 
Committees.206 At this juncture, it is more likely that Islamic Shari ’a will be playing 
a dominant role, to deal with any dispute arising as to which legal technique can be 
used in order to accomplish the transfer of the assets. This section discusses the 
possible legal techniques available under the Islamic Shari ’a to clarify the negative 
implications of the existing de facto duality on conventional securitisation. Prior to 
discussing these Islamic legal techniques, it is necessary to clarify the position of 
Islamic Shari’a towards personal rights.
4.2.1 Th e  Sh a r ia ’s  A p p r o a c h  to w a r d s  R ig h t s  in  Sa u d i  A rabia
As discussed, the legal nature of the securitised assets is considered personal 
rights or “choses in action” as opposed to real rights. Clearly, these personal rights 
by their nature should be treated as property that can be transferred and used as 
security collateral. Under Islamic Shari’a, however, the underlying assets in a 
securitisation transaction should be in compliance with Islamic Shari’a principles. 
This means that it should not be interest-bearing assets or receivables that are 
generated by prohibited transactions under Islamic Shari 'a. The question one might 
pose is whether the securitised assets as personal rights are recognised under the 
Saudi Islamic Shari ’a.
206 See Chapter Two. 1
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The distinction between real rights and personal rights is not known under 
Islamic Shari ’a. Islamic Shari ’a recognises a different type of distinction; namely, 
the distinction between ‘ayn and dayn.20S ‘Ayn is defined as “a specific existing 
thing, considered as a unique object and not merely as a member of a category”.207 809 
The basic meaning of dayn is debt.210 It can also be defined as “any property, not an 
‘ayn, that a debtor owes, either now or in the future; or it can refer to such property 
only when due in the future”.211 So, under Islamic Shari’a a property (mal)212 213can be 
owned as either ‘ayn or dayn. Unlike 'ayn, a dayn has no physical existence and 
hence Islamic Shari’a considers the dayn as property existing in the ‘dhimma’ of the 
debtor.214 Literally, dhimma means safekeeping, protection and responsibility.215 
Legally, dhimma is the “capacity in an individual by which he accepts duty and 
obligation”.216 217*9
Dhimma is the main element that distinguishes ‘ayn from dayn under Islamic 
Shari 'a. However, the distinction between ‘ayn and dayn is not tantamount to the 
distinction between real rights and personal rights.218 Thus, personal rights are 
broader than dayn because dayn is one form of personal rights 219 Having clarified
207 Al-Sanhuri, Masadir Al-Haqq f i Al-Fiqh Al-Islami (The Sources of. Rights in Islamic 
Jurisprudence) at 15, (Dar Al-Hana, 1954) (In Arabic). Also Foster, supra note 114, at 41.
208 Foster, supra note 114, at 41.
209 Frank Vogel et al., Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return, at 94 (Kluwer 
Law International, 1998).
210 Foster, supra note 114, at 41. Debts is the literal meaning o f dayn but in Islamic jurisprudence the 
word dayn refers to the property subject to the obligation and not to the obligation per se, see VOGEL 
ET Al., supra note 209, at 94.
211 Vogel ET al., supra note 209, at 94.
212 Property or mal has a different meaning under Islamic Shari’a. Mal is defined as “tangible things 
to which human nature inclines”. For mal to be the subject o f  the contract it has to be lawful under the 
Islamic Shari ’a (/. e., mutaqawwam)-, see VOGEL ET AL., supra note 209, at 94.
213 VOGEL ET al., supra note 209, at 94.
214 M  95.
215 Id. See also Muhmmad Qualaji et al., Dictionary of Islamic Legal Terminology, at 191 
(Dar An-Nafaes, 1996).
216 Id.
217 Al-Sanhuri, supra note 207, at 15.




the position of the Islamic Shari 'a law towards real and personal rights, it can be 
concluded that despite its different approach towards rights, a dayn can still be 
considered as one form of personal rights or ‘choses in action’ under Islamic 
Shari’a. Therefore, from an Islamic Shari’a perspective a conventional securitisation 
transaction in Saudi Arabia would involve the transfer of the right of repayment of a 
dayn (debt) or the originators’ debts in the 'dhimma' of the obligors to the SPV.
4.2.2 Th e  La w  o f  Transfer  in  Sa u d i  A r a bia: Th e Haw ala  C o n c e p t
So far, it is clear that the overall legal system in Saudi Arabia is Islamic Shari ’a. 
Other financial related laws are mostly supervisory in nature and there are no clear 
laws that govern specific financial transactions. Hence, Islamic Shari ’a provides the 
source for the law of transfer. It is at this juncture where Islamic Shari’a interacts 
with conventional securitisation transactions. In Saudi Arabia, one of the main legal 
techniques of transfers, under Islamic Shari ’a, is the Islamic hawala. In order to 
transact conventional securitisations in Saudi Arabia effectively and with certainty, 
the technique of hawala should pass the practical requirements, for effective 
assignment law, laid down previously in this Chapter. The conformity of the 
technique of hawala with these requirements is one of importance. This is because 
hawala might be a means of transfer, but not to the level that meet the requirements 
of achieving a successful securitisation transaction. In other words, the mere 
availability of a transfer technique is not sufficient.
Discussing the concept of hawala under Islamic Shari’a is not free of obstacles. 
The reason is that the different Islamic Shari ’a schools have different views as to the 
concept itself. Even within the same school there could be different opinions. The 
diversity among schools as to the interpretation and understanding of the concept of 
hawala adds another dimension of uncertainty. Although the Hanbali School is the
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dominant school in Saudi Arabia; the following discussion considers other schools 
also for two reasons. Firstly, it helps in a better understanding of the concept itself. 
Secondly, the dominance of the Hanbali School in Saudi Arabia does not preclude 
considering other schools.
Literally, hawala means “transfer” and it is translated as the “transfer of debt”.220 21
The Majalla121 defines hawala as making “a transfer of debt from one debtor account 
to the debtor account of another”.222 23There is no doubt that difficulties associated 
with the translation might affect the precise understanding of the hawala. Thus, ‘the 
debtor account’ is meant to be the translation of the '‘dhimma’ explained in the 
previous Section. The Arabic version defines hawala as “the transfer of debt from 
dhimma to another dhimma”. At any case, hawala involves shifting the 
responsibility from one to another. We need to go through other definitions 
mentioned in the Majalla in order to analyse the concept of hawala in the light of the 
practical requirements laid down previously. The Majalla defines the transferor as 
the debtor who makes the transfer.224 The transferee is the person who accepts the 
transfer to himself.225 However, the “creditor” is the person in whose favour the debt 
is transferred.226 Under English assignment law, in a conventional securitisation, the
220 See The Civil Law of Palestine and Trans-Jordan (Volume 1), at 161 [hereinafter The Civil 
Law OF PALESTINE] (C. A. Hooper trans., Azriel Printing Works, 1933) which is the translation o f the 
Majalla/Mejelle (the Ottoman code based on the Hanafi School).
221 See Chapter One on the Majalla
222 The Mejelle being an English Translation of Majallahel-Ahkam-I-Adliya and a 
Complete Code on Islamic Civil Law, art. 673 [hereinafter The Mejelle] (Tyser et al. trans., Law 
Publishing Company, 1901; reprint 1967).
223 Saleem RUSTOM, SH A R H  A l - M a j a l l a , art 673 (Explanation o f the M a j a l l a )  (Al-Matba’a Al- 
Adabiyya, 1923) [in Arabic].
224 Id. art. 674.
225 Id. art. 676. See also THE MEJELLE, supra note 222, art. 676.
226 The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 220, art. 675.
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SPV would be the transferee/assignee. However, under the hawala the “transferee” is 
the “obligor” rather than the SPV (i.e., the originator’s debtor).227
Foster explains that different sources provide different definitions of hawala 
which leads to a confusion in relation to the hawala concept.228 These definitions are 
the result of different translations of the hawala. There is no need, however, to go 
through these different translated definitions of hawala. Rather it is better to go 
deeper than that by analysing the legal principles and rules behind the definition 
itself. A viable starting point for this discussion is to see whether hawala involves the 
transfer of rights or obligations. As mentioned previously, one of the practical 
requirements for a good securitisation assignment law is the existence of a legal 
mechanism that effects the transfer of rights rather than obligations.
The issue of hawala and whether it involves transfer of rights or obligations is a 
subject that has not been dealt with by Islamic Scholars of the main four Islamic 
Schools. This issue has been raised recently when the hawala concept has been 
studied comparatively with other legal systems.229 Thus, Sanhuri has studied the 
concept of the Islamic hawala from a civil law-based perspective and he divides 
assignment into two types, namely; “assignment of a right” and “assignment of a 
debt”. Sanhuri explains that “assignment of a right” is a mechanism that involves a 
transfer of a right from a creditor to another creditor whereas “assignment of a debt” 
is a mechanism that involves a transfer of an obligation from a debtor to another 
debtor.230
227 The following discussions o f  the hawala are based on the Majalla definitions.
228 Foster, supra note 114, at 48 (referring to differences between the definition o f  hawala in the old 
edition o f  the Encyclopaedia of Islam and the new one).
229 See generally ABDUL RAZIQ Al -SANHURI, AL-WASIT Fl SHARHAl-QanunAL-MADANIAL-JADID, 
Vol. 3 (1950); Foster, supra note 114.
230 AL -SANHURI, supra note 229, at 413 (refers to the ‘assignment o f right’ as cession de créance and 




As mentioned earlier, securitisations involve the transfer of rights. Also, transfer 
of assets in securitisation transactions involves a transfer from creditor (i.e., 
originator) to another creditor(s) (i.e., SPV/bondholders). Hence, under Sanhuri’s 
distinction of assignments, securitisation would fall under the “assignment of a right” 
category. Under English law, assignment is not categorised as “assignment of a 
right” or “assignment of a debt”. In English law, assignment is a legal mechanism 
which effects the transfer of rights only and no obligations can be transferred through 
assignment. For convenient, however, these categories are referred to in the rest of 
this Section.
Haw ala itself is divided into two types: 1) restricted haw ala (haw ala 
muqayyada) and 2) unrestricted hawala (hawala mutlaqa)P2 The Majalla defines 
the restricted hawala as a transfer “restricted by a stipulation for the transferee to pay 
from property of the transferor owed to him by the transferee”.231 33 The unrestricted 
hawala, on the other hand, is defined as a transfer that “is not restricted for payment 
to be made from property of the transferor in the hands of the transferee”.234 Foster 
proposes a presumption, which he rebuts later in his study, that the restricted hawala 
has been perceived as a mechanism that effects the transfer of rights while the 
unrestricted hawala effect the transfer of obligations. 2 3 S  It is a “presumption” 
because there is no mention in the Majalla of whether hawala is a transfer of a right 
or an obligation.
231 Ross Buckley, The Law o f Emerging Markets Loan Sales: Part 1, 14(4) J.I.B.L 110, at 111, (1999) 
(referring to Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660).
232 THE MEJELLE, supra note 222, arts. 678 & 679. However, such distinction only exists under the 
Hanafi School.
233 The MEJELLE, supra note 222, art. 678.
234 Id. art. 679.
235 Foster, supra note 114, at 47.
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Foster’s presumption in the light of Sanhuri’s distinction between “assignment of 
a right” and “assignment of a debt” would mean that restricted hawala is an 
“assignment of a right” whereas unrestricted hawala is an “assignment of a debt”. 
Such, however, is a plausible presumption. Thus, in the restricted hawala, the 
transferor limits the transfer in the amount of money owed to him by the transferee. 
Hence, it can be argued that it is a prima facie presumption that the transferor is 
transferring his right to his creditor. As for the unrestricted hawala, the transferee is 
required to pay from his own money.
Proceeding with his analysis of restricted hawala, Foster correctly argues that the 
restricted hawala is in fact a mechanism for the transfer of an obligation and not a 
mechanism for the transfer of a right. He explains :
“In our terms the limited [restricted] hawala is only possible where the 
new obligation of the transferee ... is the same as his old obligation.. .It 
is also necessary for the obligations to be of the same type. The 
consent of all three parties is necessary...It is these characteristics 
which give the false impression that hawala is a transfer of right 
mechanism...This is not the case. The basis for the transaction is still 
the transfer of an obligation, not the transfer of a right”.236 738 
Foster concludes that both types of hawala are mechanisms to transfer obligations 
rather than rights. Hence, hawala is not tantamount to the English assignment 
mechanism because hawala is at the heart of the transfer of an obligation.239
236 THE MEJELLE, supra note 222, art. 678. See also RUSTOM, supra note 223, at 378 (explains that the 
transferee after paying from his own account can claim repayment from the transferor. If the 
transferee owes money to the transferor; the transferee can set-off against the debt).
237 Foster, supra note 114, at 47-48.
238 M. at 48.
239 M a t 44.
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Since Foster has been discussing the concept with generalisation and with no 
reference to a specific Islamic school, the above statement needs to be further 
analysed in the light of the main four Islamic schools.240 In the above statement if 
both obligations should be the same as stated, this means that Foster is relying on the 
Hanbali, Malaki or Shaft Schools (hereinafter Group A) because this is a must in 
these schools.241 If this is so, and contrary to Foster’s statement, there is no need that 
all parties should consent to the transfer as in these Islamic schools, the consent of 
the creditor and the transferor is sufficient without the need for the transferee’s 
consent.242 On the other hand, in the Hanaft school (hereinafter Group B), the 
consent of all the parties is required243 hut, and again contrary to Foster’s statement, 
there is no need that both obligations should be the same.244
Nevertheless, Foster’s conclusion that haw ala, whether restricted or 
unrestricted, is a mechanism for the transfer of an obligation is practically an 
appropriate conclusion. Thus, Sanhuri has explained the position of hawala in 
Islamic law by stating that the use of term hawala in Islamic law is always referring 
to the “assignment of a debt” rather than the “assignment of a right”.245 In other 
words, hawala is in fact a mechanism for the transfer of obligations rather than 
rights. The term “assignment of a right” is not known to Islamic scholars.246 In 
Islamic law, “assignment of a right” is referred to as the “sale of debt”.247
240 Foster, supra note 114, at 39.
241 Sanhuri, supra note 229, at 428 -429.
242 Id. at 429.
243 Id. at 422. Under the Hanafi School, the consent o f  all the parties is required in the restricted 
hawala only.




Using the terminology of the Majalla, the transfer of assets in securitisation 
transactions is confined to the repayments owed by the obligors (i.e., transferees) to 
the originator (i.e., transferor). Hence, it is a similar scenario to that of the 
restricted hawala. Therefore, it is more relevant to discuss restricted hawala in this 
Section excluding unrestricted hawala. It is also significant to consider both Islamic 
Groups (i.e., Group A and Group B) in more detail to ensure the conclusion that 
hawala is in fact a mechanism that transfers obligations rather than rights.
Restricted hawala is the only type which is recognised by Group A as hawala?49 
For Group A, the unrestricted hawala is a form of suretyship.250 As mentioned 
earlier, Group A recognises restricted hawala provided that the obligations are of the 
same type and the amount owed by the transferor to the creditor must be the same 
amount owed by the transferee to the transferor. Such circumstances might appear 
to be transfer of rights rather than obligations. Thus, the transferor has the right to 
receive an amount of money from the transferee: and instead of receiving such 
amount of money from the transferee; the transferor transfers his right to his creditor. 
In concurrence with Foster’s conclusion, however, this is not the case. In such 
scenario, it is an obligation that is being transferred and not a right. Thus, the 
transferor has met his obligation towards his creditor by way of “renewal”.252 A new 
debt, a new obligation and a new debtor (i.e., the transferee) have replaced the old 24895013
248 Using the Majalla terminology.
249 Sanhuri, supra note 229, at 428.
250 Id. at 433.
251 Id. at 428.
252 Sanhuri, supra note 229, at 432 (uses the Arabic term tagdeed which means to renew. However, 
the author avoids using the term ‘novation’ so it is not confused with such mechanism under English 
law).
253 Sanhuri, supra note 229, at 432.
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Sanhuri mentions the main reasons, based on his analysis of the views of Group 
A, why the restricted hawala can be considered to be a transfer of an obligation 
rather than a transfer of a right. Thus, in case there is a security collateral or a 
guarantee given by the transferee to the transferor in their loan arrangement, such 
security/guarantee, in the opinion of Group A, is not transferred to the creditor when 
restricted hawala takes place.254 Hence, Sanhuri infers that what has been transferred 
is an obligation and not a right. This is because, if a right is transferred, the 
security/guarantee should have been transferred as well. In other words, the 
relationship between the transferor and the transferee is vanished. Similarly, the 
relationship between the transferor and the creditor is vanished. Also, the 
security/guarantee given by the transferee to the transferor is vanished too. A new 
obligation is created whereby the transferee is obliged to pay the creditor.255 Hence, 
the transferee is the new debtor of the creditor.
Further, the creditworthiness of the transferee is another element which Sanhuri 
relies on to justify his opinion that restricted hawala involves a transfer of an 
obligation and not a right. For Group A, if the transferee is insolvent at the time of 
the transfer or becomes insolvent after the transfer by restricted hawala, the 
transferor is not obliged to pay any amount to the creditor because he is already 
dropped out of the picture. Sanhuri argues that, if restricted hawala involves transfer 
of a right, the creditor should have been able to have recourse to the transferor for 
repayment. However, this is not the case in the view of Group A and, hence, one 
reaches the conclusion that restricted hawala is a means to transfer obligations.
We turn now to consider the opinion of Group B in regards to the restricted 
hawala to see if it involves the transfer of rights or obligations. Generally, it can be
254 Id. at 4 3 0  & 432.
255 Id. at 432 .
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argued that Group B agrees with Group A that restricted hawala involves a transfer 
of an obligation. Again, m case of the restricted hawala, the security/guarantee 
given by the transferee to the transferor is not transferred. So, it is a similar 
conclusion that of Group A. The only main difference with Group A is that this new 
obligation that is created by the restricted hawala can be terminated by the creditor if 
he was unable to receive his money. .
From the above discussion, it can be argued that in the opinion of both Groups A 
and B, the restricted hawala, is a mechanism to transfer obligations rather than 
rights. Hence, restricted hawala does not pass the first practical requirement 
mentioned earlier for a good assignment law, necessary to achieve the transfer of 
rights in securitisation transactions. Now we move to consider the second practical 
requirement of the criteria discussed previously, the mechanism of restricted hawala 
should achieve a total transfer, and such transfer should not be recharacterised or 
terminated. This is because in securitisation transactions, there must be a complete 
legal strong separation between the originator and the SPV. Securities holders should 
have no recourse to the originator. In case of restricted hawala, this means that the 
creditor should have no recourse to the transferor, after being transferred to the 
transferee.
The following considers again the opinions of both Groups in this regard. For 
Group A, if the creditor is transferred to the transferee, the creditor will no longer be 
able to have recourse to the transferor for repayment. A new obligation has been 
created where the transferee is obliged to pay the creditor and the transferor is 
completely dropped out of the picture.256 57 One exception is where the transferor by
256 However, some scholars within Group B reaches the conclusion that restricted hawala is a form o f  
security or guarantee/suretyship.
257 Samurai, supra note 229, at 431.
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way of deception has agreed to the transfer with the knowledge that the transferee is 
insolvent. For Group B, the creditor will still have recourse to the transferor and is 
able to claim his money from the transferor even after the transfer.258 59 260In other words, 
in the opinion of Group A, there is a higher level of total transfer achieved, as 
opposed to the opinion of the Group B where total transfer is not achieved by means 
of restricted hawala. Hence, the opinion of Group A seems to be in concurrence with 
the third practical requirement, as opposed to the opinion of Group B.
Finally, the third proposed practical requirement requires that the transfer can 
take place without the consent of the transferee. So, the originator should be able to 
transfer its rights to the SPV without the consent of the obligors. Again, Group A and 
Group B have different opinions in this regards. For Group A, there is no need for 
the consent of the transferee in the restricted hawala260 This is because in the view 
of Group A, it is essential in restricted hawala that the amount owed by the 
transferor to the creditor should be exactly the same as the amount owed by the 
transferee to the transferor. Hence, Group A argues that there is no problem in 
transferring the obligation to the transferee without his consent because the transferee 
is not harmed in any way as he is obliged to pay the same amount in any case.261 For 
Group B, the position is the opposite. Group B requires the consent of the transferee 
if the restricted hawala to be a valid transaction.262 Hence, one can see that Group A 
passes the second practical requirement, whereas Group B fails to meet such 
requirement.
258 W .
259 Id. at 427.
260 Sanhuri, supra note 231, at 429.
261 Id.
262 THE Mejelle, supra note 222, art. 682. See also RUSTOM, supra note 223, at 373; THE CIVIL Law 
OF PALESTINE, supra note 220, at 162.
175
Chapter Three
Having discussed restricted hawala in light of the practical requirements proposed in 
this Chapter, it can be concluded that haw ala is not a legal mechanism that can 
achieve the sale of assets in a modem securitisation transactions. Such conclusion 
highlights the implications of the existing de facto duality on financial transactions, 
such as securitisation in Saudi Arabia.
5. Islamic Securitisation In Saudi Arabia
The growing Islamic banking and finance techniques and structures are a positive 
reaction to create a functional equivalent system that achieves the mobilisation of 
resources and funds. The driving force behind such initiatives is the Islamic position 
towards conventional financing. Such position had forced the financial community to 
create its own alternative in order to meet the needs of the investors and the 
borrowers. However, the growing activities of the Islamic finance sector have 
necessitated further innovations of Islamic structures and techniques.
In the light of this, the financial community has developed an “Islamic 
securitisation” structure in order to diversify assets pools, to raise capital and to 
convert illiquid assets into marketable securities. As will be seen in this Section, 
“Islamic securitisation” has penetrated to the Saudi financial market. It can be argued 
that the use of “Islamic securitisation” in Saudi Arabia is partly attributed to the fact 
that there is an existing de facto duality. This means that the impact of the existing de 
facto duality on conventional securitisation has led the market to invoke other means 




5.1 The Evolving Concept Of Islamic Securitisation: An  Overview 
The creation of an “Islamic securitisation” alternative does not mean its similarity 
to the conventional securitisation. In Chapter One, the Islamic financial techniques 
have been outlined. This section provides an overview of how such techniques are 
being used in “Islamic securitisations”. Islamic securitisation practitioners, have 
identified the following issues that should be taken into consideration when 
transacting an Islamic-compliant securitisation:263
1. The type of assets must be acceptable to Islamic investors;
2. The structures that are used must be acceptable;
3. A sufficient element of ownership must be conveyed to comply with Islamic 
principles governing asset sales and assignments; and
4. Any form of credit enhancement must be in permissible form.
The nature of the securitised assets is a major difference between Islamic and 
conventional securitisations. As explained earlier, the securitised assets should be in 
compliance with the Islamic Shari ’a. This means that interest-bearing assets cannot 
be securitised. In addition, while Islamic Shari’a encourages the trading of tangible 
assets (i.e.,‘ayn), it prevents the trading of dayn.264 26 Generally, this includes 
contingent or future rights. So, “Islamic securitisation” is an asset-based rather 
than asset-backed securitisation. This means that Islamic securitisation as an 
“Islamic finance” product is based on “money- for-assets” rather than “money-for 
money”.267 So, Islamic sukuk (i.e., bonds) issued by the SPV in Islamic securitisation
263 Suleiman Abdi Dualeh, Islamic Securitisation: Practical Aspects, available at 
http://www.guidancefinancial.com
264 VOGEL ET AL., supra note 209, at 172. However, the Malaysian school has different interpretations 
in this regards.
26SId.
266 Adam Et AL, supra note 27, at 61.
267 Mahmoud El-Gamal, Interest and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance, 27 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 108, at 129, (2003).
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transactions are not backed by the assets (i.e., not secured). Rather, the sukuk 
represent ownership interests in the assets. Assets in “Islamic finance” should be 
‘ayn with physical existence.268 269
Vogel illustrates this point by stating that Islamic securitisation works as 
“securitisation and trading of interests in tangible, known property... For example, 
one could gather investors potentially to buy an office building jointly and lease it for 
twenty years, issuing securities representing their interests. Because these interests 
represent co-ownership of a building, they could be freely traded”. It is important 
to remember, however, in Vogel’s example, that the securities should represent an 
undivided part of the asset (i.e., the office building) with all its rights and 
obligations.270 271Any securities that represent the holder’s right to claim certain amount 
of rental only without any ownership rights in the asset is not allowed under Islamic 
Shari ’a.2n
5 .2  T h e  D if f e r e n t  T y p e s  o f  S u k u k  in  I s l a m ic  S e c u r it is a t io n s  
Islamic securitisations can be structured in different ways. The nature of the 
assets being securitised or the project being financed will dictate the nature of the 
relevant Islamic securitisation structure. Islamic securitisations are normally based 
on one of the “Islamic finance” techniques discussed in Chapter One or in certain 
transactions; it could be based on a combination of two “Islamic finance” techniques. 
Therefore, the title of the sukuk structure will be named after the “Islamic finance” 
technique being used. Thus, sukuk al-ijara refer to the fact that the ijara technique is 
used as the basis for the Islamic securitisation transaction.
268 However, there is an exception as will be explained infra.
269 VOGEL ET AL., supra note 209, at 172.




Although sukuk al-ijara structure is one of the most commonly used structures 
in the Islamic finance industry, there are however other structures such as sukuk al- 
musharka, sukuk al-mudaraba and sukuk al- istisna. These structures are based on 
the “Islamic finance” techniques of musharka, mudaraba and istisna respectively. 
However, the sukuk industry is becoming more complex which has led certain 
countries and the Islamic finance standards-setters, as will be seen in Chapter Five, in 
introducing certain standards and regulations that would help in regulating the 
issuance of these sukuk. The following aims to introduce briefly these Islamic sukuk 
structures.
5.2.1 S u k u k  A l -Ijara
The “sukuk al-ijara” is the most commonly used structure in the Islamic 
finance industry.272 273Many governments find the structure of sukuk al-ijara useful to
'yrxraise funds for their fiscal needs and long-term financing of big projects. Equally, 
corporate also finds this structure useful for fund sourcing purposes to meet their 
project specific needs.274 While the advent of sukuk al-ijara have involved high costs 
relating to the rating expenditures, legal documentations, underwriting and 
investment banking services; the increased use and awareness of this product have 
brought these costs to a reasonable level.275 276
A simplified asset-based securitisation based on an Islamic-compliant leasing 
(j.e., ijara)216 can be summarised as follows:277
272 McMillen et al., s u p r a  note 22, at 40.
273 Salman Ali, Islamic Capital Market Products: Developments and Challenges,
Occasional Paper No. 9, at 28 (Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank,
2005).
276 S e e  Islamic Capital Market: Report of the Islamic Capital Market Task Force of the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, July 2004, at 37 [hereinafter Islamic 
Capital Market] a v a i l a b l e  a t  http://www.iosco.org
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1. The originator whose the owner of an asset or group of assets (e.g., office 
building(s))278 sells the asset to an SPV with the understanding that the 
SPV will lease the asset back from the SPV.279 *
2. The SPV raises financing to purchase the asset by issuing sukuk al-ijara 
for sale to investors. The amount raised by issuing the sukuk is equal to the 
purchase price. Sukuk al-ijara represent an equity interest in the SPV 
and undivided shares in the ownership of the asset being purchased.281
3. The SPV leases the asset back to the seller (i.e., originator)}n  The seller 
makes periodic lease payments to the SPV, which represent the returns to 
the investors (i.e., sukuk holders). Hence, the rent proceeds should match 
the SPV’s obligations under sukuk al-ijara.
4. At maturity, the rent flow will stop and the ownership of the asset would 
still be with the sukuk holders. However, the investors’ objective is to 
invest their money but not to own a particular asset. The aim of the 
originator, on the other hand, is to have financing for a particular period of 
time. Thus, the originator does not wish to dispose of its asset 
permanently.
Therefore, to meet both objectives of the investors and the originator; the 
SPV sells the asset back to the originator (i.e., lessee or previous
277 See Standard & Poors, A Closer Look at ljara Sukuk, 2 February 2005 [hereinafter Closer Look at 
Ijara] available at http://www.standardandpoors .com.
278 O f course other assets can be considered.
279 AL1, supra note 273, at 30. However, the rent will be negotiated and it is normally calculated on the 
LIBOR basis.
280 Closer Look at Ijara, supra note 277.
281 A n , supra note 273, at 31.
282 Id. (the SPV can lease the assets to an affiliate of the seller).
283 A/.
284 ALI, supra note 273, at 31.
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seller/owner of the asset). The amount should cover any other liabilities 
owed by the SPV under the sukuk al-ijara.285 286
While such structure is normally referred to as “Islamic securitisation”, this term 
should not be confused with conventional securitisation as practiced by non-Islamic 
institutions. Securitisation in Islamic finance is better referred to as “monetisation” of 
the underlying assets. Trading with bonds in conventional securitisation involve 
the transfer of personal rights attached to receivables by way of equitable 
assignment. In Islamic securitisation, however, personal rights to a certain extent are 
not involved because Islamic sukuk are undivided ownership in specific assets. While 
the sale of conventional bonds is a sale of debt, the sale of sukuk is a sale of shares of 
an asset.287 So, the trading of sukuk in Islamic securitisation is a sale of ‘ayn (transfer 
of a real right) rather than a transfer or sale of dayn (transfer of a personal right).
However, it is not usually the case that the originator owns a physical asset only. 
The originator might own assets consist of both physical asset (i.e., ‘ayn) and other 
receivables in the form of cash (i.e., dayn). The question we might pose is whether 
the originator can securitise such pool of assets in an Islamic compliant manner? In 
this regards the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA),288 a subsidiary organ of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIS),289 has issued an Islamic opinion allowing
285 See ALI, supra note 273, at 31(explaining the Shari’a issues related to the final stage (i.e., the sale 
o f the asset back to the originator). The main issue arises in relation to such sale is whether the asset 
should be sold back to the originator at market value or at the nominal value o f  the sukuk. Certain 
Shari’a opinions hold the view that the asset should be sold at market value only). However, in 
practice the Shari’a committees have allowed for the assets to be sold to the originator at the nominal 
value o f  the sukuk. This would allow for repayment o f  the principal paid by the sukuk holder when 
purchasing the actual sukuk.
286 Adam Et Al, supra note 27, at 109 n.9.
287 M a t  53.
288 See generally http://www.fiqhacademy.org. See also Chapter Five.
289 See generally http://www.oic-oci.org. See also Chapter Five.
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such pool of assets to be securitised provided that the pool consist of at least 51% in 
tangible assets.290
While “sukuk al-ijara” is the most widely used structure in the Islamic finance 
industry there are still some limitations.291 293Thus, some originators do not have the 
appropriate underlying assets that can be securitised in a Shari’a compliant 
manner (i.e., because it requires tangible assets). Also, the assets should be 
locked up in the structure during the term of the sukuk.294 In addition, in certain 
jurisdictions there are adverse tax consequences associated with introducing “sukuk 
al-ijara” structure.295
These limitations, however, are by no means deterrents to the development of the 
sukuk markets or the use of iisukuk al-ijara” structure. The Islamic finance industry 
is developing and attempts to provide solutions to expand the activities of these 
Islamic capital market products. For example, the sukuk market hardly existed prior 
to 1997.296 In addition, the increased awareness of “Islamic finance” would definitely 
contribute towards facilitating theses “Islamic finance” products and would eliminate 
any extra costs that could result from the particulars of an “Islamic finance” product. 
For example, in the UK; legislations have been introduced to ensure that “Islamic
290 Decision 5, forth session (1988), Fiqh Academy Journal, 3, 2161, at 2163. The decision asserts 
that (a) any combination o f assts that can be represented in a written note or bond, and (b) this bond or 
note can be sold at a market price provided that the composition o f  the group o f assets, represented by 
the bond, consists o f  a majority o f physical assets and financial rights, as compared to a minority o f  
cash and interpersonal debts. A combination o f the following o f assets can be securitised: 1) physical 
assets, 2) financial rights, 3) interpersonal debts and 4) money.
291 McMillen et al., supra note 22, at 405.
292 Id.
293 Kamalpour et al., supra note 22, at 222.
294 Id.
295 McMillen et al., supra note 22, at 405.
296 E.g., the “sukuk al-ijara” structure was first introduced in 1997. See ALI, supra note 273, at 28.
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finance” products are not at a tax disadvantage as opposed to their conventional
29 7finance counterparts.
5 . 2 . 2  S u k u k  A l -  M u s h a r k a
The “sukuk al-musharhcF is a structure which is based on the musharka 
concept. Under this structure, the SPV, acting on behalf of the sukuk holders (i.e., 
investors), enters into a joint venture or “musharka” agreement with the party 
seeking financing (i.e., the borrower).297 98 In doing so, the SPV through the issuance of 
sukuk contributes into the musharka by providing the financing whereas the party 
seeking financing makes an in-kind contribution (usually including some tangible 
assets).299 Both the SPV and the party seeking financing are parties to the musharka 
and their respective interests in the musharka are represented by contractual “Units” 
held by each party.300
However, the main purpose of the financing provided by the investors through 
the SPV is to invest the money rather than to own a specific asset through a 
musharka arrangement. Hence, the investors should be able to receive profit 
distributions. In order to achieve this purpose, “sukuk al-musharka” need to be 
structured in a way that make it possible for the investors to dispose of the “Units” 
that are owned by the investors through the SPV as part of the musharka 
arrangement.. Therefore, the SPV enters into a “Purchase Undertaking” with the party 
seeking financing.301
297 Two Acts were introduced, namely; the Finance Act 2005 and Finance Act 2006. However, these 
Acts have not referred to “Islamic finance” structures expressly. Instead, different terminology is used 
such as “Alternative Finance Return” and “Diminishing Shared Ownership”.
298 Strictly speaking, from an Islamic finance legal perspective the party seeking financing can not be 
referred to as borrower.





Under the “Purchase Undertaking” the party seeking financing undertakes to 
buy the “Units” from the SPV.302 The proceeds received by the SPV from the sale of 
the “Units” will be distributed to the investors in accordance with set a formulae.303 *
In this way, the investors will receive their expected profits whereas the party 
seeking financing will gain complete ownership of the project that it aimed to get 
financed.
5 . 2 . 3  S u k u k A l - M u d a r a b a
As explained in Chapter One, the mudaraba structure is a form of partnership. 
One party provides the capital and the other party manages the money and 
contributes through its experience and effort. The concept of mudaraba can also be 
used in sukuk structures although is not very popular like the ijara.m  Under the 
“sukuk al-mudaraba” structure, the SPV issues sukuk to the investors who are 
considered to be the sole capital providers. The party seeking financing will apply 
the proceeds of the sukuk issuance to finance the relevant project.
The party seeking financing is the mudarib. This means that it will only be 
required to use the proceeds and apply its relevant experience and effort with no 
further contribution. While the mudarib is still liable in case of negligence or 
misconduct the unpopularity of such structure is attributed to the fact it is a high 
risk.305 From a legal perspective, the main difference between musharka sukuk and 
mudaraba sukuk that in the former the financier is entitled to management 











5.3 Recent Islamic Securitisation Structure in Saudi Arabia 
The Caravan I  Sukuk?06 transaction involved one of the first “true sale” 
securitisations in Saudi Arabia.306 07 The transaction has been voted as the “Most 
Innovative Islamic Finance Product” being the first Islamic Shari’a compliant 
inventory fleet securitisation in the G.C.C/MENA region.308 The Caravan I  Sukuk 
deal has a total size of SRI 02 million309 3102and it is backed by a pool of vehicles and 
vehicle lease agreements purchased from the originator. The originator is HANCO 
Rent-A-Car (HANCO) one of the leading car leasing and rental companies in Saudi 
Arabia and it has a fleet over 4,000 vehicles. HANCO’s strategy aimed at 
restructuring its balance sheet in order to attain the necessary capacity to grow its 
business.313 HANCO also aimed at shifting its focus from fleet ownership service 
(i.e., balance sheet based) to a fleet management service.314 315*HANCO had no access
-j j f
to a bank financing and suffered from continues mismatching.
The financial technique of securitisation offered a method to achieve the above 
strategies and to circumvent the lack of financing dilemma faced by HANCO. 
Through securitisation, HANCO was able to inject cash into the company, to solve 
the mismatching and to achieve its strategy in refocusing the business on servicing
i /
activities. However, because HANCO is operating in Saudi Arabia, the 
securitisation transaction is structured within an Islamic Shari’a body. This means
306 Caravan I Sukuk is the name o f the securitisation deal.
307 Bowman, supra note 24, at 24.
308 See generally http://www.bemosecuritisation.com
309 Around US $ 27.20 million.
310 http://www.bemosecuritisation.com
311 Adam Et AL., supra note 27, at 15.
312 Bowman, supra note 24, at 24.
313 C a r v a n  I S u k u k  : The First S h a r i ’a  Compliant Securitisation (Workshop -  Securitisation 
World April 2005- Part I), at 12 available at http://www.bemosecuritisation.com
314 Id.
315 Id. at 14.
3,6 M a t  25.
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that HANCO faces certain dilemmas in structuring a conventional securitisation 
transaction. In order to circumvent such dilemmas, an Islamic securitisation structure
^ 1 7based on the issuance of Islamic sukuk has been devised to meet HANCO’s needs.
Hence, Carvan I  Sukuk is an Islamic securitisation transaction based on 
securitisation of inventory rather than a classical securitisation of receivables. This 
means that the duties of the Servicer (i.e., HANCO) are not limited to the normal 
duties of the servicer in a conventional securitisation. Rather, HANCO’s duties in the 
Carvan I  Sukuk include operating the vehicles.317 819 320The underlying assets involved 
HANCO’s inventory fleet comprising 2344 vehicles and leasing contracts. A 
special securitisation structure has been innovated in order to circumvent the existing 
obstacles in the Saudi legal system. These obstacles include: 1) unavailability of 
trust laws, 2) corporate SPVs in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to issue securities; and
3) foreign entities are not allowed to lease vehicles or own the underlying assets in 
Saudi Arabia.321 This means that it would be difficult for the sukuk to be sold to 
foreign investors.
In the light of this and in order to overcome these obstacles, Carvan I  Sukuk is 
structured on a two tier basis, that is; it involved two entities: an SPC and an SPV. 
HANCO (i.e., the originator) sold the assets to the SPC which is incorporated in 
Saudi Arabia as a limited liability company with two independent shareholders from 
HANCO.322 As mentioned, the assets are mainly vehicles which mean that the sale 
involved a transfer of ownership of the actual physical assets as opposed to the sale
317 See generally Bowman, supra note 24.
318 C a r v a n  I S u k u k  : The First S h a r i ’a  Compliant Securitisation (Workshop -  Securitisation 
World April 2005- Part II), at 4 [hereinafter C A R V A N  I SU K U K  II] available at 
http://www.bemosecuritisation.com
3,9 Id.
320 Id. at 6. (the vehicles are operated in the rental, limousine and leasing business).
321 Id. at 10. See generally Trevor Norman, Securitisation Structures within an Islamic Framework, 
102 Int’l Securitisation Rep 21, (Supp. 2005).
322 C a r v a n  I S u k u k  II, supra note 318, at 20.
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in a conventional securitisation which involves an assignment of receivables. 
Because the SPC is not allowed to issue securities; an SPV is incorporated as a 
limited liability company in the Island of Jersey. In sum, the aim of SPC is to 
provide a Saudi entity to own the assets in order to circumvent the prohibition of 
foreign ownership; and the aim of the SPV is to issue the necessary sukuk or 
securities because the SPC is not allowed to do so.
Clearly, the SPV (i.e., the issuer) is not the owner of the assets. Hence, one of the 
challenges in the Caravan I  Sukuk is the relationship between the SPC (i.e., the 
owner of the assets) in Saudi Arabia and the SPV in the Island of Jersey. The 
relationship is structured in a way to avoid frustrating the transaction through, for 
example, consolidating the SPC with HANCO or with the SPV.323 Therefore, the 
relationship between the SPV and the SPC is governed by the Funding Agreement 
whereby the Issuer (i.e., SPV) grants a loan to the SPC.324 Under the Funding 
Agreement, the SPC has no obligation to repay the Funding in full on or before 3 
July 2009.325 The SPC, however, has the obligation to repay the SPV a monthly 
Funding Repayment Amount and Funding Profit Sharing according to preset 
schedules but only if cash is available.326 These schedules are based on financial 
modelling.327 The SPC has also the obligation to pay the Funding in full immediately 
upon the reception of a notice that the securities (i.e., sukuk) have become due and 
payable in full.328
Chapter Three
™ Id. at 13.
324 Id. at 28.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 On the financial modelling o f  the structure and the calculations o f  the repayments, s e e  C a r v a n I  
S u k u k  II, s u p r a  note 318, pp 34- 47.
328 C a r v a n I  S u k u k  II, s u p r a  note 318, at 28.
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Under the Funding Agreement, the SPV may require the SPC to sell any vehicle 
if an event of default has occurred.329 The SPC has been obliged to grant a power of 
attorney to an Agent chosen by the SPV with authority to sell the vehicles or to 
exercise any other rights upon receiving a written notice from the SPV.330 In 
addition, a Servicing Agreement is entered between the SPC, HANCO and the Back­
up Servicer. According to the Servicing Agreement, HANCO will have to operate, to 
service and to administer the vehicles.331 As regards the issuing process, the SPV 
issues the sukuk which amount to USD 26.13 million.332 The sukuk rank pari passu 
among themselves and they rank senior to any other instruments issued by the 
SPV.333
5.4 F in a l  O b s e r v a t io n s
The development of “Islamic securitisation” is one product that reflects the 
current trend in developing “Islamic finance” as a means to circumvent the 
interaction between conventional finance and Islamic Shari ’a requirements. Market 
players have been looking for Islamic-compliant financial products that provide 
liquidity and at the same time tradable in the secondary market. However, the 
question is whether this “Islamic securitisation” is in fact a “securitisation” 
mechanism.
Abradat explains that there has been confusion in the market regarding the 
concept of “Islamic securitisation”.334 According to him, while the above discussed 
Islamic-compliant structures are referred to as “securitisations”, this is not really the
329 The Funding Agreement states for a number o f events o f  default including the failure o f  the SPC to 
comply with any o f its obligations.
330 C a r v a n IS U K U K  II, s u p r a  note 318, at 29.
m  Id. at 49.
332 Id. at 53.
m Id.
334 Discussions with the author’s work supervisor, Mr. Abradat Kamalpour is a partner and the head o f  
the Islamic finance team at Dechert LLP, London.
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case. The reason is mainly because in “Islamic securitisation” structures the 
underlying assets are not really transferred in the “conventional securitisation” sense. 
In “Islamic securitisations”, the “originator” normally re-acquires the underlying 
assets after the maturity of the relevant sukuk. In this sense, it is not truly an “off- 
balance” financing which is a major element of structured finance.
In other words, one can not draw a clear distinction between an “Islamic 
securitisation” structure and the issuance of Islamic bonds. This distinction, however, 
is clearer in conventional finance. Hence, it is fair to argue that “Islamic 
securitisation” is similar to the issuance of bonds in conventional finance as opposed 
to conventional securitisations. Abradat adds that true “Islamic securitisation” 
structures are in the process of being developed by the Islamic finance industry. In 
the meantime, however, this means that the conventional finance component in Saudi 
Arabia continues to suffer from the existing de facto duality and its implications on 
securitisation transactions.
Similarly, the area of “Islamic securitisations” or “Islamic sukuk” lacks a 
definitive legal framework. Consider, for example, the “Risk Factors” Section of a 
Prospectus for a recent sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia. The Section deals with 
several risk factors relating to the sukuk. The “Risk Factors” quoted below reflect the 
uncertainty surrounding the sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia. Thus, under a risk factor 
entitled “Governing Law, Jurisdiction and Enforceability” the Prospectus states: 
u The sukuk are governed by, and are to be construed in accordance with, 
the laws of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in accordance with the rules of the 
[Shari’a] as applied in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia...In addition, [the 
Issuer] is not aware of any securities of a similar nature to the sukuk being 35
335 S e e  Offering Circular, s u p r a  note 26.
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the subject of adjudicatory interpretation or enforcement in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, it is uncertain exactly how and to what extent 
the sukuk ... would be enforced by a Saudi Arabian court or other 
adjudicatory authority”.336
In addition, another risk factor under the heading “Shari ’a” reads:
“Prospective Holders should also note that although the [Issuer’s Shari’a 
Supervisory Committee] has issued a pronouncement confirming that the 
sukuk ...are in compliance with Shari’a principles, such a pronouncement 
would not bind a Saudi court or judicial committee, including in the context 
of any insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings relating to the Issuer, and any 
Saudi court or judicial committee will have the discretion to make its own 
determination about whether the sukuk...complies with the Shari’a 
principles and therefore is enforceable or otherwise.”337
The above quotations summarise the Saudi position in regards to the Islamic 
sukuk. They reflect the lawyers’ opinions who drafted these risk factors as to the lack 
of definitive legal interpretations and rules for the Islamic sukuk. The discussion 
leads us to conclude that the current position of the Saudi financial legal system as it 
relates to financial transactions is as follows:
Despite introducing the financial-related laws in Saudi Arabia, there is still 
an interaction between Islamic Shari ’a and modem finance. An example is 
securitisation transactions and the difficulty of achieving a rule-based “true 
sale”.
As a result of the interactions between the Islamic Shari’a and modem 
finance; “Islamic sukuk?’ strutcutres have developed and found their inroads
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to the Saudi financial system. This component of the financial system lacks 
a definitive legal framework.
The main aim, however, is to have a market-led financial system which is rule- 
based and maintains the “rule of law”. This means that securitisations should be 
transacted with predictability, certainty and clear rules. The Saudi case does not seem 
to be in line with these objectives. Hence, the “combination” approach mentioned in 
Chapter Two would serve as a good cure for the current dilemma. Thus, to achieve a 
successful “conventional securitisation” transaction, the interaction between modem 
finance and Islamic Shari’a should be eliminated. On the other hand, “Islamic 
securitisation” can be transacted effectively through introducing a definitive legal 
framework that define and regulate its market. Here, the “combination” approach 
would mean developing the “Islamic finance” component of the Saudi financial 
system. In this case, it is the development of the Islamic sukuk market. It also means 
applying the “segregation” phenomenon adopted in the DIFC model. This means 
introducing laws that govern conventional securitisation that are segregated from the 
overall Saudi legal system of Islamic Shari ’a.
6 . C o n c l u s io n
The Chapter has examined an example that reflects the implications of the 
existing de facto duality in Saudi Arabia on financial transactions. It also shows that 
the enactment of the Capital Market Law in Saudi Arabia to facilitate the functioning 
of the capital market is not sufficient to provide a “securitisation-friendly” legal 
framework. Such law is supervisory in nature and does function within an Islamic 
law body. This means that there are tensions and conflicts between Islamic law 
principles and the practical requirements of securitisation transactions. This, in turn,
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affects the effectiveness of transacting securitisations in Saudi Arabia, and therefore 
losing the benefits and the advantages that securitisation can achieve are lost.
In addition, the concept of “Islamic securitisation” has penetrated the Saudi 
markets. “Islamic securitisation” is an example of the “Islamic finance” trend that 
has developed to avoid the “legal unrests” generated by the interaction between 
Islamic Shari’a and modem conventional finance. Despite its success, “Islamic 
securitisation” is functioning with no definitive legal framework and it is a product 
that can not be used by the conventional banks or other institutions that are dealing 
with different type of assets and structures in Saudi Arabia.
Having analysed securitisation transactions in the light of the existing de facto 
duality, it is plausible to argue that the status quo is unsatisfactory. The main aim is 
to transact Islamic and conventional securitisations in an atmosphere of knowledge 
and certainty in line with the principles of market-economy policies that Saudi 
Arabia has introduced. This can be achieved if the interaction between Islamic 
Shari’a and conventional securitisation is eliminated. Here, introducing the DIFC 
“segregation” phenomenon would serve as a good starting point. In addition, the 
“Islamic finance” component of the securitisation industry being “Islamic 
securitisation” or the issuance of sukuk should be further developed. This dual 
approach (i.e., conventional and Islamic) would enable Saudi Arabia to link its 
capital market internationally as well as regionally with the G.C.C countries through 
developing Islamic sukuk.
338 Over the past five years the sukuk market has grown to USD 41 billion with USD 11 billion worth 
o f issues coming from the G.C.C region. See William Rhode, Reaching for the Sky, 118 INT’L 
SECURITISATION REP 40, at 41, (2006). See also Babu Augustine, Sukuk Listings in GCC Region to 
Exceed $20b, BUSINESS TIMES, 28 October 2006 (mentioning that the G.C.C sukuk market is expected 
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Adopting a market-based economy requires developing a legal infrastructure for 
secured transactions. Security collateral laws are of much importance in market 
economies.1 2The law relating to security collateral interests is highly relevant when 
governmental policies allow the market to function and creditors to extend credit and 
bear risks. In practice, creditors are more comfortable to provide credit when there is 
a valid and enforceable security collateral to minimise their credit risk. The larger 
and the riskier the loan, the more likely that creditors are inclined to require a form of 
security collateral.3 The secured creditor who has security interest in the debtor’s 
assets has an advantage over any other creditor who is not secured.4 In case of 
insolvency, the secured creditor should be able to recover its right in full ahead of the 
rest of any other creditor.5
The advantages of a developed secured transactions law are not only confined in 
facilitating lending transactions. Introducing developed and sound secured 
transactions laws should contribute positively to the overall economy.6 That security 
collateral law can have an important contribution towards a country’s economic 
growth. This has been recognised by the World Bank and other International
1 Katharina Pistor Et. Al., The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic 
DEVELOPMENT (1960-1995), at 153 (Oxford University Press, 1999).
2 Id.
3 John Simpson et al., General principles of a Modern Secured Transactions Law, in EMERGING 
Financial Markets and Secured Transactions, at 144 [hereinafter Emerging Financial 
Markets] (Joseph Norton et al. eds., Klwuer Law International, 1998)
4 Paul Ali, The Law of Secured Finance: an International Survey of Security Interests 
over Personal Property, at 1 (Oxford University Press, 2002).
5 Insolvency laws are also o f  great importance
6 Heywood Fleisig, Economic Functions of Security in Market Economy, in EMERGING FINANCIAL 
MARKETS, supra note 3, at 35. See also R.C.C Cuming, Modernising the Secured Financing Law of 
Developing Nations, with Particular Focus on the West Bank and Gaza, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 




Financial Institutions. Several studies indicate that reforming the laws relating to 
secured transactions have contributed in the increase of the GDP in the reforming 
country.7 8 This is because reforming secured transactions laws increases the 
availability of credit and lowers the interest rate which has a positive economic 
impact.9 Hence, it is believed that any economic-related reforms in any emerging 
market should include reforms to secured transactions laws.10
Moving from general to particular, security collateral laws are very significant 
for the Saudi economic-related reforms. As we have seen in this volume, the Saudi 
government is aiming to reduce the role of public banks, to privatise and to adopt 
market-oriented policies in order for the market to function.11 This means that the 
domestic financial system as well as external capital providers will play a very 
pivotal role in extending credit to meet the developmental needs of Saudi Arabia. To 
encourage the availability of credit in Saudi Arabia, secured transactions laws should 
meet the expectations of both domestic and external capital providers.
In Saudi Arabia, however, there has always been a clash between conventional 
financing principles including modem security requirements and the overall legal 
system of Islamic Shari’a. In practice, this clash can be divided into procedural and 
substantive legal problems. Procedurally, for example, notaries have always refused 
to notarise security interests in favour of conventional banks on the ground that these 
banks deal with interest (i.e., riba) which is against Islamic Shari’a.12 Substantively, 
it can be argued that the unavailability of some types of security collateral interests,
7 Roy Goode, The Changing Nature o f Security Rights, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra 
note 3, at 1.
8 See generally Fleisig, supra note 6.
9 Id.
10 Joseph Norton, Financial Sector Law Reform In Emerging Economies, at 31 (BIICL, 2000).
11 See Chapter Two.
12 E.g., notaries do not refuse notarising in favour o f  the Special Credit Institutions, mentioned in 
Chapter Two, because such banks do not deal with interest.
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as will be discussed in this Chapter, constrains the ability to extend credit in the 
Saudi market.
There are three main consequences to the above obstacles. Firstly, the legal and 
financial communities have reacted by developing practices to circumvent the 
existing procedural obstacles in the Saudi security collateral law. Secondly, the legal 
and financial communities led by the law firms and their “legal work”13 14reacted by 
developing security structures to provide more confidence for the lenders. In other 
words, providing ‘micro-solutions’ for ‘macro-problems’. An example for such 
structure is the Islamic “rahn adFu  which has been developed to be used as a 
“collective security arrangement”15 in financial transactions.16
Thirdly a final reaction, as argued in this Chapter, is the growing “Islamic 
finance” practice as a means of financing that might offer some form of security 
collateral in certain transactions especially when the financers have ownership of the 
assets being financed.17 Other forms of “Islamic finance”, however, may not require 
a “high level” of security in the conventional sense simply because “Islamic finance” 
is based on “risk-sharing”.18 At the procedural level, using Islamic-compliant
13 See Doreen McBarnet, Transnational Transactions: Legal Work, Cross-Border Commerce and 
Global Regulation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, at 98 (Michael Likosky et al. eds., 
Butterworths, 2002) (defines “legal work” as the “technical work, with and on the law, undertaken 
usually but not necessarily by lawyers, in specific transactions for specific clients”).
14 The adl is a third party holding the security collateral.
15 See A. Thiele, Collective Security Arrangements: A Comparative Study of Dutch, 
English and German Law, at 1 (Kluwer Legal Publishing, 2003) (defines collective security 
arrangement as: “an arrangement whereby security is held for the common benefit o f  a number o f  
lenders”).
16 In common law based countries security trustees are involved in the collective security 
arrangement. However, the absence o f  the concept o f  trust in other countries led to developing other 
concepts.
17 For example Islamic financing through ijara (leasing); see Chapter One. This argument has been 
inspired by Wood’s argument that countries which are hostile to security have been receptive to title 
finance such as finance leases. Title finance shares some aspects with Islamic finance concerning the 
ownership o f  the assets. See Philip Wood, World-Wide Security -  Classification of Legal 
Jurisdictions, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 42
18 However, structures have been developed in a way to provide the economic benefits tantamount to 
conventional finance and create incentives for the borrower to meet his obligations. For example,
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financing in Saudi Arabia would mean circumventing any procedural obstacles that 
are associated with notarising security collateral interests by conventional banks. In 
other words, obtaining the necessary financing with no hassle.
However, the government of Saudi Arabia has not overlooked the importance of 
security collateral law. Recently, Saudi Arabia enacted a new security collateral law 
which deals with movables.19 *Such law has confirmed the willingness of the Saudi 
government to create a market-oriented legal framework to facilitate the 
development of a market-led financial system. Nevertheless, the positive contribution 
intended by the enactment of this law could be undermined if there is a failure in 
adapting and reconciling this new law with the overall Saudi legal system as will be 
discussed later in this Chapter.
In line with the volume’s theme, this Chapter focuses on secured transactions as 
an example of the existing de facto duality and argues that the Saudi conventional 
finance component is still constrained being a system that functions within an 
Islamic Shari'a body. The Chapter also argues that despite using an alternative means 
to provide financing through “Islamic finance”; such means of financing lack a 
definitive legal framework.
This Chapter, therefore, suggests that in order to create a market-led financial 
system, secured transactions laws in Saudi Arabia need a further attention. Saudi 
Arabia is, therefore, advised to develop its exiting system following the 
“combination approach” as will be discussed in Chapter Five. This means developing 
a secured transactions law that serves the conventional finance component which is 
segregated from the overall legal system. At the same time, Saudi Arabia can
certain clauses maybe inserted in the agreements requiring the borrower to pay a certain amount to a 
reputable charity if  the borrower fails to meet its obligations towards the lender.




develop the “Islamic finance” component that would serve an alternative means of 
financing.
2. The Importance of Security and Secured Transactions Law
Extension of credit is considered to be “an engine of economic growth”. Both
0 1creditors and debtors are expecting profits from such extension. Therefore, 
transactions should be structured in a profitable way for both parties. Creditors 
consider a transaction profitable when debtors repay the extended loan. In any 
financing transaction, creditors will be concerned about the non-payment risk. If 
creditors believe that the non-payment risk is high, extension of credit may not take 
place.21 34 However, raising the interest charged on the loan, as a compensation for the 
high risk taken by the creditors may not be a very practical solution because the 
transaction must be profitable for the debtor as well.25 26
Bearing the parties’ needs in mind (i.e., the creditor and the debtor), ‘credit 
enhancement’ structures have been developed to achieve the aim of having a 
profitable transaction for both parties. Generally, credit enhancement is “the art of 
structuring a transaction, through economic agreements and legal mechanisms, so 
that the transaction is seen by both the creditor and the debtor as prospectively 
profitable”.27 Clearly, credit enhancement is a mechanism which creditors invoke to 
be protected against the risk of non-performance and to maximise their recovery in
20 Neil Cohen, Internationalising the Law of Secured Credit: Perspectives from the U.S. Experience, 




24 Id. at 429. However, this will depend on the borrower and the studies undertaken by the bank in 
relation to the credit extension transaction.
25 Id.
26 Neil Cohen, Harmonising the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next Frontier, 33TEX. INT’L L. J 




case of the debtor’s insolvency. This protection can be divided into two main 
mechanisms: 1) granting of collateral to the creditor by giving the creditor a security 
interest over assets, and 2) arranging any type of guarantees available from any 
secondary obligors or guarantors.
In addition, taking a security interest serves other functions as well as maximising 
the prospect of recovery. The second reason for taking security by the creditor is to 
gain control over the debtor’s asset. Taking a security interest in the debtor’s asset 
constrains the debtor from having exclusive control over that asset. This means that 
it is more likely that the debtor pays the secured creditor prior to the other general
'X 'ycreditors in order to avoid losing an asset which is important for the debtor. 
Moreover, it is argued that taking security would save the creditors from undertaking 
a lengthy and costly investigation as to the debtor’s financial circumstances.
Hence, clear rules and laws that govern security interests give the creditor a level 
of comfort to extend credit, to finance projects and to engage in different commercial 
and financial transactions. So, the availability of a sound secured transactions law is 
necessary because contract law is insufficient to be the sole legal framework for 
secured transactions.28 930*4 Cohen argues that the insufficiency of contract law to provide 
a legal framework for secured transactions is based on three reasons.35 Firstly, a 
security-holder’s claim of a security interest is not only against the debtor but also 
against other third parties who are not party to the contract between the creditor and
28 Guarantees and suretyships are outside the scope o f  this Chapter.





33 Id. (in practice, however, the creditors normally undertake such investigations).




the debtor.36 378So, secured creditors can not use the contract theory in order to establish
i n
their rights against third parties. Secondly, the availability of a secured transactions 
law is important to protect certain rights which cannot be left to the parties due to the 
inequalities in the bargaining powers. Thirdly, without a law for secured 
transactions; secured finance agreements will be much more complicated.39
The availability of a secured transactions law in market-based economies is, 
therefore, necessary. Equally important, however, is the enforceability and certainty 
of the security interests created under any given secured transactions law. What is the 
advantage of taking security collateral if the creditor is not able to enforce it? To this 
end, a complementary law that go hand in hand with secured transactions laws is the 
availability of a well-developed insolvency law that deals with issues related to the 
insolvency of businesses including the status of the secured creditors on insolvency.
Given the benefits of security collateral, there seems to be an international 
consensus on the importance of security collateral and on the instrumental use of the 
law to facilitate secured finance.40 Consider, for example, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and its role in promoting the reform of 
secured transactions laws in the transitional economies.41 Other international 
organisations have stressed the importance and power of security such as the World
36 M
37 Cohen, supra note 20, at 430. Also, this is relevant in international financing; thus, choice o f  law is 
not much o f help when the assets are located in a foreign jurisdiction. Foreign investors should take 
into consideration the secured transactions law in the foreign jurisdiction and not to rely on their 
agreements only. See Alejandro Garro, Difficulties in Obtaining Secured Lending in Latin America: 
Why Law Reform Really Matters, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at pp 251- 252
38 Cohen, supra note 20, at 430
39 Id. (argues that the availability o f  a secured transaction law is important to establish “default rules” 
-  that is, the rules which govern issues not mentioned in the parties’ agreement. If such law is not 
available the parties needs to draft their agreements in great detail which make such solution 
complicated and inefficient).
40 McCormack, supra note 29, at 18.
41 See, e g., Modern Law on Secured Transactions, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
AND DEVELOPMENT, (1994) [hereinafter MODERN Law] available at http://www.ebrd.com.
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Bank42 and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITAL).43 4 These international organisations have also developed model 
principles on insolvency laws to complement their work in the area of secured
• 44transactions.
In sum, a secured transaction law, as part of an economic related law package, is 
necessary to facilitate and to encourage credit extension. However, the mere 
existence of a secured transactions law is not sufficient. Such law should meet the 
necessities of a market-based economy. To this effect, certain standards have 
developed and it is believed to constitute the basis for a good and sound secured 
transactions law. Prior to discussing the security laws in Saudi Arabia, it is important 
to review these growing principles and standards.
42 See, e.g., Heywood Fleisig, The Power o f Collateral, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(WORLD Bank), Note No. 43, (1995).
43 See, e.g., Spiros Bazinas, UNCITRAL’s Work in the Field o f Secured Transactions, in EMERGING 
Financial Markets, supra note 3, 211. Also, leading academics have stressed the importance o f .  
security law, see, e.g., Roy Goode, Security in Cross-Border Transactions, 33 TEX. Int’L L. J. 47, 
(1998).
44 This Chapter is mainly concerned with secured transactions laws. The author acknowledges, 
however, the importance of insolvency laws and it is essential complementary role in developing a 
secured transactions law in any emerging market. While this Chapter does not discuss either the 
international insolvency laws and standards or the Saudi insolvency laws in detail, insolvency laws are 
referred to where necessary. There are various initiatives in relation to insolvency laws that have 
developed as an important part of the market-based policies promulgated by the International 
Financial Institutions. See generally The WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, April (2001) [hereinafter Principles and 
Guidelines for Effective Insolvency] available at http://www.worldbank.org. See also United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross- 
Border INSOLVENCY, 30 MAY (1997) available at http://www.uncitral.org. See also UNITED 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
INSOLVENCY Law, 25 JUNE (2004) available at http://www.uncitral.org. Also, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is supporting transition countries to revise their insolvency 
laws and implementing institutions. The EBRD has also developed the “Insolvency Law Assessment 
Project” to benchmark insolvency laws of the member states against the best international practices 
that incorporate the World Bank’s PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY referred 
to supra. See generally Nicolas Frome, Multi-creditor Restructurings in Transition Countries: 
Lessons from Developed Jurisdictions, LAW IN TRANSITION, (2000) available at http://www.ebrd.com. 
See also G22, 'Annex A: Key Principles and Features o f Effective Insolvency Regimes in REPORT OF 
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISES, (1998). See also Craig Averch, 
Bankruptcy Laws: What is Fair?, Law IN TRANSITION, (2000) available at http://www.ebrd.com. See 
also Mahesh Uttamchanadni, Insolvency Law and Practice in Europe’s Transition Economies, 10 
JIBFL 452, (2004). For a good reference on English corporate insolvency law see ROY GOODE, 
Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005). See generally Philip 
Wood, Principles of International Insolvency Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).
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3. Secured Transactions Law For A M arket-Based Economy
3.1 The D ifferent Attitudes Towards Security: An Overview
The mere existence of a secured transactions law is not sufficient. Inefficient 
secured transactions laws constitute an obstacle to secured finance rather than 
playing a role in facilitating its functionality.45 It is a truism, however, that different 
jurisdictions have developed different attitudes towards taking security collateral. 
These attitudes have been translated into different laws and rules. Such laws and 
rules have been influenced by different elements which include historical, 
economical, political and cultural dimensions.46 Generally, these dimensions 
accumulate to form two main contexts; namely the pro-creditor and the pro-debtor 
contexts.47 48 Generalisations can be made in order to place a particular legal
An
jurisdiction under one of these contexts.
However, there are two main families of law; namely, the civil law and the 
common law. In this Chapter, we are concerned with the context under which each 
family of law can be placed. Generally speaking, common law countries are 
considered to be very sympathetic to security and hence pro-creditor.49 Civil law 
countries, on the other hand, are considered to be unsympathetic to security and 
hence pro-debtor.50 Along the spectrum, other legal jurisdictions may fall in between 
both extremes.51
45 Cuming, supra note 6, at 184.
46 See generally Ross Cranston, Credit Security and Debt Recovery: Law’s Role in Reform in Asia and 
the Pacific, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 3, at 219.
47 Id. at 222.
48 Id. (however, Cranston argues that it is almost impossible to place a particular legal jurisdiction 
within any o f both contexts).
49 Wood, supra note 20, at 41 (listing 84 very sympathetic jurisdictions including English law).




As mentioned earlier, various elements have played a role in shaping a particular 
legal jurisdiction as to security collateral laws. Thus, one of the main concepts that 
distinguish between civil law systems and common law systems is the doctrine of 
specificity.52 53This means that in civil law systems; security interests should be 
created over assets which are specifically identified. Thus, a civil law system 
recognises only the grant of security collateral to an identified, existing and specific 
asset, it does not recognise taking security over future assets for a pre-existing debt, 
and there is a reluctance to take security over future receivables.
On the other hand, common law systems have developed secured transactions 
laws which fairly accommodate modem secured finance techniques and hence; they 
provide a suitable legal background for countries adopting market-based economic 
policies. The EBRD, however, has bridged the gap between both systems through 
the promulgation of the Model Law on Secured Transactions in 1994. The Model 
law provides that: “one principle which has guided the drafting of the Model has 
been to produce a text which is compatible with the civil law concepts which 
underlie many central and eastern European legal systems and, at the same time, to 
draw on common law systems which have developed useful solutions to 
accommodate modem financing techniques”.54 The next Section reviews the 
developed general standards for security interests which are believed to 
accommodate modem financing techniques.
However, as explained in Chapter One, the author’s theme is based on “given 
assumptions”. Thus, one of these assumptions is that a market-based economy 
requires a market-based legal infrastructure. Chapter One also explains that such
52 Philip Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, at 5 (Sweet and Maxwell. 
1995).




assumptions are based on the policies and views being propagated by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) and international economic organisations.55 
Developing security collateral laws is one example of these policies that are being 
propagated by the IFI. However, while there is no international consensus has 
evolved yet in respect of the secured transactions’ underlying legal infrastructure; 
certain standards are emerging and international efforts in this area tend to support 
general standards as discussed in the next Section.
3.2 Modern Secured Transactions Law - The General Standards 56
A modem practical legal framework governing security interests can be created 
using different approaches.57 Choosing the approach is an issue which depends on 
the reformer and its existing secured transactions law if any. One approach is the 
‘minimalist’ approach where amendment to the existing law by some fine-tuning and 
providing additional features is sufficient.58 Another approach is to undertake an 
overall reform and modernisation of the existing secured transactions law in order to 
create a law that can play a facilitating role and not just a regulating one.59 In 
reforming its secured transactions law, the reformer should take into consideration 
the developed international standards. Also, reforms should be in conformity with the 
general economic policies intended by the reformer.60
55 See generally Chapter One.
56 The following discussion o f  secured transactions is based on general standards that are based on 
certain policies being supported by the international financial community for the purposes o f  this 
thesis. This should not undermine other developed secured transactions laws in certain countries such 
as USA (e . g Article 9 o f  the US Uniform Commercial Code that governs secured transactions). A 
proponent o f the US approach, for example, is Professor Sir Roy Goode. See Roy Goode, The Exodus 
of the Floating Charge, in CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL Law : MODERN DEVELOPMENTS, at 202-3 
(David Feldman et. al., eds., Lloyds o f  London Press Ltd, 1996). For a thorough comparative study 
between the US and English secured transactions law; see generally MCCORMACK, supra note 29.
57 Cuming, supra note 6, at 191.
* I d
59Id.
60 As the law is the instrument which is used to achieve the economic polices o f  any state; the law 
governing security interests should act as facilitator for emerging markets to make the achievement o f  
market economy more efficient.
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Several issues should be taken into account by the reformer that undertakes to 
modernise its secured transactions law. Firstly, because the main purpose of taking 
security collateral is to reduce the creditors’ credit risk; secured transactions laws 
should allow the creation of security interests that achieves such purpose. To this 
effect, the law should allow the use of security in the “widest possible range of 
circumstances”.61 Secondly, the law should not undermine the views of both parties 
(i.e., the creditor and the debtor). Thus, creditors should feel that the assets are secure 
and debtors should have the right to retain the secured assets in order to keep the 
business running and to enable them to repay the principal and the debt service.62 63
Thirdly, the law should address the extent of the party autonomy allowed between 
the parties.
Having said that, a sound secured transactions law should be guided by general 
principles to improve the efficiency of the system and the availability of credit. 
These principles have two dimensions: structural and substantive. From a structural 
viewpoint, the legal framework for secured transactions should address various 
issues including the creation of security interests, the perfection of security interests, 
the priorities among secured creditors and the enforcement of security interests. 
Under each of the above-mentioned structural elements, substantive rules could be 
developed to accommodate modem financing techniques.
3.2.1 C r e a t i o n  o f  S e c u r i t y  I n t e r e s t s
Rules related to the creation of security interests are those rules which deal with 
the formalities required to create a security collateral, the nature of assets given as a
61 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 144.
62 Id. at 155. However, the law should address the competing interests o f  the various creditors (i.e., 
secured and unsecured creditors); see Thomas Laryea, Development of Standards for Security 
Interests, (IMF Legal Department, 2003) available at http://www.imf.org.
63 Laryea, supra note 62, at 2.
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security, the nature of the secured debts, the security giver, the security receiver and 
the use of the secured assets. A sound secured transactions law should establish 
simple and cost-effective rules for the creation of security interests.64 Excessive 
formalities lead to their circumvention and undermining the predictability of the 
secured transactions law.65 This means that formalities, taxes and duties must be kept 
to minimum. More important is the nature of assets that are being given as security 
collateral. The traditional use of security has always been confined to non-possessory 
security interest over immovables and possessory security interests over movables.66 67
Modem financing techniques, however, require that security be given over all types 
of assets.
The creation of security interests over all types of assets means that it is not 
confined to immovables only but encompasses movables and rights. Thus, the law 
should allow non-possessory security interests over movables to be created. Such has 
proved to encourage and to attract foreign investments.68 Likewise, security in rights 
plays a very important role in modem financing. For example, security in rights plays 
an important role in project financing where the reliance is on the receivables 
generated by the project being financed.69 The lenders would ensure to take security 
over these receivables. The availability of such form of security is helpful for 
emerging markets that are desirous to attract credit and project financing to meet 
their developmental demands.
64 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 148.
65 Laryea, supra note 62, at 4.
66 Id.
67 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 151.
68 Laryea, supra note 62, at 4.
69 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 151.
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The law should allow for the creation of security interests over future or after- 
acquired assets. Some jurisdictions impose restrictions to that effect being 
influenced by the concept of specificity mentioned above. The implementation of 
this concept dictates that no security interests can be created over any kind of assets 
unless such assets are specifically identified. Such principle is problematic for 
modem financing where creditors look for future assets as well as existing assets. In 
addition, the law should allow for the creation of security interests over “changing 
pool of assets” and the parties should be allowed to describe the assets generally.70 12 
Allowing the creation of security interests over “changing pool of assets” encourage 
financing techniques such as receivables and inventory financing. Again, the concept 
of specificity is in direct contradiction with such principle.
Furthermore, the law should allow giving security collateral for existing as well 
as future debts.73 However, the secured debt should not be confined to a static debt 
only.74 Taking security over a “changing pool of debt” should be allowed.75 *Such 
facilitates taking security over overdraft facilities or revolving credits. Therefore, 
parties should be allowed to describe the secured debt generally by “reference to a 
general class description”.77 78In addition, the law should address the nature of the 
parties involved (i.e., creditors and debtors). Thus, the law should allow any security-
7 0
giver and any security-receiver to give or receive the security.
70 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 151.
71 See the discussion supra.
72 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 151.
73 Id. at 150 (defines future debts as “debts which are created or become owed by the debtor after the 
creation o f the security right”).




78 Id. at 149-150.
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Finally, the law should allow the use of the secured assets by the debtor who 
gave the security. For the debtor to maintain the full economic advantage of the 
assets; it is desired that the debtor possesses the secured assets and make use of them. 
Thus, if the debtor purchases certain machines on credit; it is desirable that the debtor 
remains in the possession of the machines in order to make use of them and produces
QA
the intended product. In this sensé, the debtor would be able to repay the principal
and the debt service. This does not mean, however, that possessory security collateral
should be abolished. Possession in certain secured transactions might be more 
81desirable to creditors.
3 . 2 . 2  P e r f e c t i o n , P r i o r i t i e s , a n d  E n f o r c e m e n t  o f  S e c u r i t y  I n t e r e s t s  
Having explained the general principles for the creation of security interests; it is 
essential to mention other important elements of a sound secured transactions law 
such as the perfection and enforcement of security interests. Perfection of security 
interests is basically the public demonstration of their existence and the 
establishment of their priority. Perfection is of great importance to secured creditors 
to protect their rights vis-à-vis third parties. Because giving security might affect 
third parties, a sound secured transactions law should create a mechanism whereby 
third parties can be notified of the security in question. The traditional demonstration 
of possessory security interests is normally accomplished through the possession of 
the secured assets itself. In modem financing, however, non-possessory security 
interests have been allowed in certain jurisdictions. Hence, possession of the secured 
assets no longer serves the purpose for the demonstration of the security interest. 
Another mechanism has been developed; that is, a public registry. 81
81 Id. at 154 (explaining that when giving security collateral over gold bars or negotiable instruments; 
traditional possessory security collateral is more desirable).
208
Chapter Four
The whole purpose of this new registration mechanism is to restrict the 
presentation of false wealth. Such is important for third parties in order to avoid any 
false appearance of the debtor’s wealth.82 Hence, transparent and clear perfection 
rules are crucial for a sound secured transactions law.83 Equally, priority rules should 
be clear, certain, transparent and predictable.84 The security holder should be ‘super­
priority creditor’.85 Such principle should continue even through insolvency.86
Finally, enforcement and realisation of the security procedures should be effective 
as well as cost and time efficient.87 Such is of great importance because creditors rely 
mainly on the secured assets for recovery and repayment. The secured assets would 
be more valuable for the creditors if their enforcement is of a short space of time.88 
Certain rules could hinder the realisation of the security or delay its enforcement. For 
example, remedies might confine realisation of the security to public auctions rather 
than the availability of a private sale. Also, other restrictions such as compulsory 
grace periods on the enforcement of the right may delay the realisation process.89 
Any delay of the realisation of the security is in turn a delay for the recovery of 
payment. Such factor influences the creditors’ judgement when extending credit to 
the borrower.
In sum, a sound secured transactions law which accommodates modem financing 
techniques should be transparent, predictable and coherent. Certainty of the secured
82 See WOOD, supra note 52, at 4-5 (discussing the concept o f  false wealth).
83 Laryea, supra note 62, at 3.
M Id.
85 WOOD, supra note 52, at 3.
86 Id. However, the priority o f  the secured creditor issue has attracted academic debate. See generally 
Thomas Jackson et. al., Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L. J 1143, 
(1979); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD 209, (1989); Riz Mokal, 
Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth, 60 CLJ 581, (2001); Riz Mokal, The Search for 
Someone to Save: A Defensive Case for the Priority of Secured Credit, 22 OJLS 687, (2002).
87 As pointed out earlier, here a well-developed insolvency and bankruptcy laws are o f  great 
importance.
88 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 147.
89 See generally WOOD, supra note 52, 137 — 147.
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transaction law is one of its essential elements. This means that secured creditors 
should be certain as to their priority over the secured assets,90 when the security can 
be realised,91 when the security right existed92 and whether the creditors are able to 
restrict redemption of the security collateral.93 Equally important is that such security 
right must be a right in rem capable of being enforced against third parties.94 Having 
summarised the general principles of a sound secured transactions law; it is helpful to 
discuss in the following section the use of collective security arrangements in 
financing transactions and its importance.
3 . 2 . 3  T h e  U s e  o f  C o l l e c t i v e  S e c u r i t y  A r r a n g e m e n t s  i n  F i n a n c i n g  
T r a n s a c t i o n s
A collective security arrangement is defined as “an arrangement whereby 
security is held for the common benefit of a number of lenders”.95 Perhaps one of the 
most well-known concepts that are used in collective security arrangements is the use 
of trusts. In modem financing transactions, trusts play a very important role.96 97In 
syndicated loans and project finance transactions; security trustees play an important 
role for different reasons including: 1) to facilitate the trading of loans among 
lenders; and 2) to remove the insolvency risk of an agent or other third party 
holding the security on behalf of the lenders.98 Given its benefits, many jurisdictions 
have introduced the trust concept into its legal systems in order to facilitate financial-
90 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 147.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 WOOD, supra note 52, at
94 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 146.
95 Thiele, supra note 15, at 1.
96 See generally Christopher Duffet, Using Trusts in International Finance and Commercial 
Transactions, 1 J. INT’L. PLAN. 23, (1992).




related transactions. Most recently, a member of the G.C.C, namely; the Kingdom of 
Bahrain has introduced a trust law to facilitate financial transactions."
In jurisdictions where the concept of trust is not recognised; collective security 
arrangements have been structured using alternative devices. Agency and other 
concepts9 100 have been used as an alternative to the trust in collective security 
arrangements. Such structures do not normally achieve the same purpose achieved 
when using the trust in collective security arrangements. However, seven practical 
requirements are argued to constitute necessary elements for any good collective 
security arrangement structure; these are:101
1) it should be possible to create security without having to name or register 
the individual lenders that are to benefit from the security;
2) it should be possible to put one person in charge of monitoring and 
enforcing the security, subject to terms that are agreed in advance;
3) lenders’ rights in respect of the security and proceeds of the security must 
be properly protected;
4) lenders’ rights in respect of the security must be transferable;
5) security should be capable of covering new loans, even if they are made by 
new lenders;
6) it should be possible to replace the person in charge of the security without 
affecting the security; and
7) the arrangement should be simple and straightforward as possible.
A sound market-based legal infrastructure secured transactions law should allow 
these practical requirements to be implemented in order to be able to transact
99 See LAW No . (23) OF THE YEAR 2006 REGARDING THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL TRUSTS 
available at http://www.bma.gov.bh.
100 Rahn Adi has been used as a collective security arrangement in Saudi Arabia, see discussion infra.
101 THIELE, supra note 15, at 19-25.
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collective security arrangements structures in financial transactions in an effective 
manner.
4. Secured Transactions Law In Saudi Arabia
Studying the laws related to security interests in Saudi Arabia is one of the areas 
that highlight the tension arising from the existing de facto duality. It is an area 
where there is an interaction between the Saudi conventional finance component and 
the overall legal system of Islamic Shari ’a. Arguably, a strong market-led financial 
system requires a sound secured transactions law based on the general principles 
discussed above. In Saudi Arabia, however, the conventional finance component of 
the Saudi financial system is functioning within a legal system which does not, to a 
certain extent, absorb its practices. The “Islamic finance” component, on the other 
hand, lacks a definitive legal framework and hence, although it does provide a major 
financing option that may not require a secured transactions law based on the above 
discussed standards; its legal foundations need further enhancement as will be 
discussed later.
In Chapter Two, the author has already highlighted and discussed the existing de 
facto duality in Saudi Arabia, its implications and the emerging “Islamic finance” 
component. This Section further focuses on a very important area for the Saudi 
emerging financial markets which is secured transactions. In the area of secured 
transactions, the Saudi conventional finance component is faced with security 
collateral rules which might not, to a certain extent, facilitate its financing practices. 




Thus, obstacles arise when international lenders are invited to finance projects in 
Saudi Arabia. Lenders, whether domestic or international, would require a good 
security collateral package. Such may not be available under the Saudi secured 
transactions law. For example, in one of the largest project finance transactions in 
Saudi Arabia; lenders had to accept a very limited security package due to the 
considerable difficulties associated with the secured transactions law. 
Consequently, lending practices in Saudi Arabia have been transacted with the 
reliance on third-parties guarantees. The reliance on guarantees is a natural 
reaction to the difficulties associated with taking security interests that do not meet 
the lenders’ expectations and do not accommodate modem financing techniques.102 304
Another obstacle facing the financial system in Saudi Arabia is the difficulty to 
notarise the security collateral.105 A circular has been issued by the Ministry of 
Justice preventing notaries to notarise any security collateral to commercial banks on 
the ground that such banks are dealing with interest and practicing in a manner which 
is inconsistent with the principles of the Islamic Shari’a.106 This highlights the 
tension arising from the existing de facto duality. Commercial conventional banks, 
however, have devised other means to notarise security interests and to circumvent 
any restrictions.
102 John Dewar, Yanpet: Largest Petrochemical Plant Financing, April IFLR 7, at 8, (1998). See also 
Philip Fletcher et al., The Yanpet Recipe, in PFI YEARBOOK, 124 (IRF, 1998).
103 Michael McMillen, Islamic Shari’ah-Compliant Project Finance: Collateral Security and 
Financing Structure Case Studies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L J. 1184, at 1206, (2001).
104 Laryea, supra note 62, at 5 n. 4 (arguing that the reliance on guarantees is also resulting from the 
availability o f  inflexible non-possessory security laws. Such is argued to be problematic to small as 
well as medium size enterprises because they may not have third party guarantees. It is also 
problematic for larger corporations because such guarantees are normally required from shareholders; 
thus; undermining the limited liability o f  the shareholder in case o f  insolvency).
105 In Saudi Arabia, recordation o f real property is effected by the Public Notaries.
106 See Supreme Judiciary Council Circular, No. 291, dated (25/8/1981).
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Instead, Saudi conventional banks notarise the security interests in the name of a 
trusted person, normally a bank manager.107 108In doing so, the security interest is 
considered to be given to a person rather than a bank. The bank guarantees its rights 
by concluding an agreement with that person providing that the security interest is in 
fact for the benefit of the bank. Such solution, however, is impractical, complicated 
and risky. Thus, that person might be dishonest and claim his right in the secured 
assets or his estate might claim it in case of death. There is no doubt that a well- 
developed financial system cannot function on the basis of such practice. Such 
practices need to be measured against their adverse affect in hindering access to 
credit and in reducing the predictability and the transparency of the legal system.
However, such procedural problems might be solved in the light of the current 
reforms being undertaken by the Saudi government. In the meantime, law firms 
through their “legal work” have developed security structures in order to facilitate 
financing transactions in Saudi Arabia. Also, the “Islamic finance” component in 
Saudi Arabia has provided an alternative option for financing that may not face such 
procedural obstacles.109 Thus, it can be argued that the growing “Islamic finance” 
practice in Saudi Arabia is not attributed to the prohibition of interest only but also 
because “Islamic finance” legal structures are in line with the overall legal system of 
Saudi Arabia, that is, Islamic Shari ’a.
However, the recent enactment of the new security collateral law over movables 
in Saudi Arabia highlights the government’s awareness of the importance of secured 
transactions laws. Whether such law has fulfilled the desired objective in constituting
107 Such practice has been confirmed by legal practitioners. See also McMillen, supra note 103, at 
1223, n. 58.
108 See the definition o f  “legal work” McBarnet, supra note 14.
109 See discussion infra.
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a sound secured transactions law to accommodate modem financing techniques is a 
matter which will be discussed later in this Chapter.
4.1 S e c u r it y  L a w  B e f o r e  2003 : An O v e r v ie w
Prior to 2003 there was no specific statute on secured transactions in Saudi 
Arabia.110 Therefore, the general law governing security interests is the Islamic 
Shari ’a. Under Islamic Shari ’a, thé rahn is the main security interest which can be 
taken over assets.111 Rahn applies to both movable as well as immovable assets.112 
Hence, rahn can neither be translated as a ‘pledge’ nor as a ‘mortgage’.113 
Nevertheless, the translated version of the Majalla114 defines rahn as “a pledge 
consists of setting aside property from which it is possible to obtain payment or 
satisfaction of some claim. Such property is then said to be pledged, or given in 
pledge”.115 Rahn is classified as a contract116 based on four elements117 18related to the:
I 1 Q
1) contracting parties, 2) the secured asset, 3) the secured debt and 4) the 
formulation of the contract.119 These are the four elements of the rahn contract.120
110 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1194.
111 Nick Foster, The Islamic Law of Real Security, 15(2) ALQ 130, at 134, (2000).
112 Id. at 134 -135.
113 Under English law the pledge applies over movables only while the mortgage applies over 
immovables. Hence, the word ‘rahn ’ will be used in this volume. On English security collateral law 
see generally ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW, (Lexis Nexis UK, 2004).
114 References to the Majalla in this Chapter are based on Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah unless 
indicated otherwise. See Chapter One on the Majalla.
115 The Civil Law of Palestine and Trans-Jordan (Volume 1), art. 701, at 171 [hereinafter The 
Civil Law of Palestine] (C. A. Hooper trans., Azriel Printing Works, 1933) (which is a translation 
of Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah). However, as explained, the translation o f rahn is not accurate.
116 Foster, supra note 111, at 135.
117 An “element” o f  a contract is the translation for the word “rukn”. The absence o f  a rukn renders the 
contract void. Unlike other Islamic Schools, the Hanafi School recognises one rukn (i . e element) for 
the rahn contract which is the offer and acceptance.
118 The term ‘secured debt’ is not totally accurate under certain Islamic Schools which recognise that 
a secured asset can be given as a security against a physical asset 'ayn. See the definition o f  'ayn infra.
119 M. Abu Al-Rish, Bayan Madhahib Al-Fuqaha F i 'Aqd Al-Rahn, at 61 (Matba’at Al-Amanah, 
1986). See also A. Barshumi, Al-Rahn Wa Al-Shuf’ah FiAl-Fiqh Al-Islami, at 38 (Dar Al-Taba’ah Al- 
Muhmmadiyah, 1988).
120 The term “fundamental basis” is used in the translated version o f  Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah. 
See Hooper; THE CIVIL Law OF PALESTINE, supra note 115 (referring to the element o f  the rahn 
contract as “fundamental basis”). See Abu Al-Rish and Barshumi, supra note 119.
215
Chapter Four
The contracting parties include both the security grantor (i.e., the debtor)121 and 
the security grantee (i.e., the creditor).122 1234Both should have the capacity by being 
sound minded. In addition, the secured assets are considered valid and can be 
subject to the rahn under Islamic Shari'a if certain requirements are met. First, the 
secured asset should be ‘aynm  which is “a specific existing thing, considered as a 
unique object and not merely as a member of a category”.125 126*89Second, the secured 
asset should be something which “may be validly sold”. This means that the 
secured asset should be in “existence at the time of the contract, must have some 
specific value and be capable of transfer”. Thus, four conditions must be satisfied 
in any asset in order to be given as a rahn-, these are: legality, existence, 
deliverability of the asset and its precise determination. Therefore, future assets can 
not be granted as a security.130 Thirdly, the secured asset should be one that can be
121 The person who gives the rahn is called Lrahin'. See, The Mejelle being an English 
Translation of Majallahel-Ahkam-I-Adliya and a Complete Code on Islamic Civil Law, 
art. 703 [hereinafter THE MEJELLE] (Tyser et al. trans., Law Publishing Company, 1901; reprint 1967) 
(which is another translated version o f Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyah).
122 The person who takes the rahn (i.e., security grantee) is called ‘murtehin’; The MEJELLE, supra 
note 121, art. 704
123 The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 708,
124 Abu Al-Rish, supra note 119, at 77. However one o f  the Islamic Schools; namely, the Maliki 
School does not require the secured asset to be 'ayn.
125 Frank Vogel Et. Al , Islamic Law And Finance: Religion, Risk, And Return, at 94 (Kluwer 
Law International, 1998). See also Chapter Four, Section 4.3.1 on the difference between 'ayn and 
dayn.
126 The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 709 at 172
n lld.
128 Susan Rayner, The Theory Of Contracts In Islamic Law, at 131 (Graham & Tortman, 
1991),
129 Id. (legality means that the object “must be legal..., in that it is beneficial, that it is a commodity 
capable o f  being traded in (mal mutaqawwim), that its subject matter ...and underlying cause ...are 
lawful, and that it is not proscribed by Islamic law, public order or morals”) . See also, The Mejelle, 
supra note 115, art. 127 (explains mal mutaqawwim referred to in the definition o f  legality as being 
“used in two senses: one is a thing the benefit o f  which is permissible by law to enjoy. The other 
means property ...acquired. For example - A fish in the sea is not mal mutaqawwim, when it is caught 
and taken it is mal mutaqawwim"').
130 Foster, supra note 111, at 140. However, certain exceptions apply to this general rule; for example, 
assets can be added to the rahn after the formation o f  the rahn contract, see art. 713, THE CIVIL Law 
OF PALESTINE, supra note 115, at 173. However, under this exception future assets can not be covered 
as they need to be specifically added afterwards; see Foster, supra note 111, at 140.
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possessed.131 If the secured asset can not be possessed, such asset does not qualify as 
an asset that can be secured under Islamic Shari ’a.132
The third element of the rahn contract is the secured debt. Secured debts refer to 
the obligations that can be secured. Such should be in existence and certain.133 Thus, 
security over future debts is not allowed.134 The forth element of the rahn contract is 
the formulation of the contract itself. The contract is normally concluded by the offer 
and acceptance.135 Such could be either in oral or in writing136 whether expressly or 
impliedly.137 These elements of the rahn contract are essential because the absence of 
any of these elements renders the rahn contract null and void.138 A void rahn 
contract would mean that the contract has no effect and is legally non-existent.139
In addition, rahn is a possessory security interest and the transfer of possession is 
essential. Article 706 of the Majalla states that “...if the [rahn] is not transferred to 
the effective possession of the [security grantee], however, such contract is 
incomplete and revocable. The [security grantor] may, therefore denounce such 
contract before delivery of the [ra/w]”.140 A question arises here as to the 
classification of the possession in the rahn contract under Islamic Shari’a, that is, if 
possession is one of the main elements of the contract or it is only a condition.
131 Abu Al-Rish, supra note 119, at 80.
132 Id.
133 Nick Foster, Commercial Security over Movables in the UAE: A Comparative Analysis in the Light 
o f English Law, French Law and the Shari’a, 4 YEARBOOK ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN L. 3, at 21 
(1997-1998). 
l3A Id
135, The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 706at 171
136 Barshumi, supra note 119, at 48-49.
137 See, e g., The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 707, at 171.
138 Rayner, supra note 128, at 150: “Batil [Null and void] is when the pillars of the contract are
breached, or when its cause is imperfect”.
139 Id. at 168.
140 THE CIVIL Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 706, at 171. A Similar provision is found in 
Majalat Al-Ahkam Al-Shri’yah. See AHMAD AL-Qari, MAJALAT AL-AHKAM AL-ShrI ’YAH, art 996 
[hereinafter Al-Shri’YAH] (Tihama Publications, 1981).
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Foster argues that possession of the assets is a “fundamental basis” under the 
rahn contract.141 The “fundamental basis” quoted by Foster is the terminology which 
is used in the translated version of the Majalla for the word rukn in Arabic (i.e., an 
element of a contract).142 He mentions, critically, that the Majalla has failed to 
indicate to this “fundamental basis” in its definition of rahn and in its classification 
of rahn as a contract.143 To justify his argument, Foster particularly refers to Article 
729144 of the Majalla which provides that it is “a fundamental rule that the [grantee] 
has the right of retaining possession of the [rahn] until the redemption thereof’.145
However, contrary to Foster’s argument, possession of the secured assets under 
the rahn contract is not considered one of its “fundamental basis”. Two reasons 
constitute the basis for this counter-argument. Firstly, confusion in this regards arise 
provided by the translated version of the Majalla relied upon by Foster.146 147The terms 
“fundamental basis” and “fundamental rule” have been used as one translation for 
two different words in Arabic; it can hardly be seen that such translation give an 
accurate translation for both Arabic words.
The term “fundamental basis” used in the Majalla in the Heading to Section 1, 
Chapter 1 of Book V (HSCB) was the translation for the Arabic word rukn.u l Such 
can be translated as the pillar/element of the contract. For example, under English 
contract law ‘consideration’ is one of the main pillars/elements of the contract; and 
hence, it is a rukn. As will be seen, classifying whether a specific action is a rukn
141 Foster, supra note 111, at 136.
142 That is, the translated version o f the Majalla by Hooper, see The Civil Law  of Palestine, supra 
note 115 (see the Heading to Section 1, Chapter 1 o f  Book V o f the Majalla is entitled “Fundamental 
Basis o f  the Contract o f  [rahn]”.
143 Foster, supra note 111, at 136.
144 Foster, supra note 111, at 136 n. 25.
145The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 729, at 176.
146 That is, the translated version of the Majalla by Hooper, see THE CIVIL Law OF PALESTINE, supra 
note 115.
147 See the Heading to Section 1, Chapter 1 o f  Book V o f the Arabic version o f the Majalla by SALIM 
Rustam , Shark Al-Majalla, at 385 (Matba’a Al-Adabiya, 1923).
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(pillar/element) of the contract or not is one of importance. On the other hand, the 
term “fundamental rule” used in Article 729, which is relied upon by Foster to justify 
his argument, was the translation for a completely another word and gives a different 
meaning as opposed to the word used in HSCB. In the Arabic version of article 729 
there is no mention of the term “fundamental rule”. Another translated version offers 
somewhat better translation of Article 729 which states: “a consequence of making 
[rahn] is that the [security grantee] has a right to keep possession until
1 dfiredemption...”. Thus, it is a “consequence” and not a “fundamental rule”. So, 
literally it can not be relied upon Article 729 to justify that possession is a 
“fundamental basis”.
Reverting to the term “fundamental basis” used in the HSCB; and according to 
the Arabic version, the term is a translation for the word rukn in the singular (i.e., 
one element). Under the HSCB there is no explicit mention that "possession" is a 
rukn/element, or in the words of Foster “fundamental basis”, of the contract. Even 
Foster has pointed this critically as explained above. This leads us to the second 
reason for our counter-argument. The reason is because if the secured assets under 
the rahn contract are not transferred to the effective possession of the creditor; the 
contract is not null and void but it is revocable.148 49
Legally, as mentioned above, the absence of the contract’s rukn/element renders 
the contract null and void. In the rahn contract it is clear from Article 706 mentioned 
above that the absence of "possession" does not render the rahn contract null and 
void but revocable. Hence we reach the conclusion that the possession of the secured 
assets under the rahn contract is not a “fundamental basis”, element, pillar or rukn of
148 THE MEJELLE, supra note 121, art. 729.
149 The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 706 at 171.
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the contract. In fact, there is a consensus among the four Islamic Schools that 
possession is not a rukn but it is a condition.150
Nevertheless, the possession of the rahn is a must in order for the security 
interest to be perfected against third party creditors.151 If the creditor fails to take 
possession of the secured asset; such creditor is treated on pari passu basis with other 
creditors. Thus, the creditor should have possession of the secured asset in order to 
secure a super-priority status vis-à-vis other creditors. The position in Saudi Arabia 
tends to require the actual physical possession of the secured assets.152 However, the 
possession of real property in Saudi Arabia has been deemed to be a type of 
“constructive possession” of the secured asset.153 This normally is effected by 
concluding a rahn agreement and recording the security interest on the title deed to 
evidence the security interest.154 Creditors have the right to enforce the security on 
non-payment of the debt. Such can be done through a judicially directed sale of the 
secured assets.155
4.2 Security Law Post-2003: The Commercial Ra h n  Law 
Amidst the current legal reforms in Saudi Arabia; the government has enacted a 
new security collateral law. This law confirms the government’s desire to facilitate 
adopting a market based legal infrastructure. The Commercial Rahn Law of 2003 
(CRL)156 *deals with movable assets only. CRL provides that a commercial rahn is a 
rahn over a movable securing a commercial debt. A debt is ‘commercial’ when is 
considered so by the debtor as well as all the other involved parties whose rights and
150 Abu Al-Rish, supra note 119, at 47-50 & 112-113.
151 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1221.
152M
153 Id. at 1222.
154 Id.
155 The Civil Law of Palestine, supra note 115, art. 757 at 181.
156 See Rahn Law, supra note 19.
151 Rahn Law, supra note 19, art. 1.
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obligations are related to that rahn.m  Introducing the commercial rahn through the 
CRL has certain implications. First, a clear distinction is made between commercial 
and non-commercial (i.e., civil) rahn. So, the CRL governs security over movables in 
commercial transactions while Islamic Shari’a governs security over movables in 
non-commercial transactions. Second, the CRL governs movable assets only which 
means that immovables are still governed by the Islamic Shari ’a whether for 
commercial or non-commercial transactions. The CRL applies to both tangible and 
intangible movables.158 59 Intangible assets covered by the CRL include but not limited 
to negotiable instruments,160 bearer instruments,161 and nominative instruments.162 
Other intangible assets, however, such as securities, intellectual property, patents and 
trademarks are excluded from the CRL.
Assets which can be secured under the CRL should be one that can be sold and 
can be precisely specified in the rahn contract or in a later one.163 However, giving 
security over future assets is not allowed under the CRL.164 The rahn should secure 
an existing debt which should be stipulated in the rahn contract.165 The security 
grantor could be the debtor himself or anyone providing a security on his behalf and 
in his favour.166 At any case, the security grantor should be the owner of the assets
158 Id. However, it is not very clear whether a debt is commercial when it is considered so by the 
debtor only or by all the parties. See, e.g., art. 2(b), Implementation Rules o f  the Rahn Law, 
Ministerial Decision No. 6320, (18/6/1425 H) [hereinafter Implementation Rules] available at 
http://www.moc.gov.sa (provides that in order for the rahn contract to be governed by the Rahn Law; 
such rahn should secure a debt which is commercial to the debtor. No mention in the Implementation 
Rules to any other parties).
159 Implementation Rules, supra note 158, art. 2(a).
160 Id. arts 1& 13 (negotiable instruments such as cheques and bills o f  exchange).
161M  art. 1(f) (bearer instruments are defined as commercial instruments not bearing the beneficiary’s 
name)
162 Id. art. 1(e) (nominative instruments are defined as shares, bonds and other securities bearing the 
name o f their owner).
163 Rahn Law, supra note 19, art.2.
164 Id
165 M art. 3.
166 M art. 4.
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given as security.167 If the security grantor is not the owner of the secured assets; the 
creditor has the right to demand an alternative security asset or revoke the 
contract.168 169
The security interests can only be perfected vis-à-vis third parties by transferring 
the possession of the secured assets to the creditor or to an adlm  designated by the 
contracting parties.170 17The secured assets should always remain in the possession of 
the creditor or the adl.111 The creditorladl is considered to be in the possession of the 
secured asset when it is placed at his disposal in a manner leading others to believe 
that the secured asset has come under his possession.172 However, the creditor can be 
considered in possession of the secured assets if he receives a document (suk) which 
grants him only and not others the right to receive the secured asset.173 In case the 
secured asset is an instrument;174 175possession is effective when such instrument is 
transferred to the possession of the creditor. If such instrument is deposited with 
third parties; transfer of possession is effective upon the transfer of the deposit 
receipt.176 Hence, the CRL does not allow for non-possessory security interests over 
movables.
The law sets out certain procedures and conditions regarding instruments which 
must be fulfilled when concluding a rahn transaction. In case of nominative 
instruments, the rahn contract should be in writing, the rahn should be evidenced in
167 Id.
]6*ld.
169 An adl is a trusted third party who can hold the security on behalf o f  the parties. See the discussion 
o f the adl infra.
170 Rahn Law, supra note 19, art. 6
171 Id.
172 Rahn Law, supra note 19, art. 7. See also Implementation Rules, supra note 158, art. 16(a)
173 Rahn Law, supra note 19, art. 7. See also Implementation Rules, supra note 158, art. 16(b),
174 That is negotiable instruments, bearer instruments and nominative instruments covered under the 
Rahn Law.




the records of the issuer and on the instrument itself.177 178Negotiable instruments can 
be given as a security by endorsing the instrument provided that the endorser is the 
legal holder of the instrument and that the endorsement is in writing on the 
instrument itself stating, for example, that the instrument’s amount is for rahn.m  
Finally, providing bearer instruments as security should be in writing and the issuer 
of these instruments should be notified.179 Generally, however, all the competent 
entities involved in issuing instruments should create record to evidence all the 
details relevant to each instrument including the name of the security grantor, the 
name of security grantee, amount of the secured debt, date of the rahn contract and 
name of the adl if any.180
The debtor is entitled to satisfy the debt on the due date. In case of the debtor’s 
failure, the creditor has the right, after three working days of the due date, to file for 
the sale of all or part of the secured assets.181 The CRL imposes a five-day period 
before the enforcement. Thus, the sale of the secured assets is only allowed five days 
after notifying the debtor and his guarantor if any.182 183The place of the sale, its date 
and the time must also be notified. If there is more than one asset securing the 
debt; the creditor has the right, unless otherwise agreed, to designate the asset upon 
which the sale should take effect.184 Unless the court designates another means of
’’’implementation Rules, supra note 158, art. 12
178 M  art. 13.
119 Id. art. 14.
180 Implementation Rules, supra note 158, art. 6. See also art. 7 allows for such information to be 
evidenced through a computer system with certain conditions.
181 Rahn Law, supra note 19, art. 15,





sale, it should be through public auction.185 The time and the place of the sale are 
also designated by the court.186
However, if the secured asset is a commercial instrument; permission from the 
court for the transfer of title endorsement must be sought.187 If the market value of 
the secured asset depreciates and does not cover the secured debt; the creditor is 
entitled to claim the difference from the debtor.188 The CRL does not allow the 
parties to contract out from the enforcement measures provided by the law.189 The 
parties, therefore, can not stipulate ip the contract different conditions regarding the 
sale of the secured assets or the transfer of title to the creditor upon default.190 192
4.3 Saudi Law and the Essentials of a Modern Law for Secured 
101
T r a n s a c t io n s
It can be fairly argued that the development of secured transactions laws is 
influenced by the development of the financial markets. In developed market 
economies where financial systems play a pivotal role in the economy; the scope of 
security collateral has been expanded and developed in order to accommodate and to 
meet the needs of the financial system. Saudi Arabia, however, is a new emerging 
market country and its financial system is constrained by Islamic legal prohibitions 
such as riba and gharar. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is desirous to adapt to market 
economies, to accommodate modem financing techniques and to create a market- 
friendly legal framework. This is reflected by the various newly promulgated laws 
including the CRL discussed above.
185 Id. art. 17.
n6Id.
187W.
188 Id. art. 20.
189 Id. art. 22 (does not allow contracting out o f arts 15-18 related to the enforcement).
190 M
191 The discussion in this section encompasses both the Rahn Law and the principles o f Islamic 
Shari’a relating to secured transactions discussed supra in this Chapter.
192 See Chapter One on riba and gharar.
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However, the question is whether the promulgation of the new security collateral 
law into the Saudi legal system have brought about a comprehensive and a sound 
secured transactions law or whether such law would be frustrated in practice given 
the nature of modem financing transactions. The Saudi security laws (both pre and 
post 2003) need to be measured against their effect to access credit and to their 
enhancement as to the predictability and transparency of the legal framework. Earlier 
in this Chapter we have discussed the standards of a sound and market-friendly 
secured transactions law which can be summarised and founded on five key 
elements.193 Firstly, the security right should adhere to essential qualities of the 
right; that is - a right in rem and should grant a super-priority status to its holder 
against all other creditors.194 Secondly, the law should allow for the grant of security 
in the widest possible range of circumstances. Thirdly, the existence of a security 
interest over the secured asset must be effectively publicised. Fourthly, the means of 
recovery of the debt should be rapid and cost-effective. Finally, any costs to create 
and maintain the security right should be kept to a reasonable level.
Taking a broad approach, Saudi law does not to some extent implement these 
principles. While the security interest under the Saudi law is a right in rem and it 
gives its holder a super-priority status;195 there are certain restrictions as to the other 
above-mentioned elements. Firstly and generally, Saudi law does not provide for the 
granting of security in the widest range of circumstances. Saudi law does not allow 
the creation of security over future assets.196 The prevention applies to both movable 
and immovable assets and it has been referred to expressly in the CRL. Such could
193 D. Fairgrieve, 'Reforming Secured Transactions Laws in Central and Eastern Europe’, EBLR, 
245,(1998).
194 Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 145-146.
195 While this is the general rule under Islamic Shari’a; there is no explicit mention in the Rahn Law 
as to the priority status o f  the secured creditor.
196 Similarly, security interests against future debts cannot be granted.
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be problematic to project finance transactions where most of the security collateral is 
“after-acquired” or “after-constructed”. Likewise, in inventory financing debtors 
might acquire new items of inventory on on-going basis. This means that under 
Saudi law parties would have to conclude a rahn agreement every time an asset is 
acquired.
Also, certain restrictions appear in relation to the granting of security over 
movables. While the CRL came about in order to increase certainty in the granting of 
security over movables; it still provides for the possession of the secured asset in 
order to be effective. Possession of the secured asset has been argued to impede 
extension of credit and discourage investment. However, the CRL may have 
recognised constructive possession of the secured assets. As mentioned above, 
Article 7 of the CRL considers the creditor in possession of the secured assets if the 
creditor receives a document which entitles him and no one else to receive the 
secured assets. The implications of Article 7 in allowing the debtor to use the secured 
assets, however, are not yet clear in practice. Also, the scope of security in rights is 
not very clear under the Saudi law. The CRL has referred specifically to certain types 
of security in rights which are represented in an instrument. For example, bills of 
exchange and cheques can be secured according to certain procedures provided by 
the CRL. The fact that these rights are represented in instruments enables the creditor 
to possess the instruments; and in turn, satisfying the possession requirement for an 
effective rahn stipulated by the CRL.
On the other hand; there is no clear reference as to security in rights over 
receivables in the CRL. Taking security over receivables is of great importance in 
modem financing as large part of the wealth of the economy is locked up in
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receivables.197 In project financing, for example, security in rights over receivables 
play a very important role.198 As receivables are considered intangible movables;199 
securing such receivables fall under the CRL. However, certain provisions in the 
CRL may preclude taking security over receivables. Thus, under the CRL the 
secured asset must be one that can be sold. No mention in the law as to the definition 
of the saleable assets; and hence, recourse to such definition would be to the 
paramount Islamic Shari’a which prohibits the sale of debt (i.e., receivables) as 
explained in Chapter Three. Also, the CRL does not recognise granting future assets 
as security collateral and stipulates that assets should exist at the time of granting the 
security. These provisions frustrate any attempt to take security over receivables 
under the Saudi law that could be generated in a project finance transaction for 
instance.
The third element for a sound secured transactions law is the effective publicity of 
the security interest. Effective publicity is important to avoid false wealth and to 
prioritise the different competing creditors.200 In Saudi Arabia there is no registration 
system, and registering a rahn is effected through a system of recordation by Public 
Notaries that only applies to real property. Recording is according to personal 
recordation system in the name of the owner of the real property.201 The Public 
Notaries will hand the title deed of the secured real property to the security grantee 
inscribed with the rahn on the deed itself. The security grantor is not precluded from 
obtaining a new title deed instead of the one given to the grantee if the grantor claim 
the deed is lost for example. Hence, unscrupulous debtors may obtain a new title
197 McCormack, supra note 29, at 209.
198 In project finance transactions, lenders usually rely on the cash flow generated by the project for 
repayment.
199 See generally WOOD, supra note 52, at 3 2.
200 WOOD, supra note 52, at 110.
201 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1222 n. 55.
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deed and sell or re-provide the real property as security to a different creditor.202 
Such situation is unsatisfactory and hence it can be argued that the present 
recordation system is not very effective.
Another problem is, as mentioned earlier, that Public Notaries have refused to 
register security interest for banks on the ground that banks do deal with interest- 
bearing transactions which are against the Islamic Shari ’a. The banks, therefore, had 
to rely on other means in order to secure and record its security interests.203 Such 
means involved the recordation of the. security interest in the name of an employee of 
a bank or a company for the benefit of the bank. The bank then enters into an 
agreement with this employee/company to secure its rights. These techniques are not 
sufficient and can not accommodate a market-led financial system. As for the 
movable assets, the CRL does not provide for any registration system although it 
provides for certain procedures to evidence the security interests in instruments. 
Presumably, no registration system exists because the possession of the secured 
assets serves such purpose. It can be concluded, that the publicity element in the 
Saudi secured transactions law is not very satisfactory.
Fourthly, the Saudi legal system does not appear to provide a rapid and cost- 
effective means of recovery. The Saudi law would not allow a private sale of the 
secured assets or “self-help”. Enforcing the security must be through the competent 
judicial body. This, however, could be subject to different bodies and laws. Consider 
the case where a creditor has security interests over the debtors’ assets which include 
of: immovable, movables, and securities. The status quo seems to suggest that in 
order for the creditor to enforce his rights over these assets; the creditor has to go 
through different judicial bodies. To obtain an enforcement judgment over
202 Id.
203 See discussion supra.
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immovables; creditors have to go through Islamic Shari ’a courts which apply Islamic 
Shari ’a. Enforcement over movables would be through another committee which 
deals with the CRL and its provisions regarding the enforcement.204 Similarly, the 
rest of the assets are enforced through different committees which might apply 
different procedures. Such enforcement mechanisms are time-consuming and no 
cost-effective.
As for the methods of enforcement under the Saudi law; it has been clearly 
referred to in the CRL as opposed to other laws. Under the CRL which govern 
movables; the method of enforcement is through public auction. Normally, the 
intention of a public auction under the supervision of the court is to protect the 
debtor.205 Generally, court orders to enforce the security collateral through public 
auctions cause delays and costs to both parties.206 Private sale, on the other hand, 
allows for rapid disposal of the secured assets without delays. Unlike the CRL, 
Islamic Shari ’a has no clear method of enforcement but it has to be judicially driven.
Another issue which is related to the efficiency of security enforcement is the 
grace periods. While Islamic Shari 'a does not stipulate for any grace period, the CRL 
does provide for a three days before filing for enforcement through the court. Even 
after the grant of the enforcement decision by the court; the creditor is allowed to 
seek enforcement only five days after notifying the debtor. It can finally be 
concluded that the Saudi secured transactions law still needs further consideration in 
order to further improve the law that can meet the requirements of the Saudi 
conventional finance component.
204 See generally arts 1 5 -1 6 , Rahn Law, supra note 19.
205 WOOD, supra note 52, at 142.




Despite the Saudi initiatives, the above discussion reveals that the law of 
secured transactions in Saudi Arabia has not been adapted in line with the general 
market-based economy policies that Saudi Arabia aims to adopt. The law of secured 
transactions, therefore, does not play a facilitating role for the Saudi conventional 
finance component. While the CRL has been introduced as a new security collateral 
law to govern movable assets; such law in the author’s view, has only codified 
certain Islamic Shari’a principles which might add some form of certainty but 
substantively the status of the Saudi security collateral laws have not experienced 
remarkable change. Hence, the position remains that there is an existing de facto 
duality and a possibility of further interaction between the conventional finance 
component and Islamic Shari ’a.
In addition, as mentioned previously; a well-developed secured transactions 
law works hand in hand with a supporting strong insolvency law. This is true in case 
of any emerging market country which aims to develop its existing financial system 
such as Saudi Arabia. However, it seems that the Saudi government has been 
neglecting this area during the legal reform period that Saudi Arabia is witnessing 
recently. The fact that there is no comprehensive insolvency law in Saudi Arabia 
adds another dimension in terms of the interaction between the Saudi conventional 
finance component and the Islamic Shari ’a.
While Islamic Shari’a has dealt with insolvency; the current market-led 
reforms in Saudi Arabia require the existence of a set of rules that govern modem 
insolvency situations such as insolvency in case of companies.207 Thus, the Saudi
207 Islamic Shari’a would normally deal with individual bankruptcies.
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Company Law does not deal with such situations.208 Surprisingly, however, Saudi 
Arabia has introduced a Scheme of Arrangement Law (the Scheme Law),209 that 
allow for companies to reach an arrangement with their creditors regarding their 
financial status. The Scheme Law, despite its amicable nature, is the only law that 
addresses insolvency related issues in Saudi Arabia.
Having discussed thoroughly the legal issues resulting from the interaction 
between the Saudi conventional finance component and Islamic Shari ’a in relation to 
the area of secured transactions and having highlighted other related concerns such 
as insolvency laws; it is fair to argue that there is still more to be done in both areas 
of law in order to facilitate the establishment of a market-led legal infrastructure. The 
legal issues that have been discussed are the result of the existing de facto duality. In 
attempting to contain the “legal unrests” created by the existing de facto duality in 
the area of secured transactions; lawyers have been creating structures that contained 
“local ingredients” of Islamic Shari’a in Saudi Arabia. In addition, “Islamic finance”, 
as argued in this Chapter, has been used as a means of financing that provides a 
reasonable balance between the availability of funds while maintaining security 
collateral to acceptable levels. The rest of this Chapter sheds more light in this 
regards.
208 However, the Saudi Company Law does deal with liquidation. See generally Company 
Regulations, Royal Decree No M/6, July 1965 available at http://www.commerce.gov.sa
209 The author has endeavoured to provide a translation that reflects the purpose o f  the law. A literal 
translation o f the law would read “the law o f settlement that prevents insolvency”. For convenience 
this law js referred to as the Scheme o f Arrangement Law. See THE SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT LAW, 
M/16, available at http://www.commerce.gov.sa
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5. The E x is t in g  D e  f a c t o  D u a l it y  and Secured Transactions: Tensions and 
Consequences
In the area of secured transactions, the duality and its implications, which is the 
theme of this volume, is bifurcated. Firstly, the conventional finance component is 
functioning within the Islamic Shari ’a security collateral laws. The implications are 
clear - that is; the unavailability of certain security collateral rules that meet the 
needs of the Saudi conventional finance component and the refusal by the Saudi 
Public Notaries to register security interests in favour of the conventional banks on 
the ground that these banks deal with interest-based transactions which are against 
the Islamic Shari’a. Secondly, the attempt to modernise the Saudi security collateral 
laws through introducing the CRL which governs movable assets. However, this law 
itself is functioning within an Islamic Shari’a and it will always be viewed and 
interpreted from an Islamic Shari ’a perspective.
It can be argued, therefore, that the existing de facto duality in Saudi Arabia as it 
pertains to secured transactions law is creating a tension within the Saudi legal 
system leading the legal and the financial communities to create solutions or to 
invoke alternatives in order to circumvent potential legal obstacles. An example is 
the “rahn adF structure which is developed as a collective security arrangement in 
financing transactions. It is believed that the use of the “rahn adF structure
A t  A
contributes in minimising several difficult issues under the Saudi law.
Furthermore, it can be argued that a consequence of the tension arising from the 
existing de facto duality is the growing “Islamic finance” practice in Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, because the Saudi secured transactions law may not meet the lenders’ 
expectations; “Islamic finance” offers a functional equivalent means of finance that 210
210 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1211.
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incorporates a “¿¡rwasr-security” function. In other words, the growing use of “Islamic 
finance” in Saudi Arabia is not only attributed to the fact that Islamic Shari’a 
prohibits riba or interest but also because there is a legal dimension in using these 
“Islamic finance” structures. In this sense, “Islamic finance” structures serve as an 
alternative but not a substitute for conventional seemed finance practices.
This Chapter argues that “Islamic finance” offers a “gwasr-security” effect 
tantamount to certain conventional finance techniques; sometimes referred to as 
“ownership-based funding techniques”, “finance sales”,211 21 “title financing”, 
“vendor/lessor security” or “asset-based finance”. These transactions have the 
commercial effect of security in the form of sale or lease as will be explained further 
below.213 The Chapter continues to argue that the “gumr-security” function of 
“Islamic finance” provides somewhat an incentive for its use in the Saudi financial 
system. In addition, being compatible with the paramount legal system of Islamic 
Shari’a in Saudi Arabia, “Islamic finance” can be absorbed easily within the 
prevailing Saudi “credit culture”.
5.1 L e g a l  W o r k  a n d  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  S e c u r it y  S t r u c t u r e s  in  S a u d i  
A r a b ia
One of the primary concerns for lenders and lawyers in Saudi Arabia is to develop 
security structures that meet their needs. To this effect, law firms through their legal
211 S e e  generally JAN DALHUISEN, DALHU1SEN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND 
TRADE LAW, Chapter 5 (Hart Publishing, 2004). Some o f the ownership-based funding techniques 
which will be discussed are referred to as “grwiw/'-security”; see McCormack, supra note 29, at 51. 
Other “^HOM-security” devices which are not covered in this Chapter include: debt subordinations, 
negative pledges, Quistclose trusts, Ramalpa clauses and set-off agreements. See generally ALI, supra 
note 4, at 175 and S. Worthington, Proprietary Interests in Commercial Transactions, 
(Clarendon Press, 1996). See also GOODE, supra note 113, CHAPTERS (26- 28).
212 Philip Wood, Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations, Set-off and Netting, at 4 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1995).
213 Wood, supra note 20, at 46.
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work, have provided ‘micro-solutions’ for ‘macro-problems’.214 Legal work is 
defined as the “technical work, with and on the law, undertaken usually but not 
necessarily by lawyers, in specific transactions for specific clients”.215 *In Saudi 
Arabia, secured transactions have been a fertile area for legal work innovations due 
to the importance of security collateral for international lenders in financing 
transactions.
One of these examples is the development of the “rahn a d r  structure. McMillen 
summarises the structure explaining: “American and European financings usually 
involve a trustee that holds collateral on behalf of lenders. The Shari ’a does not 
provide for trustees, at least in a Western sense. However, the Shari’a has long 
experience with a similar concept the adl. In brief, an adl is a trusted and honourable 
person selected by both the lender and the borrower, a type of “trustee-arbitrator” 
having certain fiduciary responsibilities to both parties”.
The “rahn a dr  structure is developed for the use in international project finance 
transactions in Saudi Arabia. Although the structure has been criticised for being 
‘cumbersome’, such opinion has overlooked the fact that the “rahn ad r  structure has 
been used as a collective security arrangement and it is not a mere security 
package.217 A collective security arrangement is an “an arrangement whereby 
security is held for the common benefit of a number of lenders”.218 In the light of 
this, one can view the above description of the “rahn adl" structure by McMillen as a 
collective security arrangement and as an alternative to the security trustee structure
214 McBamet, supra note 13, at 99.
215 M a t 98-99.
2,6 McMillen, swpra note 103, at 1211.
217 See the criticism by Graham Methold et. al., Saudi Law Cogent Cogen: Tihama Cogen’s Structure 
Combines Both English and Saudi Security Law without being Cumbersome, 250 PROJECT FIN. & 
Infrastructure Fin. 51, at 52, (2004).
218 Thiele, supra note 15, at 1.
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which is normally used in America and Europe. The driving force behind developing 
such structure was the need to meet the challenge in developing a security structure 
that meets project financing and related credit requirements of all the involved banks 
as well as the borrower.219 201
McMillen adds “a structure had to be developed that met the traditional 
requirements of New York and English financing but was consistent with the 
Shari ’a”.220 In this sense, it can be argued that the “rahn a dr  structure is a 
consequence of the tension created by the existing de facto duality. Since the 
conventional finance component is functioning within the Islamic Shari’a which 
does not offer the “security trustee” structure available else where, the conventional 
finance component is searching for a structure that share commonalities with the 
“security trustee” structure.
At this stage, the legal work has filled this gap by developing the “rahn a dr  
structure. While such legal work should be encouraged; the use of the “rahn adF 
structure as a collective security arrangement is questioned. Thus, the “rahn adF 
structure should meet the practical requirements mentioned earlier in this Chapter. 
However, prior to any discussion of the efficient use of the “rahn adF structure, an 
overview of the law of “rahn adF is helpful.
219 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1206.
220 Id. (explains further, however, that the methodology which has been used in the developing such . 
structure was to build the structure from the Islamic Shari’a law and then add some modifications to 
incorporate procedures and structures from the Western law. He criticises the methodology where the 
structures has to be modified to fit a pre-exiting Western model).
221 McBarnet, supra note 13, at 106 highlights the role o f lawyers stating: “.. .o f  particular interest ...is  
the lawyer’s technical skills in problem-spotting and problem solving through contract drafting. In 
particular, it is the way contract is used to tackle what are perceived, from cross-border perspective, as 
regulatory lacunae. The result is legally binding constructed through contracts to compensate for 




5.1.1 Th e  La w  R elatin g  To  Th e  Us e  O f  A d l  a n d  I ts a p p l ic a t io n  in  Sa u d i  
A rabia
The adl is a trusted third-party chosen by both the security grantor (debtor) and 
the security grantee (creditor) to hold the security.222 Islamic Shari’a allows for the 
adl’s involvement on the condition that all parties agree to such structure including 
the adl.223 24Hence, if the creditor has involved a third-party to possess the secured 
assets without an agreement with the debtor; such third-party is not considered to be 
an adl but a representative of the creditor. It appears then that creating a “rahn 
adr  structure is a tripartite contract whereby the three parties should agree to the 
details of the structure. The question is, however, what is the Islamic Shari ’a ’s view 
as to the legal construction of such contractual relationship. It seems that that Islamic 
Shari’a considers such structure as an agency relationship. Thus, the adl is an agent 
of both the creditor and the debtor.225
When the adl takes possession of the secured assets the rahn agreement is 
complete and irrevocable.226 The adl is not allowed to give the secured asset neither 
to the debtor nor to the creditor without the consent of the other.227 If the adl returns 
the assets to either party he has the right to demand it back. The adl can not sell the 
secured assets without the consent of both parties.228 29Such consent, however, can be
• "yjoprovided in advance when drafting the rahn agreements. An important issue here 
is the Islamic Shari 'a’s treatment of the contractual relationships among the parties 
as one of agency. Such treatment would involve the Islamic Shari 'a’s rules
222 THE MEJELLE, s u p r a  note 121, art. 705,
223 Id. art. 752.
224 Ali Qasem, Ta s u r f a t A l -a d l F i A l - M a r h o n , at 29-30 (Dar Al-Jama’a Al-Jadida, 2002).
225 Id. at 30.
226 THE MEJELLE, s u p r a  note 121, art. 752
227 Id. art. 754.
228 A L - S h r i ’YAH, s u p r a  note 140, art. 1015, at 342.
229 McMillen, s u p r a  note 103, at 1216.
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governing agency. Such may undermine the objectives desired from such structure 
because agency arrangements under Islamic Shari’a are revocable at the will of 
either party.230 231If so, the debtor will be able to prevent the adl from selling the 
secured assets by simply terminating the agency. Such is an undesirable result in 
financing transactions.
However, McMillen argues that such structure is applied in Saudi Arabia with 
some degree of irrevocability. He states: “ ...even under construction of relevant 
Shari’a precepts by jurists applying ths.Hanbali School of Islamic Jurisprudence, the
A l l
use of a rahn adl structure confers a degree of irrevocability not otherwise found”.
No indication is provided by McMillen as to the extent of this “degree of 
irrevocability”; but he raises several issues to underpin his argument of irrevocability 
as it pertains to the “rahn adT’ structure in Saudi Arabia. Firstly, he refers to the 
principle that the agency is irrevocable when there is a third-party relying on such 
irrevocability.232 But he further explains that there is a debate among Hanbali School 
scholars in Saudi Arabia as to the extent of its applicability.233 Eventually, he argues 
that the Hanbali School would give the narrowest interpretation to the 
revocability.234 While this might be the case; this statement does not back his 
argument that using the adl under the Hanbali School “confers a degree of 
irrevocability not otherwise found”.
The second issue which McMillen raises to back his view of irrevocability is, 








235in certain situations”. Thus, he gives an example of a Saudi case where the court 
indicated that an agency is not revocable in case there is a specified term for its 
existence. While again this might be the case, but as he pointed out at the outset; 
Islamic Shari’a in Saudi Arabia does not recognise precedents.235 637 238So, such trend can 
not be relied upon as a solid legal basis for his argument of “irrevocability not 
otherwise found”.
The third issue he raises is that the Committee for the Settlement of Banking
A I D
Disputes would normally apply the agreements as signed between the parties even 
if these agreements were in contradiction with Islamic Shari'a.239 While this is a 
valid argument; but such Committee has a jurisdiction only if one of the litigant 
parties is a bank. When an adl is involved in the financing transaction we have three 
parties; that is, the bank, the borrower and the adl. The borrower may wish to bring a 
legal action against the adl to prevent him from enforcing the security collateral 
through sale. If the adl is a non-bank entity, the Committee referred to by McMillen 
no longer has jurisdiction over such dispute. Another Committee might have 
jurisdiction and hence a higher possibility of applying the Islamic Shari ’a.240
r Nevertheless, there is no clear authority for McMillen’s argument that when 
structuring a “rahn add” under the Hanbali Islamic school there is “a degree of 
irrevocability not otherwise found”. Most importantly for the lenders in this regards 
is the ability of the adl to sell the secured assets upon enforcement. In the “rahn add' 
structure, and the ability of the adl to sell the secured assets, there are four possible
235 /£/. at 1215.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1184.
238 See generally Chapter Two on the Committee for Settlement o f  Banking Disputes.
239 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1215.
240 Even i f  the adl is a bank entity, there could be potential difficulties in enforcing the security 
collateral due to the bank’s involvement in interest-bearing transactions.
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scenarios which may occur:241 1) both parties (i.e., the creditor and the debtor) agree 
that the adl sells the secured assets on the due date and such authorisation is not 
terminated until that date, 2) that both parties wish to terminate the authorisation for 
the sale of the assets, 3) that the debtor/security grantor wishes to terminate such 
authorisation and 4) that the creditor/security grantee wishes to terminate such 
authorisation.
In the first scenario the question is whether the adl can sell the secured assets with 
no further consent from both parties. According to McMillen, such consent can be 
provided in advance when drafting the rahn agreement.242 However, some Islamic 
schools, including the dominant Hanbali School in Saudi Arabia, do require that the 
consent should be re-obtained from the debtor in order for the adl to be able to sell 
the secured assets.243 Such would frustrate the aim of the “rahn adF structure.
The second scenario does not constitute obstacles to the structure because it is the 
will of both parties. As for the third scenario, it can raise certain concerns for the 
lenders because if the debtor is allowed to terminate the authorisation to sell the 
secured assets; the main aim of the structure is undermined. In this regards, two 
Islamic schools, including the dominant Hanbali School in Saudi Arabia, opine that 
the authorisation can be terminated.244 In the forth scenario, the Hanbali school, inter 
alia, opines that the adl can be prevented from selling the secured assets.245
Having reviewed the opinions of the Islamic schools and in particular the Hanbali 
School referred to by McMillen to grant “a degree of irrevocability not otherwise
241 Qasem, supra note 224, at 162-174.
242 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1216.
243 Ali Qasem, supra note 224, at 163; Shafai School does not require consent from the debtor.
244 Id at 166. The other two schools (Hanafi and Malaki) opine that the adl is not terminated. The 
Hanafi, however, go further in details and distinguish between whether the authorisation o f sale was 
stipulated in the rahn agreement or not; see Id. at 167.
245 However, the adl remains in his position as an adl but the Shaft school opine that in the forth 
scenario the adl will be prevented from the sale and removed from his position as an adl. See Qasem, 
supra note 224, at 171.
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found”; it is unlikely that we reach the same conclusion. In fact the Hanbali School 
is the one which grants the debtor the power to prevent the sale. Hence, contrary to 
McMillen’s statement, the revocability of the agency in regards to the sale of the 
secured assets is highly possible under the Hanbali School.
However, McMillen did explain the variations among Islamic Shari’a scholars 
and the difficulty in achieving consensus on novel issues.246 Faced with such 
dilemma, it seems that McMillen himself has departed from the Shari ’«-based legal 
construction of the contractual relationship among the parties under the “rahn adl” 
structure and made it clear that “an agency relationship was not, and is not, 
contemplated, and that the rights afforded the Security Agents [the adl] on behalf of 
the [banks] are irrevocable...”. Islamic Shari’a does provide, however, that the 
contractual relationship between the adl and the other parties is one of agency; a fact 
which McMillen wishes to circumvent in order to avoid any legal ambush that may 
result from the revocability issue. However, superimposing “rahn adF structure over 
the “McMillen-type” structure might be defeated in practice and could be re­
characterised as agency-based “rahn adF structure.
5.1.2 C o lle ctiv e  Se c u r it y  A r r an g em e n ts  Usin g  th e  A d l
The discussion of the “rahn adF structure can be further expanded to examine the 
implied proposal by McMillen that such structure can be used as a collective security 
arrangement. In doing so, there is no particular reference to McMillen’s transaction 
discussed earlier but the “rahn adF structure will be further analysed in the light of 
the practical requirements for a good collective security arrangement mentioned 
earlier in this Chapter. The first practical requirement for a good collective security 
arrangement suggests the possibility to create a security collateral without having to
246 McMillen, supra note 103, at 1190.
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name or register the individual lender. Under the “rahn adl” structure, the position 
seems that the lender should be known as a contracting party to the rahn agreement 
ab initio. So, the structure does not meet the first practical requirement.
The second requirement requires the possibility to appoint one person to be in 
charge of monitoring and enforcing the security. This is a requirement which , is in 
line with the elements of “rahn adF structure. The third requirement deals with the 
proper protection of the secured assets. In this regards, the creditors should not be 
exposed to the adl’s insolvency risk and should be able to pursue their claims against 
third parties in case the adl breaches his obligation. The “rahn adF structure would 
meet such a requirement. The forth requirement is that the lenders’ rights in respect 
of the security must be easily transferable. This is one of the most important practical 
requirements due to the flexibility given to the lenders involved in project financing 
and syndicated loans to transfer their loans.
However, loans are normally transferred through novation. This means that a new 
debt in favour of the new creditor is created and that the old debt is extinguished.247 
If such transfer takes effect in the absence of a “security trustee”, the transfer will 
have a detrimental effect on the security by being discharged and no longer in 
existence for the benefit of the new creditor. The new creditor is not considered as 
the legal successor of the selling creditor; and it cannot become a party to the 
existing security by ratifying the acceptance of such security on its behalf.248 This 
means that the security collateral interest should be re-created in the favour of the 
new creditor. Such is considered to be cumbersome and costly.249 Also, the new
247 Philip Wood, International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation, at 115 (Sweet 
&Maxwell, 1995).
248 THIELE, supra note 15, at 152.
249 Id. at 153.
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creditor might have a weaker priority position.250 *The use of the “security trustee” 
structure as a collective security arrangement has been innovated to avoid such 
practical obstacles. To further understand the forth practical requirement, one should 
consider the advantages of using the “security trustee” structure as a facilitator of 
loan transfers.
When a security trustee is involved in the financing transaction, the trustee holds 
the security collateral on trust for the benefit of the lenders. Under the “security 
trustee” structure, the lenders are the beneficiaries of the trust. So, while there could 
be contractual relationships between the lenders and the security trustee; the lenders’ 
rights in relation to the security collateral derive mainly from the fact that the lenders 
are the beneficiaries of the trust. The nature of the structure as being one of a trust 
rather than one of a contract is the key to facilitate the transferability of the loans.
Any person or class of persons can be the beneficiaries of the trust as long as the 
beneficiaries are described and ascertainable for the purposes of executing the 
trust.252 Hence, the security trustee can hold the security collateral for the benefit of 
the potential lenders that may participate in the loan arrangement at any time in the 
future.253 Therefore, the existing lenders can trade their loans and there is no need to 
re-create the security in favour of the new lenders.
Now the question is whether the “rahn adT structure does meet the transferability 
requirement being an essential practical requirement for a good collective security 
arrangement. In other words, does the “rahn adV’ structure provide as a collective 
security arrangement the flexibility in transferring the loans without affecting the 
security collateral. The legal nature of the “rahn adl” structure appears to suggest
250 Id.





that it is unlikely for the structure to provide the flexibility for transferring the loans. 
Unlike the “security trustee” structure, the “rahn a d r  structure is one of contract. 
The lenders in a “rahn ad r  structure are not beneficiaries of a third-party (i.e., the 
add) but they derive their rights in relation to the security collateral from the existing 
contractual relationship as opposed to the existing trust under the “security trustee” 
structure.
Under the “rahn ad r  structure, if the lender sold its loan to a new lender; the 
contractual relationship among the old lender, the borrower and the adl is vanished. 
This, in turn, affects the existing security collateral arrangement between the parties 
and hence; the new lender will have to re-create the security collateral in its favour 
which is an undesirable result. This seems to suggest that involving an adl to hold 
the security collateral does not provide any benefits in regards to loan transferability. 
Therefore, it can be concluded then that the “rahn a d r  structure does not meet the 
forth practical requirement.
The fifth practical requirement requires that the security collateral which is 
granted under the collective security arrangement should cover new loans even if 
they are made by new lenders. This is to facilitate the financing structure and to 
allow the new lenders to join the existing arrangement. However, as discussed 
previously, under Islamic Shari’a neither future assets can be granted as security 
collateral for a present debt nor existing assets can be granted as a security for a 
future debt.254 So, the “rahn a d r  structure does not meet the fifth practical 
requirement. As regards the sixth practical requirement, there is no obstacle in 
changing the adl under the “rahn a d r  structure if the parties desire to do so. Finally,
254 However, there is an exception to the general rule; that is, Islamic Shari'a allows for the debt to 
increase and remain secured by the same assets; such can not be included in the original contract and 
it has to be agreed to specifically afterwards.
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the last practical requirement is that the arrangement should be as simple and 
straightforward as possible. This is a matter of the jurisdiction where the “rahrt adl” 
structure is taking place.
Having analysed the “rahn adV’ structure, it can be concluded that the “rahn adY' 
structure is unlikely to constitute a good collective security arrangement. The use of 
the “rahn adl” structure by McMillen in a specific financing transaction in Saudi 
Arabia may have added some benefit to that transaction per se but it does not qualify 
the structure as a good collective security arrangement with general application as 
such. Law firms keep competing in attempting to provide a good security package in 
Saudi Arabia that deal with the tensions and “legal unrests” that have resulted from 
existing de facto duality?55 While this might solve certain problems at the micro 
level; it does not at the macro level.
5.2 A l t e r n a t i v e  M e a n s  t o  C o n t a i n  t h e  T e n s i o n s : T h e  E m e r g i n g  “ I s l a m i c  
F i n a n c e ”
The discussion in this Chapter reveals that there are “legal unrests” resulting 
from the exiting de facto duality in the area of secured transactions. There is an 
unease in taking security collateral interests in Saudi Arabia. Even the “legal work” 
undertaken by major law firms does not solve the problem at the macro level and it 
does increase transaction costs because these law firms prefer to keep these 
innovated “legal technologies” to themselves and to specific clients. The author 
would even argue that these structures lack the legal certainty in relation to their 
enforcement etc. Thus, since these structures are new to the market; one is not certain 
to what extent such structures are enforceable in Saudi Arabia. 25
255 See e g., Methold et. al., supra note 217, at 52 (discussing a security collateral package structured 
by a leading US law firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy).
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As discussed earlier, the availability of good secured transactions laws 
encourages the extension of credit. However, since the Saudi secured transactions 
laws are experiencing “legal unrests” resulting from the existing de facto duality, the 
availability of credit could be constrained. Having said that, the author perceives the 
development of “Islamic finance” in Saudi Arabia as a consequence of the existing 
de facto duality. Thus, it can be argued that “Islamic finance” is a means to provide 
finance using Islamic-compliant structures that do not require, to a certain extent, 
security collateral rules in the conventional sense. In fact, certain “Islamic finance” 
structures provide a quasi-security function.
£>wtf57-security interests are “devices that perform the economic function of a 
security interest- that is, they provide support for the payment or performance of an 
obligation- without, as a general rule, conferring on the obligee rights in rem in 
respect of the property of the obligor (or that of a third-party guarantor).256 As 
mentioned earlier, a means of financing which is believed to provide some form of 
quasi-security function is “title finance”. To elaborate, there are two ways to raise 
funds;257 these are: 1) the debtor can take out a loan and provide his assets as security 
collateral; or 2) the debtor can sell his assets in return for the purchase price which 
provides him with the liquidity he desires.
The latter means of financing is different from the former; but both means of 
financing could become more similar, in case that the sale of assets is made on the 
condition that the debtor/seller repays the purchase price on a specific date in return 
for his assets.258 In jurisdictions where non-possessory security collateral interests are 
not recognised; “title finance” techniques have been advantageous because these
256 ALl, supra note 4, at 175.
257 Dalhuisen, supra note 211, at 755.
258 Id. at 756.
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techniques have allowed for the debtor/seller to raise funds while keeping possession 
of the assets.259 The main aim of these “title finance” techniques is “to avoid what 
are seen as the archaic obstacles of mortgage or pledge law”.260 261
By way of analogy, “Islamic finance” techniques have similarities with these 
“title finance” techniques. Therefore, the development of the “Islamic finance” 
component in Saudi Arabia can be perceived as a consequence of the “legal unrests” 
created by the existing de facto duality and the interaction between the Saudi 
conventional finance component and Islamic Shari 'a. Martin highlights the “quasi- 
security” function of “Islamic finance” stating: “when taking security the Islamic 
financier ...is often in a much stronger position than a conventional banker in that he 
is either an owner or lessor. This is likely to be the case with trade finance. As an 
owner or lessor of goods his security is less likely to be compromised by claims from 
other lenders. If a bank owns the asset then the claims of other creditors are likely to 
become less significant”. While Martin has specifically referred to trade finance; 
“Islamic finance” structures have expanded to encompass other sophisticated 
transactions such as Islamic project finance and Islamic securitisations.
Generally, the gwosz'-security effect of title finance techniques is divided into 
‘vendor-security’ and ‘lessor-security’. ‘Vendor-security’ techniques include 
retention of title to goods, factoring, forfaiting and sale and repurchase. As for the 
‘lessor-security’ techniques, it includes finance leasing, hire purchase and sale 
leaseback.263 There are different reasons that influence the parties’ decision to choose
259 See generally id., 753-760.
260 Wood, supra note 17, at 46.
261 However, there are some differences in order to comply with some Islamic Shari’a requirements.
262 Jeremy Martin, Security in Islamic Banking, in EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAMIC BANKING, at 
69 (Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, 1996).
263 See generally WOOD, supra note. 212, at 5.
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the form of financing and its corresponding security collateral package.264 265One of the 
main reasons for choosing “title finance”, however, is its commercial effect as 
security collateral which could provide a level of comfort to the financier especially 
when financing is taking place in a jurisdiction that does not maintain a good secured 
transactions law.
Under Islamic Shari ’a, there are certain techniques that have developed in order 
to avoid certain Islamic Shari’a prohibitions such as riba, the need to transfer 
possession, court enforcement mechanisms and the ban on granting of security over 
certain types of real property. However, as the author of this volume argues, these 
techniques are similar to “title finance” techniques and have been used in “Islamic 
finance” transactions. Hence, these techniques have the same commercial effect of 
security and provide a means of financing that provides a functional equivalence to 
conventional finance in Saudi Arabia.
In Chapter One, the author explained the various “Islamic finance” modes. Of 
these “Islamic finance” modes; there are certain modes such as leasing (ijara) and 
hire purchase (ijara wa-iqtina) that do resemble “title finance”. However, other 
various structures have been adopted in Islamic financing transactions266 including: 
sale repurchase (bay’ bil-wafa’) and sale leaseback (bay’ bil-istighlal).267 When 
taking a closer look at these Islamic structures; one can see the its similarity with 
other conventional finance title finance techniques.268 Certain adjustments would
264 See generally GOODE, supra note 113, 691 - 699.
265 Foster, supra note 106, at 146. Foster refers to these mechanisms under the category o f  hiyal; 
translated as “stratagems”, “fictions” or “devices” because they were devised to circumvent Islamic 
law principles.
266 See S. Masanuzzaman, Islamic Law and Finance, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAMIC BANKING AND 
INSURANCE, 67, at 71 (Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, 1995).
267 Id. at 146-147. Also other techniques such as ‘ina (double sale).
268 To avoid confusion between title finance techniques used by conventional financiers and similar 
Islamic financing techniques used by Islamic bankers; we will refer to the former as conventional title 
finance and to the latter as Islamic title finance.
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need to be considered, however, to meet Shari ’a requirements such as the prohibition 
of riba and gharar.
Consider, for example, the conventional sale and repurchase technique whereby 
the debtor sells an asset to a financier on the condition that the debtor will repurchase 
the same asset from the financier on a specific date. The repurchase price does 
include a mark-up as a reward for this service.269 Such transaction, however, is 
different from a secured transaction because it has a different risk and reward 
structure. Under this structure, the financier/buyer upon the purchase of assets 
becomes the full owner of the assets. This entitles him in case of the debtor/seller’s 
bankruptcy to retain the assets or, if the assets were under the debtor’s possession, to 
repossess the assets.271 In principle, the Islamic sale and repurchase structure does 
not differ from its conventional counterpart. The debtor sells an asset to the financer 
on the condition that the debtor repurchases the asset. The asset is effectively a 
security for the funding provided to the debtor.272 However, there are certain 
weaknesses under the Islamic sale and repurchase structure namely; the requirement 
that the financier has to obtain the debtor’s consent in order to be able to dispose of 
the asset and the necessity to give up possession.273
Another technique is the conventional sale leaseback. Under this structure, the 
debtor/seller sells an asset to the financier/buyer; whose in turn leases it back to the 
debtor. The lease instalments comprise amounts equal to principal and interest.274 
Islamic Shari’a offers a similar structure whereby the debtor/seller sells the assets 






Dalhuisen, supra note 211, at 877. 
Id. at 876.
Id  at 877.
Foster, supra note 111, at 146.
Id
274 WOOD, supra note 212, at 8.
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contain a provision which allow the debtor to repurchase the assets.275 276As explained 
in Chapter Three, one of the main “Islamic securitisations” structures is based on the 
sale and leaseback structure.
Furthermore, another technique which is worth considering is the conventional 
leasing. Again this is different from secured transactions and it has a different risk
'JH C .
and reward structure. Under this structure, the financier/lessor obtains the assets 
according to the lessee’s specifications and put them at the disposal of the lessee. The 
lessee pays in return regular payments to the financier. Islamic financiers have 
developed a similar technique namely the ijara which is exactly the same with the 
difference that the financier bears some risks being the lessor. The ijara has been 
used in many Islamic financing transactions. Another form of conventional leasing is 
the hire purchase structure which entitles the lessee at the end of the lease to 
purchase the assets for a nominal sum. Again, Islamic financiers have developed a 
similar structure namely the ijara wa-iqtina where there is a commitment from the 
debtor to buy the assets at the end of the rental period.
The above “Islamic finance” techniques do provide an alternative means of 
financing that comply with the Islamic Shari’a; but do provide also a “quasi- 
security” function in a manner similar to their conventional “title finance” 
counterparts. That may explain the development of “Islamic finance” in a country 
such as Saudi Arabia. Thus, since there are tensions created as a result of the 
interaction between the conventional finance component and the paramount legal 
system of Islamic Shari ’a; “Islamic finance” comes to provide a means of financing 
and hence; the growing “Islamic finance” component in Saudi Arabia.
275 Foster, supra note 111, at 147.
276 DALHUISEN, supra note 211, at pp 857- 858.
277 WOOD, supra note 212, at 8. For a good study on “hire-purchase” under English law see GOODE, 
supra note 113, Chapter 27.
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5.3 F in a l  O b s e r v a t io n s
This Section has attempted to highlight to the reader certain efforts that have been 
undertaken in the legal and financial industries in Saudi Arabia. The discussion 
shows that the Saudi conventional finance component is searching for structures that 
would facilitate its financing transactions. The development of the “rahn-adr 
structure as a collective security arrangement highlights this tendency. However, the 
Saudi secured transactions law that surrounds the conventional finance component in 
Saudi Arabia remains as a constraint to its activities. Even procedural rules relating 
to the registration of security at the Saudi Public Notaries are not clear in relation to 
the Saudi conventional finance component.
As a result, as argued in this Section, the development of the “Islamic finance” 
component in Saudi Arabia is attributed to the “legal unrests” that have resulted from 
the interaction between the conventional finance component and the Saudi secured 
transactions law. Market players have been using the “Islamic finance” techniques 
which have offered some form of security. These techniques are based on different 
basis of risk and reward and hence; different approach towards security collateral. 
Having said that, the above discussion in this Section has provided a snapshot of the 
consequences of the Saudi existing de facto duality as it pertains to secured 
transactions law.
6 .  C o n c l u s i o n
This Chapter aimed at analysing the Saudi secured transactions law in the light 
of the existing de facto duality. It argued that in attempting to establish a market-led 
financial system, the exiting de facto duality in Saudi Arabia can be seen as a hurdle 
to achieve such result. Thus, the interaction between the Saudi conventional finance
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component and the Saudi secured transactions law is creating “legal unrests” that 
render all the attempts to create a well-developed market-led financial system 
fruitless.
The Chapter has also showed that in attempting to circumvent these “legal 
unrests”, the legal and financial communities have developed certain structures such 
as the “rahn adV’ structure to circumvent obstacles in the Saudi secured transactions 
law. Furthermore, the author perceived the development of the “Islamic finance” 
component in Saudi Arabia as a reaction to the difficulties created by the existing de 
facto duality. Thus, the difficulties in obtaining security collateral by the 
conventional finance component; may have stimulated other functional equivalence 
structures based on “Islamic finance” related principles to obtain the credit needed 
and to avoid the thorny issues resulting from the interaction between the 
conventional finance component and Islamic Shari ’a
However, the status quo in Saudi Arabia remains unsatisfactory. Thus, the 
conventional finance component remains functioning and lacks a predictable and 
certain secured transactions law. Likewise, the “Islamic finance” component is 
functioning and lacking a definitive legal framework. It is perhaps desirable to 
modify the exiting “legal chaos” in order to produce a legal infrastructure that can 
accommodate both the conventional finance component and the “Islamic finance” 
component and; hence, creating a well-developed, rule-based and “rule of law” 
oriented market-led financial system.
In doing so, the author proposes a combination approach, which is discussed 
further in Chapter Five of this volume. The “combination approach” in Saudi Arabia 
involves developing the Saudi conventional finance component alongside the
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“Islamic finance” component. The conventional finance component is segregated 
from the paramount legal system of Islamic Shari’a in the light of the DIFC model. 
At the same time, developing a legal framework for the “Islamic finance” 
component.
Applying the “combination approach” in the area of secured transactions would 
mean further introducing security collateral laws to serve the conventional finance 
component and which is segregated from the overall legal system. A law in the form 
of the CRL discussed above with certain modifications to accommodate the 
necessities of a market-led financial system would be sufficient. A part of this reform 
could involve introducing the concept of trust to allow for collective security 
arrangements to be structured easily. A good example for Saudi Arabia would be, the 
DIFC model and Bahrain which have recently introduced trust laws as will be seen in 
Chapter Five. However, for a secured transaction law to be effective there will need 
to be satisfactory dispute mechanisms for secured transaction disputes and modem 
insolvency law.278 In addition, parallel to the development of the conventional 
finance component and its secured transactions law, the “Islamic finance” component 
needs further enhancement to facilitate structuring Islamic-compliant transactions. 
The enhancement of both components is in line with the Saudi aim in tying its 
financial market both internationally and regionally. •
•278 These issues are outside the scope o f  this volume.
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* In connection with the author’s doctoral research, the theme o f this Chapter has been published with 
the doctoral supervisor’s permission. See Amr Marar, Building Dual Financial Systems, 10 ISLAMIC 
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1. I n t r o d u c t io n
In studying the Saudi financial and legal systems, this volume has provided a 
systematic insight into the legal complications that arise from the existing de facto 
duality in Saudi Arabia. It has identified the Saudi dilemma being the “legal unrests” 
that have resulted from the interaction between Islamic Shari ’a and global economy 
trends. This interaction is the result of “state legal pluralism” which the author has 
discussed earlier in this volume. That is, the existence of the Saudi conventional 
finance component within the Islamic Shari’a. This existing Saudi conventional 
finance component is interacting with the Islamic Shari’a in a conflicting manner. 
Hence, the exiting de facto duality is the result of this interaction or this “conflicting 
state legal pluralism”.
This conflicting form of duality has adverse implications on financial 
transactions such as securitisations and secured transactions. The volume has also 
argued that “Islamic finance” has penetrated to the Saudi financial system to provide 
a functional equivalent of finance that complies with the Islamic Shari ’a and hence
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avoiding the “legal unrests” created by the interaction between Islamic Shari ’a and 
modem finance. As argued in this Chapter, the “Islamic finance” component can be 
used as a means to modify the exiting de facto duality and to create another form of 
duality based on a “non-conflicting state legal pluralism”.
However, prior to describing this modified form of duality; it is helpful to 
summarise the desired result we need to achieve. In line with the policies discussed 
in Chapter One and the Saudi economic policies discussed in Chapter Two, it seems 
that the main objective is to establish a rule-based market-led financial system that 
functions with “rule of law” components being certainty and predictability. Such, as 
argued in this volume, is absent from the current Saudi financial system. In order to 
achieve the desired objective, Saudi Arabia is advised to eliminate, to the extent 
possible, the interaction between its conventional finance component and the Islamic 
Shari ’a. Then, Saudi Arabia can develop its “Islamic finance” component to function 
alongside its conventional counterpart.
This process, as the author of this volume perceives it, is simply a process of 
further ‘dualising ’ the Saudi financial and legal systems. Thus, the existing de facto 
duality is there because there is an interaction between conventional finance and 
Islamic Shari’a. In modifying the existing de facto duality, the conventional finance 
component is detached from the realm of Islamic Shari ’a and the Islamic finance 
component will be further enhanced. The final product would be a strong Islamic 
financial system alongside its conventional counterpart (i.e., a system alongside a 
system). This, it is hoped, would serve creating a robust and efficient dual financial 
system, which meets the requirements of a market-based economy.
At this stage, therefore, it is helpful to explore the available sources that would 
serve as viable models for Saudi Arabia to further achieve this new modified duality
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in the financial system and to be guided by these models throughout the financial 
sector law reform. So, the new modified duality is based on the “combination” 
approach (i.e. 'three-dimension approach' and DIFC model). Firstly, Saudi Arabia 
will develop its “Islamic finance” component. In doing so, Saudi Arabia can follow a 
“three-dimension” approach which includes international, regional and national 
examples.
At the international level, Saudi Arabia should be guided by the standards and the 
work of the major International Islamic Financial Institutions and Standard Setters 
(IIFISS).1 At the regional level, Saudi Arabia should examine models that have 
developed in the neighbouring countries of the G.C.C such as in Bahrain. In addition, 
Saudi Arabia may consider examining other countries that have developed a dual 
financial system successfully such as in Malaysia.
Having developed its “Islamic finance” component, Saudi Arabia would need to 
further enhance its financial system. Since Saudi Arabia is not willing to fully 
“Islamise” its financial system; the conventional finance component needs further 
legal enhancement in order to function effectively. Hence, incorporating the 
“segregation” phenomenon that has been used in the Dubai International Financial 
Centre (DIFC) is may be desirable to eliminate any possible conflicts. This means 
the enactment of carefully drafted financial-related laws that are segregated from the 
overall legal system of Islamic Shari ’a.
As discussed in Chapter One, however, a whole transplantation of a legal model 
is not really recommended. Saudi Arabia is advised to take into consideration the sui
1 The “International Islamic Financial Institutions and Standard Setters” (hereinafter IIFISS) refer to 
those multilateral Islamic institutions that aim to produce regulatory and legal infrastructures for the 
Islamic finance industry as discussed infra. However, random references to Islamic financial 
institutions (in lower case) refer to those institutions that provide Islamic-compliant products such as 
Islamic banks and Islamic insurance companies.
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generis nature of its legal, political and economic conditions. Hence, Saudi Arabia 
should commit to prepare a strong cadre that undertakes further analysis of the status 
quo in Saudi Arabia in all fields and to examine other models to gain the “know­
how”. This Chapter, however, provides a “road map” for the proposed financial 
sector law reform in Saudi Arabia. The Chapter is divided into two main parts. The 
first part considers the “three-dimension” approach that Saudi Arabia is advised to 
following in developing its “Islamic finance” component. The second part introduces 
the “segregation” phenomenon that has been adopted in the DIFC. The Chapter will 
then consider what this would mean for a country such as Saudi Arabia.
2 . D e v e l o p in g  t h e  “ I s l a m ic  F i n a n c e ” C o m p o n e n t : T h e  ‘T h r e e -D i m e n s i o n ’ 
A p p r o a c h
The first stage of the proposed Saudi financial sector law reform involves 
developing the “Islamic finance” component of the Saudi financial system through 
providing a viable legal framework for the Saudi “Islamic finance” practice. In 
pursuing this aim, legal policymakers in Saudi Arabia are advised to take into 
consideration a ‘three-dimension’ reform approach. This ‘three-dimension’ approach 
comprises international, regional and national dimensions.
These dimensions reflect the efforts of private organisations as well as other 
government initiatives to develop the Islamic finance industry. Saudi Arabia, in 
reforming its financial system, is advised to give these initiatives due consideration 
for variety of reasons. Firstly, there is a growing tendency towards international co­
operation in relation to the development of both conventional and Islamic financial
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markets.2 Hence, Saudi Arabia should not isolate itself from this growing global 
trend. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is advised to conduct consultations with other Member 
States of the G.C.C to avoid any inconsistency with the general policies or laws of the 
G.C.C. This would undermine the successful establishment of unified monetary and 
financial systems. Finally, other models implemented at the national level should also 
be taken into consideration to transfer the “know-how”. In this sense, Saudi Arabia 
can learn from other models’ experiences.
2.1  T h e  In t e r n a t io n a l  D im e n s io n : T h e  Isl a m ic  F in a n c ia l  A r c h it e c t u r e
The international dimension of the reform is reflected by the emerging concept of 
the Islamic Financial Architecture (IFA). Recently, reference to the IFA began to 
appear in the Islamic banking and finance literature.3 The use of the term 
“architecture” in the financial context refer to the existence of a web of standards and 
principles of financial law and policies promulgated by the different International 
Financial Organisations as well as other standard-setting bodies.4 Islamic finance 
commentators have been referring to the emerging IFA in a similar context.
The emerging IFA reflects the efforts by the IIFISS to build an Islamic financial 
market as well as to unity the practices of the Islamic finance industry. These 
institutions include: the Islamic Development Bank, the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, the Islamic Financial Services Board, 
The Organisation of Islamic Conference, the General Council for Islamic Banks and
2 The international co-operation in conventional financial systems is highlighted by the growing 
international financial architecture mentioned in Chapter One. Similarly, as will be discussed below, 
an Islamic international financial architecture is emerging.
3 Ahmad Mohamed, The Emerging Islamic Financial Architecture: The Way Ahead, in THE PROC 
EEDINGS OF THE FIFTH HARVARD UNIVERSITY FORUM ON ISLAMIC FINANCE (2002), 159 (Centre for 
Middle Eastern Studies-Harvard University, 2002,)[hereinafter FIFTH Harvard FORUM], See also, 
Mushtak Parker, IFSB Designs for Islamic Financial Architecture, 82 /83 ISLAMIC BANKER 8, (2002).
4 Joseph Norton, Financial Sector Law Reform in Emerging Economics, at 43 (2000, BIICL). 
Andrew Sheng, The New International Architecture: Is There a Workable Solution, in 
International Financial Sector Reform: Standard Setting and Infrastructure 
Development, 3, at 4-5 (S. Goo et al. eds, Kluwer Law International, 2002).
258
Chapter Five
Financial Institutions, the Liquidity Management Centre, the International Islamic 
Financial Market, the International Islamic Rating Agency and the International 
Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Commercial Arbitration. The following is a 
brief of each of these institutions.
2.1.1 T h e  I s l a m i c  D e v e l o p m e n t  B a n k  G r o u p
The Islamic Development Bank Group (IDB Group) is a multilateral financing 
institution comprising four entities: the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the 
Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), the Islamic Corporation for the 
Development of the Private Sector (ICD), and the Islamic Corporation for the 
Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC).5 The Group’s headquarters is in 
Saudi Arabia with representative offices in other Islamic countries. Three conditions 
must be fulfilled by any country wishes to be a member in the IDB Group; these are: 
“membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, payment of its 
contribution to the capital of the entity and acceptance of the terms and conditions 
that maybe decided upon by the entity’s Board of Governors”.6
The IDB Group was established to play a leading role in fostering socio­
economic development in member countries and Muslim communities in conformity 
with the Islamic S h a r i ’a .  It aims to promote for Islamic financial industry and 
institutions, to alleviate poverty and to promote for the co-operation among member 
countries. The main IDB Group’s institution is the IDB, which was established in 
pursuance of the Declaration of Intent issued at the Conference of Finance Ministers 
of Muslim Countries, held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1973 and began its operations
5 See ‘Islamic Development Bank Group in Brief, (2005), at 1 available at http ://www. isdb. ore
6 Id. at 2.
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in 1975.7 In line with the general aims of the IDB Group, the IDB provides financing 
in the form of project finance to member countries. Also, other funds were 
established for specific purposes.8
The IDB has been playing an important role in further developing the Islamic 
finance industry. Thus, the IDB has developed new Islamic financial modes for 
financing development projects in both public and private sectors.9 Also, the IDB 
assisted in establishing other Islamic financial organisations and bodies, which will 
be discussed below, to enhance the regulatory framework and standardisation of the 
Islamic finance industry. In addition, the IDB is co-operating with the major 
international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank to ensure that “Islamic finance” is recognised within the mainstream of 
global economy. For example, in collaboration with the IMF, the IDB has been 
working on the development of internationally acceptable regulatory standards.10 
These efforts led to the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board.11 
Also, the IDB signed an agreement with the World Bank aiming for more strategic 
co-ordination between the two institutions in operational areas.12
In 1981, the IRTI was established to undertake research activities in the field of 
Islamic banking, finance and economics. The IRTI organises conferences, seminars
I Id. at 3.
8 Id., at 4 (the IDB established several funds such as the Islamic Banks Portfolio for Investment and 
Development (IBP) which is a trust fund established to mobilise the liquid funds o f  the Islamic banks 
and to channel them for promoting trade and development in member countries, in accordance with 
the principles o f  Islamic Shari’a. Also, the Unit Investment Fund, which was established with the aim 
to mobilise resources for the IDB and to earn adequate return on investment for its unit holders).
9 Ahmed Ali, Set Standards for Islamic Banks, Says IDB, 57 ISLAMIC BANKER 6, at 6, (2000).
10 Id.
II See infra.
12 Ali, supra note 9, at 6 (operational areas such as co-financing and country technical assistance; on 
operational policies and technical assistance by the IDB). See S.A. MEENAI, THE ISLAMIC 
DEVELOPMENT Bank: A Case Study OF Islamic CO-OPERATION, chapters 11 & 14 (Kegan Paul 
International, 1989). See also, interview with IDB President Dr. A Ali, IDB Keen on Greater Links 
with World Bank/IMF, 57 ISLAMIC BANKER 7, (2000)
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and generate publications including a bi-annual journal, namely; the “Islamic 
Economic Studies”.13 In 1994, the ICIEC was established to encourage trade 
transactions and flow of investments among member countries. In pursuing this aim, 
the ICIEC has developed an Islamic Shari’a compliant export credit insurance, 
investment insurance and reinsurance to cover commercial and country related 
risks.14 Finally, in 1999; the ICD15 was established to promote the development of 
the private sector in the member countries. The aims inter alia are to mobilise 
additional sources to the private sector and to develop Islamic financial and capital 
markets.16 So far, the IDB Group has achieved a lot in developing Islamic finance. Its 
efforts should be taken into consideration and its assistance should be sought in 
developing an Islamic financial market.
2.1.2 A c c o u n t in g  a n d  A u diting  Org a n isa tio n  f o r  Isla m ic  F inancial 
In stitu tio n s  (AAOIFI)
The AAOIFI was established and registered in Bahrain in March 1991 as an 
international autonomous non-profit corporate making body.17 The main objective of 
the AAOIFI is to develop accounting, auditing, governance and ethical thought 
relating to the activities of Islamic financial institutions taking into consideration the 
international standards and practices which comply with Islamic Shari’a rules.18 It 
also aims to harmonise the accounting policies and procedures adopted by the 
Islamic financial institutions as well as achieving conformity in concepts and
Chapter Five
13 Sep. generally http://www.irti.org
14 See generally, http://www.iciec.com
15 See generally, http://www.icd-idb.com
16 Ali, supra note 9, at 6.
17 Islamic Capital Market: Report of the Islamic Capital Market Task Force of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, July 2004, at 41 [hereinafter Islamic 
Capttat. Market] available at http://www.iosco.org
18 See generally http://wWW.aaoifl.com
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applications among Shari ’a Supervisory Boards of the Islamic financial institutions 
to avoid contradictions.
The main reason behind developing special accounting standards for Islamic 
financial institutions is because Islamic finance operations are based on different 
methods and structures. Hence, conventional accounting standards such as the 
International Accounting Standards might be insufficient to account for Islamic 
financial transactions.19 So far the AAOIFI has issued financial accounting standards, 
auditing standards, governance standards and codes of ethics.20 21In addition, the 
AAOIFI has issued a Statement on the Purpose and Calculation of the Capital 
Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks. In regards to the Shari'a principles, the 
AAOIFI has issued Shari 'a standards covering various Islamic concepts as applied 
by Islamic banks in their financing operations.22 The attempt to standardise Shari'a 
related standards is a positive step that would contribute towards facilitating Islamic 
finance operations more efficiently.
2 . 1 . 3  I s l a m i c  F i n a n c i a l  S e r v i c e s  B o a r d  ( I F S B )
Given the special nature of the Islamic banks and their operations, the financial 
intermediation and allocation of resources that are achieved by the Islamic banks are 
based on different legal constructions as opposed to their conventional 
counterparts.23 Hence, there has been a trend to develop special regulations and
19 Islamic Capital Market, supra note 17, at 41.
20 See AAOIFI, ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & GOVERNANCE STANDARDS FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
Institutions (2005).
21 See AAOIFI, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE & CALCULATION OF THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATION 
for Islamic Banks (1999).
22 S e e  AAOIFI, S H A R I’A  STANDARD (2005).
23 It is a well-established principle under conventional banking and English law that the relationship 
between the depositor and the bank is a relationship o f  debtor and creditor. See generally 
However, the concept o f  intermediation under Islamic banks’ practice is based on different legal 
relationships between the customer (i.e., depositor) and the Islamic bank. Intermediation is normally 
achieved through a mudaraba agreement whereby the customer provides the money/capital for
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supervision standards that address the unique risks of the Islamic banks. To achieve 
this aim, thè IFSB has been established in Kuala Lumpur in 2002.24 The main task of 
the IFSB is to develop international prudential and supervisory standards and best 
practices for Islamic financial institutions. The IFSB will also liaise and co-operate 
with Other standard-setting bodies in areas of monetary and financial stability.25 26
In pursing its objectives, the IFSB has recently issued and approved two 
documents that lay down prudential guiding principles and standards that are 
expected to govern Islamic financial institutions. The first document, namely; the 
Guiding Principles of Risk Management, provides a set of guidelines for 
establishing and implementing effective risk management practices. The second 
document, the so-called Capital Adequacy Standard (CAS),27 aims to identify and to 
address specific Shari’a compliant products and services that are not addressed by the 
international capital adequacy standards. The CAS also aims to standardise the 
approach in identifying and measuring risks in Shari’a compliant products and 
services and in assigning risk weights thereto.28
However, as mentioned in Chapter One, the aim of the IIFISS has been to 
establish the special specificities of the Islamic financial institutions while keeping 
the Islamic finance industry within the mainstream of global economy. This is true in
investment with no rights o f  management. The Islamic bank is the mudarib and responsible to invest 
the money. Both the Islamic bank and the customer share the profit and loss and no guarantees 
provided by the Islamic bank on returns. Unlike demand accounts; this is the case o f investment 
accounts where deposits are taken to be invested in project and not returnable on demand. Such 
contract does not create a creditor-debtor relationship; and the customer is considered as a participant 
in equity. See Chapter One on the mudaraba contract.
24 See generally http://www.ifsb.org
25 Id., (objectives o f the IFSB).
26 Islamic Financial Services Board, Guiding Principles of Risk Management for 
Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial 
Services, [hereinafter Risk Management] December (2005) available at http://www.ifsb.org/.
27 Islamic Financial Services Board, Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (other 
than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial Services, [hereinafter 
Capital Adequacy Standard] December (2005) available at http://www.ifsb.org/.
28 Id. at 1.
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the case of the IFSB. Thus consider the Risk Management Guiding Principles 
introduced by the IFSB. It states: “Certain issues are of equal concern to all financial 
institutions, including [Islamic financial institutions]. While the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) has published documents setting out sound practices 
and principles pertaining to credit, market, liquidity and operational risks of financial 
institutions, the present Guiding Principles serves to complement the BCBS’s 
guidelines in order to cater for the specificities of [Islamic financial institutions]”.29
The CAS follows a similar approach. Thus, the introduction of the CAS clearly 
provides that “The proposals contained [in CAS] are primarily based on the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s documents on the (a) International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, 
June 2004 (Basel II) and (b) Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market 
Risks, January 1996 (1996 Market Risk Amendment), with the necessary 
modifications and adaptations to cater for the specificities and characteristics of the 
[Shari’a] compliant products and services offered by the [Islamic financial 
institutions]”.30
In addition, the IFSB has recently approved a set of principles on corporate 
governance. The Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance,31 which were 
approved in 2006, are designed to facilitate Islamic financial institutions in
29 RISK MANAGEMENT; supra note 26, at 1.
30 Capital Adequacy Standard, supra note 27, at l(the CAS also provides that it covers minimum 
capital adequacy requirements based predominantly on the standardised approach in respect o f  credit 
risk and the basic indicator approach for operational risks o f  the Islamic financial institutions, with 
respect to Pillar 1 o f Basel II, and the various applicable measurement methods for market risk set out 
in the 1996 Market Risk Amendment. However, the CAS does not address the requirements covered 
by Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review Process) and Pillar 3 (Market Discipline) o f  Basel II as these two 
issues will be covered by separate standards).
31 Islamic Financial Services Board, Guiding Principles On Corporate Governance For 
Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance 




identifying areas where appropriate governance structures and processes are required, 
and to recommend best practices in addressing these issues.32 3The IFSB has also 
published a document governing issues related to the regulation and supervision of
•3
the Islamic insurance industry (i.e., takaful). Having done so, the IFSB has been 
working again in collaboration with the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors in producing this document, a fact that highlights again the IIFISS’s 
approach in keeping within the mainstream of global economy.
The IFSB normally publishes exposure drafts and seek consultations prior to any 
approval. As of December 2006, the IFSB has two outstanding exposure drafts that 
are awaiting final approvals. These are: 1) an exposure draft on disclosure to promote 
transparency and market discipline34 and; 2) a guidance on key elements in the 
supervisory review process for authorities that are supervising Islamic financial 
institutions.35 The IFSB is also engaged in awareness programmes through 
organising workshops, seminars and conferences that tackle key issues in the Islamic 
finance industry.
Moreover, the IFSB established task forces to examine the possibility of further 
developing the Islamic finance industry infrastructure. For example, the Money 
Market Task Force was established with the view to facilitate the development of 
Islamic money markets and “to encourage and assist their integration into the national
*  Id. at 1.
33 Islamic Financial Services Board, Issues in Regulation and Supervision of Takaful 
(Islamic Insurance), August (2006) available at http://www.ifsb.org/.
34 Islamic Financial Services Board, Exposure Draft No. 4 Disclosures to Promote 
Transparency and Market Discipline for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services 
(Excluding Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds), December (2006) 
available at http://www.ifsb.org/.
35 Islamic Financial Services Board, Exposure Draft No. 5 Guidance on Key Elements In 
the Supervisory Review Process of Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services 




financial systems and eventually into the broader international system”.36 Finally, the 
IFSB in co-operation with IDB have introduced a draft of the Islamic Financial 
Services Industry Ten-Year Master Plan (2006-2015) (Ten-Year Master Plan), which 
identifies the key issues that need to be addressed to further enhance the Islamic 
finance industry.37
2.1.4 Th e  O rganisa  tio n  o f  Isla m ic  C o n fer en ce  (OIS)
The OIC was established in 1969 as an inter-governmental organisation grouping 
fifty-six states.38 The OIC aims inter alia to strengthen the Islamic solidarity among 
Member States as well as the co-operation in the political, economic, social, cultural 
and scientific fields.39 A subsidiary organ of the OIS is the Islamic Fiqh Academy 
(Islamic Academy)40 which was established in 1981 and based in Saudi Arabia. The 
membership of the Islamic Academy includes scholars and intellectuals in all fields. 
The Islamic Academy is expected to examine contemporary life problems with the 
purpose of providing solutions based on “Islamic culture and open forward looking 
Islamic thought”.41
However, in co-ordination with the IDB; the Islamic Academy has set up a 
special committee for financial and economic matters. The committee comprises
36 Islamic Financial Services Board, Islamic Money Market Task Force (Money Market Task Force), 
IFSB Member Update, (2006), [hereinafter Money Market Task Force] available at 
http://www.ifsb.org/.
37 Islamic Research and Training Institute -  IDB and Islamic Financial Services Board, 
The Islamic Financial Services Industry Ten-Year Master Plan (2006-2015): A Framework 
(Draft for Discussion Only), (2006) [hereinafter Ten-Year Master Plan] available at 
http://www.sbp.org.nk/. In addition, the Drafting Committee is in the process o f  considering 
comments from regulators and market players on the TEN-YEAR Master PLAN that have been 
received on 29 November 2006. See Money Market Task Force; supra note 36, at 2. The author is not 
aware o f  a final approval yet. However, discussions related to this Ten-Year Master Plan are based 
on a draft prior to its approval.
38 See generally http://www.oic-oci.org
39 Article II (A), CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, (1974) 
available at http://www.oic-oci.org




Islamic Shari’a scholars as well as economic and financial experts. Their task is to 
examine developing issues related to economic and financial transactions. The 
committee has already looked at number of banking and financial related issues. The 
Islamic Academy has become one of the most important institutions in the Islamic 
finance industry. Its importance is due to the fact that the Academy has been 
prepared to consider sophisticated securitisation transactions and endeavour to 
provide novel Islamic Shari ’a based solutions.42
2 . 1 . 5  G e n e r a l  C o u n c i l  f o r  I s l a m i c  B a n k s  a n d  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s
The General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBFI) was 
founded in Bahrain in 2001 as a non-profit making organisation.43 The GCIBFI’s 
mission is to “work for the support of the Islamic banking industry with a view to 
promoting it through the dissemination of appropriate information and accurate 
data”.44 The following provides a summary of the GCIBFI’s objectives:45
1. To inform the public regarding the concepts and rules governing Islamic 
banking and finance practices.
2. To enhance co-operation between the members of the council and other 
related institutions, such as regulatory bodies, in order to achieve common 
objectives.
3. To prepare and disseminate information and data pertinent to Islamic 
banking practices.
42 See generally ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT Bank AND ISLAMIC FlQH ACADEMY, RESOLUTIONS AND 
Recommendations of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy (1985-2000), (2000) available 
at http://www.isdb.org/
43 See generally http://www.islamicfi.com/
44 Bahrain Monetary Agency, Islamic Banking and Finance in the Kingdom of Bahrain, 




4. To help the members face the challenges and problems in a collective 
manner, in order to pave the way for success.
2 . 1 . 6  T h e  L i q u i d i t y  M a n a g e m e n t  C e n t r e  ( L M C )
The Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) which is based in Bahrain was 
established in 2002.46 LMC facilitates the creation of an Islamic inter-bank money 
market and for the creation of a larger International Islamic Financial Market 
discussed below. The main reason for the establishment of the LMC is to offer 
Islamic banks an opportunity for liquidity management. The LMC was created to 
address two constraints that affecting the Islamic financial industry; namely, the lack 
of both quality assets and secondary markets.47
Prior to the establishment of the LMC; Islamic financial institutions had 
difficulty in making long-term investments due to the inability in managing their 
asset-liability maturity mismatch.48 Through the LMC Islamic financial institutions 
would be able to manage their assets liability mismatch in accordance with the 
Shari’a principles.49 Also, the LMC facilitates the creation of a secondary market 
through which Islamic financial institutions would be able to securitise their pooled 
assets through the issuance of tradable instruments or sukuk.50
2 . 1 . 7  T h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I s l a m i c  F i n a n c i a l  M a r k e t  ( I I F M )
The International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) is an independent non-profit 
international organisation established in Bahrain and it became operational in 2002.51 
The principal objective of the IIFM is to develop an active international financial
46 See generally http://www.lmcbahrain.com/
47 Islamic Banking in Bahrain, supra note 44 at 79.
48 Id. at 80.
49 Id. at 79.
50 See Chapter Three on sukuk.




market based on Shari ’a principles. The founding members of the IIFM are: the IDB, 
the Central Bank of Bahrain, Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority, 
Bank of Sudan,52 34 Bank of Indonesia55 and the Ministry of Finance Brunei 
Darussalam.56
The IIFM seeks to develop a vital infrastructure for the expansion of Islamic 
money and capital markets both primary and secondary. The IIFM is working with 
the Bahrain Stock Exchange and Malaysian International Financial Exchange to 
facilitate cross-border listing of Shari’a compatible instruments.57 Currently, the 
IIFM is working on Islamic instruments contract standardisation and have played a 
significant role in producing the first draft of Islamic Financial Services Industry 
Ten-Year Master Plan (2006-2015) produced by the IDB and IFSB.58 In order to 
develop a successful market there is a need for a large number of players.59 
Accordingly, The IIFM is targeting new members especially the members of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).60
Moreover, in line with the general approach of the IIFISS; the IIFM is working in 
co-operation with conventional finance institutions to ensure keeping its progress 
within the mainstream of global economy. Thus, the IIFM and the International
52 The title “Central Bank o f Bahrain” replaces the “Bahrain Monetary Agency” which was the 
official name for the central bank in Bahrain in accordance with DECREE No. 26 OF 2006 WITH 
RESPECT TO PROMULGATING THE CENTRAL BANK OF BAHRAIN AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW ). 
See also THE CENTRAL BANK OF BAHRAIN AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW [hereinafter CENTRAL 
BANK OF Bahrain Law] available at http://www.bma.gov.bh
53 See generally http://www.lofsa.gov.mv
54 See generally http://www.bankofsudan.org
55 See generally http://www.bi.go.id
56 See generally http://www.finance.gov.bn
57 Interview with Ijlal Ali, IIFM in New and Active Mode, 10 ISLAMIC FlN. REV 4, at 4, (2005).
ss Id. -
59 See Islamic Banking in Bahrain, supra note 44, at 81 -82 (there are three main factors in order for 
IIFM to be successful: the involvement o f  large number o f players, the creation o f a wide range o f  
Islamic financial instruments and availability o f  an adequate liquidity in the market).
60 IIFM Admits Six New Members, 7 ISLAMIC FIN. Rev. 5, at 5 (2004).
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Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)61 have signed a memorandum of 
understanding as a basis for developing a master agreement documenting privately 
negotiated Shari’a compliant derivatives transactions.62 All these efforts would 
contribute towards further enhancing the Islamic finance industry.
2.1.8 Th e  International  Isla m ic  Ra t in g  A g e n c y  (11RA)
In order to increase the transparency and to provide confidence to the investors 
and to the regulators alike; the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA) was 
incorporated in Bahrain in 2002.63 Like other conventional rating agencies; the IIRA 
aims to provide external rating system to improve the availability of information. The 
objectives of IIRA inter alia include the following:64
1. to carry on the business of research, analysis, rating, evaluation and appraisal 
of the obligations, dues, commitments, shares, stocks and other securities 
issues;
2. to provide an independent assessment and opinion on the likelihood of future 
loss of a rated entity or a financial instrument; and
3. to provide an independent assessment of compliance by the rated entity or 
financial instrument applying the principles of Shari ’a.
However, because Islamic finance transactions must be Shari’a compliant, the 
IIRA has developed the Methodology for Shari’a Quality Rating.65 Unlike credit 
rating, a Shari ’a Quality Rating (SQR) does not relate to the financial capability of 
the institution or the credit quality of the securities. Rather it is concerned with
61 See generally http://www.isda.org/
62 See International Islamic Financial Market, ISDA and 11FM agree to develop documentation for 
Shari'ah compliant derivatives, 12 September (2006) and Standardising Derivatives for Islam, 16 
November (2006) available at http://www.iifm.net.
63 See generally http://www.iirating.com/
64 Id.




issuing an independent opinion about the Shari’a quality of the institution or the 
issued securities.66 The IIRA has also developed the Corporate Governance Rating 
Methodology.67 The IIRA’s Corporate Governance Rating is an independent opinion 
on the organisation’s commitment to excellence in its managerial practices.68
2.1.9 Th e  In ternational  Isla m ic  C en tre  f o r  R ec o n c ilia tio n  a n d
C o m m ercial  A rbitration  (IICRCA)
The IICRCA is a recent project launched in Dubai on 9 April 2005.69 The aim of 
the IICRCA is to provide a platform to settle financial and commercial disputes 
between Islamic financial institutions; and between these institutions and third 
parties through reconciliation and arbitration.70 The secretary-general of the GCIBFI 
explained that settling the disputes of the Islamic financial institutions is costly due 
to the absence of an institution offering alternative dispute services specifically to 
Islamic financial institutions.71 To facilitate the dispute settlement process related to 
the Islamic finance activities, the IICRCA was established and supported by the IDB 
and the UAE.72 The IICRCA’s Board of the Trustees held a meeting in June 2005 to 
discuss several amendments to the IICRCA’s bylaws that are pending ratification.73 
During the meeting, the members of the executive committee were appointed and 
other issues were discussed including the budget for the first year.74 The
66 Id. at 1 (the IIRA has the following rating: AAA(SQR), AA(SQR), A(SQR), BBB(SQR), BB(SQR 
and B(SQR).
67 International Islamic Rating Agency, Corporate Governance Rating Methodology, 
available at http://www.iirating.com/.
68 Id. at 1.
69 New Centre in Dubai to Settle Islamic Financial Disputes, (10/4/2005) available at 
http://www.islamicfi.com
10 Id.
71 id  ;
72 Id. (the IDB has contributed about half o f  the investment and the remaining amount was provided 
by the UAE).





establishment of the IICRCA plays an important role in further enhancing the Islamic 
finance industry.
2.1.10 F inal O bservations: IFA a s  a S o f t  La w  
The above discussion reflects the growing tendency towards the 
institutionalisation of “Islamic finance” through the establishment of the IIFISS. 
Also, IIFISS are contributing in the development of an IFA facilitating in turn the 
activities of “Islamic finance”. Arguably, however, the “voluntary adoption” nature 
of theses standards is the main challenge for their implementation. The editorial of 
the Islamic Banker writes:
“... the operative phrase in the terminology of establishment is that [the 
IFSB] standards and core principles will be “for voluntary adoption by 
member countries”. This could turn out to be the Achilles Heel of the 
IFSB...We have been down this route of “voluntary adoption” of standards 
in Islamic finance sector before. And it has yet to deliver.
...AAOIFI, for instance, has issued various standards ad an accounting 
framework for Islamic banks. Only one central bank, the host [Bahrain 
Monetary Agency] has translated this into law requiring all Islamic financial 
institutions incorporated in Bahrain to reports its financial statements both 
according to the International Accounting Standards and according to the 
AAOIFI standards...
...Therefore, the IFSB needs to have some teeth to persuade founder 
members and other who are invited to join later, that once a standard or set 
of core principles are agreed, then they should be adopted by all member”76
From a legal perspective; the above statement would suggest that the standards
issued by the IIFISS can be considered as a ‘soft law’ or as legally non-biding rules. *75
75 The author is not aware o f when the IICRCA will be fully functional.
75 Editorial, Voluntary Adoption Challenge for IFSB, 80 ISLAMIC BANKER 2, at 2, (2002).
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Unlike ‘hard law’, ‘soft law’ does not imply obligation,77 and it can be defined to 
mean a “ norm expressed by the international community to which it is hoped at least 
by a group of states articulating the ‘norm’, that states will adhere, but to which there 
is no obligation of adherence”.78 This means that these “Islamic finance” related 
standards are not legally binding and are mere policy recommendations of the 
IIFISS.79 Arguably, for ‘soft law’ standards to be effective and fulfil their functions; 
they should be implemented at the national level and be transformed into laws or 
‘hard law’.80 Such standards can then be legally binding once have been transformed 
into domestic law.81 The Kingdom of Bahrain, for example, requires Islamic banks to 
apply certain AAOIFI standards.
However, the IIFISS are aware of the challenge facing the implementation of the 
“Islamic finance” related standards as well as developing a viable legal infrastructure 
for the “Islamic finance” activity at the national level. Thus, the Islamic Financial 
Services Industry Ten-Year Master Plan (2006-2015),82 that has been prepared by the 
IFSB and the IDB raises these issues. It states in general terms “Islamic finance is
77 Cynthia Lichtenstein, Hard Law v Soft Law: Unnecessary Dichotomy?, in INTERNATIONAL 
Monetary and Financial Law upon Entering the New Millennium, at 355,355 (Joseph Norton 
et al., eds., BIICL, 2003).
™ Id. 356.
79 Giovanoli referring to the conventional financial standards but it can also apply to the Islamic 
standards. See Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects 
of International Financial Standard Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE 
New MILLENNIUM, 3, at 34 (Mario Giovanoli ed., Oxford University Press, 2000).
80 Id. at 51. Cf. Lichtenstein, supra note 105, at 365 suggesting that enforcement could be achieved 
through the ‘managerial model’ described by Chayes. He summarises Chayes’ thesis stating: 
“...compliance with international norms, whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, is better achieved through 
regulatory regimes that utilise a ‘managerial model’ relying on co-operative, problem solving 
approach than regimes presenting an ‘enforcement model’ with a coercive approach”. See Id. at 362. 
See also Chayes and Chayes, ‘On Compliance’ , 47 Int’l Org 175 (1993); Chayes & Chayes, The New  
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 
1995); Chayes, Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, 
Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Brown Weiss et al. 
eds., 1998).
*fd. (Giovanoli also discusses other mechanisms through which such standards can be implemented; 
namely, ‘market discipline’ and ‘official incentives’).
82 See Ten-Year Master Plan, supra note 37.
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still a nascent industry in most countries and has not yet achieved a critical mass or 
strategic focus needed for an effective recognition of its unique operational features in 
the national policy making process. Therefore, Islamic international infrastructure 
institutions can and should play a key catalytic role in promoting the industry at the 
national level”.83 84
The Ten-Year Master Plan identifies key challenges that need to be addressed by 
the Islamic finance industry. These include, in ter a lia , building an appropriate legal 
framework and an enabling supervisory framework. The Ten-Year Master Plan 
addresses these challenges broadly but then it gets more focused on the national level 
again in respect to the Islamic countries. It critically states: “ ... there are still many 
countries where legal and institutional framework is not explicit and transparent about 
Islamic finance, and the supervision framework for conventional finance continues to 
apply to Islamic banks, with some operational level variations to recognise their 
specific characteristics”.85
The Ten-Year Master Plan continues stating that “significant weaknesses in legal, 
governance, and systemic liquidity infrastructure is impeding the spread of product 
innovations in Islamic finance, and preventing effective supervision and risk 
management”. Also, the insolvency and creditor rights regimes, contract enforcement 
and the limited adoption of AAOIFI accounting standards for Islamic institutions in 
Islamic countries has been singled out as weaknesses that need to be addressed.
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83 Id. at 40.
84 Id
85 Id , at 35.
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In addition, the Ten-Year Master Plan provides a policy strategy for Islamic 
countries to further develop their “Islamic finance” industry at the national level. The
o r
policy strategy includes, inter alia, the following elements:
1. the public sector shall play an extensive catalytic role in developing role in 
developing Shari’a Governance Systems within financial institutions and 
regulatory organisations through an effective education and an appropriate 
institutional;
2. recognise more explicitly the position of Islamic finance in financial sector 
laws, and in supervisory regime, so that the unique operational features of 
Islamic finance can be recognised in the regulatory framework and an 
enabling environment can be provided for product innovations and enhanced 
access, while safeguarding stability;
3. strengthen insolvency and creditor right regime, investor protection 
arrangements;
4. reduce legal risks and improve legal certainty; and
5. facilitate effective enforcement of Islamic finance contracts in various legal 
environments.
The above policies, while still mere suggestions, reflect the IIFISS’ views and 
their awareness of the importance of the law as an instrument to develop the Islamic 
finance industry. Regardless of the legal nature of these “Islamic finance” related 
standards and recommendations, these standards and recommendations are of great 
importance to Saudi Arabia in its financial sector law reform. Saudi Arabia is advised 
to give due consideration to these standards and recommendations in developing the 86
Chapter Five
86 Id., 4 6 - 4 7 .
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“Islamic finance” component of its financial system and to establish bridges of 
communications and technical support with the IIFISS .
2.2 T h e  R e g i o n a l  D i m e n s i o n : E f f o r t s  b y  t h e  G.C.C M e m b e r  S t a t e s
The international dimension is not the only dimension which Saudi Arabia is 
advised to consider in developing its “Islamic finance” component but also the 
regional dimension should be given due consideration. The creation of the Gulf Co­
operation Council (G.C.C) as a regional integration model;87 and the implementation 
of its policies necessitate the achievement of a high level of harmonisation in all 
economic policies especially the fiscal and monetary policies as well as banking 
legislations.88 Also, the G.C.C agreements oblige Member States to integrate 
financial markets among themselves and to unify all related legislation and 
policies.89 As a member of the G.C.C, Saudi Arabia is influenced by these 
agreements and it is required, sooner or later, to adapt its laws and legislations with 
these policies that have been approved at the G.C.C regional level.
Despite the fact that no express indications are made in the G.C.C agreements as 
to the harmonisation of the Islamic banking and financing laws; the requirement that 
a high level of financial related laws harmonisation should be achieved at the G.C.C 
level would presumably encompass Islamic financial-related laws. So far no uniform 
financial-related laws of obligatory nature have been approved by the G.C.C.90 
Several financial-related laws of “non-obligatory” nature have been approved such
87 See Chapter T w o  on  the G.C.C. See also Amr Marar, The Co-operation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf, 10(3) LAW AND BUS. REV. Amer. 475, (2004).
88 Art. 4, THE ECONOMIC Agreement, 31 December 2001, available at available at http://www.gcc- 
sg.org/.
89Id. A rt. 5 (3 ) .
90 T h e  la w s and agreem en ts en a cted  b y  th e  G C C  fa ll under tw o  ca teg o r ie s , n a m ely , o b lig a to ry  and  
n o n -o b lig a to ry . T h e n o n -o b lig a to ry  la w s are en acted  for  g u id a n ce  o n ly .
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as: the Law of the Centralisation of Risks,91 the Unified Law on the Supervision and 
Monitoring of Insurance Operations in the G.C.C States92 and the Law on Capital on 
Adequacy of Capital, Asset Risks, and the Law on Credit Concentrations in the 
G.C.C Banks.93
At the national level, however, Member States of the G.C.C, except of Saudi 
Arabia94 have introduced either Islamic financial-related laws or special "Islamic 
finance" directives. The Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the State of Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates have all introduced “Islamic finance” related laws as 
well as directives that govern "Islamic finance" at the national level and have not 
been addressed at the regional level of the G.C.C. Despite its national effect, the 
existing “Islamic finance” related laws of the G.C.C Member States would possibly 
influence any attempt to unify “Islamic finance” related laws at the regional level and 
in turn Saudi Arabia. Bearing this in mind, these laws do provide a useful guidance 
for the Saudi legal policymakers. Hence, consultations with other G.C.C Member 
States is more likely to achieve positive results for the Saudi financial sector law 
reform. In the rest of this Section the author provides an overview of the efforts 
undertaken by the G.C.C Member States in relation to the “Islamic finance” related 
laws.
2.2.1 Th e  K in g d o m  o f  Bah rain
Bahrain is one of the most proactive states in Islamic finance.95 The first Islamic 
bank was established in 1979 when the Bahrain Islamic bank was licensed.
91 A p p ro v ed  on  th e  S ev en th  M eetin g  o f  th e  C o m m ittee  o f  G overn ors o f  M o n eta ry  In stitu tion s &  
C entral B a n k s; A b u  D h ab i 2 5  -2 6  January 1 9 8 6 .
92 Approved on 14th Meeting o f  the Commercial Co-operation Committee, Muscat; 2 6  December 
1 9 8 9 .
93 A p p ro v ed  b y  th e  C o m m ittee  o f  G overn ors o f  M o n eta ry  In stitu tion s and C entral B a n k s, A b u  D h ab i, 
10 A p ril 1 9 9 3 .
94 A ls o ,  th e  S u ltan ate  o f  O m an has not p rom u lgated  a n y  Is la m ic  fin an cia l-re la ted  law s.
95 R o d n ey  W ilso n , The Politics of Islamic finance, 1 4 7  NEW HORIZON 5 , at 6 , (2 0 0 5 ) .
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Currently, there are twenty eight Islamic banks including commercial, investment 
and offshore banking.96 In doing so, Bahrain is following the current trend through 
further developing its “Islamic banking” and its conventional counterpart.97 Unlike 
other Islamic countries, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) has developed the 
Prudential Information and Regulatory Framework to regulate Islamic banks. The 
framework covers areas such as capital adequacy, asset quality, the management of 
investment accounts and the liquidity management.
Both Islamic and conventional banks are governed by the Rulebook98 The 
Rulebook is divided into five volumes covering different areas of financial services 
activity, namely; conventional banks, Islamic banks, insurance, investment business 
and specialised activities. Volume (2) of the Rulebook is a comprehensive rulebook 
on Islamic banks and it contains two parts. Part (A) is the main part containing all 
applicable rules and guidance such as the licensing and authorisation requirements, 
principles of business, public disclosure requirements. Part (B) contains supporting 
materials such a glossary defined terms and reporting forms.
The Bahraini government also does support the issuance of Islamic sukuk (i.e. 
bonds). The government issues salam Government Sukuk as well as Islamic 
Government Leasing (ijara) Sukuk in accordance with Islamic Shari 'a standards.99 
In doing so, Islamic banks have the opportunity to invest in governmental bonds just 
like conventional banks. Recently, the Bahraini government has increased the debt 
issuance including the issuance of Islamic sukuk. For example, sukuk al-salam of 91 
days maturity has been increased from US$ 25 million to US$ 40 million.100 Both
Chapter Five
96 See h ttp ://w w w .b m a .g o v .b h
97 Islamic Banking in Bahrain, supra n o te  4 4 , at 4 2 .
98 See h ttp ://w w w .b m a .g o v .b h
"id.
100 E d itoria l, ‘BMA Increases Sukuk Issuance 10  ISLAMIC F i n . R e v . 2 ,  at 2 , (2 0 0 5 ) .
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conventional and Islamic private issuances of bonds and sukuk are regulated by the 
CBB. However, these standards do not refer specifically or define Islamic bonds.
Bahrain also has both conventional and Islamic insurance services. The Central 
Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law defines “Insurance or Re-insurance 
Company” as “any company licensed under [the law] to enter into and implement 
insurance, reinsurance, Takaful or r e-TakafuP,m  The Rulebook contains 
comprehensive regulations that govern Islamic insurance and re-insurance.10 02 Also, 
Islamic insurance companies are required to have Shari’a advisory boards to 
supervise and to direct the activities of the company.103
The Kingdom of Bahrain joins other Islamic countries in following the general 
trend in developing the Islamic finance component alongside conventional finance. 
Also, it has been undertaking major reforms recently in terms , of its financial 
infrastructure. For example, it has recently enacted the Financial Trust Law104 to 
facilitate financial transactions. This is a major “legal revolution” in the G.C.C 
Region’s legal history. Yet, Bahrain is a model to other G.C.C Member States, 
including Saudi Arabia that can be learned from in any financial sector law reform 
efforts.
2 . 2 . 2  T h e  S t a t e  o f  K u w a i t
In Kuwait the law has been amended in 2003 to include a section on Islamic 
banks. Articles 86-100 of the Central Bank of Kuwait Law 32/1968 (CBKL),105 
governs Islamic banking operations. The CBKL defines Islamic banks as those that
101 Article 1, Central Bank of Bahrain Law, supra note 52.
102 See Central Bank of Bahrain, Central Bank of Bahrain Rulebook, Volume 3, available
at http://www.bma.gov.bh.
m Id.
104 Law No. 23 of the Year (2006) Regarding the Regulation of Financial Trusts, available
at http://www.bma.gov.bh
105 Central Bank of Kuwait, Central bank of Kuwait Law No. 3 2  (1 9 6 8 )  [hereinafter  C B K L ]  
(a m en d ed  as per stip u la tion s o f  D e c r e e  L a w  N o . 1 3 0 /1 9 7 7  (2 5  O ctob er  1 9 7 7 ), and L a w  N o . 3 0 /2 0 0 3  




“exercise the activities pertaining to banking business, and any activities considered 
by the Law of Commerce or by customary practice as banking activities, in 
compliance with the Islamic Shari’a principles...”.106 The CBKL requires that each 
Islamic bank should have an independent Shari ’a Supervisory Board to ensure that 
the operations of the Islamic banks are in conformity with Islamic Shari ’a 
principles.107
The law also recognises the nature of the Islamic banks’ operations. Thus, 
Islamic banks are allowed to acquire buildings or to acquire by reservation of title for 
the purposes of executing finance operations in compliance with the Islamic Shari’a 
principles.108 No other laws have been passed to govern other Islamic finance related 
services such as Islamic capital markets or Islamic insurance.
2.2.3 Th e  S ta te  o f  Qatar
The state of Qatar has also joined the general trend in incorporating Islamic 
banking regulations within its current supervisory rules. The Central Bank of Qatar 
(CBQ)109 has issued the Banking Supervision Instructions (BSI) which deals with 
Islamic banks.110 However, both the BSI and the Law Establishing the CBQ111 serve 
to supervise Islamic banks. The BSI defines “Islamic finance activities”112 and 
requires that Islamic banks should seek the assistance of a Shari’a committee to
106 M a r t .  8 6 .
107 M . art. 9 3 .
108 Id, art. 9 9
109 See generally http://www.qcb.gov.qa
110 See Central Bank of Qatar, Banking Supervision Instructions, Part VII, at 101 [hereinafter 
BSI] available at http://www.qcb.gov.qa
111 Decree Law No. (1 5 )  of the Year 1 9 9 3 , Establishing the Qatar Central Bank (as 
amended) available at http://www.qcb.gov.qa.
112 B S I , supra n o te  110, at 71. (d e f in e s  “Is la m ic  fin a n ce  a c tiv it ie s” as co n d u ctin g  a ll th e  fin a n c in g  
b u sin ess  a s  b y  m ea n s o f  M urabaha, M u sa w a m a h , M udarabah, d im in ish in g  participation  (M usharaka), 
Istisn a , or other Is la m ic  f in a n c in g  o p eration s, for  th e  short, m ed iu m , or lo n g  term s fin a n c ia l and  
e c o n o m ic  a c tiv it ie s , w h eth er  d irect or ind irect b y  m ean  o f  th e  b an k in g  a sse m b lie s , or is su in g  b on d s  
(S u k u k ), in c lu d in g  a ll ty p e s  o f  d irect or ind irect f in a n c in g  fa c ilit ie s , to ta lly  or partia lly  w h eth er  for  
in d iv id u a ls , the other fin a n c ia l and e c o n o m ic  sec to rs, or cou n try , in c lu d in g  the fin a n c in g  o f  p rojects, 
fo re ig n  trade and other fin a n c in g  p u rp o ses).
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•  113 •approve the bank operations. The BSI also defines certain financing operations 
conducted according to the Islamic Shari ’a financing principles and divides Islamic 
financing into “Islamic Local Financings” and “International Islamic Financing”.
The BSI also provides a specific section related to the accounting procedures and 
financial statements that should be produced by Islamic banks.* 114 No other laws or 
guidelines have been issued to govern other Islamic financial related activities. 
However, the Qatari government has shown its commitment towards the Islamic 
financial services by issuing sovereign Islamic sukuk to finance certain projects. 
Qatar is also witnessing a “legal revolution”. It has established recently the Qatar 
Financial Centre to attract foreign capital and investments. This might involve 
further Islamic finance related legislations.
2.2.4 Th e  Un ited  A rab  E m irates
Just like other G.C.C Member States, the UAE has followed a similar approach 
and has adopted specific “Islamic finance” regulations that govern both Islamic and 
conventional banks. To this effect, the UAE has enacted a federal law to govern 
Islamic banks, financial Institutions and investment companies.115 The law defines 
Islamic banks, financial institutions and investment companies as “those whose 
articles and memorandums of association include a commitment to abide by the 
provisions of the Islamic Shari’a law; and conduct their activities therewith”.116 The 
law requires that a Shari ’a Supervision Authority should be formed to ensure that the 
transactions are according to the Islamic Shari'a.117 The law also establishes a 
“Higher Shari ’a Authority” attached to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs in
1,3 Id. at 101.
114 BSI, supra note 110, at 263.
115 See Federal Law N o. (6) 1985 regarding Islamic Banks, Financial Institutions and 





order to ensure the legitimacy of the Islamic banks and their conformity with the 
Islamic Shari 'a.118
Islamic financial institutions have the right to carry out lending, to enter any 
other financial operations and to receive deposits for investment in accordance with 
the provisions of Islamic Shari’a.119 The law also exempts Islamic banks from 
certain prohibitions imposed on conventional banks. Thus, unlike conventional 
banks; Islamic banks are allowed to acquire immovable property as well as trade in 
goods for its account.120 Such facilitates the activities of Islamic banks operations 
which normally involve trading arrangements.
In addition, the UAE has also passed regulations to govern the activities of 
Islamic sukuk. Thus, the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA)121 
promulgated the Resolution Concerning the Listing of Islamic Bonds (the 
“Resolution”).122 The Resolution defines Islamic bonds as “any bonds issued in ■ 
accordance with Shari’a principles and offered through a Public Subscription”.123 
The Resolution sets out a number of conditions that Islamic bonds should fulfil 
including being approved by a Shari’a committee.124 This again would facilitate the 
issuance of Islamic sukuk and would enhance its market.
2 . 2 . 5  F i n a l  O b s e r v a t i o n s
Most of the G.C.C Member States have recognised the special characteristics of 
“Islamic finance”. Certain Member States have passed laws and specific rules to
118 Id art.5.
119 Id. art. 3 (2 ) .
120 Id. art. 4  (s ta tes  that Is la m ic  banks “sh a ll b e  ex em p ted  from  p ro v is io n s  o f  C la u se  (a ) o f  A rtic le  (9 0 )  
and C la u se  (e )  o f  A rtic le  (9 6 )  o f  U n ifo rm  L a w  N o  (1 0 )  o f  1 9 8 0 ” it sh a ll a lso  b e  ex em p ted  from  
“p r o v is io n s  o f  C la u se  (b ) o f  A rtic le  (9 0 )  o f  U n io n  L a w  N o  ( 1 0 ) . . . ”).
121 T h e  S ecu r it ie s  and C o m m o d itie s  A u th o rity  is  th e  regu lator o f  th e  U A E ’s secu r itie s  m arket. T h e  
tw o  m ain  e x c h a n g e s  are th e  A b u  D h a b i S ecu r itie s  M arket (A D S M ) and th e  D u b a i F in a n c ia l M arket 
(D F M ). See generally h ttp ://w w w .sca .a e /.
122 Resolution concerning the Listing of Islamic Bonds (2 0 0 5 )  available at h ttp ://w w w .sca .a e /
123 Id. art. (1 )
124 A  /C\
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govern and regulate Islamic banks. Further, certain countries have introduced rules 
that govern Islamic insurance as well as Islamic sukuk. The development of “Islamic 
finance” in these countries as well as the increasing “financial awareness” seems to 
be the current trend. In addition, further integration among the G.C.C Member States 
under the G.C.C economic related agreements would definitely raise issues related to 
the harmonisation of their financial markets including their “Islamic finance” related 
regulations and rules. This might be developed further to bring about a dual regional 
financial market that includes Islamic and conventional finance.
These developments that are taking place around Saudi Arabia are of great 
relevance. At this stage of its development, Saudi Arabia might be interested to tap 
its financial system regionally and internationally. To do so at the regional level, 
Saudi Arabia should adhere to the G.C.C agreements and this means that developing 
the “Islamic finance” component should be given due consideration. Hence, Saudi 
Arabia can take the initiative to conduct consultations with its neighbouring 
countries, to analyse the effectiveness of their laws and to develop a clear agenda as 
to the development of its “Islamic finance” component at the national level in light of 
these regional developments. Otherwise, Saudi investors who are desirous to invest 
in compliance with the Islamic Shari’a might be tempted to invest outside in 
neighbouring G.C.C Member States which maintain “Islamic finance” friendly 
regulatory frameworks.
2.3 T h e  N a t i o n a l  D i m e n s i o n : T h e  M a l a y s i a n  M o d e l 125
Further to the international and the regional dimensions discussed above; Saudi 
Arabia is also advised in developing its “Islamic finance” component is also advised
125 See generally A m r M arar &  W o n g  S a u -N g a n , Islamic Securities Exchanges: Principles and 
International Developments, in FINANCIAL Markets AND EXCHANGES Law, (O x fo rd  U n iv ersity  
P ress, 2 0 0 6  -  forth com in g).
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to consider other models that are implemented at the national level. A successful 
model which certainly provides lessons that Saudi Arabia can learn from is the 
Malaysian model. The Malaysian experience has been always seen as a successful 
model which other developing countries including the Arab world can learn from and 
follow.126 127 Malaysia has formally recognised “Islamic finance” alongside 
conventional finance and it is considered to be a “highly proactive” in developing 
and fostering “Islamic finance”. Hence, the Malaysian financial system has been 
referred to as dual. Yakcop writes: “interest-free banking in Malaysia work within a 
dual system where the Islamic financial system operates in parallel with the 
conventional financial system”.128
The success in the implementation and overseeing a dual financial system is 
perhaps attributed to in Malaysian government’s strong support of the “dual” 
policy.129 The Malaysian government has taken essential measures to create a viable 
environment to accommodate such dual financial system. In doing so, the Malaysian 
government has followed a gradual approach which involved introducing the Islamic 
financial system step by step alongside its conventional counterpart rather than 
Islamising rapidly the conventional financial system.130 In incorporating “Islamic 
finance” alongside conventional finance, Malaysia has joined other Islamic countries
126 See Massoud Derhally, Malaysia: A Model for Economic Growth, May Arabian Bus. 46, (2003). 
See also Nor Yakcop, Modelling Interest Free Financial Systems: Avoiding Costly Errors the 
Malaysian Way, 16 ISLAMIC BANKER 12, at 12, (1997). See also Farhan Bokhari, Model Destination 
for Islamic Finance?, FINANCIAL Times, 2 October (2006).
127 See Mushtak Parker, Clamouring for Regulation, 32 ISLAMIC Banker 6, at 7, (1998) (compiling a 
table that shows several countries’ attitude towards Islamic finance).
128 Yakcop, supra note 126, at 12. See generally Ramin Maysami et. al., One Country, Two Systems: 
Banking in Malaysia, 13(7) JIBL 233, at 236-237, (1998).
129 Aishah Bidin, The Impact of Islamic Law in the Banking and Financial Market: A Malaysian 
Perspective, 22(5) Company Lawyer 154, at 160, (2001).
130 Yakcop, supra note 126, at 12.
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in recognising and following the emerging trend of having both Islamic and
131conventional finance.
Malaysia has also gone further and introduced the Malaysia International Islamic 
Financial Centre (MIFC).13 32 In doing so, Malaysia is aiming to be the international 
Islamic financial hub. The MIFC is developed to be a “one-stop-centre” for Islamic 
finance, banking and takaful. The central bank of Malaysia, namely; Bank Negara 
Malaysia, has already introduced guidelines to facilitate the establishment of Islamic 
financial institutions in the MIFC. Having highlighted the Malaysian approach 
towards “Islamic finance”, it is helpful to examine how Malaysia has developed 
“Islamic finance” at the national level.
2 . 3 . 1  I s l a m i c  F i n a n c e  i n  M a l a  y s i a :  a n  O v e r v i e w  .
The Malaysian financial system has become “dual” when the Malaysian 
government has decided to develop the “Islamic finance” component. In essence, 
introducing “Islamic finance” within the Malaysian financial system was a response 
to meet the necessities of the Malaysian Muslim community.133 It is also seen as a 
step by the government to induce Islamic economic values in Malaysia.134 Unlike 
Saudi Arabia, however, Malaysia does not maintain Islamic Shari’a as the paramount 
legal system of the country.135 Thus, in Malaysia; Islamic Shari’a is confined to 
family law, religious revenues and charitable property.136
131 A ls o  th e  M a la y sia n  p o lic y  in crea tin g  a dual fin a n cia l sy s tem  b y  in troducing  and supporting  
Is la m ic  banks a lo n g s id e  th e  co n v en tio n a l sy stem  has b een  cr it ic ised  o n  the ground that it m igh t has  
g o n e  to o  far in a llo w in g  to o  m a n y  Is lam ic  banks and Is la m ic  w in d o w s  to  fu n ction . See M ushtak  
Parker, A Financial Market Liberalisation Too Far, 1 1 0 /1 1 1  ISLAMIC BANKER 16 , (2 0 0 5 ) .
132 See generally h ttp ://w w w .b n m .g o v .m y /
133 Nik Thani et. al, Law and Practice of Islamic Banking and Finance, at 11 (S w e e t  &  
M a x w e ll, 2 0 0 3 ) .
134 Id. at 12 (referring to  article  3 (1 )  o f  the F ederal C on stitu tion  w h ich  p rovid es: “Islam  is  the re lig io n  
o f  th e  F ed eration , but other r e lig io n s  m ay  be p racticed  in p e a c e  and harm ony in a n y  part o f  the  
F ed eration ”).
135 Id.
136 F ederal C o n stitu tion , N in th  S ch ed u le , L ist II and A rtic le  7 4 . C H E C K .
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Prior to 1983, Malaysia maintained a conventional financial system. The only 
exception was the Pilgrims Management Fund Board which was a merger of the 
Pilgrims Affairs Department of the government and the Malaysian Muslim Pilgrims 
Savings Corporation.137 138To this effect, the Pilgrimage Management Fund Board Act
n o
(1969) was passed by the Malaysian government. The operations of the Fund were 
in conformity with the Islamic principles. The aim of the Fund was “the utilisation of 
and investment of savings in connection with the protection, control and general 
welfare of Muslims going to pilgrimage”.139 However, the mere availability of such 
Fund as a saving institution was not sufficient to meet the sophisticated demands of 
finance according to the Islamic principles.140
Hence, there was a growing pressure on the government to consider establishing 
an Islamic bank following the experiments of Islamic banking elsewhere in the 
Middle East and Pakistan.141 The pressure initiated by various entities has led to the 
formation of the National Steering Committee on Islamic Banking (NSCIB) in 1981. 
The main aims of the NSCIB were:142
to study and identify various critical aspects of Islamic banking such as the 
basis of establishment, the areas of operations, and the business relationship 
with the customers and other financial institutions;
137 Thani ET. AL, supra n o te  1 3 3 , at 11 (a lso  the N a tio n a l B um iputra T rust w a s esta b lish ed  to  attract 
sa v in g s  a cco rd in g  to  th e  Is la m ic  p r in cip les).
138 See generally ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, TABUNG HAJI AS AN ISLAMIC 
Financial Institution, (IRTI, 1995) available at http://www.irtipms.org/
139 Thani et. AL, supra n o te  1 3 3 , at 11.
141 Id. at 14 (ex p la in in g  that the B um iputra E c o n o m ic  C o n g ress  in 1 9 8 0  issu ed  a  reso lu tio n  c a llin g  the  
g o v ern m en t to  a llo w  the esta b lish m en t o f  an Is la m ic  bank. A n o th er  reso lu tio n  w a s  p a ssed  b y  the  
N a tio n a l S em in ar  on  th e  C o n cep t o f  D e v e lo p m e n t in  1981 w h ic h  w a s h eld  at the N a tio n a l U n iv ers ity  
o f  M a la y sia . T h e  reso lu tio n  ca lled  u p on  the g o v ern m en t to  take a c tio n s in order to  a llo w  fin a n c ia l
in stitu tion s to  op erate  accord in g  to  Is la m ic  p r in c ip les . A t th e  state lev e l; the go v ern m en ts o f  the states  
K elantan  and M a la cca  issu ed  sta tem en ts to  sh o w  their d esire  o f  esta b lish in g  Is lam ic  banks).
142 THANI ET. AL, supra note 133, at 15.
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to examine the suitability of Islamic banking in the Malaysian context from 
various points of view, including the religious, legal, racial, social and 
development angles; and
to present to the government a proposal to establish Bank Islam Malaysia in 
a complete report encompassing the following aspects - the fundamental 
concepts of Islamic banking, the legal framework, the structure of the 
company, the areas of operation and the organisational structure.
In pursuing the above aims; the NSCIB formed three technical committees: the 
Religious Committee, the Legal Committee and the Banking Operations 
Committee.143 These committees have considered various studies undertaken on 
Islamic banking by several entities.144 The committees also studied the examples of 
Islamic banks in Egypt and Sudan.145
Having undertaken its own research the NSCIB submitted a report to the 
government in 1982 recommending the establishment of an Islamic bank according 
to the principles of Islamic Shari 'a.146 The NSCIB also recommended the 
establishment of one Islamic bank because the concept of Islamic banking is new in 
Malaysia.147 The NSCIB suggested that an Act should be passed to deal with 
licensing and supervising the newly established Islamic bank.148 Also, a Religious 
Advisory Council should be set up to ensure that the operations by the Islamic bank 
conform to Islamic Shari ’a principles.149
143 Id.
144 F or ex a m p le  a  d o cu m en t prepared b y  th e  International A sso c ia t io n  o f  Is la m ic  B a n k s en titled  
“M o d e l Is la m ic  B an k ” .
145 N a m e ly  F isa l B an k  o f  E g y p t and F isa l B a n k  o f  Sudan.
146 Thani ET. AL, supra n o te  1 33 , at 16.
147 Id.




The recommendations by the NSCIB have been accepted by the Malaysian 
government. The government passed the Islamic Banking Act of 1983 allowing the 
first Islamic bank in Malaysia to be incorporated namely; the Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad.150 However, in realising the need to further deepen and strengthen the 
“Islamic finance” market alongside its conventional counterpart, the Malaysian 
government has taken further measures. In 1984 another law was passed allowing 
Islamic-compliant insurance companies (z. e., takaful companies) to be established in 
Malaysia. Similarly, special guidelines and rules have been issued to govern the 
operations of an Islamic capital market and the issuance of bonds.
Ten years after the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Malaysia, the 
government introduced a scheme whereby existing conventional banks were allowed 
to offer Islamic-compliant products. The scheme was known as Skim Perbankan 
Tanpa Faedah (SPTF)151 or the Interest-Free Banking Scheme.152 Under this scheme, 
conventional banks were allowed to establish an Interest-free Banking Unit (IBU).153 
This scheme was further upgraded few years later. Conventional banks participating 
in the SPTF scheme were allowed to upgrade their IBUs into an Islamic Banking 
Division.154 Such divisions were allowed to offer all types of Islamic banking 
services.155 Also, a second Islamic bank has been established in Malaysia in 1999 
namely; the Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad.156
150 See generally http://www.bankislam.com.mv
151 Aishah Bidin, Islamic Banking in Malaysia: Reconciling Religious Law and the Common Law, 
1 (4) J. OF INT’L BANK. Reg. 75, at 76, (2000)
152 THANIET. AL, supra note 133, at 18.
153 Bidin, supra note 151, at 76.
'54Id.
m Id.
156 See generally http://www.muamalat.com.my
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In line with these developments; an Islamic inter-money market was introduced 
to facilitate the inter-bank trading in Islamic financial instruments.157 The 
government also allowed the issuance of non-interest bearing investment certificates 
to facilitate the operations of the Islamic banks that are unable to trade in Treasury 
Bills or other interest-based papers such as government bonds.158 These non-interest 
bearing interests are known as the Government Investment Certificates (GIC) which 
were introduced under a certain concept under Islamic law.159
Clearly, in the period between 1983 and 1999 Malaysia has been gradually 
introducing Islamic financial services to its market and in turn creating some form of 
dualism in its financial system (i.e., the existence of Islamic and conventional 
finance). To further build an efficient Islamic financial system along its conventional 
counterpart, Malaysia has established the National Shari’a Advisory Council for 
Islamic Banking and Takaful (NS AC) in May 1997. The main aim of the NS AC is to 
act as the sole authority body to advise the central bank of Malaysia, Islamic banks, 
conventional banks offering Islamic products and takaful companies on Islamic 
Shari ’a issues.160
However, in developing the "Islamic finance" component in Malaysia, the 
educational dimension has not been overlooked. Entities have been established to 
provide a platform of interaction and to develop awareness and research. To this 
effect, the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia161 162and the Islamic 
Banking and Finance Institute were established.
157 Thani ET. AL, supra note 13 3, at 19.
158 Bidin, supra note 151, at 76.
159 Thani ET. AL, supra note 13 3, at 19.
160 Country Finance: Malaysia, at 9 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2004).
161 See generally http://www.aibim.com.mv
162 See generally http://www.ibfim.com
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2 . 3 . 2  T h e  L e g a l  F r a m e w o r k  R e l a  t i n g  t o  ‘‘I s l a m i c  F i n a n c e  ”  i n  M a l a  y s i a  
The above discussion reveals that the Malaysian government is committed 
towards the recognition of “Islamic finance” alongside conventional finance. Various 
Islamic products and players have been introduced and encouraged to build this form 
of “dualism” in the financial system. The role of law in the implementation of this 
dual policy in Malaysia is not overlooked. For example, the Malaysian government 
has passed and reformed certain laws in order to introduce Islamic banking into its 
financial market and to facilitate its operations. As will be seen, the issue whether the 
mere enactment of such laws is sufficient is questionable.
The first law which was passed by the Malaysian government to incorporate 
“Islamic finance” within its financial system, is the Islamic Banking Act (IBA) 
which came into effect on 11 March 1983.163 The IBA is modelled on the 
conventional Malaysian Banking Act of 1973.164 However, adjustments are 
contained in the IBA to accommodate the nature of the Islamic banks’ operations.165 
The IBA defines the Islamic bank as a “company which carries on Islamic banking 
business and holds a valid license...”.166 *Islamic banking business is defined as 
“banking business which aims and operations do not involve any element which is
1 f\lnot approved by the Religion of Islam”.
In order for an Islamic bank to be licensed; the IBA requires that the Islamic bank 
should establish a Shari’a advisory body. Like conventional banks in Malaysia; 
the IBA brings the licensed Islamic banks under the supervision of the Bank Negara
163 ISLAMIC banking ACT (1983)[hereinafter IBA] available at http://www.bnm.gov.tny.
164 This Act has been repealed by the Banking and Financial Institution Act o f  1989.
165 Jane Connors, Towards a System o f Islamic Finance in Malaysia, in ISLAMIC Law and Finance, 
57, at 58 (C. Mallat ed., Graham & Trotman, 1988).
166 IBA, Part I, Section 2, supra note 1 6 3 . .
'61 Id.
m Id. Part II, Section 5(b) (provides that the applicant Islamic bank should provide for the 
establishment o f  a Shari’a Advisory Body in its articles o f association).
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Malaysia (i.e., the central bank). The IB A mainly deals with the licensing of Islamic 
banks,169 170financial requirements and duties of Islamic banks such as reserve funds, 
the percentage of liquid assets to be held by the Islamic bank and other requirements 
related to the auditing process. The IBA also deals with the ownership, control and 
management of Islamic banks, powers of supervision and control over Islamic 
banks172 *and other issues including penalties and actions against offences by bank
173directors and employees.
In 1989 the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA)174 was introduced to 
provide a comprehensive regulatory framework for the Malaysian banking and 
financial institutions. The BAFIA governs various conventional financial institutions 
but it does not affect Islamic banks which are governed by the IBA.175 Under the 
BAFIA, banking business is defined as “ (a) the business of (i) receiving deposits on 
current account, deposit account, savings account or other similar account, (ii) 
paying or collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers; and (iii) provision of 
finance...”.176 The BAFIA prevents conventional banks from engaging in wholesale 
or retail trade including import and export trade except in connection with the 
realisation of security.177 Such provision is not included in the IBA meaning that 
Islamic banks are allowed to engage in trade and commerce as long as it is 
compatible with Islamic Shari’a principles.178 This shows that the Malaysian
169 Id. Part II.
170Id. Partili.
171 Id. Part IV.
172 Id. Part VI.
''73 Id. Part VII.
174 Banking and Financial Institutions Act (1989) [hereinafter BAFIA] available at 
http://www.bnm.gov.mv.
175 THANI ET. AL, supra note 133, at 8.
176 BAFIA, supra note 174, Section 2.
177 Id. Section 32(1).
178 Thani ET. AL, supra note 133 at 81.
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legislator has taken into account the special operation nature of the Islamic banks 
which relies on profit sharing and trade.
The IBA along with the BAFIA serve to govern and supervise the Malaysian 
banking system both Islamic and conventional. However, the Malaysian government 
passed other necessary laws in order to deepen the dual nature of its financial system. 
One of these laws is the Government Investment Act (1982)179 which allowed the 
government to issue non-interest bearing investment certificates in order to make it 
possible for Islamic banks to meet its legal liquidity requirements. The issuance of 
the Government Investment Certificates is Islamic compliant.
The Malaysian support towards the creation of a legal framework for a dual 
financial system in not confined to the banking system. Further steps have been taken 
by the Malaysian government to develop its "Islamic finance" component. In 1993, 
the Malaysian government passed the Securities Commission Act (the “Securities 
Act”);180 which brought the securities industry under the main control of the 
Securities Commission (SC). The Securities Act applies to both Islamic as well as 
conventional securities. Under Section 32 of the Securities Act; any person who 
issues, offers for subscription or purchase, or makes an invitation to subscribe or 
purchase debentures181 or Islamic securities would require the approval of the SC.
The SC has released special guidelines for the issuing of Islamic securities. The 
Guidelines on the Offering of Islamic Securities182 define “Islamic securities” as
179 See generally http://www.bnm.gov.tnv.
180 Securities Commission Act (1993) available at http://www.sc.com.my
181 Item 1.05 (a) o f  the Guidelines on the Offering o f  Private Debt Securities (Revised Edition 26 July 
2004) states: “the term “debenture” has the meaning assigned to it under subsection 2(1) SCA and 
used synonymously with the term “private debt securities”. Subsection 2(1) o f the SCA describes 
“debenture” to include “ debenture stock, bonds, notes and any other evidence o f  indebtedness o f  a 
corporation for borrowed moneys, whether or not constituting a charge on the assets o f  the 
corporation...”.




“any securities issued pursuant to any Shari ’a principles and concepts approved by 
the Shari’a Advisory Council as set out in Appendix l ”.183 Appendix 1 of the 
Guidelines lists and defines the primary as well as other supplementary approved 
Shari 'a concepts and principles for structuring and trading of the Islamic 
securities.184 185 However, because Islamic securities are a developing area; the 
Guidelines have allowed for Islamic securities to be structured on the basis of 
Shari’a principles and concepts other than those listed in Appendix 1 of the 
Guidelines provided that such principles and concepts are approved by the Shari’a
I  O f '
Advisory Council.
The SC has also published guidelines for the offering of asset-backed securities. 
The Guidelines on Offering of Asset-Backed Securities (GOABS)186 apply to both 
Islamic as well as conventional issuing of securities. The issuance of asset-backed 
conventional or Islamic securities should meet the criteria of the GOABS as well as 
the Guidelines either on Private Debt Securities or Offering of Islamic Securities as 
the case may be.187 The GOABS defines “asset-backed securities” or ABS as 
“private debt securities or Islamic securities that are issued pursuant to a 
securitisation transaction...”.188 The GOABS also requires that the assets underlying 
the securitisation transaction should be acceptable in accordance with Shari 'a 
principles where the issue, offer or invitation of ABS is Islamic in nature.189
183 Id. Item 1.05(a).
184 Id. Appendix 1.
185 Id. Item 1.06.
186 The Guidelines on Offering of Asset-Baked Securities (Revised Edition 26 July 2004)
available at http://www.sc.com.my. .
187 Id. Item 2.01.
188 Id. Item 3.01.
189 Id. Item 4.02.
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In addition, the Malaysian government has also passed a law to govern Islamic 
insurance activities alongside conventional insurance. In 1984, the Takaful Act190 
was passed to provide for the licensing and regulation of takaful activities.191 The 
Takaful Act was modelled on the Malaysian conventional Insurance Act of 1983.192 
The Act defines takaful as “a scheme based on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual 
assistance which provides for mutual financial aid and assistance to the participants 
in case of need whereby the participants mutually agree to contribute for that 
purpose”.193 The Act further defines “takaful business” as that “business of takaful 
whose aims and operations do not involve any element which is not approved by the 
Shari’a”.194
The Act divides the takaful business into family solidarity business and general 
business.195 Family solidarity means “takaful for the benefit of the individual and his 
family”.196 Family solidarity is similar to life insurance in conventional schemes.197 *
However, the word takaful should not be used by any operator unless registered 
under the Takaful Act. An applicant may be refused to be registered to carry out 
takaful business if the business desired to be carried out involve any element which 
is not approved by the Shari’a.m  Also, the Articles of Association of the takaful 
operator should provide for the establishment of Shari ’a Advisory Council.200 The 
Act brings the takaful industry under the supervision and control of the central bank
190 TAKAFUL Act 1984 [hereinafter TA] available at http://www.bnm.gov.mv.
191 For further information on takaful, see Chapter One.
192 Connors, supra note 165, at 63. However, the Insurance Act o f  1983 was repealed by the Insurance













Thani ET. AL, supra note 133, at 63. 





of Malaysia.201 Both the Insurance Act of 1996 and the Takaful Act of 1984 govern 
both Islamic and conventional insurance activities.
The above laws have contributed in creating a form of “dualism” in the 
Malaysian regulatory framework. In doing so, the Malaysian government has taken 
into consideration all the components of the financial industry. It passed laws and 
guidelines in connection with the three main components of the financial system: the 
banks, the capital market and the insurance. However, other laws have been amended 
in order to accommodate the establishment of an Islamic financial system alongside 
its conventional counterpart. Thus, tax laws were amended to accommodate the 
nature of the Islamic banks transactions which might attract extra tax and put the 
conventional banks at a better competitive position in comparison with Islamic 
banks. The Stamp Act 1949, the Income Act 1967 and the Real Property Gains Tax 
Act 1976 were all amended to accommodate Islamic finance operations.202
2 . 3 . 3  F i n a l  O b s e r v a t i o n s
The discussion of the “Islamic finance” related laws that have been passed by the 
Malaysian government in order to facilitate the activities of “Islamic finance” 
alongside conventional finance reveals that Malaysia has already done considerable 
effort in developing its legal framework in order to facilitate the creation of a dual 
financial system. However, criticisms have been directed towards the sufficiency of 
such efforts. Supporters of an Islamic-based financial system argue that there is still a 
need for further reforms in order to accommodate “Islamic finance” in Malaysia 
more effectively.
201 Id. Section 54(1).
202 See generally THANIET. AL, supra note 133.
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The Malaysian “Islamic finance” related laws have been criticised as being 
insufficient or being a “piecemeal” legislation.203 Thus, despite these “Islamic 
finance” related laws; Islamic financial services are still functioning in the context of 
English common law principles as it is applicable in Malaysia.204 Also, “Islamic 
finance” related laws may still be interpreted in the light of the conventional financial 
legislations. Thus, consider the definition of the “Islamic banking business” 
mentioned above. The term is defined as that business which does not involve any 
operation not approved by Islam.205 206Bidin argues that such definition of Islamic 
baking business it is not sufficient in comparison with the definition of the 
conventional banking business defined in BAFIA. The definition of conventional 
banking business is more detailed, clear and it is based on common law principles.207 
Bidin argues that in the absence of a clear statutory definition of the Islamic banking 
business; the practice is to refer to the common law.208
Hence, Bidin argues that the IBA intends to define Islamic banking business in 
the light of the conventional banking business definition with the exception that the 
operations of Islamic banks should not involve any element not approved by 
Islam.209 Such result is not satisfactory however due to the different relationship 
created between the customers and the Islamic bank. In addition, the critics of the 
“Islamic finance” related laws seem to agree that these laws are supervisory and 
regulatory in nature. Thus, the laws do not describe in detail the Shari ’a compliant
203 Shanthy Rachagan, Islamic Banking in Malaysia, 20 (2) JIBLR 88, at 93, (2005).
204 THAN1ET. AL, supra note 13 3, at 91.
205 IBA , Section 2, supra note 163.
206 Bidin, supra note 151, at 80.
207 BAFIA, Section 2(1), supra note 174 (referring to the common law principles given by Justice 
Atkins in the case o f  Joachimson(A Firm) v. Swiss Bank (1921) 3 KB 110).




commercial transactions and do not offer any substantive law to govern Islamic 
financing transactions.210
Therefore, in case of a dispute arising from Islamic financing transactions; such 
dispute would be resolved from a conventional common law perspective especially 
that such dispute would be referred to the Malaysian civil courts and not to the 
Shari’a courts.211 In one of the cases brought before the Court of Appeal it was held, 
inter alia, that despite the fact that the facility is an Islamic banking facility; this does 
not mean that the law applicable is different from that applicable to conventional 
banking facility.212 213This is another example which shows that Islamic financing 
transactions are still functioning within common law based principles in Malaysia.
The critics argue that legal practitioners are facing challenges with the current 
status quo.2n In drafting Islamic financing transactions; legal practitioners will need 
to satisfy both Islamic law and other laws such as the Contract Act 1950 and Bills of 
Exchange Act 1949.214 *This result could be difficult to achieve because a contract 
could be valid under Islamic law but unenforceable from a common law perspective 
for want of consideration for instance. Hence, it is believed that there is still a need 
to strengthen the legal infrastructure in order to facilitate Islamic financing 
transactions. It is suggested that a special Islamic Shari ’a court should be established 
to hear Islamic finance related disputes. It is also suggested that there should be a
210 See Connors, supra note 165, at 65 & Bidin, supra note 151, at 157.
211 Thani et. AL, supra note 133, at 90.
212 See Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd v Emcee Corporation Sdn Bhd (2003) 1 CLJ 625. See 
also Nicholas Foster, Encounters between Legal Systems: Recent Cases Concerning Islamic 
Commercial Law in Secular Courts, 68 AMICUS CURIAE 2, (2006) (referring to the recent case o f  Affin 
Bank Berhad v. Sulkifli Abdullah (2006)).





comprehensive Islamic Commercial Code to support the existing Malaysian Islamic 
regulatory framework.216
However, the IIFISS are in the process of developing such laws.217 These laws 
might find inroads to the Malaysian legal system. The Malaysian government has 
achieved a lot in promoting and incorporating “Islamic finance”. It was the first 
Islamic country that attempted to develop “Islamic finance” alongside conventional 
finance in structured and regulated manners. While there could be certain 
“unfinished agendas”; the Malaysian example does serve a good model that Saudi 
Arabia could be inclined to follow during its proposed financial sector law reform.
2 .4  C o n c l u d in g  R e m a r k s
The Section reveals the tremendous development relating to the “Islamic 
finance” industry at the international, regional and national levels. As “Islamic 
finance” has become an important means of financing, there is an emerging trend 
towards standardising, regulating, institutionalising and strengthening the “Islamic 
finance” industry. It seems, however, that this trend has developed in a manner that 
does not completely clash with conventional finance. The current approach, 
therefore, is incorporating “Islamic finance” alongside conventional finance.
As explained earlier in this volume, Saudi Arabia itself is witnessing a high 
activity of “Islamic finance”. Saudi Arabia, however, has not followed this current 
approach. Therefore, the above-discussed “three-dimension” approach would serve 
as a good starting point to develop the “Islamic finance” component in Saudi Arabia. 
However, Saudi Arabia is a special case because it is the only country among all the
216 M a t  94.
217 See discussion o f the international dimension supra.
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above discussed Islamic countries that maintain Islamic Shari ’a as a paramount legal 
system of the country and not as a mere source of law.
While Saudi Arabia might have indicated impliedly its willingness to 
strengthen the “Islamic finance” component as explained in Chapter Two, there 
seems to be no current trend towards “Islamising” the whole financial sector. Even if 
the “Islamic finance” component is further developed alongside conventional 
finance, there will still be an interaction between the conventional finance 
component and Islamic Shari’a. To eliminate such interaction, Saudi Arabia may 
consider segregating its conventional finance component from the overall law of 
Islamic Shari ’a. The next Section aims to explain this “segregation” phenomenon in 
the light of the DIFC model and to put the last piece of the “puzzle” to have the full 
picture.
3 . F u r t h e r  L e g a l  E n h a n c e m e n t : T h e  “ S e g r e g a t i o n ” P h e n o m e n o n
There has always been an interaction between Islamic Shari’a and modem 
commercial and finance practices. The primary sources of the Islamic Shari’a have 
dealt with many issues in generic terms.218 This is the main reason for the 
development of the Islamic fiqh which provides, based on well founded Islamic 
principles, human interpretations for these generic terms. However, certain concepts 
such as riba and gharar have always been controversial. This, in turn has generated 
substantial “legal unrests” in respect to conventional finance transactions in the 
Islamic countries.
Hence, certain innovations have been created to circumvent, to the extent 
possible, these “legal unrests” and to ensure the Islamic compatibility of the
218 That is, the Quran and Sunna. See Chapter One.
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structure. For example, various types of arrangements have been used in the past to 
circumvent the prohibition of riba.219 In addition, in the era of globalisation and 
economic “dependence”, the interaction between Islamic Shah ’a and global 
economy is more than ever. Certain Islamic countries, therefore, have attempted to 
reconcile the demands of Islamic Shari ’a and modern economy requirements at the 
macro level.
Foster argues, for example, that the French distinction between civil and
commercial law has been adopted in the UAE to reconcile the demands of Islamic
Shari ’a and those of international business. He explains this situation as follows:
“This situation presents Middle Eastern legislators drafting commercial 
legislation with a difficult task, because some basic principles of the Shari ’a 
(such as the prohibition of riba and gharar) cannot, on anything but a very 
liberal, an minority, interpretation of the Shari 'a, be reconciled with many 
important international business practices (such as charging interest and 
speculation). However, there international practices are so important to the 
economy of the region that they can not be ignored. The French distinction 
between civil and commercial law has been adopted as a compromise 
solution in an attempt to reconcile the demands of the newly resurgent 
Shari’a and those of international business”.220 Foster continues:
“...the UAE, in common with nearly all other Arab jurisdictions, has 
adopted it ..., with the result that it is an essential part of the structure of 
commercial law in the UAE. The UAE Civil Code incorporates Shari’a 
ideas for non-business transactions between individuals in order to satisfy 
the need of a Shari’a element in the law; the Commercial Code incorporates 
international commercial practice for business transactions”.221
219 Nicholas Foster, Commercial Security Over Movables in the UAE: A Comparative Analysis in the 
Light of English Law, French Law and the Shari’a, 4 YEARBOOK ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN L. 3, at 
21 (1997-1998) (referring to various contractual/property indirect mechanisms, the co-called “hiyaF 
(i.e., stratagems) to avoid riba. These include double sale and sale with right o f  redemption).
220 Foster, supra note 219, at 6.
221 Id. at 7.
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Nevertheless, this approach of reconciliation has not eliminated completely the 
implications of the Islamic Shari’a. Thus, the UAE in establishing the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC), has followed completely a different approach 
as will be explained below. It is fair to say, however, that Foster has presented a 
correct example of how Islamic countries have been trying to reconcile Islamic 
Shari ’a and modem economy requirements. Even the Saudi existing de facto duality 
discussed throughout this volume can be seen as part of this process. Why Saudi 
Arabia would establish all these committees that the author has discussed in Chapter 
Two? The aim is to avoid referring cases to the Islamic Shari ’a courts that might 
apply conflicting rules with modem financial and commercial transactions.
It is against this background, that the author examines the recent establishment of 
the DIFC. The DIFC is a free zone that focuses on various areas of financial activity 
and it is located in the UAE.222 The DIFC is seen as a part of a larger vision to create 
an environment for progress and economic development in the UAE.223 Having been 
established as a free zone, the DIFC is based on the notion of segregating in whole 
the DIFC’s financial activities from the legal system of the UAE. It is believed that 
this “segregation” phenomenon would provide a further legal enhancement by 
providing a viable legal framework for the DIFC and at the same time eliminating 
entirely any conflict that might arise between the UAE and the DIFC laws. Here, the 
DIFC is another innovation relating to financial services in an Islamic country. 
Rather than going through the thorny route of “reconciliation” the UAE has preferred 
“segregation” this time.




The main reason behind such “segregation” is to ensure the efficiency and 
certainty of transacting financial transactions within the DFIC. Local and foreign 
investors would be confident that their investments are governed by a well-developed 
legal framework that can accommodate modem financial transactions. The 
“segregation” phenomenon is simply a legislative process whereby the UAE 
government has amended the constitution to allow for the establishment of the DIFC 
and introduced various laws that are essential for modem financial transactions. The 
DIFC’s “segregation” phenomenon provides a viable model that could serve the 
Saudi financial sector law reform process. This Section aims to provide an 
explanation of how the DIFC works and explains the functions of its main founding 
institutions.
3.1 T h e  D u b a i  In t e r n a t io n a l  F in a n c ia l  C e n t r e  (DIFC)
The first step in establishing the DIFC is the amendment made to the UAE’s 
Constitution.224 Article 121 of the UAE’s Constitution was amended to allow for the 
establishment of free zones including the DIFC.225 In addition, the UAE enacted the 
Financial Free Zone Law (FFZL) that allows for the establishment of the free zones 
in the UAE. The FFZL defines the Financial Free Zone as a “free zone that is 
established in any Emirate of the State, in which Financial Activities are carried
224 Michael Blair et. al., Legal Issues Arising in the New Dubai International Financial Centre, 20 
J.I.B.L.R 207, at 20, (2005).
225 Article 121, Constitutional Amendment No. 1 of 2003, 10 January 2004 available at 
http://www.difc.ae (“the Union shall have exclusive legislative jurisdiction in the following matter- 
...the order and the manner o f  establishing Financial Free Zones and the boundaries within which they 
are exempted from having to apply rules and regulations o f  the Union”).
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out”.226 Then, the Crown Prince of Dubai issued a Decree (the “Decree”) that 
provides for the establishment of the DIFC.227 28
Following the Decree, the Law of the Dubai International Financial Centre (the 
“DIFC Law”) was passed. The DIFC Law establishes a financial free zone area in 
the Emirate of Dubai.229 The DIFC is presided by a President who is appointed by a 
decree230 and it is supervised by a Board of Directors.231 The DIFC Law empowers 
the President with certain powers and duties that include, inter alia, approving the 
policies of the DIFC,232 submitting the proposed laws for the Ruler’s approval,233 
issuing the DIFC’s Regulations234 and creating any administrations or entities to 
achieve the objectives of the DIFC.235
In addition, the DIFC Law establishes within the DIFC the following bodies: 1) 
the Dubai International Financial Centre Authority (DIFCA); 2) the Dubai 
International Financial Centre Financial Services Authority (DFSA) and 3) the Dubai 
International Financial Centre Judicial Authority.236 The DIFCA is the legal 
representative of the DIFC and it can sue and be sued in this capacity.237 2389It is 
independent from any other DIFC’s bodies and it has its own budget. The 
DIFCA has various roles that include, inter alia, proposing to the President all the
226 Article 1, Federal Law  N o. (8) of 2004 Concerning Financial Free Zones, 14 March 2004 
available at http://www.difc.ae.
227 Federal Decree N o. (35) for the year 2004To Establish Financial Free Zone in Dubai, 27 
June 2004 available at http://www.difc.ae.
228 Dubai Law No. 9 of 2004 in Respect of the Dubai International Financial Centre, 14 
September 2004 available at http://www.difc.ae.
219 Id. art. 3(1).
230 Id. art. 3(2)
231 Id. art 6(1).
232 M  art.5(l)(a).
233 M  art.5(l)(c).
234 Id. art.5(l)(d).
235 Id. art.5(l)(g).
236 Id. art. 3(3). '
237 Id  art. 3(4).
238 Id. art. 6(2).
239 Id. art. 6(3).
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strategies and policies of the DIFC,240 reviewing and submitting to the President the 
DIFC’s proposed laws,241 reviewing and issuing any DIFC’s proposed regulations242 
and establishing representative office to promote the objectives of the DIFC.243
The DIFC A has an Executive which is supervised and managed by the Director 
General.244 The Director General, who is a de facto member of the DIFCA’s Board 
of Directors,245 is appointed to implement the various strategies and policies of the 
DIFC.246 In addition, the Advisory Board is established to assist the DIFCA in
achieving its objectives through providing advices to the DIFCA.247 Finally, the 
DIFCA has a Legislature that is responsible for drafting the DIFC’s laws and 
regulations.248 As will be seen, various laws are introduced to facilitate the activities
of the DIFC.
To enhance the confidence in the DIFC, the DIFC Law establishes a special and
separate regulator for the sole purpose of supervising the DIFC, namely; the 
DFSA.249 The DIFC Law grants the DSFA certain powers and functions that enable
it to achieve its main objective which is the regulation of the financial services and
other related activities in the DIFC. The powers of the DFSA include, inter alia,
proposing to the President of the DIFC laws related to the financial regulation,250 251




243 Id  art.6(4)(k).
244 Id. art.6(6).
245 Id.
246Id .art. 6(6)(a) - (k).
247 Id. art. 6(8).
248 Id. art. 6(7).
249 Id  art. 7(2).
250 Id. art 7(8) (a).
251 Id. art 7(8) (g).
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inside and outside Dubai for the purpose of achieving its objective252 and 
establishing ancillary bodies that are necessary for the discharging its functions.253
In addition, the DIFC Law establishes a special DIFC judicial system to ensure 
the enforcement of the DIFC law away from any other conflicting laws that might 
exist under Dubai’s law or the Federal law of the U.A.E. To this effect, the DIFC
Law establishes the DIFC Courts that should function in an independent manner in 
accordance with the DIFC Law and other laws under the DIFC.254 While the courts 
in Dubai have jurisdiction over any crimes that take place in the DIFC,255 the DIFC 
Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any disputes arising out of 
any transaction carried out in the DIFC.256 257In addition, the DIFC Courts have also the
*5 <7exclusive competence to interpret the DIFC laws.
The above bodies are established to govern the activities of the DIFC. However,
the entities that function within the DIFC can be divided into two main types, 
namely, the Licensed Centre Establishments and the Centre Establishments. The 
Licensed Centre Establishments are those entities that are licensed, registered or
otherwise authorised to carry on financial and banking business including other 
activities authorised by the law.258 This includes, inter alia, Islamic financings,259
insurance, re-insurance,260 the trading and advising on securities,261 pension funds,
investment funds, trust services262 and legal, auditing and accounting.263
252 Id. art 7(8) (i).
253 Id. art 7(8) 0).
254 Id. art 8(1).
255 Id. art 8(3).
256 Id. art 8(2)
257 Id. art 8(4).
258 i j  o
260 Id. art. 9(2).
261 Id. art. 9(3).
262 Id. art. 9(5).
263 Id. art. 9(8).
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The Centre Establishments include any entity or business duly established or 
carrying out an activity in the DIFC including any Licensed Centre Establishment.264 
The Centre Establishments should carry their activities in accordance with the DIFC 
laws. The Centre Establishments can be located outside the DIFC for a period not 
exceeding four years from the date of the DIFC establishment. Their activities, 
however, are still subject to the DIFC laws.265
In addition, to further enhance the role of the DIFC as an international financial 
centre, the DIFC Law imposes no tax on the DIFC’s bodies and the Centre 
Establishments or their employees. This extends to a period of 50 years since the 
establishment of the DIFC and it is renewable to a similar period upon the issuance 
of a resolution by the Ruler of Dubai. The DIFC Law offers further security to the 
DIFC through expressly providing that the DIFC’s bodies and the Centre 
Establishments are not subject to any nationalisation procedures or any restrictions in 
regard to personal ownership.268 Finally, the DIFC Law provides that any law that
' y s Q
contradicts its provision shall be repealed.
3.2 The Dubai International Financial Exchange
The Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX) is a recent international 
exchange located in the DIFC and was opened in September 2005.270 The DIFX, 
which is incorporated as a limited liability company,271 aims to provide a platform 
for access to regional and global capital. The DIFX’s products include equities, 
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Id. art. 14. 
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Id. art. 15. 
Id. art. 20.
270 See generally http://www.difx.ae/





the DIFX as part of the DIFC involved introducing various laws modelled on the 
laws and practices found in other leading financial centres such as London and New 
York.272 273
The DIFX maintains a regulatory environment of the highest international 
standards. Thus, two sets of rules serve as a regulatory framework over the listing 
and exchanges process. The DIFX Listing Rules regulate the process which 
companies must follow if their securities to be traded in the DIFX. In addition, the 
DIFX Business Rules274 were promulgated to regulate the behaviour of the members 
operating in the market and to regulate the obligations that members owe to their 
clients. The DIFX itself is regulated by the DFSA mentioned previously.
However, “Islamic finance” has not been overlooked by the founders of the 
DIFC as an emerging current trend in international finance arena. To this effect, the 
DIFX aims to list new and innovative Shari ’a-compliant Islamic instruments in 
collaboration with regional intermediaries.275 Also, the DIFX ambitiously aims to 
develop a secondary market for Islamic securities which has always been a challenge 
for the Islamic securities industry.276
3.3 T h e  R e g u l a t o r y  a n d  L e g a l  F r a m e w o r k s  in  t h e  DIFC
The establishment of the DIFC is based on the “segregation” phenomenon. 
Thus, the DIFC is a free zone which is completely segregated from the overall legal 
and supervisory systems of the UAE. However, this would have left the DIFC in
272 See Michael Blair & Jamie Orchard, Legal Issues Arising in the New Dubai International 
Financial Centre, 20 J.I.B.L.R 207, at 207, (2005).
273 The DIFX LISTING Rules, September (2005) available at http://www.dibc.ae/.
274 THE DIFX BUSINESS Rules, September (2005) available at http://www.dibc.ae/.
275 http://www.dibc.ae/listing/products/islamic_products.html.
276 See generally Fuad Al-Omar et. al., Challenges Facing Islamic Banking in the 21st Century, in 
Proceedings of the Second Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance (October 9-10, 
1998), 243 (Centre for Middle Eastern Studies-Harvard University, 1999). See also, Jassar Al Jassar, 
Islamic Finance: Success, Prospects, and Neglected Areas, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTH HARVARD 
University Forum on Islamic Finance (September 30 - October 1 2000), 173 (Centre for Middle 
Eastern Studies-Harvard University, 2002)
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legal and regulatory vacuums if no legal and regulatory alternatives have been 
introduced. To this effect, the establishment of the DIFC involved the enactment of 
laws and regulations at both levels, that is, laws forming a viable legal infrastructure 
combined with a “second level” of financial regulation and supervision. These laws 
and regulations constitute the legal framework of the DIFC.
To achieve this objective, the DIFC enacted several laws to facilitate transacting 
financial transactions. These include, inter alia, the following:277 the Limited 
Partnership Law,278 Companies Law,279 Personal Property Law,280 Employment 
Law,281 Law of Obligations,282 Implied Terms in Contract and Unfair Terms,283 Law 
of Damages and Remedies,284 Law of Security,285 Limited Liability Partnership 
Law,286 Contract Law,287 Insolvency Law,288 Arbitration Law,289 Trust law290 and 
Collective Investment Law.291 All these laws are separate from corresponding laws 
under the UAE law (if any) and can be enforced by the DIFC courts.
At the regulatory level, a robust regulatory system has been created to govern the 
DIFC activities. The DFSA, as mentioned earlier, is the sole regulator of the DIFC 
and overseas DIFC’s financial activities. Certain laws are administered by the DFSA 
which include:292 the Regulatory Law,293 Markets Law,294 Law Regulating Islamic
277 This list is not exhaustive: for full details and to download all these laws visit http://www.difc.ae 
unless indicated otherwise.
278 Limited Partnership Law, DIFC Law No. 4 of 2006.
279 Companies Law, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2006.
280 Personal Property Law, DIFC Law No. 9 of 2005.
281 Employment Law, DIFC Law No. 4 of 2005.
282 Law of Obligations, DIFC Law No. 5 of 2005.
283 The Implied Terms in Contracts and Unfair Terms Law, DIFC Law No. 6 of 2005.
284 Law of Damages and Remedies; DIFC Law No. 7 of 2005.
285 Law of Security, DIFC Law No. 8 of 2005.
286 Limited Liability Partnership Law, DIFC Law No. 5 of 2004.
287 Contract Law, DIFC Law No. 6 of 2004.
288 Insolvency Law, DIFC Law No. 7 of 2004.
289 Arbitration Law, DIFC Law No. 8 of 2004.
290 Trust law, DIFC No. 11 OF 2005 available at http://www.difccourts.ae
291 Collective Investment Law , DIFC N o. 1 of 2006 available at http://www.difccourts.ae
292 See generally http://www.dfsa.ae/.
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Financial Business,293 495 Data Protection Law,296 Trust Law,297 Collective Investment 
Law298 and Investment Trust Law 299 In addition, other Rules can be made under any 
law administered by the DFSA. These DFSA Rules are subsidiary legislations and 
contained in the DFSA Rulebook Modules.300
“Islamic finance” is again incorporated under the activities of the DIFC. Thus, 
conducting Islamic financial business is defined by the law as: “carrying on one or 
more Financial Services in accordance with Shari'a”.301 302In addition, any authorised 
firm which has been endorsed a license to conduct Islamic business is required to 
appoint a Shari ’a Supervisory Board. The above discussion reveals that there has 
been a whole importation of law models that facilitate financial activities and that are 
segregated from the UAE’s legal system.
3.4 Final Observations
The establishment of the DIFC as a free zone can be attributed to the fact that 
the UAE needs to create such a centre in a short period of time. Thus, undertaking 
financial and legal reforms for the whole legal system in the UAE could be a lengthy 
process. Alternatively, the UAE has chosen to start from scratch and to build a whole 
new system that accommodates the DIFC. The DIFC model has introduced a new 
phenomenon, namely; the “segregation” to the Islamic and other neighbouring G.C.C 
countries. The main idea behind such phenomenon is to build a robust rule-based
293 Regulatory Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2004.
294 Markets Law, DIFC Law No. 12 of 2004.
295 Law Regulating Islamic Financial Business, DIFC Law No. 13 of 2004 (as amended by DIFC 
Laws Amendment Law 2005, DIFC Law No.2 of 2005 on 19 April 2005)[hereinafter Law 
Regulating Islamic Finance] available at http://www.dfsa.ae/.
296 Data Protection Law, DIFC Law N o. 9 of 2004.
297 See supra note 290.
298 Collective Investment Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2006. See also Michael Blair et. al., A New 
Framework for Collective Investment Funds in the Middle East, 21 (8) J.I.B.L.R 440, (2006).
299 Investment Trust Law, DIFC Law No. 5 of 2006.
300 However, another sourcebook is published, namely; the DFSA Sourcebook Modules. This 
sourcebook contains matters which are not Rules, such as application forms and notices.
301 Law Regulating Islamic Finance, supra note 295, Section 10(1).
302 Id  Section 13(1).
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financial centre that attracts investments but at the same time eliminating any conflict 
with the national laws to the largest extent possible. In this case, eliminating the 
conflict has been achieved through the phenomenon of “segregation”. In fact, this 
would not only achieve elimination but complete protection.
4. Saudi Arabia: Further “Dualising” the F inancial Legal System
The previous discussion has presented the efforts that the IIFISS and other 
Islamic countries have been undertaking to address different issues related to the 
financial services including the development of the Islamic finance industry. It is the 
author’s belief that a combination of these efforts provide a good model for Saudi 
Arabia and can be considered in order to create the desired market-led, rule-based, 
“rule of law” oriented financial system. This “combination approach” attempts to 
modify the existing de facto duality discussed in Chapter Two to bring to existence a 
new modified duality. In doing so, the implications of the existing de facto duality are 
eliminated and hence financial transactions such as securitisations can be properly 
transacted in a rule-based and “rule o f law” oriented manners.
This “combination approach” is basically a combination of the “three- 
dimension” approach and the “segregation” phenomenon. The “three-dimension” 
approach aims to develop the “Islamic finance” component in Saudi Arabia in the 
light of the international, regional and national above-mentioned examples. The 
“segregation” phenomenon is simply a legislative interference to eliminate any 
conflict between modem finance and Islamic Shari 'a. This should particularly deal 
with the conventional finance component of the Saudi financial system. However, 
the effect of the “segregation” phenomenon can be further expanded to include 
segregating the “Islamic finance” component from the overall Saudi legal system for
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a particular period of time. This is to ensure that no conflict arises between the 
general interpretations of the Islamic Shari’a and “Islamic finance” related laws 
which are normally based on modem interpretations of the Islamic Shari ’a. Once the 
“Islamic finance” component establishes stronger roots and robust recognition within 
the Saudi financial system; then further amendments can be made.
The process of implementing the “combination approach” to create the new 
modified duality is simply a process of further “dualising” the Saudi financial legal 
system. This is because the Saudi “Islamic finance” component is being further 
developed to constitute a fully-fledged system to function alongside the conventional 
finance component. This conventional finance component is also detached from the 
paramount legal system of Islamic Shari ’a through implementing the “segregation” 
phenomenon. Having introduced the “combination approach” as a solution, the 
question is how this approach would solve the “legal unrests” generated by the 
existing de facto duality discussed in Chapter Two and its associated legal 
implications on financial transactions such as securitisations. In other words, how 
would this “combination approach” solve the Saudi dilemma at both the macro and 
micro levels.
4.1 Developing the “Islamic Finance” Component
Financial activities can not function in a legal or regulatory vacuum. This is 
also true in the case of “Islamic finance”. As discussed throughout this volume, 
“Islamic finance” exists in Saudi Arabia but it functions within no definitive 
regulatory or legal frameworks. In order to create the desired market-led, rule-based 
and “rule of law” oriented financial system; the “Islamic finance” component need to 
be further developed. This means that Saudi Arabia should consider amending the
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current financial-related laws or enact new laws that incorporate “Islamic finance” 
related rules. In either case, the first limb of the “combination approach” (i.e., the 
“three-dimension” approach) should be given serious consideration by Saudi Arabia.
In doing so, Saudi Arabia should examine three main regulatory laws that have 
been discussed in Chapter Two. These are: the Banking Control Law (BCL), the 
Capital Market Law (CML) and the Law on Supervision of Cooperative Insurance 
Companies (LSCIC). The BCL should clearly address “Islamic finance” and define 
its activities. The BCL should define “Islamic finance” related methods of financing, 
such as murabaha, istisna and ijara. It should also deal with the composition of the 
Islamic banks and provide the basis of the legal treatment for their activities. Here, 
examining the efforts that have been undertaken at the international, regional and 
national levels offer Saudi legislators good examples.
Similarly, the CML needs to address “Islamic finance” related activities. This 
means providing clear rules that regulate sukuk issuance and define the different 
types of sukuk. For example, the UAE has passed a Resolution to govern the issuance 
of Islamic bonds. Also, the LSCIC should be clear as to what is considered to be an 
Islamic compliant insurance. A broad reference to Islamic Shari'a is no longer 
acceptable in the light of the development of “Islamic finance” and its activities. 
Certain Islamic-compliant structures have developed in relation to insurance services 
which need to be defined and properly addressed. It should be remembered that it is 
all about a rule-based and a “rule o f law ” oriented market-led financial system. This 
means certainty and predictability.
Saudi Arabia is also advised to address “Islamic finance” substantive law and 
not only the supervisory laws. As mentioned earlier, the Ten-Year Master Plan have
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addressed this issue and IIFISS currently collating efforts and lobbying to convince 
Islamic countries’ governments of the importance of “Islamic finance” related laws 
and their implementation at the national level. It has been brought to the author’s 
attention that the IFSB has commissioned five international law firms to undertake 
surveys in relation “Islamic finance” related laws. These include: comparative study 
on insolvency laws in Islamic finance, comparative study on securities laws in 
Islamic finance, comparative study on trust laws in Islamic finance and a survey on 
Shari ’a Boards across jurisdictions.
It is understandable that these substantive laws are still emerging. However, 
certain structures are nearly standardised at least at the national level. Structures such 
as “sukuk al-ijara” and other retail banking structures such as Islamic mortgages 
have been transacted for a considerable period of time. Saudi Arabia, in consultation 
with the IIFISS, Member States of the G.C.C and other countries such as Malaysia 
can take the initiatives and attempt to legislate “Islamic finance” related laws that 
would facilitate Islamic finance transactions. In doing so, Saudi Arabia simply 
further develops its “Islamic finance” component. This means that “Islamic finance” 
transactions will function within clear legal and supervisory frameworks.
4.2 Implementing the “Segregation” Phenomenon
The Saudi financial system comprises two components. The first component is 
the conventional finance component. The interaction between this “conventional 
finance” component and the paramount legal system of Islamic Shari ’a is creating 
the existing de facto duality discussed in Chapter Two and which is also leading to 
the emerging second component, that is; the “Islamic finance” component. This 30




“Islamic finance” component lacks the legal and regulatory frameworks. The author 
suggested in the previous Section that such component should be further developed 
following a “three-dimension” approach.
However, developing the “Islamic finance” component will not entirely solve 
the “legal unrests” generated by the existing de facto duality that have resulted from 
the interaction between the conventional finance component and the paramount legal 
system of Islamic Shari’a. While the “Islamic finance” component offers a means of 
financing that to some extent could be a functional equivalent to that offered by the 
conventional finance component; the conventional finance component still exists in 
Saudi Arabia and the government has not shown any indications as to abolishing 
such a system. In fact, both the BCL and CML are mainly dealing with the 
conventional finance component.
Here, the “segregation” phenomenon that has been introduced in the DIFC 
could serve as a good example for the Saudi legislator. As already mentioned in 
Chapter Two, the author perceives the existing de facto duality as a form of 
“segregation”. Consider again the Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes and the Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes that have been 
discussed in Chapter Two. It is simply segregating the disputes that are related to the 
financial services from the Islamic Shari ’a courts. However, it is not similar to that 
“segregation” phenomenon that has been introduced in the DIFC model.
The DIFC has involved a whole importation of laws, regulations and entities. It 
is not necessary to use the same approach in the case of Saudi Arabia. However, the 
idea of “segregation” can be used in terms of substantive law and the Saudi judicial 
system. Thus, introducing laws that would facilitate the functions of the conventional
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finance component of the Saudi financial system. These laws are segregated from the 
paramount legal system of Islamic Shari ’a but do function alongside the “Islamic 
finance” component. To this effect, any ambiguities in relation to dispute settlements 
as explained in Chapter Two should be ratified. For example, any ambiguities in the 
establishing Resolutions of the Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, should be abolished.
The author acknowledges the difficulties that are associated with such 
approach. These difficulties are mainly political and the belief that such 
“segregation” might simply eliminate the role of the Islamic Shari ’a.304 However, 
Islamic Shari’a is playing a major role through the development of the “Islamic 
finance” component of the Saudi financial system. Investing in the development of 
the “Islamic finance” component might absorb the difficulties that might arise when 
implementing the “segregation” phenomenon to the conventional finance 
component.305 In addition, because the author perceived the exiting de facto duality 
as a form of segregation in Chapter Two, it is in the author’s opinion that there are no
304 The political difficulties mainly relate to the existing Saudi political composition and the influence 
o f the “ulama”. The term ulama is used to include all recognised religious scholars, the judges o f  the 
different ranks, religious lawyers and all other scholars engaged in the Saudi judicial system. Those 
ulama are represented by different institutions such as the Assembly o f  Senior Ulama, the Higher 
Council o f  Qadis (Judges), the Supervision o f Religious Affairs and the Committee for the 
Commendation o f Virtue and the Prevention o f Evil (sometimes referred to as the moral police). 
These institutions could have influence on the Saudi political decisions and in turn certain legal 
policies. Hence, there could be a tension between the Saudi government’s policy o f modernisation in 
certain aspects on the one hand and these religious institutions on the other. The Saudi government’s 
approach has always been to contain these institutions given the fact that the Saudi political and legal 
systems are based on Islamic principles. For a good discussion o f such tension and its implications on 
the Saudi legal system see Frank Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi 
Arabia, (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2000).
305 In addition, thinking positively, with the recent “Islamic finance” developments that are happening 
at the international level; Islamic countries could be linked with the international capital markets 
through “Islamic finance”. The London Stock Exchange is already witnessing sukuk listing. In other 
words “Islamic finance” is no longer a national or regional phenomenon. So, developing the “Islamic 
finance” component alongside the conventional finance component offers a strategy for Saudi Arabia 




obstacles to complete this “unfinished agenda” and to implement the “segregation” 
properly.
4.3 The “Combination Approach” and Financial Transactions
Having explained the author’s vision in relation to the Saudi financial sector 
law reform through the implementation of the “combination approach”; it is helpful 
to consider what this would mean to financial transactions such as securitisation and 
secured transactions that have been discussed in this volume.
4.3.1 S ecu ritisatio n s
The volume has addressed asset-backed securitisations as a case study to 
highlight to the reader the adverse implications of the existing de facto duality on 
financial transactions. It has also discussed “Islamic securitisations” as an emerging 
product in Saudi Arabia and which lacks a definitive legal framework. In proposing 
the “combination approach”, it is the author's belief that both conventional and 
Islamic securitisations could be transacted in line with the requirements of a market- 
based economy; that is, rule-based and “rule of law” oriented.
Thus, implementing the “segregation” phenomenon would mean that 
transacting conventional securitisation transactions are segregated from the overall 
legal system of Islamic Shari’a. Most importantly is the “sale of assets” in 
securitisation transactions and the risk that there is no definitive legal mechanism 
that effects the transfer of these assets as discussed in Chapter Three. “Segregation” 
would mean here passing a securitisation law that settles this issue and hence there is 
more certainty in this regards. The form of “segregation” that Saudi Arabia wishes to 
apply may vary depending on what Saudi Arabia aims to achieve. Since 
securitisation is not the only financial transaction that Saudi Arabia wishes to
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facilitate, implementing the “segregation” phenomenon could involve passing several 
laws to ensure that financial transactions within the conventional component are 
transacted effectively.
Turning to “Islamic securitisations”; here developing the Saudi “Islamic 
finance” component will contribute towards facilitating “Islamic securitisations” and 
the issuance of sukuk. The legal framework will be more certain and hence it will be 
easier to obtain legal opinions relating to the issuance of sukuk. Therefore, better 
rating and marketability could be achieved. Again, legislating any laws or regulations 
related to “Islamic securitisations” or any of the “sukuk structures” should be 
conducted in consultations with the G.C.C Member States and the efforts by the 
IIFISS.
4 .3 .2  Se c u r e d  Tra n sac tio n s
Addressing the laws related to secured transactions in Saudi Arabia is essential. 
The author explained various legal tensions that may arise as a result of the 
interaction between the conventional finance component and the Saudi secured 
transactions law. As discussed, these legal tensions can be divided into procedural 
and substantive. Also, it has been argued that the development of the "Islamic 
finance" component in Saudi Arabia is partly due to the difficulty in obtaining 
security collateral by conventional banks. The question is, however, what would the 
"combination approach" mean to the Saudi financial sector law reform as it relates to 
the area of secured transactions?
Firstly, the interaction between the conventional finance component and 
secured transactions can be eliminated through the implementation of the 
"segregation" phenomenon. Secured transactions laws can be further modified to
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accommodate conventional finance practices. Security interests under such laws can 
have a "special" enforcement mechanism that would allow for their enforcement 
effectively.
Secondly, the Saudi "Islamic finance" component should be further developed 
because "Islamic finance" has provided an alternative mechanism of financing to 
circumvent any "legal unrests" resulting from the interaction between the 
conventional finance component and the paramount legal system of Islamic Shari'a. 
Again, Saudi Arabia can be guided by the 'three-dimension' approach discussed 
earlier. In the area of collective security arrangements, Saudi Arabia may consider 
the possibility of introducing trust laws. Bahrain has already done it and the IFSB is 
currently studying the possibility of introducing the concept of trust in the Islamic 
countries.
5. Conclusion
This volume has established that Saudi Arabia aims to establish a market-led 
financial system. In the light of the discussions in Chapter One, such market-led 
financial system should be a rule-based and a “rule of law” oriented with acceptable 
levels of predictability and certainty. In addition, the discussions in Chapter Two 
reveal that there is an existing de facto duality that affects the qualities of these 
market economy requirements and has adverse implications on the Saudi legal 
system at the macro level. Also, in subsequent Chapters; the implications of this 
existing de facto duality have been examined at the micro level in respect to financial 
transactions such as securitisations and secured transactions. Furthermore, 
throughout the volume; the author highlighted that there is an emerging “Islamic 
finance” trend and an appetite towards “Islamic finance” products such as “Islamic
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securitisation”. This emerging “Islamic finance” component, however, lacks a 
definitive legal framework in Saudi Arabia unlike other Islamic countries.
Hence, the dilemma of the Saudi financial system has been identified as being 
the exiting de facto duality, that is; the interaction between the conventional finance 
component and the paramount legal system of Islamic Shari’a as well as the 
emerging of an “Islamic finance” component that lacks regulatory and legal 
frameworks. At this juncture, it is the author’s belief that further “dualising” the 
Saudi financial legal system would create a financial system that meets the 
requirements of a market-economy. This can be achieved through the 
implementation of the “combination approach” on which this Chapter has provided 
the “road map”. In sum, the development of the “Islamic finance” component in the 
light of the “three-dimension” approach. Simultaneously, segregating the 
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